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A b s t r a c t 
The s u b j e c t i s the formation of o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h p o l i c y on i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y between the e n t r y i n t o f o r c e of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s 
and Germany's entry i n t o the League of Nations, and defence p o l i c y i n 
r e l a t i o n to f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The problem of s e c u r i t y i n these y e a r s , f o r 
B r i t a i n , f a l l s i n t o t h r e e p a r t s : i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n the broadest 
sense; the s e c u r i t y of areas of the world of importance to B r i t a i n and the 
Empire; and the s e c u r i t y of B r i t a i n and the Empire i t s e l f . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n the broadest sense was l a r g e l y a matter of 
the development of the League of Nations, The a t t i t u d e of B r i t i s h Govern" 
ments t o the o b l i g a t i o n s of the Covenant and the r e j e c t i o n of the attempts 
of 1922=24 to gi v e them g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n , are shown to have been much 
i n f l u e n c e d by the a b s t e n t i o n of the United S t a t e s from membership of the 
League and by the p o s i t i o n of the Dominions,, I n terms of f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
the a r e a s of g r e a t e s t importance f o r r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y were western Europe 
and the F a r E a s t . The problem of western European s e c u r i t y i s t r a c e d 
from the u n s u c c e s s f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s of 1921-22 f o r an Anglo-French pact to 
the apparent s o l u t i o n a t Locarno; t h a t of the F a r E a s t from the e a r l y 
d i s c u s s i o n of the f u t u r e of the Anglo»Japanese a l l i a n c e through the 
Washington Conference to the problems of developing the Singapore base. 
Defence p o l i c y was, i t i s shown, more c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n 
the F a r E a s t than i n Europe, The s e c u r i t y of France and Belgium was 
g e n e r a l l y regarded as a B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t ; but danger was nowhere imminent 
and economy was a paramount c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The s o l u t i o n s sought were 
p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r than m i l i t a r y : no commitment was undertaken i n the F a r E a s t 
and when B r i t a i n f i n a l l y accepted one i n western Europe no p r o v i s i o n f o r 
i t s f u l f i l m e n t was c o n s i d e r e d . 
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Introduction 
On 17 A p r i l 1869 Gladstone, i n a l e t t e r to the Queen's 
private secretary, summarised what he believed to be his 
colleague Lord Clarendon's ideas on the pr i n c i p l e s of 
B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y ; 
"that England should keep entire i n her own hands 
the means of estimating her own obligations upon 
the various states of f a c t as they arise; that 
she should not foreclose and narrow her l i b e r t y of 
choice by declarations made to other Powers, i n 
t h e i r r e a l or supposed in t e r e s t s , of which they 
would claim to be at least j o i n t i n t e r p r e t e r s ; 
that i t i s dangerous—for her to assume an advanced 
and therefore an isolated p o s i t i o n i n regard to 
European controversies; th a t , come what may, i t i s 
better to promise too l i t t l e than too much; that 
she should not encourage the weak by giving expec-
tations of aid to r e s i s t the strong, but should 
rather seek to deter the strong by f i r m but moderate 
language from aggression on the weak; that she 
should seek to develop and mature the action of a 
common, or public, or European opinion as the best 
standing bulwark against wrong, but should beware 
of seeming to lay down the law of that opinion by 
her own authority, and thus running the r i s k of 
setting against her and against r i g h t and j u s t i c e , 
that general sentiment which ought to be, and 
generally would be arrayed i n t h e i r favour." 
1. J.M. Morley, L i f e of William Ewart Gladstone, London 
1903, Vol. I I , pp.31b-18. " — 
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I n a sentence, the purpose of t h i s work may be said 
to be an examination of the way i n which, h a l f a century 
l a t e r and i n very d i f f e r e n t circumstances, a series of 
B r i t i s h Governments of d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l complexions 
applied these same pr i n c i p l e s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s 
to examine B r i t i s h policy on the question of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
security and to consider B r i t i s h defence policy i n r e l a t i o n 
to foreign policy, between the entry i n t o force of the 
Treaty of Versailles and Germany's entry i n t o the League of 
Nations- The subject matter i s the decisions taken by 
successive Governments, the advice given to them by t h e i r 
o f f i c i a l advisers, and the considerations upon which the 
advice and the decisions were based. The formulation of 
o f f i c i a l policy i s a coherent subject which can reasonably 
be examined on i t s own. Parliamentary and public opinion -
or, to be more precise, what ministers and o f f i c i a l s thought 
public opinion was - were of course factors i n t h i s process 
and are treated as such. But no attempt has been made to 
evaluate public opinion separately; and u n o f f i c i a l policy 
and the influence of pressure groups has been largely 
excluded. 
The problem of security i n the years a f t e r the F i r s t 
World War, so f a r as Great B r i t a i n was concerned, can be 
divided i n t o three separate but overlapping parts: 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and security i n the broadest sense; the 
security of those areas of the world of greatest importance 
to B r i t a i n and the Empire and Commonwealth, and the 
security of the Empire i t s e l f . 
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Interna t i o n a l peace and security i n the "broadest sense 
were, during the 1920's, largely a matter of the development 
of the League of Nations. During the war the creation of a 
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l order and some organisation to secure 
peace had become to a greater or lesser extent one of the 
aims of many of the bel l i g e r e n t s , especially on the A l l i e d 
side. The Covenant of the League of Nations, drawn up at 
the Peace Conference, r e f l e c t e d mainly B r i t i s h and American 
conceptions of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s and functions of an 
organisation of t h i s kind. The elements of guarantee and 
c o n c i l i a t i o n , of coercion and t r i b u n a l of opinion, of 
oblig a t i o n and free decision, were d e l i c a t e l y and not 
altogether harmoniously balanced. The abstention of the 
United States from membership of the League greatly enhanced 
the i n s t i n c t i v e doubts of B r i t i s h Governments about the 
coercive and automatic obligations of the Covenant: t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e to the attempts of 1922-24 to give greater 
precision to these obligations i n connexion w i t h the pursuit 
of disarmament i s discussed i n Chapters 3 and 4. 
Throughout the period covered by t h i s study the two 
areas of the world the security of which most s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
involved Great B r i t a i n and the Dominions i n r e l a t i o n to 
other powers were Europe and the Far East. Once peace had 
been concluded with Turkey, the Middle East and India were 
pr i m a r i l y matters of imperial concern alone; but i n t e r n a l 
disorder or subversion from outside might (and i n subsequent 
years did) require the use of substantial B r i t i s h forces. 
Of the two the problem of European security was the more 
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immediate, the more in t r a c t a b l e and the closer at hand. 
I t was one aspect of, and at times seemed to be the key to 
the whole question of the economic as w e l l as the p o l i t i c a l 
recovery of Europe, and of B r i t a i n , from the war. As t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva 
Protocol shows, B r i t i s h Governments of the period s t i l l 
refused to undertake commitments f o r circumstances which 
could not be precisely foreseen: t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l 
reluctance to undertake continental commitments of any kind 
was s l i g h t l y weakened by the advent of a i r power, but only 
to the extent that the l i m i t was pushed eastwards from the 
Channel coast to the Rhine. The search f o r a solution i s 
discussed i n Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6. The t r e a t y 
concluded at Locarno was a p a r t i a l solution to one part of 
the problem of European security. The expectations founded 
upon t h i s settlement r e f l e c t a conviction that France held 
the key to European p a c i f i c a t i o n , and also perhaps a desire 
to make the greatest possible p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l out of the 
l i m i t e d extent to which B r i t a i n was prepared to undertake 
European obligations even i n her own i n t e r e s t s . 
The problem of the Far East, discussed i n Chapters 2 
and 7, also arose to a large extent from the war but i n a 
d i f f e r e n t way. Fundamentally i t was a matter of changes i n 
the r e l a t i v e strengths of the powers concerned w i t h the area. 
The problem was less immediate than that of Europe, less 
ponderable, rather a question of possible future d i f f i c u l t i e s 
than actual ones. I n 1920 and 1921 the issue was one of 
t r i a n g u l a r relations between B r i t a i n (with three of the 
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Dominions deeply concerned), the United States, and Japan. 
The Washington t r e a t i e s of 1921-22 secured a naval balance 
between the three which r e f l e c t e d the new s i t u a t i o n . The 
p o l i t i c a l undertakings too i n a sense re f l e c t e d e x i s t i n g 
relationships: they neither promised nor produced active 
co-operation^ between a l l or any of the signatories. 
The security of Great B r i t a i n , the Dominions, India, 
and the colonies was the object of defence policy, also 
discussed i n Chapters 2 and 7« A connexion can be shown 
between defence policy and foreign policy i n the Far East, 
but despite the magnitude of the security problem there, i n 
Europe hardly at a l l . The reasons f o r t h i s paradoxical 
difference appear to be several. I n the f i r s t place imperial 
defence was s t i l l conceived mainly i n naval terms; i t was 
on naval pol i c y that the e a r l i e s t postwar decisions were 
required; and the nature of these decisions c l e a r l y depended 
on re l a t i o n s w i t h the United States and Japan. Even a f t e r 
the naval balance had been struck the development of a base 
at Singapore, whether f o r the sake of imperial communications 
or to meet a remote threat, s t i l l involved r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
Japan. 
I n the second place, i n Europe, the protection of Great 
B r i t a i n i t s e l f against a i r attack began to be provided f o r 
i n t h i s period; but the peculiar circumstance that the 
greatest e x i s t i n g a i r force belonged to a recent and possible 
future a l l y robbed the preparations of urgency. However 
uneasy were r e l a t i o n s w i t h France between 1920 and 1924, and 
whatever the alarms created by the A i r Staff, war with France 
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was not seriously considered to be probable and was 
o f f i c i a l l y stated by Austen Chamberlain i n 1925 to be 
inconceivable. On the whole i n Europe, despite i t s troubled 
state, there was no threat to B r i t a i n , Germany having been 
defeated and, i t was held, e f f e c t i v e l y disarmed. However 
the doctrines of deterrence by bomber or of l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y 
had not yet taken root: i t was assumed that i n the case of 
a war i n Europe i n which B r i t a i n f e l t i t necessary to 
intervene, she would do so with m i l i t a r y as w e l l as wi t h 
naval and a i r forces. I t was also assumed that i n the case 
of a major war conscription and i n d u s t r i a l mobilisation 
would be required. Meanwhile i t was regarded as impossible 
to provide i n peacetime more than a token expeditionary 
force made up from that portion of the regular army which 
was not currently required f o r imperial duties. A fu r t h e r 
paradox of defence policy i s the f a c t that whereas 
immediately a f t e r the war informal contacts between the 
B r i t i s h and French General Staffs seem to have remained 
f a i r l y close, once B r i t a i n did undertake a European 
obli g a t i o n at Locarno the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of holding s t a f f 
t a l k s w i t h both France and Germany about the defence of 
each against the other meant that no plans were made f o r 
the implementation of the B r i t i s h guarantee. As the Chiefs 
of Staff pointed out i n 1930, B r i t a i n was i n a less 
favourable p o s i t i o n to f u l f i l the Locarno guarantees than 
she had been, without any w r i t t e n undertaking, to go to the 
(2) 
assistance of France i n 1914. v J The lack of a sense of 
2. C.O.S. Paper 247, CAB 53/21, c i t e d by Michael Howard, 
The Continental Commitment, London 19?^, p.l60, n.180. 
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urgency was most powerfully reinforced by f i n a n c i a l 
stringency. The net r e s u l t of a l l these considerations 
was th a t , as the Chiefs of Staffs stated i n the summer of 
1925 without drawing any comment from ministers: "The 
size of the forces of the Crown maintained by Great B r i t a i n 
i s governed by various considerations peculiar to each 
service, and i s not arrived at by any c a l c u l a t i o n of 
foreign policy, nor i s i t possible that they ever should be 
so calculated." w / 
I n some senses the p o s i t i o n of Great B r i t a i n i n the 
years immediately a f t e r the war was very strong. A l l her 
enemies had been defeated, and she had suffered l i t t l e 
material damage i n the process. But on the other hand the 
war had Imposed costs and" burdens which would weigh heavily 
f o r two generations or more; her trade had been disrupted 
and her f i n a n c i a l predominance l o s t ; economic reorganisation 
and social improvement were imperative. To outside eyes 
B r i t a i n might appear powerful, but successive postwar 
Governments were conscious rather of the severe l i m i t a t i o n s 
on her resources. The desire f o r European p a c i f i c a t i o n 
f i t t e d the temper of a public determined never to see 
another such war. I t also seemed essential to B r i t i s h 
recovery. 
The Dominions also, during t h i s period, acted as a 
brake upon Great B r i t a i n . Their p o s i t i o n of greater v i s i b l e 
independence was sealed by t h e i r separate membership of the 
League of Nations. Although the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l expression 
3. See p. St' 
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was not l a i d down u n t i l 1931, the implications of t h e i r 
independence were "being worked out i n practice throughout 
the 1920's. I n retrospect the idea, held mainly i n B r i t a i n , 
that i t might be possible to construct and conduct an 
"imperial" foreign po l i c y i n which the Dominions would have 
a voice and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , seems to have been u n r e a l i s t i c 
from the moment of i t s conception. I t was defeated 
successively by Canadian, South African and I r i s h insistence 
on independent decision and refusal of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; but 
since no one was yet prepared to face the consequences of 
complete separation the Dominions had something very near to 
a veto on B r i t i s h commitments: only i n western Europe did 
they acquiesce. A p r a c t i c a l sharing of the costs of 
imperial naval defence also proved impossible although 
Australia and New Zealand, aware unlike Canada of dependence 
on maritime communications, made some contribution. 
During t h i s period the Cabinet ress, as always, 
responsible f o r deciding B r i t i s h foreign and defence policy; 
and the advice and information upon which t h e i r decisions 
were based were provided by the Foreign Office and the 
Service departments, w i t h the Treasury looming i n the 
background. Within t h i s constant framework practice and 
actual authority varied from one Government to another. 
U n t i l the end of the Coalition Lloyd George took a more 
active part i n the formation and conduct of foreign policy 
than many other Prime Ministers; frequent i n t e r - A l l i e d 
conferences gave scope f o r his p a r t i c u l a r t a l e n t s , and his 
personal secretariat remained powerful. Curzon's lack of 
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authority during Lloyd George's premiership has often been 
described: a noteworthy feature of the Anglo-French 
negotiations discussed i n Chapter 1 i s the minor part played 
by Foreign Office advice. Circumstances were then against 
the taking of new i n i t i a t i v e s a f t e r Lloyd George8s f a l l 
even had Curzon wished f o r them. 
I n the f i r s t Labour Government MacDonald combined the 
o f f i c e s of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Before 
entering o f f i c e the Labour Party had had ideas of introducing 
new blood and tapping fresh sources of advice to counteract 
the influence of the permanent officials» But although 
there i s a d i f f e r e n t flavour about foreign policy i n 1924 
the o f f i c i a l s were i n practice neither cold-shouldered nor 
constantly overruled. With the retur n to power of the 
Conservatives at the end of 1924 the picture changed again 
to one that was to l a s t u n t i l 1929, w i t h Baldwin as a 
generally non-interventionist Prime Minister and Austen 
Chamberlain as a Foreign Secretary more powerful than Curzon 
but yet not always able to get his way i n the Cabinet. 
I n defence policy too the framework remained much the 
same throughout the period, w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l Services, 
under more or less f o r c e f u l p o l i t i c a l heads, contending more 
or less unsuccessfully f o r t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l needs. Proposals 
f o r the creation of a Ministry of Defence were defeated: 
the Committee of Imperial Defence remained the combined 
p o l i t i c a l and professional source of advice to the Cabinet. 
The only innovation was the formation of the Chiefs of Staff 
committee under the Committee of Imperial Defence, and they 
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were not as yet supported by j o i n t planning. Even i f such 
provision had been made, however, i t i s reasonable to assume 
that the decisions of the Cabinet, governed as they largely 
were by other considerations, would have been much the same. 
The Foreign Office conducted the day-to-day business 
of foreign a f f a i r s , even under Lloyd George's premiership. 
I t had grown during the war and retained some of i t s wartime 
r e c r u i t s ; i t s i n t e r n a l procedures were modified to deal w i t h 
the increased volume of work; and the Diplomatic Service was 
merged wi t h the Foreign Office s t a f f . Since reparations were 
dealt with by the Treasury an important area of postwar policy 
was almost wholly outside the Foreign Office's influence, 
and overseas trade matters were shared w i t h the Board of 
Trade. Reading the Foreign Office f i l e s , and comparing them 
wit h those of the German Foreign Ministry and an as yet 
l i m i t e d number of those of the French Ministry of Foreign 
A f f a i r s , one cannot but be struck by the generally high l e v e l 
of a b i l i t y and professional competence of the permanent 
o f f i c i a l s at home and abroad; the two ambassadorial 
exceptions - D'Abernon and Geddes - were both 
non-professionals. But during these years, unlike those 
immediately before the war, the senior o f f i c i a l s , even Crowe, 
did not exert great influence on the formation of policy. 
They were essentially executants; and even i f they had the 
i n c l i n a t i o n , they had l i t t l e l eisure to r e f l e c t or advise on 
the long-term implications of the problems w i t h which they had 
to deal piecemeal. Despite a l l the upheavals l e t loose by the 
war and the new uncertainty introduced by the existence of a 
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fundamentally a l i e n regime i n Russia, they s t i l l assumed 
that the state system would function i n a generally 
r a t i o n a l matter: adjustments through the League or by 
exercise of d i r e c t influence might be required, but i t was 
not an i n t e r n a t i o n a l anarchy. At the very worst they and 
t h e i r Service counterparts assumed, or were compelled to 
assume, that B r i t a i n would be given time, and the w i l l and 
means to use i t . 
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Chapter 1 
The Anglo-French Pact Proposals 1921-22 
The Background 
For the f i r s t two years a f t e r the entry i n t o force 
of the Treaty of Versailles on 10 January 1920 the most 
important question of security so f a r as B r i t i s h policy 
i n Europe was concerned, was whether to renew the guarantee 
to France, which had been offered i n A p r i l 1919 as part of 
the bargain over the peace terms regarding the l e f t bank 
of the Rhine and embodied i n the t r e a t y signed, with the 
peace t r e a t y and a p a r a l l e l Franco-American agreement, on 
28 June of that year. The question was closely bound 
up with the search f o r a solution to a l l the problems 
ari s i n g out of the war and the peace settlement, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y those concerning Germany but also those 
concerning eastern Europe and the Near East. The p o s i t i o n 
of Belgium was a subsidiary question closely connected 
with that of France. 
The terms of both the B r i t i s h and the American 
guarantee provided that neither should come i n t o force 
without the other. R a t i f i c a t i o n s of the Anglo-French 
treat y were exchanged i n November 1919» After the long 
i n t e r n a l struggle over reservations to the Covenant of the 
League of Nations the United States Senate rejected the 
1. B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers, hereafter c i t e d as 
B.F.S.P., Vol. CXII, pp.213-18. 
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Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s on 19 March 1920: the Franco-American 
agreement was never brought before the Senate. But so 
long as there seemed t o be a chance of a Democratic v i c t o r y 
i n the e l e c t i o n s of 1920, or a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the new 
United States a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , whatever i t s complexion, 
might reconsider the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , there was reason 
f o r the Government i n London t o do nothing more about the 
B r i t i s h t r e a t y w i t h France. 
Their r e l u c t a n c e , however, was more fundamental than 
merely a desire t o w a i t upon the United States. As Harold 
Nicholson pointed out i n h i s study of Curzon, two 
a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s were t h e o r e t i c a l l y open t o B r i t a i n a t 
the beginning of 1920. One would have been t o side w i t h 
Germany and work f o r the r e v i s i o n of the Treaty of 
V e r s a i l l e s ; the other would have been t o r e c o n s t i t u t e the 
wartime a l l i a n c e and co-operate w i t h France i n r e s o l v i n g 
the problems a r i s i n g from the peace settlements. E i t h e r 
p o l i c y would have been d i f f i c u l t . The f i r s t was probably 
impossible because i t would have represented much too 
r a p i d a break w i t h the recent past and B r i t i s h o p i n i o n was 
s.til.1 on the whole anti-German although no longer so r a b i d 
as i n 1918: the second would have been unpopular because 
there was a widespread d e s i r e t o draw a l i n e under the war 
and avoid f u r t h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The guarantee t r e a t y 
(3) 
had been accepted by Parliament w i t h l i t t l e debate, w / 
2. Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925, 
London 1934, pp.197-8. 
3. On 21 and 24 J u l y 1919: Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Commons, h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as H.C.Deb., 5 t h ser., Vol. 118, 
co l s . 1115-18; House of Lords, h e r e a f t e * ' c i t e d as H.L.Deb., 
5th ser., Vol.35, cols.1036-7. 
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amid general agreement t h a t i n case of need B r i t a i n would 
i n any case go t o the help of France; but a t the same 
time a n x i e t i e s were expressed l e s t B r i t a i n be drawn by i t 
i n t o more d i s t a n t involvements or be r e q u i r e d t o maintain 
s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y forces,. Moreover a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n 
of the a l l i a n c e seemed unnecessary; there was no prospect 
of e a r l y German revenge; B r i t a i n was secured by the 
disappearance of the German navy; French f e a r s seemed 
e i t h e r i r r a t i o n a l or at best remote, and f o r many who could 
appreciate them French p o l i c y seemed designed t o ensure 
t h e i r r e a l i s a t i o n . The B r i t i s h Government t h e r e f o r e 
pursued n e i t h e r p o l i c y . They assumed the continuance of 
the Entente and attempted on t h i s basis t o solve each 
problem piecemeal as i t arose; but a t the same time they 
attempted t o moderate, f o r the sake of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , 
the harshest e f f e c t s of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The 
r e s u l t i n g s t r a i n s on Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s were o f t e n 
severe, and each occasion made the conclusion of a pact 
more d i f f i c u l t . 
As f a r as the United States was concerned, the Foreign 
O f f i c e were more anxious about the Covenant than about the 
Franco-American agreement. On 19 November 1919 Viscount 
Grey, who had been sent on a s p e c i a l mission t o the United 
States rendered a b o r t i v e by President Wilson's i l l n e s s , 
expressed the view t h a t even i f the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s 
f a i l e d t o pass the Senate, r a t i f i c a t i o n of the 
Franco-American agreement i n some form was s t i l l most 
de s i r a b l e and i t s f a i l u r e a d i s a s t e r . Four days l a t e r Grey 
15 
r e p o r t e d general o p i n i o n i n Washington t h a t the agreement 
was dead, but he s t i l l hoped t h a t i f a compromise could 
be reached on the Treaty and the Covenant some form of 
agreement w i t h France might be p o s s i b l e . However i n reply-
t o h i s f i r s t suggestion the Foreign O f f i c e remarked t h a t 
although r a t i f i c a t i o n of the agreement was d e s i r a b l e i n 
the long run, temporary suspension might have advantages 
i f i t f o r c e d France i n t o a more moderate p o l i c y towards 
(4) 
Germany. v ' 
The suspension of the guarantee was f i r s t used t o 
suggest a more moderate French p o l i c y towards B r i t a i n . I n 
the middle o f December Clemenceau came t o London f o r an 
i n t e r - A l l i e d conference. A week e a r l i e r Lloyd George had 
t o l d the French M i n i s t e r of Reconstruction, Loucheur, t h a t 
since France could not count on support from the United 
States she must continue i n close r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n ; 
and t h e r e f o r e press attacks must cease and b i t t e r n e s s must 
not be allowed t o grow out of matters which were not of 
(5) 
v i t a l importance t o e i t h e r country. v ' On the eve.... of 
Clemenceau*s a r r i v a l a meeting of M i n i s t e r s disussed what 
should be s a i d t o him. Curzon and C h u r c h i l l agreed t h a t 
4. Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y 1919-1939» h e r e a f t e r 
c i t e d as D^ B. F. P., Ser. I , Vol. V, Nos.413, 253, 423. 
5. S.2, Public Record O f f i c e , London, CAB 23/35. Documents 
i n the Public Record O f f i c e are c i t e d by t h e i r 
i n d i v i d u a l number and by the class and volume number -
CAB, CO, DO, FO, f o r Cabinet O f f i c e , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , 
Dominions O f f i c e , and Foreign O f f i c e r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
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the guarantee was a very powerful weapon t o use w i t h 
(6) 
France, ^ ' I n a p r i v a t e conversation before the 
i n t e r - A l l i e d meetings Lloyd George warned Clemenceau t h a t 
there would be o p p o s i t i o n i n Parliament i f the Government 
proposed a guarantee w i t h o u t the United States, and 
impressed upon him t h a t everything depended on the 
atmosphere i n which the two Governments faced t h e i r 
(7) 
problems, v ' 
I t i s a matter f o r speculation whether keeping the 
guarantee i n reserve would have served t o improve 
Anglo-French understanding had the French e l e c t i o n s of 
November 1919 not given a l a r g e m a j o r i t y t o the Bloc 
National or had Clemenceau been elected President i n January 
--- 1920. I t seems u n l i k e l y . As i t was the French a t t i t u d e - " " 
s t i f f e n e d , and a l l mention of the guarantee seems t o have 
been dropped f o r over a year. I n August 1920 the B r i t i s h 
General S t a f f , who throughout the year were anxious about 
the prospects of a r i g h t - w i n g regime i n Germany and even 
more about the prospects of Bolshevism, and t h e r e f o r e 
advocated A l l i e d concessions t o maintain the parliamentary 
Government, suggested an a l l i a n c e w i t h France and Belgium 
i n order t h a t those c o u n t r i e s might f e e l s u f f i c i e n t l y 
6. S.4, l o c . c i t . 
7° S<>5j loo© ci"to 
17 
secure t o allow German recovery. v ' The suggestion was 
not discussed by the Cabinet. The question had i n e f f e c t 
been s e t t l e d already by t h e i r d e c i s i o n not t o send an 
o f f i c e r t o take p a r t i n Franco-Belgian s t a f f t a l k s . 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of j o i n t m i l i t a r y plans was f i r s t 
discussed between the French and Belgian Governments i n 
the summer of 1919, and the Belgians enquired whether the 
(q) 
B r i t i s h would take p a r t . w ' The matter hung f i r e , p a r t l y 
owing t o Franco-Belgian disagreement over Luxembourg and 
p a r t l y because disc u s s i o n i n Paris of the r e v i s i o n of the 
t r e a t i e s of 1839 r a i s e d the question of an i n t e r i m 
guarantee t o Belgium. Since some lawyers held t h a t the 
guarantee of 1839 remained i n f o r c e i f the new t r e a t y were 
not signed, and since they d i d not wish t o make B r i t a i n ~ 
appear the cause of breakdown, the Cabinet agreed on 
2 December 1919 t o give a guarantee f o r not more than f i v e 
years provided t h a t the Belgian Government would undertake 
t o maintain n e u t r a l i t y . (-^) 
8. CP. 1782, CAB 24/110. The term "Bolshevism" was 
f r e q u e n t l y used at t h i s time i n the sense of r a d i c a l 
s o c i a l upheaval r a t h e r than s p e c i f i c a l l y of a Russian 
connexion; but i n t h i s paper, w r i t t e n j u s t a f t e r the 
Spa conference had i n s i s t e d on the r e d u c t i o n of the 
German army t o the t r e a t y f i g u r e and w h i l e the Russians 
were advancing i n Poland, the General S t a f f envisaged 
an a l l i a n c e w i t h Russia, whether Bolshevik or n a t i o n a l i s t , 
as the only a l t e r n a t i v e f o r Germany t o continuance i n 
su b j e c t i o n t o the Entente. Such an a l l i a n c e would be 
disa s t r o u s f o r the West; the only way t o prevent i t 
was t o give Germany more hope; t o induce France and 
Belgium t o allow t h i s they should be o f f e r e d an a l l i a n c e . 
9- D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. V, Nos.108,211. 
10. CP. 117, CAB 24/^3; CP. 228, CAB 24/94; C 9 ( 1 9 ) , 
Appendix, CAB 23/18; C.12(19), Appendix IV, CAB 23/18; 
Conference of M i n i s t e r s , No.13, CAB 23/37; D.B.F.P., 
Ser. I , Vol. V, Nos.228, 246, 248, 249, 254, 259, 260, 
274, 281, 282, 308. 
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I t i s not a t a l l c l e a r what t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n meant, 
f o r as S i r Eyre Crowe (who was a t the time i n charge of the 
B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n i n P a r i s ) p o i n t e d out, Belgium, as a 
p a r t y t o the m i l i t a r y occupation of Germany, could not be 
completely n e u t r a l and i n any case the Belgian Government 
were determined t h a t t h e i r country should not r e t u r n t o a 
p o s i t i o n of " s e r v i t u d e " . Attempts t o f i n d a formula 
t h a t d i d not in c l u d e the word " n e u t r a l i t y " were, however, 
r e j e c t e d by the Foreign O f f i c e , and on 8 January 1920 the 
Belgian M i n i s t e r f o r Foreign A f f a i r s t o l d the B r i t i s h 
Ambassador i n Brussels t h a t h i s Government had decided t o 
f 12) 
abandon the request f o r an i n t e r i m guarantee. v ' Owing 
t o continued Belgian-Dutch disagreement over the 
n a v i g a t i o n of the Scheldt the r e v i s i o n a r y t r e a t y was not 
signed, and the question of the c o n t i n u i n g v a l i d i t y of the 
1839 guarantee seems t o have been q u i e t l y dropped. The 
subject of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y came up again, as w i l l be 
seen, i n January 1922; but on 12 A p r i l of t h a t year i t was 
stat e d i n the House of Commons t h a t the B r i t i s h , French and 
Belgian Governments were agreed t h a t the t r e a t y e s t a b l i s h i n g 
(13) 
the guarantee was not regarded as being s t i l l i n f o r c e . ^ ' 
Although an i n v i t a t i o n t o take p a r t was d e l i v e r e d by 
11. D.B.F.P.t Ser. I , Vol. V, Nos. 286, 302. 
12. Op. c i t . , Nos.287, 289, 312, 319, 323,^30, 331, 343. 
13. H.C. Deb., 5 t h ser., Vol. 153, c o l s . 32-3-
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the French Ambassador i n London on 2 February, the 
Franco-Belgian s t a f f t a l k s were s t i l l delayed. At 
the i n t e r - A l l i e d conference a t San Remo, on 20 A p r i l , 
Hymans asked Curzon f o r B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n but Curzon, 
annoyed by the Belgian a t t i t u d e over the recent French 
occupation of F r a n k f u r t and Darmstadt, r e p l i e d t h a t the 
moment was not opportune t o ask B r i t a i n t o enter i n t o new 
f 15) 
o b l i g a t i o n s towards an a l l y who had t r e a t e d her badly. v ' 
On 2 June, the French and Belgian Governments having 
reached agreement on the Luxembourg r a i l w a y s , the 
i n v i t a t i o n t o m i l i t a r y t a l k s was renewed by the Belgian 
Ambassador i n London. He said t h a t a t r e a t y of a l l i a n c e 
was not contemplated; the t a l k s were t o be about plans i n 
case of German aggression; and the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s 
would be t o l d of the r e s u l t s even i f they d i d not take 
p a r t . (1^) At Boulogne l a t e r i n the month Hymans asked 
Crowe t o impress on Curzon the importance of an 
Anglo-Belgian understanding. He expressly disclaimed any 
(17) 
i n t e n t i o n of asking f o r a B r i t i s h commitment. v y 
Although the correspondence was sent t o the Committee 
14. Curzon Papers, Kedleston, Box 22, Anglo-Belgian Pact; 
C.I.D. Paper 240-B, CAB 4/7; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. X I I , 
Nos. 6, 7, 9, 11; Documents diplomatiques beiges 
1920-1940. La P o l i t i q u e de se'curite' e x t g r i e u r e , h e r e a f t e r 
c i t e d as D.D.B., Vol. I , Brussels 1964, No.141. 
15. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. IX, No.4l6; D.D.B., Vol. I , 
Nos.113, 146. 
16. D.B.F.P., S e r . I , Vol. IX, No.501; D.D.B., Vol. I , 
Nos.153, 157, 158, 159. The D i r e c t o r of M i l i t a r y 
Operations i n the War O f f i c e was informed of the sense 
of the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n Paris i n June: General Maurice 
Weygand, Memoires, Vol. I I , P aris 1957, pp.75-6. 
17. D.B.F.P., Ser. I . Vol. X I I , No.23, D.D.B., Vol. I , 
No s . l b l , 163, 164, 165. 
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of I m p e r i a l Defence, who also received a paper from Austen 
Chamberlain advocating a t r e a t y undertaking t o Belgium, 
the Committee d i d not discuss the question. The War O f f i c e 
were i n favour of t a k i n g p a r t i n the s t a f f t a l k s ; but on 
30 June the Cabinet agreed t h a t they were not prepared t o 
contemplate a t r e a t y w i t h Belgium and t h a t m i l i t a r y t a l k s 
should not precede discussions between governmentsi they 
(18) 
had an unf o r t u n a t e way of becoming b i n d i n g . K 1 No 
formal r e p l y was sent t o the Belgian i n v i t a t i o n , but a t 
Spa i n J u l y Lloyd George t o l d the Belgian Prime M i n i s t e r 
( TO ) 
of the d e c i s i o n . K z " The Franco-Belgian s t a f f t a l k s then 
proceeded w i t h o u t B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n and an agreement 
was signed on 7 September. (^0) 
S h o r t l y before the i n t e r - A l l i e d conference i n London 
of Feb r u a r y - A p r i l 1921 Crowe, now the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State i n the Foreign O f f i c e , suggested 
t o Curzon t h a t he should ask the Cabinet t o consider a 
comprehensive p o l i c y of r e c o n s t i t u t i n g the Entente and 
g i v i n g France a guarantee. Crowe feared t h a t unless a 
general settlement t h a t would s a t i s f y French o p i n i o n were 
reached a t the conference, there was every prospect of a 
serious q u a r r e l . This could not be i n B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t , 
since she had f a i l e d t o gain or keep the good w i l l of any 
18. C.I.D. Papers 240-B, 244-B, 246-B, CAB 4/7; D.B.F.P., 
Ser. I , Vol. X I I , No.11, n.2; D.D.B., Vol. I , Nos. 164, 
165; Co38(20), CAB 23/21; Thomas Jones, W h i t e h a l l 
Diary, ed. K e i t h Middlemas, Vol. I , London 1968, 
pp.115-17. 
19. D.D.B., Vol. I , Nos. 169, 172, 173. 
20. Op. c i t . , No.175; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. X I I , No.38. 
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European power, r e l a t i o n s w i t h the United States were f a r 
from s a t i s f a c t o r y , and Russian h o s t i l i t y was a c t i v e i n the 
Near and Middle East* R e c o n s t i t u t i n g and i f p o s s i b l e 
strengthening the Entente would have a s t a b i l i s i n g e f f e c t 
i n Europe and would help towards a settlement i n the Near 
East .-
Since f e a r s o f German r e v i v a l l a y behind French 
p o l i c y on r e p a r a t i o n s and the disarmament o f Germany, 
Crowe suggested t h a t the key t o the s i t u a t i o n might l i e i n 
r e v i v i n g the guarantee o f 1919. He be l i e v e d t h a t an o f f e r 
of d e f i n i t e s e c u r i t y i n the same terms as the 1919 t r e a t y 
might w e l l make the French Government more c o n c i l a t o r y , 
both i n areas such as the Near East and i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e 
t o Germany. Crowe also thought t h a t many sections of 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n would support an understanding w i t h 
France - some as the f u l f i l m e n t of an o b l i g a t i o n 
acknowledged two years e a r l i e r , some f o r the prospect of 
a more reasonable r e p a r a t i o n p o l i c y , some f o r the prospect 
(21) 
of French concessions i n the Near East. v ' 
Much o f the work of the London conference was 
concerned w i t h the r e v i s i o n of the Treaty o f Sevres, upon 
which French p o l i c y was d i v e r g i n g from the B r i t i s h . , On 
Germany, Crowe appears t o have underestimated the urgent 
21. D.B.E..P., Ser. I , Vol. X V I I I , No.38. I n a Cabinet 
discussion of German disarmament on 30 December 1920 
C h u r c h i l l and Chamberlain advocated a defensive 
a l l i a n c e w i t h France and Belgium i n order t o induce 
France t o adopt a more reasonable a t t i t u d e towards 
Germany; C.80(20), CAB 23/23; Stephen R o s k i l l , 
Hankey, Man, of Secrets, Vol. I I , London 1972, 
pp.209-10. 
need f o r money f o r the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the devastated 
areas as a f a c t o r i n French r e p a r a t i o n p o l i c y , although 
he was r i g h t about the u n d e r l y i n g f e a r o f German r e v i v a l . 
I n eastern Europe France was about t o si g n an a l l i a n c e 
f 22) 
w i t h Poland, v ' which might lessen her anxiety f o r the 
B r i t i s h guarantee; but the f u t u r e of Upper S i l e s i a was 
t o be a cause of serious Anglo-French d i f f e r e n c e i n the 
summer of 1921. I n the Danubian area French p o l i c y a t 
t h i s time was s t i l l u n c e r t a i n , f a v o u r i n g a grouping based 
(23) 
on Hungary r a t h e r than the L i t t l e Entente. v ' I n 
general, French p o l i c y i n Europe a t the end of 1920 and 
the beginning of 1921 lacked d i r e c t i o n , and there might 
have been an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a new B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e . 
Curzon d i d not r a i s e the matter w i t h the Cabinet.' I t d i d 
come up t h e r e , however, once or twice i n the next three 
months, i n . connexion w i t h French p o l i c y towards Germany. 
On 21 May there was a general discussion of Anglo-French 
r e l a t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s were prepared t o consider a guarantee 
i f i t would b r i n g about a ste a d i e r French p o l i c y , but 
there was a good deal of doubt whether i t would do so, 
whether an o f f e r would be welcome i n France, or whether 
B r i t i s h and Dominion o p i n i o n would support one. I t was 
suggested i n s t e a d t h a t France should be made t o r e a l i s e 
22. B.F.SoP., Vol. CXVIII, pp.342-3:' a t e x t o f the 
attendant m i l i t a r y convention i s p r i n t e d i n P i o t r S. 
Wandycz, France and.her Eastern A l l i e s 1919-23, 
Minneapolis 1962, Appendix I I I . 
23. P i e r r e Renouvin, H i s t o i r e des r e l a t i o n s i n t e r n a t i o n a l e s 
Vol. V I I , Les Crises du XXe s i e c l e , Pt I , P aris 1957, 
pp.281-3. 
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t h a t an aggressive p o l i c y would lead t o the end of the-Entente. 
The Cabinet agreed t h a t the time was not r i p e f o r anything 
more than t e n t a t i v e soundings as t o the French Government's 
a t t i t u d e t o a mutual guarantee of assistance. 
The i n d i c a t i o n s at f i r s t appeared t o be t h a t the 
French Government would welcome an a l l i a n c e . Early i n June 
Barthou, a t t h a t time M i n i s t e r f o r War, t o l d the B r i t i s h 
Deputy High Commissioner i n the Rhineland t h a t an a l l i a n c e 
would give France the sense of s e c u r i t y which would enable 
(25) 
her to. r e t u r n t o normal. ' At the same time the press 
on both sides of the Channel took up discussion of an 
a l l i a n c e or a guarantee - the two were not c l e a r l y 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . Crowe commented t h a t he-believed" t h a t 
the French d i d want an a l l i a n c e but would not modify t h e i r 
a n t i - B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the r e s t of the worl d w i t h o u t 
(27) 
a d d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h concessions. v A f t e r a few days the 
French press was l e s s favourable, perhaps as a r e s u l t of a 
(28) 
h i n t from the Quai d'Orsay. ^ 
24. C.24(21); C.40(21), CAB 23/25. 
25. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XVI, No.634. 
26. The Times, 3 Jun. 1921; Le Temps,, 6 Jun. Lord Derby, 
from 1918 t o 1920 Ambassador I n P a r i s , was also 
u r g i n g Lloyd George t o take an i n i t i a t i v e s Lloyd 
George Papers, Beaverbrook L i b r a r y , F/14/5/27, 
F/13/2/31, F/14/5/29; Randolph S. C h u r c h i l l , Lord 
Derby, 'King of Lancashire', London 1959, pp.396-8. 
27. Minute, 14 Jun. 1921, W 6298/6298/17, F0 371/6995. 
28. Hardinge t o Curzon, 13 Jun. 1921, Curzon Papers, Box 
22, Hardinge l e t t e r s ; Comte de S a i n t - A u l a i r e , 
Confession d'un vieux diplomate, Paris 1953, PP»566-9. 
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The argument whether a guarantee or a l l i a n c e would 
make France more co-operative was repeated i n the I m p e r i a l 
Conference which opened on 20 June. The Dominion Prime 
M i n i s t e r s were d i v i d e d on l i n e s t h a t were t o remain the 
same throughout the p e r i o d covered by t h i s work: Smuts 
was anxious f o r B r i t a i n t o stand outside Europe as a 
mediator: Meighen of Canada was opposed t o a l l a l l i a n c e s ; 
Hughes of A u s t r a l i a and Massey of New Zealand were g e n e r a l l y 
i n favour of a guarantee. The B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s present 
were also d i v i d e d . Curzon thought t h a t a guarantee might 
make France more r a t h e r than l e s s i n t r a n s i g e n t , and was 
u n w i l l i n g t o r i s k a r e b u f f ; Lloyd George said t h a t i f a 
guarantee would help France t o s e t t l e down he would t h i n k 
i t wise t o give one, but he d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t i t would 
be welcomed now; C h u r c h i l l hoped t h a t something might be 
done i n a year or so, since i f B r i t a i n were able t o reduce 
French f e a r s she would be i n a p o s i t i o n t o moderate French 
p o l i c y and t o r e b u i l d r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany w i t h o u t 
(29) 
i n c u r r i n g French suspicions. v ' No d e c i s i o n was 
recorded, but i t appears t o have been t a c i t l y agreed t h a t 
i n s u i t a b l e circumstances B r i t a i n might renew the o f f e r of 
a guarantee t o France. 
29. E. 2nd, 4 t h , 6 t h , 18th meetings, CAB 32/2. 
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The Genesis of the Cannes Negotiations 
As recounted i n Chapter 2 the Washington Conference 
of November 1921 t o February 1922 both revealed once more 
the French anxiety about s e c u r i t y and exacerbated 
Anglo-French d i f f e r e n c e s . Before the conference met the 
Cabinet agreed t h a t i f the question of the guarantee t o 
France came up, the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n would be bound t o 
support American r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r 1919 agreement, 
which would b r i n g the B r i t i s h t r e a t y i n t o f o r c e . (30) 
i 
But although Briand i s said t o have hoped t o renew 
discussions on the guarantee, he was given no o p p o r t u n i t y 
(31) 
t o do so. K ' Instead the French d e l e g a t i o n found 
i t s e l f i s o l a t e d , and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Four-Power 
pact oh the P a c i f i c was minor c o n s o l a t i o n . Lloyd George* s 
contemptuous d i s m i s s a l of Briand 8s statements about 
German p o t e n t i a l h a r d l y augured w e l l f o r serious B r i t i s h 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a pact w i t h France. But a t l e a s t no 
one could now doubt t h a t s e c u r i t y was a most s e n s i t i v e 
p o i n t f o r France. Some s o r t of guarantee t h e r e f o r e came 
t o be regarded as necessary i f the French Government were 
to be induced t o co-operate i n the grand p l a n of economic 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and p a c i f i c a t i o n i n Europe which Lloyd 
George was developing at the end of 1921. At the same 
time the p o s i t i o n of Briand 1s m i n i s t r y was weakened, (as 
a r e s u l t both of the Washington Conference and of 
domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s . There was t h e r e f o r e more readiness 
30. C.83(21), CAB 23/27. 
31. Georges Suarez, Briand. Sa v i e , son oeuvre, Vol. V, 
Paris 1952, p.252. 
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on both sides t o t r y t o improve Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s 
than there had been f o r some months. 
When at the beginning of December Curzon suggested 
a new meeting of Foreign M i n i s t e r s i n Paris on the 
Turkish question, Briand r e p l i e d t h a t he would also be 
glad o f a more general conversation on questions a f f e c t i n g 
(32) 
B r i t a i n and France. v ' I t appears, however, t h a t the 
Comte de S t - A u l a i r e , the French Ambassador, was a c t i n g 
on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e i n proposing an a l l i a n c e t o 
Curzon. He had p r e v i o u s l y mentioned the subject t o Austen 
(33) 
Chamberlain, who warned him not t o ask too much. 
This warning the Ambassador can h a r d l y be said t o have 
heeded, f o r he t o l d Curzon t h a t France n e i t h e r wanted 
nor needed the 1919 guarantee: the a l l i a n c e - t h a t he 
proposed should cover eastern Europe as w e l l . 
Curzon asked whether he was speaking on i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
S t - A u l a i r e s a i d no, but he thought t h a t Briand would 
share h i s views. Curzon asked him t o f i n d out, and 
poi n t e d out t h a t whenever the idea of an a l l i a n c e had been 
32. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. X V I I , No.465; France, 
MinistSre jdes A f f a i r e s Etrange*res, Archives des 
A f f a i r e s Etrangeres, Europe 1918-29, Briand t o 
St - A u l a i r e , 4 Dec. 1921, Grande Bretagne, Vol.69 
(Documents i n the French archives are h e r e a f t e r 
i d e n t i f i e d as A.A.E., w i t h country and volume 
number); France, Documents r e l a t i f s aux n e g o t i a t i o n s 
concernant l e s g a r a n t i e s de s e c u r i t y contre urie 
agression de l'Allemagne, 10 .ianvier 1919-7 decembre 
1923, Paris 1924, h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as Documents" ' 
r e l a t i f s aux g a r a n t i e s , No.17; Suarez, Briand, Vol. V, 
p.365. 
33. A. Chamberlain t o Ida Chamberlain, 1 Jan. 1922, 
Chamberlain Papers, Birmingham U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , 
AC/5/1/222. 
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discussed i n speeches or i n the press the r e a c t i o n i n 
France had been u n e n t h u s i a s t i c . St - A u l a i r e r e p l i e d t h a t 
t h a t had been the guarantee: an a l l i a n c e would be 
d i f f e r e n t . Curzon then mentioned the d i f f i c u l t y w i t h 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n and the Dominions and asked whether the 
French would a t the same time favour c l e a r i n g up a l l the 
problems on which the two Governments disagreed. The 
Ambassador said t h a t he thought t h i s would be 
(34) 
indispensable. K ' 
At the same time Lloyd George i n v i t e d Loucheur t o 
England t o discuss r e p a r a t i o n s , and on 8 December at 
Chequers apparently expressed t o him a desire t o discuss 
w i t h Briand a l l the problems which f e l l outside the scope 
of "these p a r t i c u T a r t a l k s . The questioh^of r e p a r a t i o n s 
was reaching one of i t s c r i t i c a l stages, and the German 
Government were about t o ask f o r a moratorium. I t was 
hoped at t h i s p o i n t t h a t American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s would 
j o i n i n discussing outstanding economic problems, i n c l u d i n g 
war debts; and i n conversation w i t h Loucheur Lloyd George 
34. Desp. 3223 t o P a r i s , 5 Dec. 1921, ¥ 127l6/£7, FO 
37«/7000, p r i n t e d i n Cmd 2169 of 1924, Papers 
respecting N e ^ g t i a t i o n s f o r an Anglo-French Pact, 
No.32. Briand t o l d Lord Hardinge t h a t he had not 
authorised St-Aulaire's approach. S t - A u l a i r e d i d 
not r e p o r t h i s conversation w i t h Curzon u n t i l 14 
Dec. and was apparently annoyed when Hardinge took 
the matter up. He says i n h i s memoirs t h a t he 
continued t o advise h i s Government not t o take the 
i n i t i a t i v e : Paris t e l . 936, 7 Dec, ¥ 12728/12716/•>. 
FO 371/7000; memorandum by Co¥we, 30 Dec, ¥ 50/50/17, 
FO 371/8249; St- A u l a i r e t o Briand, 14 Dec, A.A.E., 
Grande Bretagne, Vol. 69; S t - A u l a i r e , Confession 
d*un vieux diplomate, pp. 584, 749. 
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showed some readiness t o accept the French proposal of 
A p r i l 1921, which he had p r e v i o u s l y r e j e c t e d , t o use 
the C Reparation bonds t o e x t i n g u i s h i n t e r - A l l i e d 
c a n c e l l a t i o n , since no B r i t i s h expert expected t h a t these 
bonds would ever be marketed. But u n o f f i c i a l e n q u i r i e s 
i n Washington showed t h a t the United States Government 
were not ready t o take p a r t i n any general discussions, 
and on 11 December they announced t h a t there was no 
i n t e n t i o n of c a n c e l l i n g A l l i e d debts. When on 16 
December the Cabinet discussed Briand*s forthcoming 
v i s i t the prospects f o r agreement on r e p a r a t i o n s were 
t h e r e f o r e poor. I t was s t i l l thought t h a t the French 
Government were opposed t o an a l l i a n c e . I t was rec~ognised 
t h a t Briand*s p o s i t i o n was weak, and t h a t h i s Government 
might f a l l i f he ret u r n e d from London empty-handed; but 
/ (31 i t was f e l t t h a t Poincare might be b e t t e r t o deal w i t h . v 
The gr e a t e r p a r t o f Briand's t a l k s i n London from 
35. Suarez, Briand, Vol. V, pp.346-7; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , 
Vol. XVI, No.752; Paris t e l . unnum., 6 Dec. 1921, 
FO 800/153; Louis Loucheur, Carnets secrets 
1908-1932, ed. Jacques de Launay, Brussels and Paris 
Washington by himself and Briand and Loucheur. 
C.93(21) < J CAB 23/27. Poincare had been advocating 
f o r some months, i n a r t i c l e s i n the Revue des deux 
mondes, a "general l i q u i d a t i o n " of a l l questions 
d i s t u r b i n g Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s ; see h i s H i s t o i r e 
p o l i t i q u e , Paris 1920-21, Vol. I I , pp.245-6; 
Vol. I l l , pp.142-4. 
debts. (35) This would have been tantamount t o 
pp.183, 185o 8: Jones. W h i t e h a l l Diar 
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19 t o 21 December was taken up w i t h r e p a r a t i o n s and w i t h 
Lloyd George's p l a n f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic 
conference and a consortium, i n c l u d i n g Germany, f o r the 
(37) 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Russia. v ' Neither Curzon nor any 
Foreign O f f i c e o f f i c i a l was present. On 20 or 21 December 
Briand c a l l e d on Curzon and spoke of the a l l i a n c e idea, 
although not going beyond St-Aulaire's o u t l i n e . ^ ' On 
21 December Briand spoke of the a l l i a n c e i n greater 
d e t a i l t o Lloyd George and Chamberlain, saying t h a t h i s 
idea was t h a t B r i t a i n and France should guarantee each 
other's i n t e r e s t s i n a l l p a r t s o f the w o r l d and act 
c l o s e l y together on a l l questions. 
Lloyd George said t h a t B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n would 
not be ready f o r anything so wide. I t would be p o s s i b l e 
t o give France a guarantee against d i r e c t German i n v a s i o n , 
37. This idea, which was c u r r e n t i n Germany a t the same 
time, was also being discussed w i t h Rathenau, the 
German M i n i s t e r o f Reconstruction, who p a i d two v i s i t s 
t o London, from 28 Nov. t o 10 Dec. and again about 
20 Dec. On the f i r s t v i s i t h i s main concern was the 
German f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , but he probably met Lloyd 
George p r i v a t e l y (Lloyd George Papers, F/53/3/12) and 
i t i s l i k e l y t h a t the o u t l i n e s of the consortium were 
discussed then ( c f . C.93(21), CAB 23/27) although i n 
h i s biography (Walther Rathenau, B e r l i n 1928, pp.308, 
311-12) Count Kessler suggested t h a t i t was on the 
second occasion t h a t the p l a n emerged f o r Russian 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , c a n c e l l a t i o n of European war debts, 
and a peace pact. On the second v i s i t Rathenau 
discussed, the Russian p r o j e c t w i t h the Chancellor o f 
the Exchequer^ ( S i r Robert Horne) and Loucheur: see 
D o B ^ F ^ , Ser. I , Vol. XV, Nos.108, 109. 
38. Curzon t o Hardinge, 24 Dec. 1921, Curzon Papers, Box 
65, L e t t e r s 1919-23. Curzon wrote t h a t Briand c a l l e d 
on Wednesday, which was 21 December, and opened the 
subject i n more d e t a i l t o Lloyd George next day: 
but the l a t t e r conversation was on 21 December (see 
below) and Briand said a t midday t h a t he had seen 
Curzon. I t t h e r e f o r e seems more probable t h a t he 
saw Curzon on 20 December. 
but the p u b l i c would not be prepared t o be i n v o l v e d i n 
p o s s i b l e q u a r r e l s on Germany's eastern f r o n t i e r , , Briand 
r e p l i e d t h a t he thought there was much t o be s a i d f o r a 
c o n s u l t a t i v e pact l i k e the Four-Power t r e a t y on the 
P a c i f i c o A European pact of t h i s k i n d might include 
three or f o u r c o u n t r i e s : others, i n c l u d i n g Germany, 
might j o i n l a t e r , but i t s nucleus should be a complete 
a l l i a n c e between France and B r i t a i n . Lloyd George 
repeated t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n was not ready f o r anything 
so l a r g e , but t h a t a simple guarantee could be given. 
He said t h a t he would consult h i s colleagues; Briand s a i d 
t h a t he would put h i s ideas on paper; and they agreed t o 
resume the discussions at the conference t o be h e l d a t 
("59) 
Cannes i n January. K ' 
When he got back t o Paris Briand repeated t o 
Hardinge much of what he had said, and added the f u r t h e r 
idea t h a t B r i t a i n and France should form the "secular 
arm" of the League of Nations, t o enforce i t s decisions 
and maintain peace i n Europe. Hardinge himself was 
s t r o n g l y opposed t o an a l l i a n c e which, he feared, would 
39. D.B.F.P,, Ser. I , Vol. XV, No.110. A meeting of 
M i n i s t e r s on the afternoon of 21 December had a 
short discussion of Briand's suggestion, of which 
no d e t a i l s were recorded: Co93(21), Appendix I I I , 
CAB 23/27. There does not seem t o have been any 
other Cabinet discussion before Lloyd George l e f t 
f o r Cannes. 
40. Hardinge t o Curzon, 26 Dec. 1921, Curzon Papers, 
Box 22, Hardinge l e t t e r s . 
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i n v o l v e B r i t a i n i n dangers greater than any t h a t i t might 
remove. He was t h e r e f o r e r e l i e v e d t o hear Lloyd George, 
on h i s was through Paris t o Cannes, t e l l Briand t h a t the 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c would not accept an a l l i a n c e since they 
d i d not l i k e b i n d i n g themselves t o f i g h t when they d i d 
not know what the casus f o e d e r i s would be. Lloyd George 
said t h a t he was, however, co n f i d e n t t h a t Parliament and 
the country would agree t o a guarantee. 
Curzon too advised against an a l l i a n c e , and even 
against a guarantee unaccompanied by a settlement of the 
main questions on which the two c o u n t r i e s were d i v i d e d and 
an attempt t o reach an understanding on f u t u r e p o l i c y . 
A memorandum which he sent out t o Lloyd George was p a r t l y 
based on a paper by Crowe. The l a t t e r , on the whole, 
favoured an a l l i a n c e confined t o the case of an 
unprovoked German a t t a c k on France but p r o v i d i n g also f o r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n i f the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of e i t h e r country 
were threatened from any quarter. Other c o u n t r i e s , 
i n c l u d i n g Germany, could be i n v i t e d t o adhere t o the 
l a t t e r agreement, which could f o l l o w the general l i n e s of 
the Covenant w i t h regard t o methods of d e a l i n g w i t h 
disputes l i k e l y t o lead t o war. Germany would also j o i n 
the League and undertake the general o b l i g a t i o n s of the 
Covenant. A l l t h i s would o f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l guarantees of 
peace. "The a l l i a n c e alone would keep any German 
aggressive designs on France i n check; any danger from 
41. Hardinge t o Curzon, 27 Dec. 1921, l o c . c i t . 
the Russian quar t e r , more p a r t i c u l a r l y Russian or 
Russo-German movements against Poland, would be, i f not 
a b s o l u t e l y prevented, a t l e a s t rendered i n f i n i t e l y l e s s 
probable, w i t h o u t a t the same time f i n d i n g England 
committed t o go t o war f o r Poland's sake i n circumstances 
when Poland h e r s e l f might be t o blame." The League 
machinery f o r d e a l i n g w i t h p o s s i b l e causes of disturbance 
would be strengthened. France would be able t o go some 
way i n disarming, and t o j o i n i n encouraging German 
economic r e v i v a l or at l e a s t t o cease her o p p o s i t i o n t o 
B r i t a i n doing so. Crowe concluded t h a t the objects which 
might be a t t a i n e d by Briand's proposal were important and 
d e s i r a b l e . I t should not be summarily r e j e c t e d ; r a t h e r 
Briand should be allowed t o develop i t and i f p o s s i b l e 
guided i n the d i r e c t i o n Crowe had o u t l i n e d . Curzon, 
although p r e f e r r i n g a guarantee t o an a l l i a n c e , also 
recommended an Anglo-French agreement t o consult i n case 
of a t h r e a t t o e i t h e r country's v i t a l i n t e r e s t s , an 
agreement t o which Germany and other c o u n t r i e s could be 
i n v i t e d t o adhere and which could be placed under the 
(42) 
auspices of the League of Nations. v 
42. Memorandum by Crowe, 26 Dec. 1921; memorandum by 
Curzon, 28 Dec, ¥ 13420, 13355/12716/17, F0 
371/7000; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XVI, No.768; 




Curzon t o l d Hardinge t h a t i f the Foreign O f f i c e 
advised i n favour of Briand's proposal he would go out 
t o Cannes t o discuss i t . He d i d go t o Cannes but 
took no p a r t i n the discussions on the proposed 
Anglo-French pact. At t h e i r f i r s t meeting, on 4 i * i January, 
each Prime M i n i s t e r began by r e s t a t i n g h i s e a r l i e r 
p o s i t i o n , Briand the idea of a grouping of a l l the 
s i g n a t o r i e s of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s round B r i t a i n 
and France, Lloyd George h i s r e f u s a l t o j o i n an a l l i a n c e 
i n v o l v i n g the s e c u r i t y of Poland and Chechoslovakia. 
Briand said t h a t he was not t h i n k i n g of m i l i t a r y 
o b l i g a t i o n s on t h e i r account but of an a l l i a n c e which 
might keep the peace by n o n - m i l i t a r y means, f o r example 
by conferences i n which B r i t a i n and France would act 
together. He admitted t h a t a B r i t i s h undertaking l i m i t e d 
t o the p r o t e c t i o n of France might p o s s i b l y serve the same 
purpose. Lloyd George said t h a t he thought the 
e s s e n t i a l t h i n g f o r France was a guarantee against German 
in v a s i o n : on t h i s a s t a b l e peace i n Europe might be 
b u i l t . Briand asked what c o n d i t i o n s were proposed, and 
Lloyd George r e p l i e d t h a t c e r t a i n questions must be 
cleared up, l i k e Turkey and Tangier; he mentioned the 
B r i t i s h a n x i e t y about the French submarine programme as 
a warning, not as a c o n d i t i o n : and he stressed the need 
43. Curzon t o Hardinge, 24 Dec. 1921, Curzon Papers, 
Box 65, L e t t e r s 1919-23. 
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f o r j o i n t a c t i o n i n the f i n a n c i a l and economic 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Europe. He hoped t h a t Briand would 
agree t o a l l the cou n t r i e s of Europe being i n v i t e d t o 
( 4 4 ) 
the economic conference. v ' 
A f t e r t h i s conversation Lloyd George sent Briand a 
(45 ) 
memorandum of h i s views. He described a close 
understanding between B r i t a i n and France as indispensable 
t o European w e l f a r e and world peace. The problems f a c i n g 
the Cannes conference must be met as a whole, and the 
French an x i e t y about r e p a r a t i o n s and s e c u r i t y , the 
B r i t i s h a n x i e t y about unemployment and European economic 
recovery, should be d e a l t w i t h together. With regard t o 
re p a r a t i o n s , B r i t a i n would have been ready, i n c o n s u l t a t i o n 
w i t h the United States, t o cancel the war debts-owed t o 
her and t o give up almost a l l her share of German 
re p a r a t i o n s . But since c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Americans 
had proved impossible she was ready t o recommend the 
4 4 . I.CP. 220A, CAB 2 9 / 9 4 . The p o i n t about Tangier 
was t h a t the Foreign O f f i c e wanted the French t o put 
i n t o e f f e c t an undertaking, given before the war, t o 
place i t under i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . The mention of 
Czechoslovakia i s r a t h e r s u r p r i s i n g : France d i d not 
have a t r e a t y w i t h t h a t country u n t i l 1924 . 
4 4 . There were f o u r successive versions of t h i s memorandum, 
A.J. 311 ( 4 Jan.), A.J. 321 (8 Jan.), A.J. 323 
(9 Jan.), and A.J. 332 (probably 12 Jan. but p r i n t e d 
i n Cmd 2169 of 1924 w i t h the date 4 Jan.), CAB 2 9 / 3 5 . 
Many of the d i f f e r e n c e s between the versions are 
matters of wording, l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the f a c t 
t h a t the t h i r d and f o u r t h were w r i t t e n w i t h a view 
t o p u b l i c a t i o n . The major d i f f e r e n c e s of substance 
are described 
arrangement r e c e n t l y reached i n Londin, K ' which 
represented a considerable s a c r i f i c e but which she thought 
would meet French needs u n t i l a wider f i n a n c i a l settlement 
could be reached. With regard t o s e c u r i t y , B r i t a i n was 
prepared t o give France a "guarantee t h a t i n the event of 
unprovoked German aggression the B r i t i s h Empire w i l l put 
i t s f orces at her side." Such a guarantee would both 
safeguard France i n the event o f German at t a c k and make 
i t u n l i k e l y . The undertaking could be given i n the form 
of an a l l i a n c e , but t h i s would be against B r i t i s h 
t r a d i t i o n and would not be g e n e r a l l y supported. The 
B r i t i s h people "would not w i l l i n g l y be committed t o 
m i l i t a r y l i a b i l i t i e s f o r breaches o f the peace i n Eastern 
Europe, -and- they would not-under take r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f -
any k i n d f o r the defence of c o u n t r i e s i n Eastern and 
Central Europe, i n which t h e i r i n t e r e s t i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
small." The a l t e r n a t i v e was a " d e f i n i t e guarantee" t h a t 
the B r i t i s h Empire would stand by France " i n the event of 
unprovoked aggression by Germany," and i t was probable 
t h a t the Dominions would j o i n i n g i v i n g i t . This would 
have f a r greater weight than an a l l i a n c e and was the 
a l t e r n a t i v e which the B r i t i s h Government were ready t o 
propose. 
The t r e a t y must, however, be accompanied by a 
complete understanding between the two co u n t r i e s and t o 
t h i s end f o u r problems must be cleared out of the way. 
46. See D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XV, No.111. 
The questions of Turkey and Tangier must be s e t t l e d , 
France must co-operate i n the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Europe 
and must agree t o the summoning of an economic conference 
a t which a l l the c o u n t r i e s of Europe would be represented, 
i n c l u d i n g Russia. The c o n d i t i o n s and assurances necessary 
f o r t r a d i n g w i t h Russia were set out. Submarines were 
mentioned, not as a c o n d i t i o n but w i t h a warning t h a t i f 
the French programme were c a r r i e d out B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n would i n s i s t on a programme of anti-submarine 
c r a f t , and the r e s u l t i n g competitive b u i l d i n g would 
"react very s e r i o u s l y on B r i t i s h sentiment towards 
France." 
On 5 January Briand asked Lloyd George t o e l u c i d a t e 
c e r t a i n " points" of the ~memorandumy~notably~Turkey"and~ " ~ 
Tangier. Lloyd George said t h a t these should be taken up 
w i t h Curzon, and asked what Briand thought about the 
guarantee. Briand, who had already suggested t h a t the 
c o n d i t i o n s which Russia was t o be asked t o accept should 
include an undertaking not t o a t t a c k her neighbours, sai d 
t h a t t h i s undertaking and one by Germany might be 
included i n a general European understanding based upon 
47. A.J. 311, CAB 29/35. The B r i t i s h Government had 
signed a trade agreement w i t h Soviet Russia i n March 
1921: see D.BoF.P.. Ser. I , Vol. X I I , Che V; M.V. 
Glenny, "The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, March 
1921," i n Journal of Contemporary H i s t o r y , V ( l 9 7 0 ) , 
No.2, pp.63-82. Lloyd George's hope now was f o r a 
general r e g u l a r i s a t i o n of t r a d e r e l a t i o n s , l e a d i n g 
t o r e c o g n i t i o n . 
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the Anglo-French entente. I t would e n t a i l no m i l i t a r y 
o b l i g a t i o n s but would give s u f f i c i e n t guarantee of 
peace f o r several years t o allow France t o reduce her 
m i l i t a r y expenditure. Lloyd George asked how the 
non-aggression undertaking would d i f f e r from the Covenant 
of the League of Nations: as soon as Germany and Russia 
j o i n e d the League they would be ifound t o respect the 
f r o n t i e r s l a i d down i n the peace t r e a t i e s . Briand said 
t h a t he thought the Covenant was not s u f f i c i e n t l y b i n d i n g 
i n form. Lloyd George then suggested t h a t armaments might 
be put on the agenda of the economic conference. Briand 
demurred, although he said t h a t French o p i n i o n was very 
much i n favour o f reducing expenditure. He undertook t o 
l e t Lloyd George have h i s views oh the Anglo-French 
understanding i n w r i t i n g . 
The next two days were taken up w i t h the Supreme 
Council meeting and discussion of the economic conference, 
r e p a r a t i o n s , and c o n d i t i o n s f o r the resumption of trade 
w i t h Russia. The French views on an understanding 
w i t h B r i t a i n were communicated t o Lloyd George on 8 
January. The main p o i n t s of the memorandum were, f i r s t , 
t h a t the agreement must express the w i l l of the two 
48. I.CP. 220D, CAB 29/94; Suarez, Briand, Vol. V, pp.359-61 „ 
49. For the l a t t e r see Cmd 1621 of 1922, Resolutions 
adopted by the Supreme Council a t Cannes, January 1922, 
as the Basis of the Genoa Conference. The r e s o l u t i o n 
s t a t e d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t a l l c o u n t r i e s should j o i n i n 
an undertaking not t o a t t a c k t h e i r neighbours. 
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c o u n t r i e s t o act together f o r the maintenance of peace. 
A u n i l a t e r a l B r i t i s h guarantee of France would not be 
enough t o deter Germany from t r y i n g t o provoke Anglo-French 
disagreement; moreover B r i t a i n was no longer immune from 
a t t a c k . The guarantee must t h e r e f o r e be r e c i p r o c a l . 
Secondly, v i o l a t i o n o f A r t i c l e s 42-44 of the Treaty of 
V e r s a i l l e s regarding the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the 
Rhineland should be regarded as an a t t a c k on France no 
l e s s than an a t t a c k on her own t e r r i t o r y ; B r i t a i n should 
also undertake t o regard any v i o l a t i o n of the m i l i t a r y , 
naval, or a i r clauses of the Treaty as a ground f o r 
concerted a c t i o n by the two c o u n t r i e s . I n order t o give 
f u l l e f f e c t t o these p r o v i s i o n s the two Governments 
should undertalce" t o "regulate" the "strength ~of t h e i r "armed — 
fo r c e s by agreement. T h i r d l y , the two Governments should 
agree t o act together on any question of a k i n d l i k e l y 
t o endanger the general peace. While the B r i t i s h 
r e l u ctance t o assume m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n s i n respect of 
c o u n t r i e s i n which B r i t a i n was not d i r e c t l y i n t e r e s t e d 
was recognised, i t was p o i n t e d out t h a t B r i t a i n had 
acknowledged the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a new element i n the 
arrangements f o r m a i n t a i n i n g peace. This could grow out 
of the Cannes r e s o l u t i o n , on the l i n e s of the P a c i f i c 
settlement reached a t Washington, and be based on a close 
union of France and B r i t a i n . (^0) 
50. A.J. 318, CAB 29/35; Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.35; A.A.E., 
Grande Bretagne, Vol. 69; Documents r e l a t i f s aux 
g a r a n t i e s , No.21; Suarez, Briand, Vol. V, pp.373-6. 
39 
The same evening, a f t e r the famous game of g o l f , 
Lloyd George and Briand had a f u r t h e r conversation., 
Lloyd George suggested t h a t the French memorandum tended 
towards a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e which he could not recommend 
t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n . B r i t a i n was q u i t e ready t o do again 
what she had done i n 1914, and he was ready t o sign a 
d e c l a r a t i o n t o t h a t e f f e c t t here a t Cannes; but he would 
not go any f u r t h e r . He would give Briand a d r a f t . 
Briand r e p l i e d t h a t h i s proposal was f o r a p u r e l y 
defensive a l l i a n c e , l i m i t e d t o the case of a t t a c k by 
Germany. Lloyd George went on t o repeat t h a t B r i t a i n 
would not guarantee the general peace of Europe since t o 
do so might i n v o l v e her i n e n t e r p r i s e s which p u b l i c 
opin i o n would not contemplate. Briand r e p l i e d t h a t h i s 
general understanding would not e n t a i l any m i l i t a r y 
o b l i g a t i o n s : he thought t h a t the Cannes r e s o l u t i o n 
might be expanded on the l i n e s of the P a c i f i c pact i n t o 
a general undertaking by the nations t o r e f r a i n from 
aggression. Lloyd George said t h a t B r i t a i n intended t o 
work f o r such an undertaking, but i t must include a l l 
the c o u n t r i e s which were capable of d i s t u r b i n g the peace, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the dangerous ones l i k e Russiarf, Germany, 
Poland, and Hungary. Briand agreed. He said t h a t he 
wanted i n the f i r s t place an "entente entre deux", and 
f o l l o w i n g on t h a t an "accord generale". I n t h i s way, 
he thought, they might b u i l d up a powerful system t o 
stop war. They wanted something more p r a c t i c a l than the 
League. Lloyd George said t h a t i t would a t any r a t e be 
a powerful system t o reduce armaments and the f i n a n c i a l 
burden which they represented. 
The second v e r s i o n of the B r i t i s h memorandum was 
also dated 8 January, but there i s nothing t o show 
whether i t was ever communicated t o the French. The main 
p o i n t s of d i f f e r e n c e between i t and the f i r s t v e r s i o n 
were: (a) the f o r e c a s t of Dominion p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a 
guarantee t o France was a l t e r e d t o a f o r e c a s t t h a t 
Dominion o p i n i o n "would support t h a t of Great B r i t a i n i n 
g i v i n g such a guarantee" ( t h i s wording was r e t a i n e d i n 
the subsequent v e r s i o n s ) ; (b) French co-operation i n the 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Europe was dropped from the l i s t of 
cond i t i o n s f o r an understanding; (c) t h i s v e r s i o n alone 
included an o f f e r t o co-operate i n n e g o t i a t i n g ah 
agreement between the powers on the l i n e s analogous t o 
those of the P a c i f i c t r e a t y . w ' 
Next day Lloyd George telegraphed t o London a d r a f t 
t r e a t y f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the Cabinet - a proceeding 
which caused Briand t o t h i n k t h a t he was t a k i n g a wider 
view than he had done i n London, and t h a t the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
might be e n t e r i n g a de c i s i v e stage. v-'-,/ The d r a f t 
consisted o f s i x a r t i c l e s . I n the f i r s t , B r i t a i n 
51. I.CP. 225C CAB 29/^4; Suarez, Briand, Vol. V, pp. 
380-2. 
52. A.J. 321, CAB 29/35. 
53. Briand t o P e r e t t i , 9 Jan. 1922, A.A.E., Grande Bretagne 
Vol. 69; Suarez, Briand, Vol. V, p.384. 
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undertook, i n the event of d i r e c t and unprovoked German 
aggression against the s o i l of France, t o come t o 
France !s assistance w i t h a l l her f o r c e s . I n the second 
the two c o u n t r i e s undertook, i n the event o f German 
aggression against Belgium, t o concert together measures 
t o p r o t e c t Belgian n e u t r a l i t y . A r t i c l e 3 asserted the 
i n t e r e s t of both c o u n t r i e s i n the p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e s 
42-44 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and provided f o r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n i n case any breach of them were threatened 
or any doubt arose about t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A r t i c l e 
4 l i k e w i s e provided f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n i n case Germany took 
any m i l i t a r y measures i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Treaty of 
V e r s a i l l e s . A r t i c l e 5 excluded the Dominions unless they 
themselves approved the agreement." The l a s t a r t i c l e -
(54) 
l i m i t e d the d u r a t i o n of the t r e a t y t o t e n years. v ' 
The d r a f t was accompanied by the t h i r d v e r s i o n of 
the B r i t i s h memorandum. The p r i n c i p a l d i f f e r e n c e s 
between i t and the two e a r l i e r versions were: (a) the 
guarantee was more p r e c i s e l y l i m i t e d , as i n the d r a f t 
t r e a t y , t o "unprovoked aggression against French s o i l " ; 
(b) the d i s c u s s i o n of the economic conference and the 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r a d e w i t h Russia were r e s t o r e d , but 
agreement on submarines was said not t o be a c o n d i t i o n ; 
(c) i n accordance w i t h the f i n a l v e r s i o n of the Cannes 
r e s o l u t i o n , a b s t e n t i o n from propaganda and a 
non-aggression undertaking were included among the 
54. Cannes t e l . 13, 9 Jan. 1922, W 251/50/17, F0 
371/8249. 
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c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r a d i n g w i t h Russia, and i t was suggested 
t h a t the l a t t e r undertaking could form the basis of a 
wider system of European accord. (55) 
With Chamberlain i n the c h a i r the Cabinet discussed 
the d r a f t t r e a t y and the B r i t i s h and French memoranda on 
the morning of 10 January. The d r a f t a r t i c l e s were 
g e n e r a l l y accepted. I t was p o i n t e d out t h a t a b i l a t e r a l 
guarantee would leave B r i t a i n no longer f r e e t o decide 
the size o f her land f o r c e s ; on the other hand a simple 
guarantee would i n v o l v e no s p e c i a l m i l i t a r y preparations 
although i f France were attacked a l l the resources of 
the Empire would be a v a i l a b l e t o support her. A guarantee 
would give confidence t o France and enable t h o u g h t f u l 
Frenchmen t o oppose c h a u v i n i s t p o l i c i e s . I t would also 
enable B r i t a i n t o help German recovery w i t h o u t i n c u r r i n g 
the charge of d e s e r t i n g France. A telegram was sent t o 
the Prime M i n i s t e r saying t h a t the Cabinet were opposed 
t o the French proposal f o r extending the agreement but 
concurred i n h i s proposals subject t o the c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
an understanding being r e a l i s e d : they attached great 
importance t o the submarine question and the avoidance 
( 5 6 ) 
o f naval competition. ^  
Before t h i s telegram a r r i v e d a t Cannes the t h i r d 
55. A.J. 323, CAB 29/35Q 
56. C . l ( 2 2 ) , CAB 23/29; t e l . 4 t o Cannes, 10 Jan. 1922, 
W 251/50/17, F0 371/8249. 
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v e r s i o n of the B r i t i s h memorandum was handed t o the 
French- They had learned t h a t Lloyd George was 
contemplating p u b l i s h i n g something, and Briand asked 
f o r time t o consider the t e x t f i r s t . When he met 
Lloyd George l a t e r i n the afternoon Briand sai d t h a t he 
feared t h a t a d e t a i l e d enumeration of c o n d i t i o n s would 
make a bad impression i n France, and asked whether they 
could not be expressed more g e n e r a l l y . Lloyd George 
said t h a t he was w i l l i n g t o drop Tangier i f Curzon 
agreed, but B r i t i s h o p i n i o n would be most s e n s i t i v e 
about submarines. He read out the Cabinet*s telegram 
and suggested adding t o the memorandum a sentence 
recommending j o i n t discussion of naval programmes. He 
agreed t o a suggestion of B r i a n d 1 s ~ t h a t more should be 
made of B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t i n the s a f e t y of France. (58) 
At the time of t h i s meeting Briand had not y e t 
received an answer from Paris about the r e p a r a t i o n 
discussions. That morning the French Cabinet had 
expressed doubts about Russia being i n v i t e d t o the 
economic conference, had decided not t o agree t o a 
moratorium f o r Germany unless adequate guarantees were 
given, and had agreed t h a t the Anglo-French pact could 
not be accepted i f i t were t o lead t o other pacts i n 
which Germany might be able t o discuss the Treaty of 
V e r s a i l l e s - i n other words Briand»s i n c l u s i o n of Germany 
i n a wider European grouping. Telegraphing an account of 
57. Minute by Grigg, 10 Jan. 1922, A.J. 328, CAB 29/35; 
Grigg t o Maj-sigi©, 10 Jan., A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, 
Vol. 69. 
58. I.CP. 229A, CAB 29/94. 
the meeting t o Briand i n the afternoon the President, 
M i l l e r a n d , added t h a t the Government r e a l i s e d t h a t these 
decisions would not make conclusion of the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
w i t h Lloyd George easier, but t h a t i n any case the 
question would have t o be discussed i n Paris and the 
two memoranda revealed d i f f e r e n c e s which made a r a p i d 
s o l u t i o n unlikely.. Briand r e p l i e d t h a t there had never 
been any question of h i s s i g n i n g a pact w i t h o u t 
(59) 
discussion and approval. v ' 
On 11 January f u r t h e r communications from Paris 
made Briand decide t h a t he must go back and confront 
M i l l e r a n d and h i s colleagues. He d i d so w i t h success 
as f a r as the Cabinet were concerned, but r a t h e r than 
face a c r i s i s w i t h the President w i t h d o u b t f u l support, 
and p o s s i b l e defeat i n the Chamber, he resigned on 12 
January. I t i s not c l e a r whether he saw the re v i s e d 
d r a f t of the Anglo-French pact and the f i n a l v e r s i o n o f 
59. Suarez, Briand, Vol. V, pp.388-90, 393-5. The 
exchanges between M i l l e r a n d and Briand from 6 t o 
11 January, p r i n t e d by Suarez, show t h a t the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between them were over the i n v i t a t i o n 
of Russia t o Genoa and the moratorium f o r Germany. 
M i l l e r a n d seems t o have ignored the Anglo-French 
pact proposal u n t i l 10 January, and Briand d i d 
not make much of i t . He was not at t h i s time 
l a y i n g s t r e s s on the pact i n order t o j u s t i f y 
concessions on Russia and r e p a r a t i o n s . 
the B r i t i s h memorandum before he l e f t Cannes. ^ ' The 
preamble to the t r e a t y now stated that French security-
was a B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t . The a r t i c l e s were i d e n t i c a l 
w i t h those of 9 January except that the one about 
Belgium was omitted and the f i n a l clause now provided 
f o r renewal at the end of ten years. I n the f i n a l 
version of the memorandum only the submarine question was 
now treated as a condition f o r an understanding, and the 
proposal f o r consultation on naval programmes appeared. 
French agreement to the summoning of the economic 
conference was stated as a desideratum, and the B r i t i s h 
Government were said to wish "to clear away a l l questions 
on which controversy between the two countries i s 
possible." Restoration of peace i n the Near East was 
said to be essential, but Tangier was no longer 
mentioned. ^ ' 
60. I n Cmd 2169 the d r a f t t r e a t y (No.38) i s said to have 
been handed to Briand on 12 January; but as he had 
by then l e f t Cannes either the date i s wrong or the 
t r e a t y and the memorandum were given to the French 
delegation. A copy of the d r a f t i n the French 
archives (Grande Bretagne, Vol. 69) i s dated 11 
January. 
61. CP. 3623, CAB 24/132; Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.38. 
62. CP. 3622, CAB 24/132; Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.38, 
misdated 4 January. A warning against concluding 
an agreement w i t h France about submarines while 
naval questions were s t i l l being discussed at 
Washington came from Balfour on 11 January? 
Washington del. t e l . 249, W 388/50/17, FO 371/8249. 
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The reason why Belgium was not mentioned i n the 
revised d r a f t of the Anglo-French t r e a t y was that i t was 
now proposed to conclude a t r e a t y w i t h Belgium herself. 
On 10 January M. Jaspar, the Belgian Minister f o r Foreign 
A f f a i r s , asked Curzon f o r news of the Anglo-French 
discussions and was shown the f i r s t d r a f t . He immediately 
asked why no guarantee f o r Belgium was envisaged. Curzon 
re p l i e d that t h i s was an Anglo-French pact, that Belgium 
had her m i l i t a r y agreement w i t h France, and that B r i t a i n 
had not joined i n i t because the Belgian Government would 
not give an undertaking to maintain n e u t r a l i t y . He asked 
whether Jaspar would prefer the a r t i c l e on Belgium to be 
l e f t out. 
Curzon commented on t h i s conversation that i f i t 
were desired to extend a guarantee to Belgium a h i n t would 
c e r t a i n l y e l i c i t a formal request from the Belgian 
Ministers. (^3) The request must have been made, f o r on 
13 January Curzon, with Lloyd George's approval, agreed 
on a t e x t w i t h Jaspar and Colonel Theunis, the Belgian 
Prime Minister. The Belgians f i r s t proposed a d r a f t 
t r e a t y directed solely against Germany. The t e x t agreed 
contained a preamble r e c a l l i n g Belgium's exposed p o s i t i o n 
and the experience of 1914, and two a r t i c l e s . The f i r s t 
pledged B r i t a i n to come to Belgium's assistance w i t h a l l 
her forces i n the event of d i r e c t and unprovoked attack 
on Belgian t e r r i t o r y . The second read: "Belgium w i l l 
63. Memorandum by Curzon, 10 Jan. 1922, Curzon Papers, 
Box 22, Anglo-Belgian Pact. 
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employ a l l her m i l i t a r y and a i r forces to defend her 
f r o n t i e r s i n the event of any attack upon or v i o l a t i o n 
of her t e r r i t o r y . She w i l l r e f r a i n from concluding 
agreements or arrangements incompatible with the present 
engagement." 
In sending the d r a f t to London f o r Cabinet 
consideration Curzon commented that a decision whether 
to conclude the agreement separately from the Anglo-French 
tre a t y depended p a r t l y on the arrangements to "be made 
wit h the new French Government, and p a r t l y on polic y 
considerations which needed to be thought out. The 
Cabinet approved the agreement subject to amendments 
designed to make i t clear t h a t the guarantee applied 
only to aggression by Germany, and the addition of a r t i c l e s 
excluding the Dominions and l i m i t i n g the duration of the 
trea t y to ten years- The Belgian Government had by t h i s 
time approved the agreement i n i t s e a r l i e r form. ^ 
There was no question of a guarantee f o r I t a l y , 
but the I t a l i a n representatives at Cannes were nervous, 
as always, of any Anglo-French understanding i n which 
t h e i r country was not included. On a r r i v i n g at Cannes 
Lloyd George t o l d the I t a l i a n Prime Minister, Bonomi, 
64. Cannes t e l . 26, 14 Jan. 1922; t e l . 7 to Brussels, 
20 Jan., ¥.. 468, 613/432/4, F0 371/8239; D.D.B., 
Vol. I , No.204. 
65o C. 2(22), CAB 23/29; Brussels t e l . 11, 17 Jan. 
1922; t e l . 5 to Brussels, 19 Jan., ¥ 543/432/4, 
F0 371/8239; D.D.B., Vol. I , Noso208-10. 
about the idea of the economic conference and said that 
he thought France's a t t i t u d e to i t would be influenced 
by what B r i t a i n was prepared to do f o r her security. I f 
B r i t a i n gave France a guarantee i t would be on condition 
that she would work with B r i t a i n and I t a l y f o r the 
reconstruction of central Europe and Russia; and 
B r i t a i n would not enter i n t o an exclusive alliance with 
France, 
On 9 January Bonomi called on Lloyd George and 
Curzon to ask about the Anglo-French negotiations. Lloyd 
g 
George showd him the f i r s t d r a f t of the t r e a t y and 
explained that i t was only a guarantee, not an al l i a n c e , 
and was s t i l l under discussion. He said that he hoped 
that I t a l y would enter any scheme of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
co-operation that grew out of the Cannes resolution, and 
promised to send Bonomi a copy of the memorandum that he 
was to give Briand. Next day Lloyd George returned 
Bonomi's c a l l and asked what he thought of the B r i t i s h 
memorandum. Bonomi and his Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , 
the Marchese d e l l a Torretta, expressed anxiety about 
France and B r i t a i n undertaking to keep Germany i n check 
by themselves. Lloyd George said that t h i s was not the 
66. I . C P . 220B, CAB 29/94; A.J. 312, CAB 29/35. 
67o I.Co P. 225A, CAB 29/94. I t appears that the I t a l i a n 
delegation were given copies of the t h i r d and f o u r t h 
versions of the B r i t i s h memorandum. 
object of the tr e a t y : i t was simply intended to repeat 
the 1919 guarantee and give B r i t a i n a r e s t r a i n i n g 
influence on French policy- He would have been ready to 
include I t a l y , but she would take part i n the general 
pact which he hoped would be concluded at Genoa. He 
i n v i t e d Bonomi to send him any I t a l i a n comments i n 
... (68) w r i t i n g . v ' 
The I t a l i a n s sent i n a memorandum on the same day, 
saying that i f the proposed pact discouraged German 
aggression i t was to be welcomed. But they again 
deprecated separate agreements about only one f r o n t i e r 
as opposed to strengthening the Entente as a whole. 
Lloyd George repl i e d i n another memorandum assuring the 
I t a l i a n s that there was no i n t e n t i o n of excluding I t a l y 
from the counsels of the great A l l i e s or of weakening 
the close understanding between them. B r i t a i n had a 
p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n and ob l i g a t i o n on France's 
eastern f r o n t i e r , but the guarantee was only a 
stepping-stone to the wider pact, i n which I t a l y had as 
much chance as France of co-operating. (^9) Three years 
l a t e r , i n the early stages of the negotiations which 
eventually led to Locarno, Briand suggested that the 
French Government had wished to see I t a l y included i n 
the proposed pact i n 1922. He presumably did expect 
68. I.CP. 229B, CAB 29/<f4. 
69. A.J. 337, 338, CAB 29/35. 
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I t a l y to j o i n the wider grouping, but not the 
Anglo-French nucleus. From London, where he had become 
ambassador, Torretta pointed out that Lloyd George's 
objection to including I t a l y had not been the only 
factor; but Lloyd George had indicated that the general 
non-aggression undertaking would reduce B r i t a i n 8 s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r French security and that the guarantee 
proposal only had value as a means of getting France to 
Genoa. ^ 7 ° ^ 
Poincare and Lloyd George 
Briand's f a l l , and i n p a r t i c u l a r i t s circumstances, 
was a bad omen f o r the Genoa Conference. On the 
Anglo-French negotiations, however, making a l l 
allowance f o r a difference i n tone, Poincare fs p o s i t i o n 
was not f a r removed from that of the French memorandum 
of 8 January. Lloyd George stopped i n Paris on 14 
January on his way home from Cannes and had a long 
conversation with Poincare, although the l a t t e r had not 
completed his ministry and could therefore only speak 
personally. Poincare agreed that there should be a 
general l i q u i d a t i o n of problems outstanding between the 
two Governments, but said that he feared that publication 
70. I t a l y , Minister® degli a f f a r i e s t e r i , I Documenti 
diplomatici i t a l i a n i , hereafter c i t e d as P.P.I., 
7th series, Vol. I l l , No.707; a l l references i n 
t h i s study are to the 7th series. 
of the d r a f t t r e a t y would make i t more d i f f i c u l t . He 
would need time to go i n t o the questions of Tangier and 
Turkey and would not commit himself to a v i s i t by 
Curzon and Torretta i n the following week. He would 
prefer to put o f f discussion of the Anglo-French t r e a t y 
u n t i l the other questions had been se t t l e d , but he was 
ready to give Lloyd George an i n d i c a t i o n of his 
preoccupations about i t . 
I n the f i r s t place, Poincare said, French opinion 
d i s l i k e d the idea of a u n i l a t e r a l guarantee. I t was a 
question of d i g n i t y and also might compromise France's 
position. A French guarantee of B r i t a i n might seem 
superfluous, but i t might be wiser f o r B r i t a i n to accept 
I t . Poincare then came to the crux of the problem by 
saying that i t seemed to him most important that there 
should be a m i l i t a r y convention between the two countries. 
There ensued a lengthy and at times evidently 
rather heated argument. Poincare said that the t r e a t y 
would not have much e f f e c t i v e value without a m i l i t a r y 
convention: i f he could only have one or the other he 
would prefer the convention. Lloyd George r e p l i e d that 
a convention could only r e l a t e to such forces as B r i t a i n 
had actually i n being, and would therefore be misleading. 
He was sure that Poincare' would rea l i s e that B r i t a i n ' s 
peacetime strength - three or four divisions - was not 
her r e a l strength. This consisted of m i l l i o n s of 
trained men, who were r e a d i l y available and would r e t a i n 
t h e i r value f o r as long a time as Germany's reserve of 
trained men could be considered dangerous. A guarantee 
to come to the aid of France w i t h a l l B r i t a i n ' s forces 
was much more valuable than a convention. Poincare 
said t h a t he was not giving the d e f i n i t e French answer 
now, but he must point out that a t r e a t y unaccompanied 
by a m i l i t a r y agreement would not appeal very much to 
French opinion. There was no need f o r publication: 
a l l t hat was necessary was j o i n t plans made and kept 
under review by the General Staffs. Lloyd George said 
that publication would be necessary i n B r i t a i n . I n any 
case the most important thing was that Germany should be 
deterred from thoughts of revenge, and the guarantee 
would do t h i s . Furthermore, although the Dominions 
might adhere to a guarantee they would c e r t a i n l y not 
sign a m i l i t a r y agreement or undertake i n advance to 
supply any forces. 
Poincare objected that Parliament would surely not 
want to know the d e t a i l s of the plans every year: a l l 
that he wanted was some reference i n the t r e a t y to s t a f f 
t a l k s and a m i l i t a r y agreement. Where, he asked, would 
France stand i f B r i t a i n disarmed altogether? Lloyd 
George did not answer t h i s question. He merely asked 
i n reply what difference a reference i n the t r e a t y would 
make. The reserves, t h e i r equipment, the pledge would 
be there. He would not bind the Government to maintain 
any p a r t i c u l a r strength i n peacetime. " I f the word of 
the B r i t i s h people was not s u f f i c i e n t f o r France, he 
feared that the d r a f t t r e a t y must be withdrawn. The 
B r i t i s h people would honour t h e i r pledge, i f France were 
attacked, with the whole of t h e i r strength, but they 
would never bind themselves by m i l i t a r y conventions as 
to the forces which they would maintain i n present 
conditions during a time of peace." 
Poincare said that i t was r e a l l y a question of 
knowing whether the guarantee would be e f f e c t i v e . I f 
France had no idea of the strength B r i t a i n would maintain, 
how could she calculate what she would have to maintain 
herself? The lack of a m i l i t a r y agreement would make 
the guarantee i l l u s o r y . I f these were Poincare's views, 
said Lloyd George, he had only to communicate them 
o f f i c i a l l y and there would be no tre a t y . The French 
people must judge t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , but i f they were 
not s a t i s f i e d w i t h B r i t a i n ' s pledge to put a l l her forces 
at France's side there was no possible basis of 
understanding„ 
At t h i s Poincare retreated s l i g h t l y , saying that 
France d i d not doubt B r i t a i n ' s word: she knew that even 
without a t r e a t y B r i t a i n would do a l l that she could. 
But, he repeated, how could France measure the forces 
she would have to maintain i f she had no idea what the 
s i t u a t i o n would be i f war broke out? Lloyd George 
rep l i e d that the strength of the B r i t i s h Empire had been 
demonstrated, and i t could be deployed much more quickly 
than that of Germany, f o r the Empire had the equipment 
and Germany had not. I t seemed preposterous to be 
discussing m i l i t a r y conventions now when Germany was 
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disarmed. I f a German r e v i v a l made a m i l i t a r y agreement 
necessary, B r i t a i n would not hesitate to conclude one; 
but he could not understand d i f f i c u l t i e s being made about 
one now. Poincare again referred to the d i f f i c u l t y of 
regulating French ef f e c t i v e s , and said that he would 
l i k e to discuss the matter again through diplomatic 
channels. 
Lloyd George then said that he was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
anxious to know whether the change of government i n 
France betokened a change i n policy. No, said Poincare', 
the aims would be the same although some nuances might 
be d i f f e r e n t . I n reply to a fur t h e r question about 
other points over the t r e a t y , Poincare said that the 
duration of ten years seemed badly chosen. Lloyd George 
said that t h i s could be discussed, and that s t a f f 
contacts would of course continue. The conversation 
ended w i t h a b r i e f discussion of the prospects f o r 
Genoa, and an expression of Poincare's d i s l i k e of 
conferences. He hoped that preliminary discussion of 
a l l questions could take place through normal channels, 
and that conferences would only take place when s t r i c t l y 
(71) 
necessary. 
After t h i s meeting Poincare would appear to have 
accepted the idea of a settlement of other questions 
71. I.CP. 235A, CAB 29/f 5; A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, 
Vol. 69; Documents r e l a t i f s aux garanties, No.23. 
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before the pact was concluded- He t o l d Curzon, who 
went to Paris on 16 January to t a l k about Turkey and 
Tangier, that the pact could follow and set the seal on 
the elimination of a l l the questions d i v i d i n g B r i t a i n 
and France, which he was determined to see. But he 
c e r t a i n l y hoped that a l l the problems could be dealt 
(72) 
with quickly. w ' 
Reporting t h i s conversation to the Cabinet, Curzon 
said that the proposal at Cannes had been that he and 
the French and I t a l i a n Ministers f o r Foreign A f f a i r s 
should meet to agree on a re v i s i o n of the Treaty of 
Sevres which would then be put to the Greeks and the 
Turks. When Poincare spoke of discussions through 
diplomatic channels" Curzon"had reminded him that only 
the Supreme Council could revise the t r e a t y . He feared 
(mistakenly, as the French archives show) tha t Poincare 
wanted to spin negotiations out u n t i l the spring i n 
the expectation of a Turkish v i c t o r y over the Greeks. 
The Cabinet discussion then turned to Lloyd George's 
meeting w i t h Poincare and the question of what to do 
next. I t was suggested that i t would be best to leave 
the French to make the next moves they might be i n a 
more reasonable frame of mind a f t e r some weeks had passed 
and they began to re a l i s e that the pact was not 
regarded as p a r t i c u l a r l y important to B r i t a i n . Other 
72. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. X V I I I , No.508; Poincare to 
St-Aulaire, 23 and 30 Jan. 1922, A.A.E., Grande 
Bretagne, Vol. 70. 
Ministers asked whether, i f negotiations were suspended, 
the French would occupy the Ruhr. The answer was that 
the Ruhr could only he occupied i f Germany were i n 
default on reparations, and t h i s could not happen before 
the end of March. The Cabinet agreed to take no action 
(73) 
about the pact f o r the time being. 1 
However the next French step was not long delayed. 
On 20 January Poincare t o l d Hardinge that the French 
observations were to be sent o f f very shortly. Hardinge 
asked whether press reports that they referred to Poland 
were correct, as he thought that he should warn Poincare 
that the B r i t i s h Government were u n l i k e l y to take any -
re s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the event of an attack on Poland by 
Germany or Russia. Poincare said that French opinion was 
anxious about Poland and he hoped that some formula 
could be found which, without d i r e c t mention, could 
cover the case of a German attempt to recover Upper 
Sile s i a by force. He thought that there must be some 
Anglo-French agreement about preserving portions of the 
(74) 
Treaty of Versailles such as t h i s . v ' 
A French revised d r a f t of the t r e a t y was handed to 
Curzon by the French Ambassador on 26 January. I t 
73. C. 2(22), CAB 23/29. 
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over the whole t e r r i t o r y . 
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corresponded to the views expressed i n the memorandum of 
8 January. The ob l i g a t i o n to assistance was made 
reciprocal, and the casus foederis unproved aggression 
against France or against Great B r i t a i n . A r t i c l e 2 l a i d 
down, f i r s t , that any v i o l a t i o n of A r t i c l e s 42 or 43 of the 
Treaty of Versailles should be considered as c o n s t i t u t i n g 
an act of aggression against both, and secondly that the 
two countries would concert together i n case of any 
threat of v i o l a t i o n , any doubt as to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the a r t i c l e s , or any breach by Germany of the naval, 
m i l i t a r y , or a i r clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. 
A r t i c l e 3 stated that the General Staffs of the two 
countries would maintain a constant entente to ensure the 
efficacy of the two previous a r t i c l e s . By A r t i c l e 4 the 
two Governments were to consult together on a l l questions 
of a nature to endanger peace or jeopardise the order of 
things established by the peace t r e a t i e s , and to examine 
together measures necessary to ensure a quick, peaceful, 
and equitable solution. The t r e a t y was to l a s t f o r 
t h i r t y years and to be renewable. The Dominions were 
(75) 
excluded as i n the B r i t i s h d r a f t . v'^ y 
Giving the d r a f t to Curzon, St-Aulaire made some 
comments on i t . He said that the French desire f o r a 
reciprocal agreement was a matter of self-respect, and 
Curzon r e p l i e d that he thought that the Cabinet would be 
75. W 963/50/17, F0 371/8250; Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.39; 
Documents r e l a t i f s aux garanties, No.23. 
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w i l l i n g to consider i t from t h i s point of view. 
St-Aulaire then said that something much more specific 
was needed on v i o l a t i o n s of A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 of the 
Treaty of Versailles than the B r i t i s h suggestion of 
consultation. He was aware of press c r i t i c i s m on the 
line s that B r i t a i n might f i n d herself involved i n war 
over some petty incident f o r which the Germans might not 
be wholly to blame, but his Government were thinking of 
serious and unprovoked acts of aggression. Curzon said 
that there was bound to be serious objection to t h i s 
a r t i c l e . B r i t a i n was ready to regard the French eastern 
f r o n t i e r as i n a sense her own outer f r o n t i e r , but t h i s 
proposal meant B r i t a i n and France taking on themselves 
the enforcement of provisions of the Treaty of Versailles 
which were the concern of a l l the signatories. Moreover 
i t smacked of a return to the old r i v a l groupings of 
powers which everyone thought were to disappear and to 
be replaced by a concert of nations. St-Aulaire r e p l i e d 
that he thought on the contrary that the alliance would 
tend to consolidate i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , w i t h the 
other powers grouping themselves round France and B r i t a i n . 
Curzon said that Briand had talked i n t h i s vein, but he 
had not been able to understand how t h i s grouping was to 
come about. 
On the t h i r d a r t i c l e St-Aulaire said that i n view 
of Lloyd George^ objection to a m i l i t a r y convetion, a l l 
that was now proposed was regular s t a f f conversations 
similar to those held before the war. He admitted that 
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the mention of such t a l k s i n the tr e a t y was mainly intended 
to impress the Germans. A r t i c l e 4, the Ambassador said, 
had been framed to meet the B r i t i s h objection to the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of being involved i n war by German aggression 
i n eastern Europe. The i n t e n t i o n was that i n such a case 
the two countries would consult and, i f they agreed, would 
act i n concert with the League i n f i n d i n g a peaceful 
solution. Curzon said that he thought there might be 
objections to put t i n g anything so ambiguous i n the t r e a t y . 
He then said that he thought that the Cabinet might be 
w i l l i n g to consider something l i k e f i f t e e n years f o r the 
duration of the tr e a t y , but that agreement to t h i r t y was 
not l i k e l y . 
F i n a l l y Curzon asked how-Poincare proposed that the 
general discussions, which the B r i t i s h believed that he 
favoured as they did, should be carried on. St-Aulaire 
said that he thought that Poincare hoped that the pact 
would be concluded before the Genoa Conference, and his 
decision whether to go to Genoa would no doubt be 
influenced by the extent to which his hopes were f u l f i l l e d . 
Curzon, surprised by t h i s change from what Poincare had 
said to him ten days e a r l i e r , r e p l i e d that he thought i t 
would be out of the question to s e t t l e the pact i n f i v e 
weeks (at t h i s stage the Genoa Conference was expected 
to open about 8 March), and he preferred the method, 
which he had thought Poincare favoured, of s e t t l i n g the 
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other questions f i r s t . w ; 
I n h is despatch to Hardinge recording t h i s 
conversation Curzon commented that Poincare's new 
hurry over the pact showed his anxiety to get i t , and 
that t h i s could be used to get a favourable settlement 
on the other questions. I t might be supposed that on a 
similar c a l c u l a t i o n Poincare was hoping to use Lloyd 
George's anxiety f o r the success of the Genoa Conference 
to secure B r i t i s h concessions on the pact. But 
that t h i s was the r i g h t l i n e to take, and he t o l d the 
Belgian Ambassador i n Paris that he wanted the pact and 
would conclude i t even i f he had to abandon many of his 
(77) 
demands. v ' - - . _-
St-Aulaire followed up these verbal explanations 
with three w r i t t e n memoranda. I n the f i r s t , on 28 
January, he developed the argument f o r consultation i n 
case of a threat to peace. I t was true, he wrote, that 
Germany was u n l i k e l y f o r many years to be able to 
attack B r i t a i n or France d i r e c t l y ; but there was l i t t l e 
doubt that she would invade Poland or Czechoslovakia, 
or incorporate Austria, i f she thought that she could do 
76. Desp. 289 to Paris, 28 Jan. 1922, ¥ 937/50/17, F0 
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with impunity. Success here would give Germany new 
strength and would lead to an attack i n the west. Peace 
would remain precarious unless B r i t a i n and France 
undertook to f a c i l i t a t e c o l l e c t i v e action. The 
connexion between the west and the east was also pointed 
out by Max Muller, the B r i t i s h Minister i n Warsaw, i n 
reporting Polish anxiety about an Anglo-French pact. At 
present, he wrote, the pact l e f t a loophole: i f Germany 
were to attack Poland and France went to the help of her 
a l l y , a German counter-attack on France would not count 
as unprovoked aggression and therefore B r i t a i n could 
say that her guarantee to France did not arise. Foreign 
Office o f f i c i a l s were not impressed by t h i s f i r s t 
mention of the problem t h a t was to become f a m i l i a r l a t e r , 
noting merely that Parliament and public opinion would 
not contemplate an Anglo-Polish pact and that Max Muller 
(79) 
was ignoring the existence of the League of Nations. w ^ 
St-Aulaire's second memorandum was a b r i e f 
explanation of A r t i c l e s 2 and 4 of the French d r a f t 
t r e a t y . The t h i r d went i n t o some d e t a i l on v i o l a t i o n s 
of A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. I f , 
f o r instance, he wrote, Germany asked permission to send 
police i n t o the demilitarised zone to deal w i t h disorder, 
78. Note from French Ambassador, 28 Jan.1922, ¥ 963/50/17, 
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there would be no v i o l a t i o n or threat of one. I f 
permission were refused and Germany showed signs of 
sending i n forces nonetheless, there would be a threat 
of v i o l a t i o n and the two Governments would have to 
consult. I f forces actually went i n , either a f t e r 
permission had been refused or without i t having been 
asked, t h i s would be a v i o l a t i o n and the casus foederis 
would arise. Such a provision, the memorandum argued, 
was essential i f the protection afforded by the 
d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Rhineland were to be r e a l . (^0) 
This problem too was to become f a m i l i a r i n 1925. 
But t h i s time there was no serious attempt to tackle i t , 
and the example of Germany sending police forces i n t o 
the demilitarised zone to quell disorder was not happily 
chosen i f the object of the explanation was to reassure 
the B r i t i s h . The three stages were almost exactly what 
had happened i n A p r i l 1920 and had then give r i s e to 
sharp disagreement between the B r i t i s h and French 
(81) 
Governments. v ' But i n two respects the memorandum 
80. Notes from French Ambassador, 1 Feb. 1922, W 1162, 
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desire to ensure as f a r as possible that another 
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. suggested a way of meeting i t . 
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took account of Curzon's comments to St-Aulaire. The 
French Government, i t stated, preferred t h i r t y years 
f o r the duration of the treat y but would accept twenty, 
provided i t were made renewable. And the French 
Government attached the utmost importance to the general 
understanding ( A r t i c l e 4) but were prepared to transfer 
i t to notes to be exchanged and published at the same 
time as the tr e a t y . 
On 1 February Hardinge assured Poincare that Lloyd 
George and Curzon were f r i e n d l y to France, but said that 
there was some resentment i n London about the French 
a t t i t u d e to the pact. I t was Briand who had asked f o r 
i t , and the Government had thought they were making a 
-handsome gesture i n o f f e r i n g to assume an obli g a t i o n 
which they had not asked should be reciprocated. But 
now conditions were being imposed as though i t were f o r 
France to lay down the terms of the pact and f o r B r i t a i n 
to accept. Poincare denied that h is proposals were 
conditions; they were subjects f o r discussion. The 
greater part of the conversation had been about Turkey, 
and Hardinge concluded that i f i t were possible f o r the 
two Governments to agree about t h i s , there would be no 
(82) 
d i f f i c u l t y i n s e t t l i n g a l l the other questions. ^  
I n the meantime two of the Dominion Governments 
had expressed t h e i r views on the proposed pacts w i t h 
France and Belgium, of which they were only informed a f t e r 
82. D.BoF.P., Ser. I , Vol. XVII, No.516. 
Lloyd George's return from Cannes. v ; As might have 
"been expected the New Zealand Government were i n favour 
of the pacts, the South African Government against. 
Smuts telegraphed on 28 January that he approved the 
B r i t i s h e f f o r t s f o r European reconstruction but thought 
that a m i l i t a r y 'alliance was too high a price to pay 
f o r French support i n them. The South African Parliament 
would c e r t a i n l y not r a t i f y such t r e a t i e s , and then the 
problem would arise of some parts of the B r i t i s h Empire 
being bound while others were not. Smuts feared that 
the existence of an Anglo-French alliance might mean 
the end of the Empire i f war broke out i n the next ten 
years, and he did not believe that France needed a 
guarantee against Germany. S t i l l worse, the e f f o r t s at -
economic reconstruction might f a i l and then B r i t a i n 
would be l e f t w i t h an alliance w i t h "the state whose 
present reactionary policy f i l l s w i t h alarm both Europe 
and America and creates special danger f o r the B r i t i s h 
Empire." ^ 8 4^ 
Lloyd George's i n i t i a l rash expression of confidence 
that the Dominions would j o i n i n the guarantee had been 
replaced.as early as the second version of his memorandum 
to Briand by an expression of confidence that they would 
83. CO. 2511, CO 532/244; CO. 3077, CO 532/215. 
84. CO. 2298, 2299, 3568, 4701, CO 532/207. I have 
not traced any expression of views by the Canadian 
or Australian Governments. 
approve a B r i t i s h guarantee. Even t h i s was now shown to 
be somewhat doubtful. I n Parliament too debates i n the 
f i r s t week of February not only revealed a good deal of 
objection to anything going beyond the obligations of 
the 1919 guarantee; there were sections of opinion, 
including the main supporters of the League l i k e 
Lord Robert Cecil, who were opposed to any guarantee at 
a l l . ^8"^ After these debates Curzon warned St-Aulaire 
that the Cabinet were very u n l i k e l y to wish to go 
beyond the scope of the 1919 tr e a t y , and that i n 
p a r t i c u l a r the French must expect refusal of t h e i r case 
on A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
On 17 February Curzon circulated to the Cabinet a 
long memorandum on the French d r a f t t r e a t y . Decisions 
were required on seven points. F i r s t , Curzon recommended 
that the proposal f o r reciprocal obligations should be 
accepted, since i t would do no harm and might be of 
advantage. On the second point, the deletion of 
"d i r e c t " from before "attack" and "the s o i l of" from 
before "France" i n A r t i c l e 1, Curzon was disposed to 
refuse, f o r three reasons. I n the f i r s t place B r i t i s h 
opinion would only endorse the t r e a t y i f i t became 
85. H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 150, cols. 8-266; 
H.L. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 49, cols. 4-122. 
86. Desp. 405 to Paris, 9 Feb. 1922, C 2000/458/62, 
FO 371/7418; Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.42; Documents 
r e l a t i f s aux garanties, No.26. 
operative only when the German army crossed the f r o n t i e r . 
I n the second place, the p o s s i b i l i t y of e a r l i e r action 
could give r i s e to serious arguments about what 
constituted an act of aggression and, f o r example, at 
what point German mobilisation developed i n t o an attack. 
Thirdly, the deletion of " s o i l " would make the t r e a t y 
apply to an attack on a French colony, which need not 
involve B r i t a i n . 
The t h i r d question f o r decision was the treatment 
of a German v i o l a t i o n of A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Here again Curzon recommended 
r e j e c t i o n of the French proposal. He did not think that 
B r i t i s h opinion would be w i l l i n g to t r e a t the Rhineland 
as though i t were French t e r r i t o r y or to be bound to go 
to war i f i t were v i o l a t e d , even though i n some 
circumstances i t might be w i l l i n g to do so. As he had 
said to St-Aulaire, Curzon also d i s l i k e d the idea of a 
special obligation overriding the common obli g a t i o n of 
a l l the signatories of the Treaty, feared that i t might 
give r i s e to other alliances, and regarded i t as 
inconsistent with the pri n c i p l e s on which the postwar 
organisation of Europe was supposed to be based. 
On s t a f f conversations, Curzon supposed that there 
would be no objection to co n f i d e n t i a l contacts 
provided that i t were understood that any agreements 
produced were not binding upon the Governments. But he 
was opposed to mentioning such contacts either i n the 
tre a t y or i n an exchange of notes, on the ground that 
t h i s would imply the existence of m i l i t a r y obligations 
defined not by Governments or Parliaments but by 
General Staffs. 
The f i f t h point was the French a r t i c l e about 
consultation. I n some ways, Curzon wrote, t h i s was 
highly desirable since the Government had more than once 
complained of French f a i l u r e to consult them on matters 
of common i n t e r e s t . But looked at more closely the 
a r t i c l e seemed to be an attempt to involve B r i t a i n a l l 
over Europe and indeed to set up a kind of Anglo-French 
hegemony which B r i t a i n did not want and which other 
countries, notably I t a l y , would resent. 
On the duration of the t r e a t y , Curzon admitted 
that from the French point of view ten years was too 
short. B r i t a i n could no more aff o r d to see France 
overrun i n 1932 than she could do i n 1914. While t h i r t y 
years would almost c e r t a i n l y be too long f o r public 
opinion, he recommended f i f t e e n to twenty years. 
The f i n a l question was whether the pact should be 
concluded on i t s own or held over u n t i l other questions 
were set t l e d . Curzon regarded delay as a powerful means 
of pressure on the French Government whose sur v i v a l , 
he thought, depended on some form of pact. He therefore 
recommended waiting u n t i l they were nearer a solution 
(87) 
of the many other problems. v ' 
Thus Curzon recommended r e j e c t i n g a l l but two of the 
87. CP. 3760, CAB 24/133- Part i n Cmd 2169 of 1924 
No.44. 
68 
French proposals, that on making the guarantee reciprocal 
and that on lengthening the duration of the tr e a t y . 
The Cabinet, however, never discussed his memorandum. 
Lloyd George took i t w i t h him when, a week l a t e r , he went 
to meet Poincare at Boulogne. The main topic of a not 
very harmonious conversation was the Genoa Conference. 
Lloyd George accused Poincare of t r y i n g to wreck the 
conference i n advance by asking f o r postponement and 
making conditions. He said that B r i t a i n would not wait: 
i f France would not come i n B r i t a i n could make her own 
agreements w i t h I t a l y , Germany, and Russia; but she 
could not a f f o r d delay. After t h i s onslaught Poincare', 
who had suggested at the beginning that they should 
discuss "closing up"" the Entente and clearing up p o l i t i c a l 
questions, did not mention the pact u n t i l the very end. 
He then said that he had already put o f f his departure 
and now had no time to discuss i t . Lloyd George said 
that he was w i l l i n g to t a l k about the pact whenever 
Poincare wished, but i t would be easier f o r him to get 
i t through Parliament when other outstanding questions 
(88) 
had been set t l e d . v ' 
Meanwhile the Anglo-Belgian negotiations had gone 
as f a r as was possible without a f i n a l decision on the 
French t r e a t y . Some d i f f i c u l t y was caused at f i r s t by 
the B r i t i s h amendments to the t e x t agreed at Cannes. 
88. I.CP. 236, CAB 29/95. See also desp. 799 to Paris, 
19 Mar. 1922, ¥ 2448/50/17, FO 371/8251. 
The omission of a mention of Germany from t h i s t e x t was, 
as the Foreign Office said, c e r t a i n l y an oversight - a 
piece of carelessness which may be a t t r i b u t e d to the 
fa c t that Curzon had no o f f i c i a l w i t h him at Cannes. 
The Belgian Government accepted the amendment making i t 
clear that the t r e a t y was concerned only w i t h aggression 
by Germany; but they did not l i k e the provision binding 
Belgium not to make agreements w i t h the possible enemy 
which might be inconsistent with the tre a t y . This 
provision was intended to secure something l i k e a 
posit i o n of n e u t r a l i t y on Belgium's part; but the kinds 
of agreement tha t might be objectionable were not c l e a r l y 
thought out and proved d i f f i c u l t to explain. ^ 8^) ^ the 
same time the Belgian press showed an indifference, not 
to say coldness, about the pact which caused surprise and 
annoyance i n London. (^0) 
Early i n February the Ambassador i n Brussels, 
Sir George Grahame, thought that the Belgian Government 
were deliberately delaying discussions, probably i n order 
89. The case mentioned as an example was that of a 
left - w i n g government i n Belgium making an agreement 
with a like-minded German government, and a l a t e r 
right-wing Belgian government breaking i t and thus 
provoking a German attack. Tel. 7 to Brussels, 20 
Jan. 1922; Brussels t e l . 16, 21 Jan.; Brussels t e l . 
18, 24 Jan.; t e l . 8 to Brussels, 27 Jan.; Brussels 
t e l . 20, 30 Jan.; t e l . 9 to Brussels, 4 Feb.; ¥ 613, 
710, 806, 964/432/4, F0 371/8239; D.D.B., Vol. I , 
Nos. 211, 212, 218, 220. 
90. Grahame to Curzon, 17 Jan. 1922, Curzon Papers, Box 22, 
Anglo-Belgian Pact; Brussels t e l . 8, 15 Jan.; 
Brussels t e l . 12, 17 Jan., ¥ 496, 545/432/4, F0 
371/8239. 
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to see what happened over the Anglo-French t r e a t y and to 
gain as good terms as the French. (91) However on 9 
February Jaspar said that he was ready to proceed 
independently, and produced a d r a f t i n which the provision 
about c o n f l i c t i n g agreements was transferred to the 
preamble, the relevant part of which now read: 
"Considering that Belgium i s determined, as i n 1914, to 
to r e s i s t a German aggression with a l l the means i n her 
power and not to conclude any agreement or arrangement 
c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h t h i s determination to defend her 
t e r r i t o r y . . . . " ( 9 2 ) By 20 February the pact had been 
agreed, subject to Cabinet approval and one or two 
matters of wording which depended on the f i n a l form of 
the French tr e a t y . (93) Subsequently the Belgians made 
attempts to have the agreement signed without waiting 
f o r the Anglo-French negotiations to be concluded; but 
on 14 June Crowe t o l d the Belgian Ambassador, Baron 
Moncheur, that i t could not be done. (94) 
For i t s part the French pact seems not to have been 
91. Brussels t e l . 24, 6 Feb. 1922, W 1245/432/4, 
FO 371/8239. 
92. Brussels t e l s . 25, 26, 9 Feb. 1922, ¥ 1325, 1356/432/4, 
FO 371/8239; D.D.B., Vol. I , No.223. 
93. Desp. 107 to Brussels, 13 Feb. 1922; note from Belgian 
Ambassador, 20 Feb., ¥ 1436, l67<?/432/4, FO 371/8239; 
D.D.B., Vol. I , Nos.225-6. 
94. Brussels t e l . 35, 7 Mar. 1922; Brussels desp. 223, 28 
Mar.; desp. 639 to Brussels, 15 Jun., ¥ 2263, 2795, 
4959/432/4, FO 371/8239; D.D.B., Vol. I , Nos.228-9. 
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mentioned f o r some three weeks a f t e r Lloyd George's 
meeting w i t h Poincare at Boulogne. On 19 March, at the 
end of a conversation about the Genoa Conference, 
St-Aulaire asked Curzon whether the Cabinet had reached 
a decision on the French d r a f t . Curzon said no; but 
he believed that his colleagues agreed with the views 
which he had already expressed to the Ambassador. No 
doubt a decision would be taken at the r i g h t time, but 
he indicated that clearing up the other questions would 
(95) 
l a s t w e l l i n t o the summer. v ' At the end of March 
Ministers were s t i l l t hinking of the tr e a t y as a means 
of p u t t i n g pressure on Poincare, although the objects 
to be achieved were becoming less d e f i n i t e . At a Cabinet 
discussion on 20 March of the prospects of a meeting to 
be held i n Paris on Turkey, a l l the Ministers present 
(Lloyd George was not among them) recognised that the 
Government's Turkish policy had f a i l e d . On 28 March 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of using the tr e a t y as a means of 
inducing the French to follow the B r i t i s h l i n e on 
recognising the Soviety Government was mentioned. 
95. Desp. 799 to Paris, 19 Mar. 1922, ¥ 2448/50/17, 
FO 371/8251, extract i n Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.45; 
A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol. 70; Documents r e l a t i f s 
aux garanties, No.31. St-Aulaire considered that 
Lloyd George was now s a t i s f i e d about Genoa and that 
Curzon, who was p r i m a r i l y interested i n Turkey, was 
the main obstacle to progress. 
96. C. 19(22), CAB 23/29. 
Churchill, who was strongly opposed to recognition, said 
that he thought such pressure would be unfair. Lloyd 
George re p l i e d that he had not intended to threaten 
Poincare that the t r e a t y would not be pursued unless he 
f e l l i n w i t h B r i t i s h wishes over Russia; but he thought 
that i t might be used i n connexion with reparations and 
(97) 
the treatment of Germany. w , / 
The General Pact of Non-Aggression 
The idea of a general non-aggression undertaking, 
which formed part of the Cannes resolution, grew out of 
Briand's suggestions that such an undertaking by Russia 
should be one of the conditions f o r resuming trade and 
that Germany too should give such a pledge. The 
proposal came to play a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n Lloyd George's 
hopes f o r the Genoa Conference. Nothing was done about 
i t f o r some weeks a f t e r Cannes, but i n the middle of 
March Hankey, the Secretary to the Cabinet, asked the 
Foreign^Legal Adviser to prepare a d r a f t . Sir Cecil Hurst, 
with some d i f f i c u l t y , produced two short a r t i c l e s , the 
f i r s t pledging the parties to r e f r a i n from any act of 
aggression against the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of any other 
parti e s , the second pledging them, i n the event of any 
act of aggression taking place, to use a l l the means at 
t h e i r disposal and to resort to any organisation that 
97. C. 21(22), CAB 23/29. 
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might be available to adjust by peaceful means the dispute 
out of which the aggression arose. Crowe, although 
conscious of the d i f f i c u l t y of c r i t i c i s i n g something that 
the Prime Minister was assumed to want, wrote that he 
regarded t h i s proposal as "mere verbiage", weaker even 
than A r t i c l e 10 of the Covenant, which the lawyers now 
admitted imposed no material obligations. Crowe found 
i t impossible to conceive that a country which f e l t 
i t s e l f threatened by an unscrupulous neighbour would 
disarm on the strength of that neighbour's signature at 
the bottom of a t r e a t y such as t h i s . He agreed with the 
suggestion of a more j u n i o r o f f i c i a l that the aim could 
best be attained by getting Germany and Russia to j o i n 
the League. (98) However Hahkey, to whom Crowe put the 
l a s t point, r e p l i e d that even i f the French dropped 
t h e i r objections to Germany, i t would be very d i f f e r e n t 
to induce them to accept Russian entry i n t o the League. 
I t would therefore be as w e l l to have a second-best 
plan. <99> 
Hurst's a r t i c l e s were therefore taken to Genoa as 
the B r i t i s h d r a f t of a non-aggression tr e a t y . At an 
early meeting there of the B r i t i s h Empire delegates 
Horne explained the objects which i t was hoped that the 
conference would achieve. I t was generally f e l t , he said, 
98. Memorandum by Hurst, 16 Mar. 1922; Crowe to Hankey, 
24 March, C 4356/458/62, FO 371/7423. 
99. Hankey to Crowe, 25 Mar. 1922, C 4543/458/62, FO 
371/7423. 
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that the main obstacle to European reconstruction was 
the d i f f i c u l t y of securing peace; hence i f an agreement 
could be achieved that f o r a period of years no 
country would deliberately attack another, conditions 
would be created i n which p r a c t i c a l measures f o r reviving 
trade would have a chance of success. During discussion 
i t was explained that there was no question of the 
obligations going beyond those of the Covenant. But i t 
was agreed that a pact of t h i s kind would have considerable 
moral value and that ©, signatory would hesitate long 
before wantonly breaking a pledge thus solemnly given. (l^O 
I n public utterances at Genoa, as the prospects of 
agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet 
Union diminished, Lloyd George l a i d increasing emphasis 
on peace as the main aim of the conference. ( - ^ l ) gu^. 
even preliminary discussion of the terms of a pact soon 
revealed the d i f f i c u l t i e s . One was that an undertaking 
to respect t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y necessarily involved 
d e f i n i t i o n and recognition of f r o n t i e r s , and t h i s was 
100. B.E.D. 74th conference, 10 Apr. 1922, CAB 31/1. 
101. For example at a press conference on 20 A p r i l he 
said that unless the conference ended i n a general 
pact of non-aggression, he considered that i t 
would have f a i l e d . At a dinner given to him by 
press representatives on 26 A p r i l , he said that 
without a r e a l pact of peace Genoa would have 
accomplished nothing: " I t may redress exchanges; 
i t may improve currencies; but i t w i l l not have 
accomplished the main purpose f o r which i t was 
summoned." J. Saxon M i l l s , The Genoa Conference, 
London 1922, pp.99, 120. 
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most d i f f i c u l t precisely i n that area - eastern 
Europe - where Lloyd George thought the pact was most 
needed. On 23 A p r i l J.D. Gregory, Head of the Northern 
Department of the Foreign Office, wrote to Crowe from 
Genoa about the eastern f r o n t i e r of Poland. He 
described the present f r o n t i e r , l a i d down i n the 
Polish-Soviet peace t r e a t y of 1921, as a bad one which 
the smaller powers would probably not wish to guarantee. 
But any other f r o n t i e r would be equally vulnerable, 
the Treaty of Riga had not been concluded under any 
p a r t i c u l a r duress, and the Russians had so f a r shown no 
(10' 
sign of wishing to upset i t s t e r r i t o r i a l provisions. v 
The Foreign Office r e p l i e d that the non-aggression pact 
should preferably be accompanied by an agreed d e f i n i t i o n 
of existing f r o n t i e r s . I f t h i s would take too long to 
negotiate, i t might be best to refer to de facto 
f r o n t i e r s , reserving f i n a l settlement by a r b i t r a t i o n . 
But t h i s reservation should probably apply only to the 
Polish-Lithuanian f r o n t i e r , since i t would be almost 
impossible to touch the Polish-Russian f r o n t i e r and 
Russia must recognise the incorporation of Bessarabia 
in t o Roumania. 
102. Gregory to Crowe, 23 A p r i l 1922, N 3952/646/38, FO 
371/8188. Gregory said that the B r i t i s h Empire 
delegation were going to discuss the d r a f t pact (a 
copy of which, dated 23 A p r i l , i s B.E.D. 285, CAB 
31/1) next day; but no meeting of the delegation 
i s minuted between 22 A p r i l and 10 May. 
103. Tel 48 to Genoa, 27 Apr. 1922, N 3952/646/38, FO 
371/8188. The t e x t of the Treaty of Riga i s i n 
B.F.S.P., Vol CXIV, pp.917-50; the Western Powers 
did not recognise the Russo-Polish f r o n t i e r u n t i l 
March 1923. 
Meanwhile the smaller powers' reluctance to 
underwrite any f r o n t i e r of Poland had been expressed to 
Lloyd George by.the Czechoslovak Minister f o r Foreign 
A f f a i r s . Benes's remarks, as recorded by a B r i t i s h 
secretary, were somewhat disconnected but appear to 
amount to assertions: (a) that the L i t t l e Entente was 
a factor of s t a b i l i t y i n the region south of Germany 
and south of the Carpathians, but i t s strength did not 
extend farther north or east; (b) that Poland was not 
a factor of s t a b i l i t y and could not take the place i n 
French policy that Russia had once occupied; (c) that 
the French policy of t r y i n g to erect a b a r r i e r on 
Germany's eastern f r o n t i e r was unsound, but i t might be 
modified i f France were relieved of her anxiety i n the 
west by being given a B r i t i s h guarantee. Lloyd George 
remarked that i f the Russians accepted the Treaty of 
Riga i t was not f o r the A l l i e s to quarrel with i t . 
Benes re p l i e d that i f i n the next few years the Soviet 
•Gci 
Union attack^Poland, Czechoslovakia would have to say 
that she had been against the f r o n t i e r . (104) 
Benes also sent Lloyd George a memorandum on the 
non-aggression pact which, he wrote, must r e a l l y be a 
guarantee and not j u s t the appearance of one. To 
propose an i l l u s i o n would be dangerous to peace. After 
104. S.G. 17, 26 Apr. 1922, CAB 31/5. Although they 
may simply be an expression of Czechoslovak 
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t h i s implied, c r i t i c i s m of the B r i t i s h d r a f t Benes 
proceeded both to suggest turning the pact i n t o an 
instrument serving the interests of the L i t t l e Entente 
while leaving open the f r o n t i e r s of eastern Europe, and 
to revive Briand's conception of the Anglo-French pact 
as part of a wider European understanding. The 
non-aggression pact, he wrote, must contain an undertaking 
104. (cont) 
d i s l i k e of Poland, these statements could be 
construed as a reference to the Franco-Soviet 
exchanges of the winter of 1921-22 during which, 
according to what Karl Radek t o l d the Germans, the 
French indicated that they would be w i l l i n g to 
give up support f o r Poland and Roumania i n return 
f o r a Franco-Soviet alliance and Soviet willingness 
to make claims on Germany under Art. t116 of the Treaty of Versailles: see W. von Blucher, 
Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo, Wiesbaden 1951, p.155; 
G. Freund, Unholy Alliance, London 1957, pp.109-11; 
H. Helbig, Die Tracer der Rapallo-Politik, Go'ttingen 
1958, pp.67-8; G. Rosenfeld, Sow.jetrussland und 
Deutschland 1917-22, (East/ B e r l i n 1960, p.369. On 
10 February St-Aulaire gave Crowe some information 
about the exchanges, according to which the i n i t i a t i v e 
and a l l the running had come from the Russian side: 
minute by Crowe, N 1338/646/38, fO 371/8185. I n view 
of the s t i f f n e s s of the French Government's a t t i t u d e 
towards dealing w i t h the Soviet Government i n I f 2 2 , 
Radek's statements about French off e r s should be 
treated w i t h caution u n t i l confirmed from French 
sources. The meagre references i n Dokumenty 
Vaeshnee P o l i t i k i S.S.S.R., Vol IV, Moscow 1960, 
p.791, n.75; Vol. V, Moscow 1961, No.27, do not 
support Radek's statement. (For those and l a t e r 
references to Dokumenty Vimshneal P o l i t i k i I am 
indebted to Dr. Eleonore B r e u ^ ^ of the University 
College|Swansea.) Before the Genoa Conference the 
Polish'Government t r i e d to get the French Government 
to recognise the Polish eastern f r o n t i e r and f a i l e d : 
Wandycz, France and her Eastern A l l i e s , pp.258-9. 
Wandycz shows that the Polish Government had only a 
general idea about the Franco-Soviet exchanges, and 
i t seems u n l i k e l y that Bene! had more. 
to observe exi s t i n g t r e a t i e s , since otherwise attempts 
to enforce them could be denounced as aggression. The 
problem of unrecognised f r o n t i e r s , especially the 
Russo-Polish f r o n t i e r , the Polish-Lituanian f r o n t i e r , 
and the p o s i t i o n of Eastern Galicia, could be solved 
either by providing that they must be s e t t l e d before 
the pact was concluded or by making the pact inapplicable 
to c e r t a i n states u n t i l t h e i r f r o n t i e r s had been 
set t l e d . There could be regional arrangements whereby 
parties could agree i n advance on measures to be adopted 
i n case of v i o l a t i o n : one such arrangement should be 
the Anglo-French pact. The non-aggression pact, Benes 
concluded, presupposed as "an essential condition of 
a l l European policy an immediate-understanding between 
Great B r i t a i n and France on European policy (and 
especially on that of Eastern Europe)." (105) 
Talk of endorsing ex i s t i n g t r e a t i e s aroused 
misgivings among some of the former neutrals as w e l l as 
among the German delegation at Genoa. (106) On 2 May 
105o Memorandum from Benes, 26 Apr. 1922, C 8025/458/62, 
F0 371/7433; J-loyd George Papers, F/199/3/5. See 
also E. Benes, Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign 
Policy, Prague 1924, p.32. Bene§, who v i s i t e d 
Paris and London i n February, had acted as an 
intermediary i n bringing yabout the meeting between Lloyd George and Poincare at Boulogne and t r y i n g to 
promote Anglo-French agreement on the Genoa 
Conference and recognition of the Soviet Union: 
S. 42, 43, 45, 46, 16-20 Feb., CAB 23/36; Benes to 
Lloyd George, 22 Feb., Lloyd George Papers, F/49/9/3; 
aide-memoire from Benes, 22 Feb., C 2931/458/62, 
FB>371/7421; minute by Grigg, 24 Feb., Lloyd George 
Papers, F/86/1/19; Wandycz, France and her Eastern 
A l l i e s , p.257. 
106. SoG. 23, 2 May 1922; S .G. 25, 4 May; S .G. 27, 5 May, 
CAB 31/5. 
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R.F. Wigram, a member of the Central Department of the 
Foreign Office, sent home from Genoa some comments on 
Benes^proposal. I f i t were adopted, he wrote, i t would 
be a great coup f o r France, the L i t t l e Entente, and 
Poland, but the neutrals as w e l l as the ex-enemy countries 
were u n l i k e l y to be w i l l i n g to subscribe to the peace 
t r e a t i e s . Wigram repeated the B r i t i s h view of the nature 
and scope of the non-aggression pact and ended: " I t was 
also, I think, considered that two essential preliminaries 
to the conclusion of such a pact were (a) an adjustment 
of the unsettled f r o n t i e r s , etc., i n Eastern Europe and 
(b) a general settlement w i t h Germany." (107) 
By the time that Wigram wrote hopes of an 
agreement w i t h the Soviet Union at Genoa were waning, 
and i n conversations w i t h the German and Yugoslav 
delegates on 4 and 5 May Lloyd George said that i f the 
Russians did not accept the l a t e s t Western memorandum 
there would be no non-aggression t r e a t y . (^^8) A 
remnant of the idea was, however, salvaged by including 
what Hankey described as "sort of Truce of Non-Aggression" 
i n the resolutions providing f o r f u r t h e r negotiations 
w i t h the Soviet^ Union at The Hague at the end of 
107. Wigram to Waterlow, 2 May 1922, C 6652/458/62, 
F0 371/7431. Wigram overestimated the benefit to 
Poland of Benes's proposal, but he had perhaps 
not seen the record of Bene!1s conversation with 
Lloyd George. 
108. S.G. 23, 27, CAB 3l/5» 
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June. v ' No more was heard of i t thereafter. 
The end of the Anglo-French negotiations 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t not to agree w i t h Crowe that the 
proposed non-aggression undertaking was mere verbiage. 
On a more p r a c t i c a l l e v e l the signature of the 
German-Soviet Treaty of Rapallo, the f a i l u r e of the 
Genoa Conference, and the prospect of a new c r i s i s over 
reparations at the end of May, impelled the Foreign 
Office to consider once more Anglo-French rel a t i o n s and 
the guarantee. On 28 A p r i l S.P. Waterlow, a member of 
the Central Department, wrote a long memorandum on the 
reparation s i t u a t i o n i n the l i g h t of recent correspondence 
between the German Government and the Reparation 
Commission, and of Poincare's speech at Bar l e Due on 
23 A p r i l threatening u n i l a t e r a l action by France. Since 
the armistice, wrote Waterlow, the aim of B r i t i s h p o l i c y 
had been to reconcile and mediate. I t was no 
p a r t i c u l a r c r e d i t to B r i t a i n that she had been quicker 
than France to recognise economic facts and work to bury 
the past, f o r she had not been invaded and her trade 
needed a return to stable economic conditions. I t had 
been thought possible to achieve reconstruction w i t h i n 
109. Hankey to Chamberlain, 11 May 1922, N 4775/646/38, 
FO 37l/8191o Clauses of 19 May i n Cmd 1667 of 
1922, Papers r e l a t i n g t o the Inter n a t i o n a l Economic 
Conference, Genoa. 
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the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, so the B r i t i s h 
had t r i e d "to apply the t r e a t y i n a s p i r i t at once j u s t 
and reasonable - to permit that economic recovery of 
Germany which i s a necessity f o r ourselves, and at the 
same time to secure the disarmament which i s equally a 
necessity i f French fears are to be allayed." The task 
called f o r great wisdom and patience: there had been 
many d i f f i c u l t i e s ; but Genoa was meant to resolve them 
and to be the culmination of the policy of turning the 
Versailles settlement i n t o a "real peace." The opening 
stages of the conference, however, had coincided with two 
events - Rapallo and the deadlock over reparations - which 
were the negation of the whole of B r i t i s h p olicy. There 
was bound to be a strong reaction to Poincare's speech; 
" I t i s int o l e r a b l e that the intransigence of one Power, 
whose m i l i t a r y strength dominates the Continent, and 
whose a e r i a l and submarine projects are a p o t e n t i a l threat 
to ourselves, should f r u s t r a t e our e f f o r t s to bring 
Russia back i n t o the economic o r b i t of Europe, to restore 
the general commercial and f i n a n c i a l conditions that are 
v i t a l to the B r i t i s h Empire, and to avoid any return to 
the European Group system that provided the conditions 
f o r the l a s t war." I f Genoa f a i l e d , and especially i f 
Germany were driven to despair of a p r a c t i c a l reparation 
settlement, Germany and the Soviet Union would be 
cemented i n a union of h o s t i l i t y towards western Europe. 
Perhaps the time had come to make i t clear to France that 
i f she ins i s t e d on her own policy B r i t a i n must refuse 
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fur t h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and dissolve the partnership. 
But there were equally strong objections to a breach 
with France. I t would bring l i t t l e moral advantage, 
f o r B r i t a i n was as much responsible as France f o r 
imposing the reparation burden on Germany - or even more 
so, f o r i t was Br i t a i n ' s doing that pensions had been 
included; and equally her record over the lapse of the 
1919 guarantee was not good. New methods ought to be 
t r i e d : the non-aggression pact was hardly the answer, 
fo r i t was p a r t i c u l a r l y aimed at eastern Europe and did 
not touch the question of Germany. However Waterlow found 
i t easier to analyse the problem than to suggest a 
solution: his proposed new methods amounted to no more 
than the appointment of a p o l i t i c a l l y weightier f i g u r e 
as the B r i t i s h representative on the Reparation Commission, 
and the adoption of a more pos i t i v e a t t i t u d e towards the 
League of Nations. 
Sir William T y r e l l , the Assistant Under-Secretary 
of State, had a much more sweeping proposal. " I am 
convinced," he minuted, "that we s h a l l not achieve either 
peace or settlement u n t i l we arrive at a comprehensive 
settlement w i t h the French based on our affording her 
^sic"! security against attack on her eastern f r o n t i e r s 
i n r e t u r n f o r which she w i l l undertake to pursue a sane 
policy both i n Europe and i n the Near East.... To t h i s 
end, I would begin by concluding a pact with her f o r the 
guarantee of her s o i l to which I should i n v i t e Belgium 
and I t a l y to adhere, w i t h a view to the eventual inclusion 
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of Germany, and which should be i n harmony wi t h the 
requirements of the League of Nations. The demands of 
France f o r a guarantee of Poland I should meet by 
c o n s t i t u t i n g the i n t e g r i t y of the countries and the 
f r o n t i e r s created by the Treaty of Versailles as a special 
charge on the functions of the League of Nations, and, i n 
fe 
order to enable the latter^discharge such a task, I 
would, j o i n t l y w i t h France, make a declaration that f o r 
that purpose the two countries would place at the 
disposal of the League a l l t h e i r resources f o r the 
enforcement of i t s decisions." 
Curzon l i k e d neither proposal. Waterlow's suggestions 
he regarded as t h i n , Tyrell's as p u t t i n g the cartbefore 
the horse: France was to behave badly everywhere -and 
B r i t a i n was to "run round and conclude our Treaty of 
Guarantee and a l l w i l l be w e l l , " a l l the more i f the 
f r o n t i e r s created by the peace t r e a t y were to be placed 
under the protection of the League, which had been unable 
to get the Poles to leave Vilna and was u n w i l l i n g to take 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r protecting Christians i n Anatolia. 
I t was no use asking him to put a new policy before the 
Cabinet unless i t was " p r a c t i c a l , practicable (two 
d i f f e r e n t things) and coherent." ( 1 1 0 ) Waterlow therefore 
revised his paper i n an attempt to meet Curzon's 
objections. He strengthened the argument f o r an 
110. Memorandum by Waterlow, 28 Apr. 1922, with minutes 
by T y r e l l and Curzon, C 6200/6200/18, F0 371/7567. 
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Anglo-French pact: a statement, he wrote, at the time 
when the United States Senate rejected the Treaty of 
Versailles, that the B r i t i s h guarantee would be maintained 
would have paid a hundred times over. As i t was the 
French, although they never said so, had reason to f e e l 
that they had been led i n t o "a characteristic B r i t i s h 
trap" as regards the security of t h e i r eastern f r o n t i e r . 
The defensive pact ought to be taken up again, and not 
postponed u n t i l a settlement had been reached on other 
questions: i t was pu t t i n g the cart before the horse 
(Curzon's phrase turned against him) to aim at the 
periphery rather than at the central question. Waterlow 
then combined Tyrell's conception of the pact with h is 
own concern over reparations. He had noted that France 
could not give up her demand f o r immediate f i n a n c i a l 
r e l i e f : now he suggested, i n addition to renewing the 
of f e r of the pact and combining i t w i t h a complex of 
agreements including Belgium and I t a l y and eventually 
Germany, o f f e r i n g to w r i t e down Bri t a i n ' s reparation 
claim, and perhaps o f f e r i n g to reduce France's debt to 
B r i t a i n , i n return f o r a reasonable settlement of the 
whole reparation problem, 
The revised paper was not d i s t r i b u t e d , nor did 
Curzon see i t : he was i l l f o r some weeks i n May and June 
and away from the Foreign Office. I t would hardly have 
111. Memorandum by Waterlow, 9 May 1922, C 6875/6200/18, 
F0 371/7567. 
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convinced him, running counter as i t did not only to his 
own a t t i t u d e but to that of the Cabinet as well., Here 
the l i n e was s t i l l to keep the pact i n reserve, although 
Lloyd George was now less confident about the 
effectiveness of t h i s means of put t i n g pressure on 
France. At the end of a long Cabinet discussion on 
reparations on 23 May Churchill asked whether fear of 
losing the tr e a t y could not be used to induce the French 
to co-operatwe i n f i n d i n g a solution. Lloyd George 
re p l i e d that he did not think that Poincare set much store 
by the treaty. ( 1 1 2 ^ 
I t was i n f a c t Poincare who took the next i n i t i a t i v e . 
He did, as Hardinge suspected, regard the German-Soviet 
t r e a t y as an additional reason f o r concluding the pact, 
and on 11 May instructed St-Aulaire to take up the 
negotiations again. (^3) Ambassador at f i r s t 
demurred; but on 30 May he called on Balfour, who was 
acting i n Curzon's place, and said that Poincare saw no 
reason why the other subjects being discussed between the 
two countries should hold up consideration of the 
treat y . The French Government were interested i n 
concluding i t and were not t r y i n g to make i t a contract 
under which a specified number of forces would have to 
be available f o r the defence of France. Balfour said 
112. C. 29(22), CAB 23/30. 
113. Poincare to St-Aulaire, 2 May 1922, A.A.E., Grande 
Bretagne, Vol. 71; Documents r e l a t i f s aux garanties, 
Nos. 32-3; Paris desp. 1002, 30 Apr. 1922, 
C 5922/458/62, FO 371/7427. 
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that he would look up the recent h i s t o r y of the 
negotiations and communicate with St-Aulaire again, 
Crowe wrote to Curzon a couple of days l a t e r that 
St-Aulaire had t r i e d to rush Balfour i n t o agreeing to 
take up the negotiations again at once; but Hardinge 
was to be instructed to make i t p l a i n to Poincare that 
the Government stood by t h e i r decision that outstanding 
questions must be se t t l e d before a tr e a t y were 
concluded. (-^ -15) 
The instructions i n question were sent to Hardinge 
on 13 June. The outstanding matters referred to 
included more p a r t i c u l a r l y the economic reconstruction 
of Europe, peace wi t h Turkey, and Tangier. The prospect 
of- an early settlement of such questions, i t was said, 
seemed f a r from hopeful, largely owing to the a t t i t u d e 
of the French Government, and i n the circumstances no 
useful purpose would be served by discussing the t r e a t y 
f u r t h e r at present. Hardinge conveyed t h i s message 
to Poincare three days l a t e r . Poincare, whose mood was 
c i v i l but not amiable, said that he agreed that 
114. Desp. 1787 to Paris, 30 May 1922, ¥ 4880/50/17, 
F0 371/8251,' Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.46; St-Aulaire 
to Poincare, 31 May, A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, 
Vol. 71; Documents r e l a t i f s aux garanties, No.36. 
Poincare had informed St-Aulaire as early as 23 
January that a l l that he wanted on the m i l i t a r y 
side was s t a f f conversations on contingency plans, 
not an agreement f i x i n g numbers of troops: A.A.E., 
Grande Bretagne, Vol. 70. 
115. Crowe to Curzon, 2 Jun. 1922, Curzon Papers, Box 
65, Letters 1922. 
116. Desp. 1790 to Paris, 13 Jun. 1922, ¥ 4880/50/17, 
FO 371/8251; Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.47. 
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outstanding questions must be settled. But he indicated 
that he would not regard the t r e a t y proposed by the 
B r i t i s h as worth paying f o r w i t h concessions on other 
matters since, as he maintained, i t added nothing to 
what B r i t a i n would be bound to do i n her own interests 
i f circumstances l i k e those of 1914 arose again. He 
also claimed that the inclusion, i n the l i s t of questions 
to be s e t t l e d , of the economic reconstruction of Europe 
was a means of escape f o r B r i t a i n from any obligation 
to conclude the t r e a t y since the French a t t i t u d e to 
negotiations w i t h the Soviet Union was w e l l known. (H?) 
On the same day as he saw Hardinge, Poincare 
crossed to London to see Lloyd George. He had not 
proposed any subjects f o r the conversation, and the 
l a t t e r had declined to ask what Poincare wanted to t a l k 
about or to raise any topics himself. As neither 
Prime Minister raised i t , the t r e a t y was not discussed: 
the main topics of the conversation were reparations and 
the discussions about the Soviet Union at The Hague. 
117. Paris t e l . 326, 16 Jun. 1922, W 4995/50/17,,F0 
371/8251? Cmd 2169 of 1924, No.48. Poincare 
also t o l d the Belgian Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s 
that the B r i t i s h o f f e r had moral value only, but 
the Belgians thought his detachment more apparent 
than r e a l : D.D.B., Vol. I , No.230. 
118. Crowe to Curzon, 15 Jun. 1922; Van s i t t a r t to 
Curzon, 17 and 20 Jun., Curzon Papers, Box 65, 
Letters 1922. 
119. I.CP. 249C, CAB 29/96. 
On 4 July the French Ambassador read to Balfour a note 
of reply to Hardinge's statement to Poincare. I t said 
that the French Government were ready to take part i n 
a conference on Tangier, and that as regards Turkey the 
B r i t i s h and French Governments were acting together to 
bring about a settlement. As regards the economic 
reconstruction of Europe, to make the pact conditional 
on that would be tantamount to postponing i t i n d e f i n i t e l y . 
French co-operation i n reconstruction had indeed been one 
of the conditions i n Lloyd George's memorandum at Cannes, 
but that had meant French co-operation i n c a l l i n g the 
economic conference. The actual r e a l i s a t i o n of 
reconstruction was a d i f f e r e n t matter and no one could 
say at present how and when i t would come about. (-^ -O) -
With t h i s reply the Anglo-French negotiations simply 
faded out. Technically i t was f o r the B r i t i s h Government 
to answer the French proposals of 1 February; but the 
summer saw worsening disagreement over reparations -
which was presumably what the B r i t i s h now meant by the 
reconstruction of Europe, a l l hope of a settlement with 
the Soviet Union having evaporated. I n the Balfour Note 
of 1 August the B r i t i s h Government did o f f e r to reduce 
t h e i r reparation claim on Germany and ask f o r repayment 
of war debts owed to B r i t a i n only to the amount needed 
120. Desp. 2135 to Paris, 4 J u l . 1922, W 5657/5657/50, 
FO 371/8300; Cmd 2169 of 1924, Nos.49-50; A.A.E., 
Grande Bretagne, Vol. 71; Documents r e l a t i f s aux 
garanties, No.38. 
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to pay Bri t a i n ' s debt to the United States. ( 1 2 1 ) This 
suggestion could not encourage the French to agree to a 
moderate reparation settlement, since under i t the less 
France received from Germany the more she would have to 
pay to B r i t a i n herself. After the f a i l u r e of the 
London conference i n August to reach a new agreement, the 
inauguration of a French pol i c y of taking "productive 
pledges" seemed only a question of time. At the same 
time Anglo-French differences over the Turkish settlement 
continued. They culminated i n the near breach over the 
Chanak c r i s i s i n September, which marked probably the 
lowest point of Anglo-French rel a t i o n s since the 
armistice. 
Conclusion 
The records of the Cabinet discussion of 10 January 
1922 and of Lloyd George' s conversation w i t h Poincare' on 
14 January are s u f f i c i e n t to explain why the negotiations 
f o r an Anglo-French t r e a t y f a i l e d . The discussions of 
the ensuing six months did l i t t l e more than dot the i ' s 
and cross the t's of a basic difference of aim between 
the two countries, and reveal a remarkable degree of 
mutual incomprehension. 
121. Cmd 1737 of 1922, Despatch to the Representatives of 
France, I t a l y , Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Roumania, 
Portugal and Greece at London respecting War Debts; 
C. 35(22), C. 36(22), C. 40(22J, Co 42(22), CAB , 
23/30. 
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The fundamental French aim i n the years immediately 
a f t e r the war was to gain l a s t i n g security against 
Germany and to extract from her the largest possible 
f i n a n c i a l contribution to reconstruction i n the shortest 
possible time. I n the negotiations with B r i t a i n , 
therefore, the French desired a d e f i n i t e assurance of 
m i l i t a r y assistance i n case of war, and secondly a 
commitment to help i n maintaining the European order set 
up by the peace t r e a t i e s . On the need f o r some kind of 
m i l i t a r y agreement Briand and Poincare were at one, as 
the former was at pains to emphasise eighteen months 
(±22) 
l a t e r . v ' The two French Prime Ministers probably, 
however, envisaged the wider understanding on Europe i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways. Brian&'s idea of a consultative European 
pact analogous w i t h the Four-Power Washington tr e a t y 
does not seem to have been f u l l y worked out: he appears 
to have envisaged an Anglo-French agreement under which 
the two countries would concert t h e i r p o l i c i e s and lend 
each other aid i f either were attacked d i r e c t l y ; and 
secondly an agreement between France, B r i t a i n , Germany, 
and I t a l y , under which the four countries would confer 
to s e t t l e disputes among themselves, and concert 
together i f peace were threatened by another power. (-^3) 
122. Journal o f f i c i e l . Chambre des deputes, Compte-rendu, 
23 Nov. 1923. 
123. Memorandum, 28 Dec. 1921, A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, 
Vol. 69. Nothing i s said here about the s t i l l 
widergrouping. 
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Poincare's ideas seem to have been confined to 
strengthening the peace settlements. The desire f o r 
a l i n k between B r i t a i n ' s commitment to France and 
France's commitment to Poland under the alliance of 
February 1921 was common to both, and indeed must have 
been shared by any French Government. To some extent 
t h i s alliance lessened the immediate French need f o r a 
B r i t i s h guarantee; but although i t was on the whole an 
asset to France i n respect of Germany, i t also proved a 
burden on French security as w e l l as a p o t e n t i a l source 
of trouble i n respect of eastern Europe. Henceforth 
the function of the demilitarised Rhineland and the 
Rhin^e bridgeheads was not only to protect the French 
f r o n t i e r but also to enable France to bring assistance-
to Poland (and from 1924 to Czechoslovakia). 
The fundamental B r i t i s h aim, on the other hand, 
was to achieve a "real peace" - that i s a p a c i f i c a t i o n 
of Europe i n which economic recovery could take place -
without the assumption of fu r t h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I n 
the negotiations with France there was some acknowledgment 
both of the moral obl i g a t i o n to make up f o r the f a i l u r e 
of the 1919 guarantee, which had been suggested by the 
B r i t i s h as part of a bargain over the l e f t bank of the 
Rhine at the Peace Conference, and of Br i t a i n ' s own 
int e r e s t i n the security of France. But renewal of 
the guarantee was conceived as part of a new bargain 
with France, and was not to involve either wider European 
obligations or m i l i t a r y commitments. 
As regards Poland, at the Peace Conference and 
throughout the 1920's successive B r i t i s h Ministers were 
w i l l i n g to t r e a t the Polish-German f r o n t i e r on i t s 
merits, and Polish policy since Versailles bred i n 
London a strong d i s t r u s t . The t e r r i t o r i a l provisions 
of the peace t r e a t i e s were not generally regarded i n 
B r i t a i n as immutable even where they were regarded as 
j u s t - and many people did not regard the German-Polish 
f r o n t i e r as altogether j u s t . A l l t h i s , on top of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l d i s l i k e of involvement on the continent of 
Europe and the immediate desire f o r r e l i e f from foreign 
commitments, i s enough to explain the refusal of 
successive B r i t i s h Governments to undertake obligations 
i n eastern Europe. 
As f o r the question of a concrete m i l i t a r y 
commitment to France, i t i s understandable that the 
Government should not have considered a m i l i t a r y 
convention necessary at present, since a German m i l i t a r y 
threat was thought u n l i k e l y f o r a number of years. 
Furthermore the outcome of the s t a f f conversations w i t h 
France before 1914 was fresh i n mind and Liberal 
ministers, i n p a r t i c u l a r , were reluctant to repeat the 
experiment of undertakings at the m i l i t a r y l e v e l . I n 
the p r e v a i l i n g climate of demands f o r reduction of 
armaments and of Government expenditure, there was no 
incentive to abandon the t r a d i t i o n a l refusal to subject 
the l e v e l of B r i t i s h armaments to the influence of any 
other country. One noteworthy feature of the story of 
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the 1921-22 negotiations i s the absence of any 
consideration, on the B r i t i s h side, of the proposed pact 
from the m i l i t a r y point of view. No papers on i t were 
submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence, nor did 
the Committee ever discuss i t . Early i n A p r i l 1922 the 
War Office did send to the Foreign Office, uninvited, 
some comments on Curzon's Cabinet paper of 17 February. 
The General Staff favoured accepting several of the 
French proposals f o r the t r e a t y since, they said, from 
the m i l i t a r y point of view the French were r i g h t i n 
wishing to f o r e s t a l l v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r f r o n t i e r and i f 
B r i t i s h forces were to co-operate u s e f u l l y they must do 
so from the outset. I f the A l l i e s waited u n t i l German 
forces - cro ssed "the - French-f rontler- they-would—lose -the 
value of the demilitarised zone. But these comments came 
when the negotiations were already more or less at a 
s t a n d s t i l l . They received l i t t l e consideration i n the 
Foreign Office and none elsewhere. 
Since the proposed tr e a t y w i t h France was never 
discussed i n m i l i t a r y terms i t i s impossible to say how 
seriously Lloyd George himself took the argument that 
he used to Poincare on 14 January about the "real strength" 
of the B r i t i s h Empire - that i s , that i t had enormous ^ . 
One would suppose that Lloyd George realised that m i l l i o n s 
124. War Office to Foreign Office, 5 Apr. 1922; Foreign 
Office to War Office, 18 Apr., W 2996/50/17, 
FO 371/8251. 
of trained men were a wasting asset unless they were 
p e r i o d i c a l l y retrained and renewed i n some way such as, 
the French maintained, the German equivalents were 
being trained and recruited i n police and paramilitary 
forces„ Lloyd George should have remembered that 
however much better than her word B r i t a i n had been i n 
1914, i t had taken two years of war before her 
contribution i n manpower on the western f r o n t had been 
substantial. I t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t he should have 
expected France to be able and w i l l i n g to bear the brunt 
fo r so long another time. I t also appears that he never 
faced the contradiction between a refusal to give an 
undertaking to maintain land forces and continual 
~complaints about the l e v e l of French armaments. "One i s ~ 
driven to conclude that the B r i t i s h Government never 
intended the guarantee to be m i l i t a r i l y meaningful. 
I t was conceived purely as a p o l i t i c a l gesture, to pay 
an obl i g a t i o n outstanding since 1919 but mainly to 
induce France to f a l l i n w i t h B r i t i s h policy elsewhere. 
Both Governments indeed attempted to use the pact 
as a bargaining counter i n achieving other aims. Or 
more precisely Poincare t r i e d b r i e f l y to use Lloyd 
George's desire f o r the success of the Genoa Conference 
as a lever i n securing the pact. The weakness of h i s 
attempt lay i n the f a c t that he was not i n any case i n 
a po s i t i o n to commits France to f u l l co-operation i n a 
settlement with the Soviet Union followed by a moderate 
reparation settlement. S i m i l a r l y the weakness of 
B r i t i s h attempts to use the French desire f o r the pact 
to secure concessions elsewhere lay i n the f a c t that the 
pact offered was not the pact that the French Government 
wanted, and no attempt was made to explore a compromise 
on the terms before the prospects of general agreement 
became worse i n the summer of 1922. The B r i t i s h o f f e r 
was not s u f f i c i e n t l y a t t r a c t i v e to induce the French to 
change t h e i r p o l i c y over Germany, the Soviet Union, 
Turkey or anything else. The B r i t i s h bargaining p o s i t i o n 
was i n f a c t weak because, as Poincare pointed out to 
Hardinge on 16 June, t r e a t y or no t r e a t y B r i t a i n would be 
bound i n her own interests to come to the help of France 
i n the case of renewed German aggression. Sim i l a r l y the 
threats ltfhich~Llbyd~George ^ walf ~fohd~6f using afroTTt^the -
end of the Entente or the end of the alliance were 
larg e l y meaningless, since unless B r i t a i n were to withdraw 
even more completely than the United States had done from 
a l l organs set up to execute the peace t r e a t i e s , she was 
i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d to France i n carrying them out. 
Although at times there would have been a good deal of 
support f o r the withdrawal of the occupation forces from 
the Rhineland, or even f o r withdrawal from the Rhineland 
High Commission, there was never any suggestion of 
withdrawing from the Reparation Commission or the m i l i t a r y 
control commissions, or from the p l e b i s c i t e commissions 
while they s t i l l existed. ( 1 2 ^ ) 
125. Hardinge wrote l a t e r than when i n August 1921, at 
the time of the c r i s i s over Upper Si l e s i a , he asked 
Lloyd George and Curzon what t h e i r phrase "rupture 
wi t h the French" meant, neither was able to say: 
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Old Diplomacy, London 
1947, p.260. 
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The whole story, on the B r i t i s h side, reveals a 
lack of careful thought. Apart from two or three papers 
by Crowe and Waterlow the Foreign Office appear to have 
given l i t t l e serious consideration to the proposals. 
They were not asked to do so: Curzon was not r e a l l y 
interested i n Europe and was not i n c l i n e d , i n t h i s f i e l d , 
to challenge Lloyd George's control of policy; economic 
polic y and reparations were outside t h e i r f i e l d of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Lloyd George f o r his part thought of the 
guarantee as part of a wider plan, and when that f a i l e d 
he was not interested i n a d i f f e r e n t approach. I t i s a 
matter f o r speculation whether, i f the B r i t i s h 
Government had declared the 1919 guarantee to be i n force 
despite the American rejectron-of the Treaty of 
Versailles, or had agreed i n 1922 to a r e a l defensive 
alliance, French policy towards Germany would have been 
more f l e x i b l e . The chief argument against i s the 
d i s t i n c t l y right-wing composition of the Chamber of 
Deputies between 1919 and 1924. On the other the number 
of occasions, i n 1919, i n 1924, and i n 1925, when French 
Governments of d i f f e r e n t complexions, faced w i t h a choice 
between gaining B r i t i s h support and pursuing French 
inte r e s t s single-handed, chose B r i t a i n , suggests that the 
same might have been true i n 1922. Keeping the pact i n 
reserve as a means of pressure was not only u n l i k e l y to 
succeed f o r the reasons pointed out above; i t was also 
bad psychology. 
A secondary point that stands out from t h i s record 
i s the a t t i t u d e of the Governments at t h i s time to the 
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League of Nations. I t i s clear that none of the four 
ministers p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned considered the League 
seriously as a peace-keeping organisation. Briand's 
suggestion that France and B r i t a i n should form the 
"secular arm" of the League harked back to the French 
desire at the time when the Covenant was drafted f o r the 
League to have forces as i t s disposal. His suggestion 
that an Anglo-French alliance coupled w i t h a European 
c o n s u l t a t i v e pact would conduce to a p o l i t i c a l order 
more p r a c t i c a l than the League i s more strange. I t 
perhaps bears a ce r t a i n resemblance to his proposal of 
1929 f o r a European union, but i s i r o n i c a l f o r a time 
when the League was widely regarded i n the defeated and 
former neutral countries as an organ of French policy; 
and the use of the Pacific pact as an analogy suggests 
that Briand overestimated the strength of t h i s instrument. 
On the B r i t i s h side, while on the one hand Curzon used the 
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l order as an argument against alliances, 
on the other hand i t i s worth noting that i n none of the 
documents i s the p o s s i b i l i t y discussed that membership 
of the League might seriously involve B r i t a i n i n eastern 
Europe. The argument about the new i n t e r n a t i o n a l order 
sounds, indeed, unconvincing i n Curzon Js mouth. He 
c l e a r l y set no great store by the League, and was 




Defence Policy, the Far East and the United States 
1920-22 
Throughout the period covered by t h i s study, B r i t i s h 
defence policy was concerned almost exclusively w i t h the 
security of the B r i t i s h Empire,. None of Bri t a i n ' s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagements committed her to any precise 
m i l i t a r y or naval action i n defence of any other country. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations, which by A r t i c l e s 
10 and 16 bound member states to preserve the i n t e g r i t y 
and independence of a l l against external aggression and 
to contribute e f f e c t i v e m i l i t a r y force to protect the 
covenants of the League, l e f t i t to the members to decide 
the extent and nature of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l contribution. 
This f a c t was not e x p l i c i t l y stated i n the Covenant but 
was made clear i n a resolution approved by a majority of 
the Assembly i n 1923. As w i l l be shown i n Chapters 3 and 
4, successive B r i t i s h Governments resisted a l l attempts 
to make the sanctions of the Covenant more automatic, or 
applicable by a majority decision of the Council. I t has 
1. A l i s t of B r i t a i n ' s t r e a t y engagements i n 1920 i s i n 
C.I.D. Paper 251-B, CAB 4/7= The only ones of a 
nature to involve the country i n war or m i l i t a r y 
action were: the Anglo-Japanese al l i a n c e , A r t i c l e 44 
of the Treaty of Versailles, the provision about the 
freedom of the S t r a i t s i n the Treaty of Sevres, and 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. A revised l i s t 
of 1926 i s printed i n D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , 
Appendix. 
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already been shown i n Chapter 1 that the Government i n 
1922 rejected the French attempt to secure a commitment 
to maintain a specified amount of forces to implement 
a guarantee to France. Once the various p l e b i s c i t e s 
were completed i n 1921 the only m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n on 
the continent of Europe a r i s i n g out of the peace t r e a t i e s 
was th a t of contributing to the i n t e r - A l l i e d occupation 
of the Rhineland. A B r i t i s h force was maintained at the 
S t r a i t s u n t i l the f i n a l conclusion of peace wi t h Turkey 
i n 1923. 
As before 1914 the problems of imperial defence 
were seen p r i m a r i l y i n naval terms; but a i r power now 
became a factor of some importance, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
r e l a t i o n to the defence -of" the United-Kingdom. I n the 
immediate aftermath of a v i c t o r i o u s but costly war, w i t h 
no new major enemy as yet on the horizon, w i t h demands 
f o r the reduction of armaments on p r i n c i p l e , and w i t h 
pressures f o r economy i n government expenditure so strong 
as to cast a l l e a r l i e r struggles on the subject i n t o the 
shade, defence planning was f o r several years l i m i t e d and 
t e n t a t i v e . A d i f f i c u l t y which must not be underestimated 
was that of deciding what were the threats against which 
provision should be made. The major recent enemy, 
Germany, might i n due course become a danger again but 
was not l i k e l y to be one f o r perhaps f i f t e e n years? the 
countries currently most powerful at sea, on land and i n 
the a i r were friends or a l l i e s . There were also 
continuing domestic and imperial problems such as the 
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r e l a t i o n s between and proportinal spending on the 
d i f f e r e n t Services, and rel a t i o n s between the United 
Kingdom and the Dominions» Towards the end of the 
period the question of the general l i m i t a t i o n of 
armaments by i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t y became increasingly 
important. At a f a i r l y early stage i t had to be decided 
whether the strongest naval and a i r powers were to be 
taken as the yardsticks f o r f i x i n g the l e v e l of B r i t i s h 
armaments regardless of p o l i t i c a l relationships, and 
whether ex i s t i n g friendships could be capitalised upon to 
secure agreed l i m i t a t i o n s . The answers reached f o r a i r 
and f o r naval armaments were i n some respects d i f f e r e n t , 
r e f l e c t i n g the d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l circumstances, but i n 
both f i n a n c i a l stringency played a dominant part w i t h the 
re s u l t t h a t B r i t i s h defence rested on a d i s t i n c t l y 
precarious basis. 
I n the a i r France was f o r years the strongest power and 
was also very close to the United Kingdom. Whether f o r 
that reason France should be not only taken as a yardstick 
but also regarded as a p o t e n t i a l enemy was much discussed 
between 1921 and 1925. At sea the problem was even more 
complex: i t was a matter of re l a t i o n s with the United 
States and Japan, of re l a t i o n s between those two countries, 
and of the whole strategic s i t u a t i o n i n the Far East and 
the Paci f i c . The war and the peace settlement had wrought 
far-reaching changes i n the Far East: the a l l o c a t i o n to 
Japan, as mandatory power, of the German islands north of the 
Equator; the temporary disappearance of Russian power and 
the predominantly Japanese intervention i n Siberia; 
the accelerated economic development of Japan and her 
increased hold on north China; American suspicion of 
Japanese poli c y i n China and Siberia. I n a l l these 
problems the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was 
involved as w e l l as naval policy. B r i t i s h and Japanese 
policy and interests i n China had never been the same 
and had begun to diverge increasingly; the state of 
American-Japanese rela t i o n s aroused anxiety. But at the 
same time the naval question, and the p o l i t i c a l r i s k s of 
leaving Japan isolated, made i t undesirable simply to 
terminate the alliance. The solution found at 
Washington at the end of 1921 was regarded as a great 
achievement; but i t posed new strategic problems. I t 
marked v i s i b l y the abandonment of a B r i t i s h claim to a 
pos i t i o n of primary in^lujfence among the external powers 
wit h i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East - a po s i t i o n which had 
never rested on massive strength, which had probably 
disappeared before 1914, and which would now be very 
expensive to reassert. I t increased the dependence of 
B r i t i s h policy i n the Far East i n the l a s t resort upon 
the United States; but i t also raised the question of 
how f a r even together, supposing that they could agree 
on one, B r i t a i n and the United States could supply the 
backing f o r a Far Eastern pol i c y . Once again f i n a n c i a l 
considerations hampered the search f o r an answer. 
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Defence Planning 1920-21: c a p i t a l ships and Singapore 
Early i n August 1919 the Cabinet began a 
consideration of t h e i r future policy i n the l i g h t of the 
postwar state of the country. I n connexion w i t h the 
accepted need to reduce government expenditure the 
Service Ministers, Churchill and Long, suggested that 
policy decisions on the duties of the armed forces were 
needed before t h e i r size could be f i x e d . As a r e s u l t 
f i r s t the Finance Committee of the Cabinet and then 
the Cabinet i t s e l f l a i d i t down that i n framing the 
Service estimates i t should be assumed that the B r i t i s h 
Empire would not be engaged i n a major war during the 
next ten years and that an expeditionary force would not 
be required; and also that the " pr i n c i p a l " function of 
the m i l i t a r y and a i r forces was to provide garrisons f o r 
India, Egypt and a l l t e r r i t o r y under B r i t i s h c o n t r o l : 
obligations under the peace t r e a t i e s were not mentioned.^ 
As regards the navy the chief problem was whether the 
United States should f o r the f i r s t time be taken i n t o 
account i n framing the standard governing the size of 
the navy. Discussion on t h i s question was inconclusive. 
For the time being i t was decided that no a l t e r a t i o n 
should be made i n the pre-war standard and that no new 
naval construction should be undertaken. One of the 
objects of Grey's mission to Washington i n the autumn of 
2. W o C . 606A, 5 Aug. 1919; W.C. 6l6A, 15 Aug., CAB 23/15; 
Cabinet Finance Committee, 11 Aug., CAB 27/71. 
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1919 was to induce the United States Government to 
modify t h e i r naval programme; but owing to President 
Wilson's i l l n e s s nothing concrete was achieved. By the 
end of the year p a r i t y w ith the United States was i n 
eff e c t accepted, but the naval estimates f o r 1920-21 
(3) 
were no more than a stop-gap. v ' 
I t was not u n t i l June 1920 that the Committee of 
Imperial Defence decided to explore the whole question 
of defence anew. v Having e l i c i t e d papers from the 
War Office, the Admiralty, the India Office and the 
( 5 ) 
Foreign Office, v ' the secretariat summarised the naval, 
m i l i t a r y and a i r obligations of the B r i t i s h Empire. 
Under the heading "Defence of B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y and 
naval "bases at home and overseas, "~ i t - was pointed -out 
that despite the defeat of Germany i t was not possible 
to dispense w i t h a scheme of home defence. For the 
purpose of revising standing i n s t r u c t i o n s the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of war w i t h a revived Germany or wi t h Germany and Russia 
3. G.T. 7975, 12 Aug. 1919, CAB 24/86; W.C. 6l6A, CAB 
23/15. The naval question i s discussed by J. Kenneth 
McDonald, "Lloyd George and the search f o r a postwar 
naval pol i c y , 1919", i n Lloyd George, Twelve Essays, 
ed. A.J.P. Taylor, London 1971, pp.191-222; and more 
b r i e f l y by Stephen R o s k i l l , Naval Policy between the 
Wars, Vol. I , The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 
1919-1929, hereafter c i t e d as Naval Policy, London 
1968, pp.214-19. 
4. C.I.D. 133rd meeting, 29 Jun. 1920, CAB 2/3. The 
C.I.D., which had been suspended during the war, 
seldom met again as such u n t i l 1922, i t s business 
between 1920 and 1922 being mainly conducted by the 
Standing Defence Sub-Committee chaired by Balfour. 
The minutes of the sub-committee were subsequently 
renumbered as minutes of the C.I.D. See R o s k i l l , 
Hankey, Vol. I I , pp.154-7. 
5. C.I.D. Papers 251-B, 252-B, 253-B, 255-B, CAB 4/7. 
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combined had been postulated. A l t e r n a t i v e l y the scheme 
of home defence could be based on the forces actually i n 
existence which might be used f o r an attack on the 
United Kingdom: at present these forces were French. 
No a i r force was available f o r home defence. Under the 
heading "Treaties of Peace and Agreements with Foreign 
Powers," Mesopotamia, Palestine, Persia and Constantinople 
were discussed before Europe. M i l i t a r y l i a b i l i t i e s i n 
the p l e b i s c i t e areas were said to be temporary, but the 
strength of the occupation force i n the Rhineland bore 
no r e l a t i o n to the requirements i f complications arose. 
I t was suggested that provision f o r possible obligations 
to the League of Nations should not be made u n t i l the 
Council-had—given some"indication of-what-members were - — 
expected to do. The chief B r i t i s h obligations were 
summarised as: (a) to maintain superiority at sea over 
any combination of powers l i a b l e to be arrayed against 
the Empire: (b) to keep s u f f i c i e n t forces i n the United 
Kingdom to maintain i n t e r n a l order, to meet the I r i s h 
s i t u a t i o n , and to provide d r a f t s and reserves f o r overseas 
garrisons; (c) to have s u f f i c i e n t forces overseas to 
meet the s i t u a t i o n i n Egypt, Palestine, India and 
Mesopotamia and to give e f f e c t to B r i t i s h policy i n 
Persia; (d) to garrison defended ports overseas; (e) 
to provide s u f f i c i e n t forces to f u l f i l B r i t i s h 
obligations under the peace t r e a t i e s ; ( f ) to have plans 
fo r the rapid expansion of forces i n case of emergency. 
The paper ended w i t h a l i s t of questions which i t was 
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suggested that the Committee of Imperial Defence might 
answers ( l ) At what standard are naval forces to be 
maintained? W i l l i t be enough f o r the time being to 
maintain them at a strength equal to that of the United 
States? (2) W i l l i t be the policy of Great B r i t a i n i n 
the future to support France, Belgium or the Netherlands 
i n the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany? (3) 
How f a r are the Government prepared to assist with 
m i l i t a r y forces i n enforcing the terms of the peace 
t r e a t i e s w i t h regard to the neutralised zone of the 
(6) 
S t r a i t s v ' and the occupation of German t e r r i t o r y ? 
(4) Should the r e l i e f of m i l i t a r y forces i n Egypt, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia by naval and a i r forces be 
considered? ("5) Is the defence -of I n d i a - t o be ~ 
reconsidered? (6) Is the scheme f o r home defence to be 
revised and i f so should i t be based f o r the time being 
on the p o s s i b i l i t y of France being the enemy? (7) Is 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of war with the United States being 
forced upon B r i t a i n to be taken i n t o account i n 
considering the defence of Canada and the West Indies? 
(8) I s the p o s s i b i l i t y of war with Japan to be taken i n t o 
(7) 
account i n considering the Far East? v ' 
6» The Treaty of Sevres created a zone of t e r r i t o r y , 
including both shores of the S t r a i t s and adjoining 
t e r r i t o r i a l waters, i n which only B r i t a i n , France 
and I t a l y were to have the r i g h t of maintaining 
armed forces. 
7. C.I.D. Paper 257-B, 20 Sep. 1920, CAB 4/7. 
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I t was not to be expected that a l l these questions 
should be discussed, s t i l l less answered, at once. The 
three related questions of the naval standard, r e l a t i o n s 
w ith the United States, and r e l a t i o n s w i th Japan came up 
f i r s t i n connexion with a request to the Cabinet from 
the Admiralty f o r authority to s t a r t four new c a p i t a l 
ships i n 1921-22 and four more i n 1922-23, and to complete 
ships already p a r t l y b u i l t . ^ The Committee of 
Imperial Defence considered the question on 14 December, 
at a f u l l - s c a l e meeting with the Prime Minister i n the 
chair. Lloyd George said that the problem before them 
was that of the kind of navy on which they would have to 
depend i n the future f o r the protection of the Empire and 
i t s communications. I t was p a r t l y a p o l i t i c a l and p a r t l y 
a technical question. I n the f i r s t place there was the 
problem of i d e n t i f y i n g the "probable enemy". The German 
navy no longer existed, but there were two formidable new 
naval powers. They were now r e a l l y b u i l d i n g against each 
other, but the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t one or other f l e e t might 
be used against B r i t a i n had to be taken i n t o account. 
The ground f o r the pre-war decision not to allow f o r the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h the United States - that 
f o r economic as w e l l as m i l i t a r y reasons B r i t a i n could 
not f i g h t her - was equally applicable now. Competition 
would be ruinous, not only because of the cost of the 
ships but also because, i n the atmosphere of antagonism 
8. CP. 2176, 22 Nov. 1920, CAB 24/115. 
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that would arise, the United States would immediately 
demand f u l l repayment of the B r i t i s h war debt. Competition 
w i t h Japan would also be very expensive. No responsible 
statesman could commit B r i t a i n to what might be a 
disastrous r i v a l r y except f o r the most compelling reasons; 
every means of amicable arrangement must be exhausted f i r s t . 
There were signs that the new Administration would prefer 
such an arrangement rather than continue w i t h the 
previous one's naval programme. He suggested that they 
might explore the idea of d i v i d i n g the seas - B r i t a i n to 
be supreme i n "the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the 
Indian Seas, etc., while the United States should be 
conceded unchallenged sup e r i o r i t y i n her special seas" 
(unspecified)o Secondly, there was the question of what 
types of ship should be b u i l t and how the lessons of the 
war should be examined. 
The Ministers present a l l favoured t r y i n g to reach 
an accommodation with the United States. Churchill, 
however, said that he started from the standpoint that 
B r i t a i n must remain the strongest naval power. He did 
not see why t h i s should cause offence to the United 
States. I t was only f o r a few years before the war that 
B r i t a i n had avowedly b u i l t i n competition w i t h Germany; 
before t h a t , her policy of naval supremacy had not been 
directed against any p a r t i c u l a r countries. But he could 
see that American-Japanese competition brought the 
future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance i n t o question. He 
had always favoured the alliance, but the terms might 
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have to be reconsidered, not least because of Dominion 
objections to Japanese immigration., Curzon remarked that 
reconsideration of the alliance had already been forecast, 
but said that he s t i l l regarded i t as a useful check on 
aggressive Japanese policy i n China and elsewhere. 
Chamberlain, r e f e r r i n g back to Lloyd George's 
opening remarks, said that before embarking on competition 
with the United States they must consider whether i t could 
be carried through. Before 1914 there had been no doubt 
that B r i t a i n ' s resources were adequate f o r competition 
w i t h Germany, despite the s t r a i n . But there could be 
l i t t l e doubt that the United States would o u t s t r i p 
B r i t a i n unless the Dominions contributed on an unprecedented 
scaleo He thought that" they must -take every possible-step 
to obviate competition. Bonar Law considered that the 
United States might f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to keep up naval 
expansion unless national pride were aroused by B r i t i s h 
competition. He was i n c l i n e d to think, therefore, that 
i t was worth running a l i t t l e r i s k now rather than s t i r 
up American antagonism. The r e a l problem, he suggested, 
was what could be done by diplomatic action to obviate 
competition between B r i t a i n , the United States and Japan. 
The three Service chiefs contributed l i t t l e to the 
discussion. Beatty stressed that the time factor was 
very important i f equality were to be maintained. An 
accommodation w i t h the United States had not been reached 
since the previous autumn, so a decision about a building 
programme must be made now. The Admiralty were not 
1 1 9 
hidebound by the idea that sea power must be measured 
i n post-Jutland battleships; they were thinking i n 
terms of t o t a l sea power, but they could not a f f o r d more 
than a small margin of i n f e r i o r i t y i n c a p i t a l ships. 
Trenchard spoke of the importance of a i r attack both on 
the United Kingdom and on shipping, but he agreed that 
f o r the next two years surface vessels would be more 
important than a i r c r a f t i n naval warfare„ Wilson agreed 
that competition with the United States was impracticable, 
but said that the Empire could not be held together i f 
tropps could not be moved f r e e l y from one part to 
another. 
The discussion was adjourned u n t i l the following 
week. On 2 3 "December the Committee decided to set up a -
sub-committee to hear evidence about the place of c a p i t a l 
ships i n the navy. This decision did not please the 
Admiralty, who would have preferred to conduct t h e i r own 
enquiry. Long, who was i l l and had not attended the 
meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, complained 
to Lloyd George about the future of the navy being 
discussed without consultation with him, and wrote t h a t 
" a l l questions about what we can a f f o r d , what alliances 
we can enter i n t o , etc., are r e a l l y subsidiary to the 
9 . C.I.D. 1 3 4 t h meeting, CAB 2 / 3 . 
1 0 o C o I . D o 1 3 5 t h meeting, CAB 2 / 3 . Wartime experience 
had raised questions about the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of 
c a p i t a l ships to torpedo or even a i r attack. Naval, 
as w e l l as c i v i l i a n , opinion was much divided on 
the subject. 
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main question - are we, or are we not, to r e t a i n the 
supremacy of the seas-" I n answer to a question 
from Beatty at the meeting of 23 December, Lloyd George 
affirmed that the one-power standard s t i l l stood, but 
he refused to agree to two c a p i t a l ships being l a i d down 
i n the coming summer. 
Provision was made i n the 1921 naval estimates f o r 
preliminary expenditure on four new c a p i t a l ships, but 
t a l k of attempting to l i m i t competition with the United 
States was now public and pressing. Conservative 
Ministers had doubts about the party p o l i t i c a l 
(12) 
consequences of abandoning t r a d i t i o n a l policy; ^ ' but 
Lord Lee of Fareham, who succeeded Long as F i r s t Lord i n 
February and had American connexions^ f e l t t hat the only 
hope f o r the future was to come to an immediate 
(13 
understanding with both the United States and Japan- v 
Lee put out feelers f o r an agreement i n a speech to the 
Society of Naval Architects and i n the Admiralty's 
statement on the naval estimates, as w e l l as through 
American contacts <> On 19 March he wrote to Lloyd George 
l i e Long to Lloyd George, 13 Dec. 1920; Lloyd George 
to Long, 14 Dec; Long to Lloyd George, 17 Dec, 
Lloyd George Papers, F/34/1/54, 57, 58. 
12. Balfour to Bonar Law, 3 Mar. 1921, Bonar Law 
Papers, Beaverbrook Library, 100/3/3. 
13. Lee to Lloyd George, 10 Feb. 1921, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/31/2/50. 
that despite doubts expressed by Sir Auckland Geddes, 
the Ambassador i n Washington, he was convinced that the 
present moment was favourable f o r an Anglo-American 
discussion. And the approach of the Imperial Conference 
made i t the more important not to delay; i f the 
Dominions could not be t o l d the r e s u l t s of discussion 
w i t h the United States and, i f possible, Japan, the 
s i t u a t i o n would not be clear enough f o r an approach to 
them on naval co-operation. 
The Admiralty, however, were s t i l l anxious to s t a r t 
on the new ships. On 15 July they appealed to the 
Cabinet against a Treasury r u l i n g that the money was not 
available. The Washington Conference was now a coming 
r e a l i t y , but-Lee pointed out t h a t - i f the ships were-not 
l a i d down before the conference met, and i f i t decided 
against f u r t h e r laying down, B r i t a i n would be relegated 
to t h i r d place f o r twenty years. The Cabinet then 
decided to give the Admiralty authority to construct the 
(15) 
four ships provided f o r i n the 1921 estimates. v ' 
Shortly before the Imperial Conference met i n June 
1921 the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet 
discussed the development of a naval base at Singapore. 
14. H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 139, cols. 1766-7; Lee to 
Lloyd George, 19 Mar. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/31/2/52; William Reynolds Braisted, The United 
States Navy i n the Pacific 1909-1922, Austin, Texas, 
1971, PP.555-4; E.J. Young, Powerful America, New 
York 1936, pp.48-54. 
15. CP. 3137, CAB 24/126; C. 60(21), 20 J u l . , CAB 23/26. 
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Although there was no expectation of keeping a large 
f l e e t i n the Pacific i n peacetime, a base wi t h reserves 
of f u e l was necessary i f the f l e e t were to be able to 
operate there at a l l . There was no dockyard capable of 
taking modern c a p i t a l ships east of Malta; Sydney was 
regarded as too f a r from a possible theatre of operations; 
Hong Kong was too vulnerable. Singapore had been 
reasonably adequate before the war, but the docks could 
not take large modern ships, and the navy's change to 
o i l f u e l meant that new storage f a c i l i t i e s would be 
needed. The t o t a l cost of development was expected to 
be nearly £5 m i l l i o n spread over eight years. The e f f e c t 
on Japan of developing a base i n the Far East was 
considered, but i t was argued that-i-t- would- be-less 
serious i f the work were started soon and done gradually 
than i f i t were begun l a t e r when re l a t i o n s might be less 
good. I n explaining the recommendations to the Cabinet 
Balfour said that the base would be needed even i f the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance were renewed: they could not 
continue i n a s i t u a t i o n where i t was impossible f o r 
whatever f l e e t i t was decided to maintain to be used i n 
the area where i t was most l i k e l y to be needed. Some 
Ministers stressed that i t was almost more important to 
be able to t e l l the Dominions that there was a naval 
policy than to s t a r t development immediately. On the 
understanding that no considerable expenditure was 
l i k e l y f o r the next two years, the Cabinet approved the 
development of Singapore and agreed to t e l l the Imperial 
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Conference that the more help the Dominions could give the 
sooner the programme would be completed. 
When the Imperial Conference reached defence 
questions on 4 July, Lee gave a survey of the p o l i t i c a l 
and f i n a n c i a l p osition. A one-power standard had been 
adopted, he said, but i t was doubtful whether B r i t a i n 
could a f f o r d even t h i s unless the Empire shared the cost 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Proposals would be put before the 
Dominions showing what they could most us e f u l l y do. 
With the present American and Japanese construction 
programmes the p o s i t i o n i n another four or f i v e years 
would be serious, and B r i t a i n could not f a l l too f a r 
behind. I f i t were argued that the wor^ d needed disarmament 
and that B r i t a i n should set an example, he would point out 
that the navy had already been reduced to below i t s 1914 
strength while other countries were s t i l l b u i l d i n g . 
Without i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement the Empire could not 
possibly reduce i t s strength any furt h e r . Beatty then 
spoke about naval strategy and explained the reasons f o r 
the choice of Singapore as a Far Eastern base. I t was 
not possible, he said, to r e l y on the United States to 
defend B r i t i s h possessions and communications i n the 
western Pacific, since she would hardly be able to 
(17 
defend her own possessions of the Philippines and Guam. v 
16. C.I.D. Paper 143-C, CAB 5/4; C.I.D. 140th and l 4 l s t 
meetings, 10 and 13 Jun. 1921, CAB 2/3; CP. 3039, 
CAB 24/125; C. 50(21), 16 Jun., CAB 23/26. The 
Admiralty also prepared a paper f o r the C.I.D. 
recommending building up o i l f u e l reserves over a 
period of fourteen years; C.I.D. Paper 145-C, CAB 
5/4. 
17. E. 14th meeting, CAB 32/2. 
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On 19 July the conference agreed that "equality i n 
f i g h t i n g strength w i t h any other Naval Power" must be 
the minimum standard f o r the Empire, but i t proved 
impossible to agree on any proposal f o r sharing the cost. 
By t h i s time the American i n v i t a t i o n to a conference on 
the l i m i t a t i o n of armaments had been announced, so that 
the question might seem to have l o s t urgency. The 
positions of the Dominion Governments were so d i f f e r e n t , 
however, that i t i s u n l i k e l y that agreement would have 
been reached i n any case. Hughes of Australia and Massey 
of New Zealand were anxious that the whole Empire should 
bear a proportionate share of the cost; Meighen not only 
upheld the r i g h t of the Canadian Parliament to decide 
Tor i t s e l f but said that i t was expecting~dxsarmament and 
would not approve any expenditure. Hughes proposed that 
the Dominions should undertake to contribute i n 
proportion to the numbers of t h e i r white population. 
Meighen, Smuts, and Edwin Montagu on behalf of India 
objected, and Smuts suggested th a t the Dominions should 
(18) 
contribute from t h e i r share of reparation receipts. v ; 
Next day Treasury representatives were present to point 
out that the t o t a l Empire share of reparations was 
u n l i k e l y to be large enough. Meighen stressed that h i s 
objection was not based on cost but on the f a c t that the 
Canadian Parliament would not sanction any contribution 
to an imperial navy. Hughes enquired what r i g h t the 
18. E. 26th meeting, CAB 32/2; E. 26A meeting, CAB 2 3 / 4 . 
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Dominions could claim to discuss foreign p o l i c y i f they 
made no contribution to sea power. Smuts referred to 
South African p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s but said that they 
must not leave the whole burden to the United Kingdom. 
Lloyd George said that the f l e e t was essential to the 
whole Empire, but the United Kingdom would go to the 
brink of bankruptcy rather than s a c r i f i c e her naval 
posi t i o n i f the Dominions would not contribute. The 
Canadian Minister of Marine, Ballantyne, was anxious to 
refute any suggestion that Canada was not concerned f o r 
the Empire, but said that j u s t now Parliament would not 
agree to any contribution. Canada's p o s i t i o n was 
d i f f e r e n t from A u s t r a l i a 8 s ; only B r i t i s h Columbia was 
at a l l affected by Pacific a f f a i r s . Smuts repeated 
that he had not suggested a contribution, but only a 
deduction from reparation receipts before they were 
di s t r i b u t e d . Meighen rep l i e d that even t h i s would be 
(19) 
impossible. v ' 
The only resolution on which, even a f t e r f u r t h e r 
discussion, i t proved possible to agree was an extremely 
anodyne one recommending co-operation i n providing f o r 
naval defence but s t a t i n g that the determination of the 
method and cost was a matter f o r the several Parliaments, 
19. E. 26B meeting, CAB 32/4. The Admiralty had i n 
1918 proposed a single imperial navy. After that 
had been rejected by the Imperial War Cabinet, 
Je l l i c o e v i s i t e d several of the Dominions to advise 
them on b u i l d i n g up t h e i r own naval forces. See 
R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, pp.274-88. 
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and that any recommendations should be deferred u n t i l 
a f t e r the Washington Conference. Hughes f e l t bound to 
reserve the Australian p o s i t i o n i f Canada would not 
contribute, and was not moved by Balfour's observation 
that since the United Kingdom had always borne most of 
the burden one Dominion should not refuse to pay what 
i t could j u s t because another was paying less. Smutg's 
proposal was recorded, with an undertaking that each 
Prime Minister would approach his own Parliament. The 
Admiralty proposals f o r Dominion co-operation were held 
over u n t i l the p o s i t i o n was more clear a f t e r the 
Washington Conference. 
The future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
Discussion of the future of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance began i n the autumn of 1919 and proceeded 
largely independently of that on naval po l i c y u n t i l the 
summer of 1921, The circumstances which the successive 
agreements of 1902, 1905 and 1911 had been intended to 
(21) 
meet no longer existed. v ' The agreement of 1911 would 
20o E. 26C meeting; E. 31A meeting, CAB 32/4; Cmd 1474 
of 1921, Conference of Prime Ministers and 
Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, 
and India, held i n June, July, and August 1921. ' 
Summary of Proceedings and Documents. 
21. Agreement of 1902 i n B.F.S.P., Vol. XCV, pp.83-4; 
agreement of 1905, Vol. XCVIII, pp.136-8; agreement 
of 1911, Vol, CIV, pp.173-4. 
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reach i t s term i n 1921. Although i t would not then 
expire unless notice of termination had been given by 
(22) 
13 July 1920, ' reconsideration and revision i n the 
l i g h t of the changed circumstances i n the Far East would 
be natural. Revision might also be necessary to make 
the agreement compatible w i t h the terms of the Covenant. 
The problem f e l l i n t o four i n t e r r e l a t e d parts: the 
future p o l i t i c a l alignment of Japan i f the alliance were 
terminated; Japanese policy i n China and the extent to 
which i t could be influenced or checked; B r i t a i n ' s naval 
po s i t i o n i n the Pacific; the p o s s i b i l i t y of co-operation 
with the United States. 
B r i t i s h aims i n the Far East were defined by the 
Charge-d'Affaires i n Tokyo-, — i n - a -letter of October 19197" 
as peace and the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of China, close 
co-operation w i t h the United States and, i f possible, 
f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with Japan and Japanese co-operation 
i n the peaceful development of the area. Alston assumed 
that the alliance would at least have to be modified: he 
regarded a "union" between B r i t a i n , the United States 
and Japan as the ideal substitute. I f t h i s couldrbe 
achieved, an Anglo-American understanding might make i t 
22. A r t i c l e VI of the 1911 agreement provided that i t 
should remain i n force f o r ten years from the date 
of signature. I f neither party gave notice of 
termination twelve months before the expiration of 
ten years, the agreement would remain binding u n t i l 
the end of one year from the date on which either 
party did denounce i t . 
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possible to dispense w i t h Japan; but i f B r i t a i n had 
to deal w i t h Japan alone the posit i o n would be d i f f i c u l t , 
especially as Japan would probably seek friends 
(23) 
elsewhere. v ' 
The only factor not included i n t h i s analysis was 
the naval question. Once that was added, nothing i n i t 
needed to be changed i n the next eighteen months. 
Discussion revolved i n the main about the r e l a t i v e 
importance of the d i f f e r e n t factors. I n the early months 
of 1 9 2 0 the Foreign Office sought the views of the 
Service Departments, the Colonial Office and the India 
(24) 
Office and then attempted to draw up a balance sheet. v 
I n a memorandum of 28 February a member of the Far 
Eastern Department, C.H. Bentinck, wrote-that the B r i t i s h 
Empire was i n an exposed p o s i t i o n i n the Far East. Either 
Japan must be kept f r i e n d l y or B r i t a i n would have greatly 
to increase her naval forces: on the other hand re l a t i o n s 
with the United States must not be embarrassed. A 
middle course between the two countries, however d i f f i c u l t , 
23. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. VI, N o . 5 2 2 , Alston also 
reported that i n f l u e n t i a l opinion i n Japan appeared 
to favour continuance of the alliance or some 
understanding, but that a German-Russian-Japanese 
alliance was not beyond the bounds of p o s s i b i l i t y : 
op. c i t . , Nos. 528, 598, 657. 
24. D . B . F o P . , Ser. I , Vol. VI, Nos.744, 789, n.; 
F 751/199/23, F O 371/5358. 
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('25') must be found. v 1 The balance of opinion i n the 
Department at t h i s time tended towards renewal of the 
alliance or continuance i n some modified form, but the 
question had not yet been considered at higher levels. ^2^^ 
Before t h i s consideration took place i t was decided 
to inform the League of Nations that i f the alliance 
were continued a f t e r July 1921 i t would be i n a form 
consistent w i t h the Covenant. The i n i t i a t i v e f o r t h i s 
move came from the B r i t i s h side; the Dominion Governments 
(27) 
were consulted; and the Japanese Government agreed. v '' 
There was some confusion l a t e r about the meaning of t h i s 
n o t i f i c a t i o n , the Foreign Office legal advisers and the 
Law Officers of the Crown holding t h a t i t amounted to 
notice of termination of the 191T agreement, the" Japanese-
25. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. VI, No.76l. 
26. Op. c i t . , No.789 n. Copies of the correspondence 
so f a r were circulated to the C.I.D. i n March. At f t ^ o j u the Colonial Office the C.I.D. secretariat 
produced an appreciation of the strategic 
consequences of terminating the all i a n c e : C.I.D. 
Papers 121-C, 122-C, 124-C, 126-C, CAB 5/3-
27. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.4l, 45, 46, 55, 65; 
CO. 30450, 31254, CO 5 3 2 / 1 6 2 ; F 1230, 1266, 1290. 
1399/199/23, FO 371/5359; League of Nations O f f i q a l 
Journal, No.5, 1920, pp.252-3. 
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Government maintaining that i t did not. ^ 2 8^ 
At the end of July 1920 a more intensive, and 
higher l e v e l , discussion of future p o l i c y began i n the 
Foreign Office. A new d r a f t t r e a t y was drawn up and 
sent f o r comment to some senior axperts on the Far East -
Sir John Jordan, u n t i l 1919 Minister i n Peking, 
Sir Conyngham Greene, u n t i l 1919 Ambassador i n Tokyo, 
and Alston, now i n England before taking up the post of 
Minister i n Peking. I n a note on the d r a f t t r e a t y 
Sir Cecil Hurst commented that the Japanese desire f o r 
renewal was presumably based on a wish to prevent an 
Anglo-American combination i n the Pacific. A German-
Russian-Japanese combination would be very strong on the 
mainland ~of Asia but would not provide s u f f i c i e n t sea 
power. The only way by which Japan could u l t i m a t e l y 
withstand an Anglo-American combination was to gain 
complete control over China. The alliance was supposed 
28. F 1509/199/23, FO 371/5360; F 2034/63/23, FO 371/6673; 
F 2316/63/23, FO 371/6674; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, 
Nos.277, 283, 287, 288, 291, 295, 301, 310, 320. 
The a t t i t u d e of the Japanese Government at t h i s time 
and l a t e r was extremely r e t i c e n t . The Minister f o r 
Foreign A f f a i r s did not mention the alliance a f t e r he 
had been t o l d i n July that there would be no 
negotiations u n t i l a f t e r the Imperial Conference 
(which was then expected to be held i n the autumn of 
1920). However i n August Lloyd George mentioned the 
idea of a t r i p a r t i t e agreement w i t h the United States 
to the r e t i r i n g Japanese Ambassador, Viscount Chinda: 
D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.36, 44, 52, 70; 
I.H. Nish, "Japan and the ending of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance," i n Studies i n International History, 
Essays presented to W.N. Medlicott, edd. K. Bourne 
and D.C. Watt, London 1957, p p . 3 7 2 - 4 ; Braisted, The 
United States Navy i n the Pacif i c , p.557. 
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to secure the Open Door i n China, but i n practice i t 
had not served as an obstacle to the Japanese i n 
strengthening t h e i r position. Hurst concluded that the 
advantage to B r i t a i n of renewing the alliance was less 
than that offered by an Anglo-American combination; 
but i f the United States would not co-operate, i t would 
be dangerous f o r B r i t a i n to allow Japan to j o i n a 
German-Russian combination. The threat of such a 
combination had recently been described by the new 
Ambassador i n Tokyo, Sir Char.les E l i o t , as "hardly 
conceivable at the present moment," and he thought that 
the Japanese were u n l i k e l y to wish f o r a connexion w i t h 
Bolshevik Russia. Nevertheless, E l i o t wrote, "Japan, i f 
she believed herself" "to be "threatened" by Great B r i t a i n " 
and America, might j o i n i n a t r i p a r t i t e a l l i a nce, should 
the Germans ul t i m a t e l y prove able to take Russia i n 
tutelage, and i t i s perhaps unwise to suppose that only 
the m i l i t a r y and oligarchic party could make such an 
Alliance." ^ 3 0^ 
Before he received the new d r a f t , Alston, on 
a r r i v i n g i n England, had submitted a memorandum on an 
"Anglo-Saxon" policy f o r the Far East. He advocated an 
Anglo-American understanding on naval power i n the 
Pacific and on maintaining the i n t e g r i t y of China. He 
29. F 1914/199/23, FO 371/5360o I have not been able 
to trace the t e x t of the d r a f t t r e a t y . 
30. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.52. 
1 3 2 
considered that such an understanding could be achieved, 
and that i t should suffice to keep Japan i n check. 
A memorandum by Wellesley, head of the Far Eastern 
Department, had accompanied the d r a f t . I n a revised 
version, dated 1 September, Wellesley showed less 
optimism than Alston w i t h regard to the United States. 
He concluded that the alliance had been of greater 
benefit to Japan than to Britain,, and had e n t i r e l y f a i l e d 
i n regard to the Open Door i n China. The argument f o r a 
renewal of the alliance lay almost e n t i r e l y outside i t s 
professed aims: they were powerful, i f the agreement 
could be divested of the character of an alliance. 
Wellesley did not fear any danger from a strong, modern, 
united China. Taking the guiding p r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h 
p o l i c y i n the Far East to be "a ca r e f u l l y planned 
constructive p o l i c y f o r China, and the creation of a 
proper equilibrium of economic in t e r e s t s i n that country," 
Wellesley saw four possible courses of action on the 
alliance. The f i r s t was simply not to renew i t . This 
would mean leaving i t to the League of Nations to 
maintain Chinese independence and i n t e g r i t y , and r e l y i n g 
on the recently established four-power consortium po l i c y 
to maintain the Open Door. w < w Japan would probably 
3 1 o D o B . F . P . 9 Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.80. 
3 2 . For the consortium see D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. VI, 
Ch. I I , and Vol. XIV, Chs. I - I I I , passim: Survey 
of Inter n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1 9 2 0 - 2 3 , p p . W - 5 2 . 
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become h o s t i l e . The second course was to renew the 
1911 agreement with only such modifications as would 
bring i t i n t o l i n e w i th the Covenant. I n t h i s case 
B r i t a i n would have rather more hold over Japan, but 
f r i c t i o n over China would increase and the p o s i t i o n 
would be anomalous. The t h i r d course was to renew the 
agreement i n a form less l i k e an alliance, and open i t 
to the accession of other countries. This would s t i l l 
meet the Service Departments' desire f o r a f r i e n d l y 
Japan, but the United States could not be counted upon 
to j o i n and the desired hold over Japan would be watered 
down. The fou r t h course was to renew the agreement i n 
the same form as i n the t h i r d course but without an 
accession clause, and to aim' at a parairel~ -agreement w i t h " 
the United States with the object of u l t i m a t e l y 
consolidating the two i n t o a m u l t i l a t e r a l t r e a t y 
(33) 
including China and possibly, other countries as w e l l . v ' 
In t h e i r comments Jordan and Greene both generally agreed 
(34) 
w i t h the aim of the f o u r t h course. w ' I t was now 
decided to set up a small committee i n the Foreign Office 
to consider the question of the renewal/ of the alliance 
33- D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.97. The f i r s t part 
of the memorandum, not there printed, i s i n 
F 2200/199/23, FO 371/5361. 
I 
34. Memoranda by Joran, 24 Aug. 1920, and Greene, 11 
Sep., F 2077, 211.6/199/23, FO 371/5360; D.B.F.P., 
Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.97, n.10. 
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and future B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the Far East. 
I n a l l the discussion so f a r the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
co-operation w i t h the United States featured largely; 
but equally doubts were expressed whether the United 
States would co-operate; s t i l l more whether she would 
j o i n any kind of agreement- The authors of several of 
the papers, however, urged that i t was v i t a l to f i n d 
out American views and intentions before any decisions 
were made- I t was known that the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance was d i s l i k e d i n the United States, where i t was 
widely, although erroneously, held to commit B r i t a i n to 
support Japan i n the event of a Japanese-American 
c o n f l i c t . (36) There was an American feeler i n the 
summer of 1920 which would have made possible an informal 
exchange of views. On instr u c t i o n s from Washington the 
Counsellor of the United States Embassy t o l d the Foreign 
Office that the State Department hoped that i f the 
35- The committee consisted of T y r e l l , Jordan, Greene, 
and Wellesley. Further information and observations 
were sought from the Embassies i n Washington and 
Tokyo and the Legation i n Peking; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , 
Vol. XIV, Nos.97, n . l , 139, 144; F 2396/199/23, F0 
371/5361. 
36. The 1911 agreement excluded from the scope of h o s t i l e 
action any state w i t h which either party had a 
general a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y . An Anglo-American 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y was negotiated i n 1911 but f a i l e d 
of r a t i f i c a t i o n by the Senate. A more l i m i t e d Peace 
Commission tr e a t y was concluded i n September 1914, 
and i t was then made clear to the Japanese Government 
that B r i t a i n regarded i t as equivalent to a general 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y and as thus covered by A r t i c l e 4 
of the 1911 agreement. 
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a l l i a n c e were renewed some p r o v i s i o n would be included 
about the Open Door and Chinese r i g h t s , and t h a t i t 
should s p e c i f i c a l l y cover the Anglo-American Peace 
Commission Treaty. He also suggested t h a t discussion on 
co-operation i n China would be welcomed. The 
suggestion was repeated a month l a t e r , but although 
Wellesley recommended t h a t the approach be taken up, 
(^8) 
nothing was done. ^ ' Curzon was u n w i l l i n g t o say 
anything i n p u b l i c about the renewal of the a l l i a n c e , but 
d i d not e x p l a i n h i s disapproval of u n o f f i c i a l soundings. 
I t may have been due t o the approach of the American 
e l e c t i o n s , or t o the expectation, soon afterwards 
abandoned, t h a t the I m p e r i a l Conference was going t o take 
place i n the autumn. Whatever the -reason, the lack" o f 
even i n f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n meant t h a t when the Foreign 
O f f i c e committee r e p o r t e d a t the end of January 1 9 2 1 they 
3 7 •> Papers R e l a t i n g t o the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, hereafted c i t e d as F.R.U.S., 1 9 2 0 , 
"VOT7~IT71^1>80-1; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, 
No.40, n . 2 . 
3 8 . Op. c i t . , Nos* 4 0 , n . 7 , 9 7 , n . 1 0 . The U.S. Ambassador 
repor t e d t o the State Department t h a t he had been 
assured t h a t i n any r e d r a f t i n g of the a l l i a n c e i t 
would be made q u i t e c l e a r t h a t i t was not aimed a t 
the United States. M.G. Fry, "The North A t l a n t i c 
T r i a n g l e and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese 
A l l i a n c e , " i n Journal of Modern H i s t o r y , XXXIX 
( 1 9 6 7 ) , p.4 9 , s l i g h t l y misquotes t h i s assurance. 
3 9 . Minute, 2 0 Jun. 1 9 2 0 , F 1 0 2 8 / 1 9 9 / 2 3 , FO 3 7 1 / 5 3 5 9 = 
Curzon wrote t h a t i f Geddes thought t h a t the matter 
was e x c i t i n g r e a l alarm i n the United States he would 
r e p o r t i t ; but even when Geddes recommended t h a t i t 
should be made c l e a r t h a t the agreement was not being 
renewed but was merely not being allowed t o lapse 
before the I m p e r i a l Conference met, no statement was 
made; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No .43« 
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s t i l l knew l i t t l e about American i n t e n t i o n s . 
Since by then President Harding's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
had not y e t taken o f f i c e , t h e i r views could i n any case 
h a r d l y have been formulated precisely., Geddes's f o r e c a s t s 
of t h e i r a t t i t u d e were not p a r t i c u l a r l y encouraging., He 
wrote on 1 5 November t h a t American o p i n i o n was almost 
u n i f o r m l y suspicious of Japan and would be r e a l l y h o s t i l e 
t o a renewal of the a l l i a n c e unless i t were so watered 
down as t o be p r a c t i c a l l y meaningless. He thought t h a t 
sober o p i n i o n would probably welcome an exchange of notes 
a f f i r m i n g the p r i n c i p l e of the Open Door, and an 
Anglo-American understanding on naval s t r e n g t h i n the 
P a c i f i c . But the Senate would not agree t o anything 
l i k e - an a l l i a n c e , and the country could not be r e l i e d 
upon t o abide f o r long by any agreement unless i t were 
c l e a r l y seen t o serve American i n t e r e s t s . Geddes thought 
t h a t i t would be unwise t o decide now against renewal, 
unless i t were considered so important t o avoid f r i c t i o n 
w i t h the United States t h a t the Government were prepared 
t o give way on any question t h a t the United States might 
r a i s e . He recommended i n s t e a d renewing the a l l i a n c e 
w i t h o u t m i l i t a r y clauses f o r a p e r i o d corresponding t o 
an American p r e s i d e n t i a l term, and t r y i n g t o secure some 
agreement w i t h the United States f o r the same p e r i o d and 
i n a form not r e q u i r i n g r a t i f i c a t i o n . E l i o t , i n 
commenting on Wellesley's memorandum, also warned against 
r i s k i n g the enmity of Japan and recommended renewing the 
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a l l i a n c e i n a form c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Covenant. 
E l i o t had also reported, as asked, on Japanese 
economic c o n d i t i o n s . He considered t h a t a t present the 
main Japanese o b j e c t was economic expansion; the middle 
classes wanted i t , by cautious methods; but popular 
o p i n i o n might be more aggressive. There was, he be l i e v e d , 
no c a r e f u l l y thought out government p o l i c y of expansion 
t o the detriment of other c o u n t r i e s . The Legation 
a t Peking also r e p o r t e d t h a t despite the complaints of 
B r i t i s h merchants about the Japanese, there was l i t t l e 
evidence t h a t they were using i l l e g i t i m a t e methods. Only 
where they had succeeded, through c o n t r o l over 
communications, i n e s t a b l i s h i n g something l i k e a 
condominium, were they i n a p o s i t i o n " t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h " ~ 
(Lp) 
equal o p p o r t u n i t y . v ' 
At the end of December Wellesley informed A l s t o n 
t h a t the Foreign O f f i c e committee were going t o recommend 
dropping the a l l i a n c e and s u b s t i t u t i n g an exchange o f 
notes between B r i t a i n , Japan, and the United States. 
A l s t o n r e p l i e d t h a t he agreed w i t h t h i s course: he also 
stressed the importance of c o n s u l t i n g China before any 
40. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.l62, 175, 181. 
41. Tokyo t e l . 418, 5 Nov. 1920; Tokyo desp. 556, 
26 Nov., F 2758, 3350/199/23, FO 371/5361. 
42. D^B.F.R, Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.195, 198. 
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agreement were made concerning her. K ^ D ) The f i n a l 
v e r s i o n of the committee's r e p o r t was dated 21 January 
1921. I t s t a t e d t h a t the problem of the Far East turned 
on Japan's p o l i c y towards China. The fundamental 
question f o r B r i t a i n was whether her t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y -
peace, the p r o t e c t i o n o f her possessions and i n t e r e s t s , 
the independence and i n t e g r i t y of China, and equal 
o p p o r t u n i t y - was s u f f i c i e n t l y l i k e Japanese p o l i c y t o 
make renewal of the a l l i a n c e on the basis of i d e n t i c 
i n t e r e s t s and common p r i n c i p l e s e i t h e r p r a c t i c a b l e or 
de s i r a b l e . An examination of the p o s i t i o n s of China and 
Japan suggested t h a t the answer was no. Japanese p o l i c y 
was one of expansion motivated by economic needs, aiming 
"at" the c o n t r o l of Chinese resources-and even at—hegemony 
over the Far East and the P a c i f i c . P o t e n t i a l l y strong 
but p o l i t i c a l l y weak, China o f f e r e d a standing 
t e m p t a t i o n t o Japan. Japanese a c t i v i t i e s so f a r had 
r e s u l t e d i n the exc l u s i o n of f o r e i g n competition. 
Expansion was a v i t a l n e cessity f o r Japan but her aims 
were d i v e r g i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y from the p r i n c i p l e s on which 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y had always been based. I f i t were 
objected t h a t non-renewal o f the a l l i a n c e would remove 
a l l r e s t r a i n t on Japan, i t must be answered t h a t the 
43. Tel. unnum. t o Peking, 23 Dec. 1920; Peking t e l . 
unnum., 30 Dec, F 91, 92/63/23, FO 37l/6671» 
Chinese h o s t i l i t y t o renewal of the a l l i a n c e , or t o 
mention t h e r e i n o f China, had already been expressed, 
and such expressions m u l t i p l i e d i n the f i r s t h a l f of 
1921. B r i t i s h r e s i d e n t s i n the Far East were also 
g e n e r a l l y opposed t o renewal. 
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a l l i a n c e had not been an e f f e c t i v e brake on her, and 
Chinese resentment a t renewal would have a serious e f f e c t 
on B r i t i s h t r a d e . 
However the committee admitted the f o r c e of the 
arguments against l e a v i n g Japan i s o l a t e d and p o t e n t i a l l y -
h o s t i l e . Her p r o j e c t e d expenditure on armaments f o r the 
next few years was very l a r g e . I f the present Japanese 
and United States naval programmes were maintained, 
B r i t a i n would be faced w i t h heavy o b l i g a t i o n s unless she 
r e l i n q u i s h e d her p o s i t i o n i n the Far East. The s o l u t i o n 
proposed would not be a s u b s t i t u t e f o r adequate naval 
f o r c e s , but the committee b e l i e v e d t h a t i t would help t o 
discourage naval competition. The most important 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n was t h a t i f the c a r d i n a l element of f u t u r e 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y were t o c u l t i v a t e close r e l a t i o n s w i t h the 
United States and secure American co-operation i n 
maintaining w o r l d peace, renewal o f the a l l i a n c e i n 
anything l i k e i t s present form might be a serious 
obstacle. 
The committee d i d not recommend departing from the 
p r i n c i p l e s which had determined B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the 
Far East i n the past, but proposed r a t h e r a more p o s i t i v e 
approach - i n p a r t i c u l a r a c o n s t r u c t i v e p o l i c y f o r the 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of China. The independence and i n t e g r i t y 
of China depended on the r e a l maintenance of the Open 
Door p o l i c y , f o r economic p e n e t r a t i o n l e d u l t i m a t e l y t o 
p o l i t i c a l encroachment and the danger l a y as much i n 
China's weakness as i n the aggressive tendencies of Japan. 
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But i t would be hopeless t o embark on such a p o l i c y 
singlehanded or w i t h o u t adequate naval s t r e n g t h . 
American co-operation was indispensable and might be 
hoped f o r since American i d e a l s i n China were i d e n t i c a l 
w i t h B r i t a i n ' s . 
The recommendation of the committee t h e r e f o r e was 
t h a t the a l l i a n c e should be dropped, and be replaced i f 
possible by a t r i p a r t i t e understanding between the United 
States, Japan, and B r i t a i n i n the form of a d e c l a r a t i o n 
of p r i n c i p l e s which could be subscribed t o w i t h o u t the 
r i s k of embarrassing commitments. Only i f the United 
States found i t impossible t o enter i n t o any such 
arrangement d i d the committee suggest a new 
Anglo-Japanese agreement, conforming t o the s p i r i t of ~the 
League of Nations and so framed as not t o exclude 
(44) 
eventual American p a r t i c i p a t i o n . v 
This r e p o r t represented probably the best-informed 
(45) 
B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g about the Far East a t the time. v ^' 
The a n a l y s i s of Japan's p o s i t i o n proved accurate over 
the next twenty years. Subsequent events were t o show 
t h a t the committee were o v e r - o p t i m i s t i c about China, both 
as t o the extent t o which she could be helped t o r e s i s t 
Japanese encroachment and as t o the a t t i t u d e o f a strong 
44. D.B.F.Po, Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.212. 
45. Not only o f f i c i a l t h i n k i n g ; the committee took 
evidence from witnesses w i t h business experience 
i n the Far East. 
141 
modern China t o the western world. Nevertheless the 
r e p o r t d i d not receive wide c i r c u l a t i o n outside the 
Foreign O f f i c e and dip l o m a t i c serv i c e . I t appears t o 
have been shown t o the I n d i a O f f i c e and the C o l o n i a l 
O f f i c e , ^ w a g n o^. submitted t o the Committee 
of I m p e r i a l Defence or the Cabinet, nor sent t o the 
Dominions as one o f the papers f o r the I m p e r i a l 
Conference. The committee was set up i n the Foreign 
O f f i c e t o advise the Secretary o f State, and c i r c u l a t i o n 
would have i m p l i e d t h a t Curzon accepted i t s recommendations, 
whereas i t appears from the l a t e r discussions i n the 
Cabinet and the I m p e r i a l Conference t h a t t h i s was not 
a l t o g e t h e r the case. However a wider d i s t r i b u t i o n would 
have: saved TTisunderstanding w i t h the Canadian Government 
a t the time, and could have saved l a t e r misconceptions 
about B r i t i s h views and the Canadian impact on p o l i c y . 
On 15 February Meighen telegraphed t o Lloyd George 
recommending t e r m i n a t i o n o f the a l l i a n c e , a conference 
of P a c i f i c powers, and p r e l i m i n a r y soundings i n 
Washington t o f i n d out the views of the new A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
(4 
a task which S i r Robert Borden was prepared t o undertake. v 
46. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.139, n . l . 
47. C o O o 7503, CO 42/1032; W.R. Graham, Arthur Meighen, 
Vol. I I , Toronto 1963, p.71 °, summary i n D.B.F.P., 
Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.26l. The message was based on 
advice t o Meighen by Loring C h r i s t i e , l e g a l adviser 
t o the Canadian Department o f Ext e r n a l A f f i r s : 
A.R.M. Lower, "Loring C h r i s t i e and the genesis o f 
the Washington Conference," i n Canadian H i s t o r i c a l 
Review, XLVII (1966), pp.42-8. 
\ 
A meeting of M i n i s t e r s discussed the message on 18 
February and agreed t o i n v i t e Borden t o London. 
Lloyd George's r e p l y appears t o have caused so much 
misunderstanding i n Ottawa t h a t i t i s worth quoting i n 
f u l l : 
"My colleagues and I have given the most c a r e f u l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o your telegram of 15 February. We 
e n t i r e l y share your view as t o the importance o f 
considering the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
A l l i a n c e from the p o i n t o f view of f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s 
between the United States and the B r i t i s h Empire, 
and we are agreed t h a t , i n whatever a c t i o n may 
e v e n t u a l l y be decided upon, i t i s of utmost importance 
t o c a r r y the United States w i t h u s . We f e e l a t the 
same time t h a t there are c e r t a i n considerations, 
which we should l i k e you t o consider, t o be urged 
against the immediate adoption o f your proposal. 
I n the f i r s t place, we have throughout f e l t t h a t 
n o thing should be done t o p r e j u d i c e the complete 
l i b e r t y of a c t i o n of the I m p e r i a l Cabinet i n regard 
t o the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Question a f f e c t s 
a l l the Dominions, and e s p e c i a l l y A u s t r a l i a , New 
Zealand and Canada. I t also a f f e c t s I n d i a and the 
B r i t i s h Possessions i n the Far East. I t i s 
feared t h a t the f o r m u l a t i o n , from an o f f i c i a l q u a r t e r , 
i n however t e n t a t i v e and i n f o r m a l a form, of a 
48. Conference of M i n i s t e r s No.79, CAB 23/38; C.8(21)A, 
CAB 23/24. 
proposal t o the United. States t h a t a round-table 
conference of a l l the Powers concerned should be 
summoned t o discuss P a c i f i c questions could, 
e s p e c i a l l y i f i t were favourably regarded by 
Washington, h a r d l y f a i l t o t i e the hands of 
Conference next June. We t h i n k i n any case t h a t 
other Dominions would have t o be consulted before 
such a proposal was approved. We t h i n k i n the 
second place t h a t , w h i l e there i s much t o be s a i d 
f o r a conference of t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n as a po s s i b l e 
u l t i m a t e s o l u t i o n , there are very many questions t o 
be s e t t l e d before the d e c i s i o n t o make such a 
proposal could be reached. The questions a t issue 
a f f e c t the general f o r e i g n p o l i c y of the Empire 
and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n o f Great B r i t a i n . 
They are inseparably bound up w i t h problem o f naval 
s h i p b u i l d i n g , the f u t u r e of the League o f Nations, 
and i t s disarmament programme. For some months 
various expert committees have been s i t t i n g i n 
t h i s country considering the various p o l i t i c a l , 
m i l i t a r y , naval and economic issues i n v o l v e d , w i t h 
the o b j e c t of p l a c i n g members of the I m p e r i a l 
Cabinet i n possession of a l l considerations 
necessary t o enable them t o a r r i v e a t a judgment. 
We t h i n k , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t there are very strong 
arguments f o r having a f u l l d i scussion between the 
various Governments o f the B r i t i s h Empire of the 
whole problem i n the l i g h t of the i n f o r m a t i o n which 
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i s now being c o l l e c t e d , before making any o f f i c i a l 
approaches, however i n f o r m a l , t o the United States 
of America. 
" I t i s recognised a t the same time t h a t the 
a t t i t u d e of the new United States Government towards 
f o r e i g n questions, the League of Nations and 
disarmament, must be a v i t a l f a c t o r i n our 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s , and we should g r e a t l y welcome an 
interchange o f views w i t h the Canadian Government, 
both upon main problem i t s e l f and also on whether 
any s p e c i a l steps should be taken t o sound American 
o p i n i o n before the Conference meets, and as t o the 
manner i n which t h i s could be done w i t h o u t 
p r e j u d i c i n g the freedom of a c t i o n of the TmperlaT 
Cabinet. Would i t t h e r e f o r e be p o s s i b l e t o ask 
S i r Robert Borden, a f t e r having discussed the 
question i n a l l i t s bearings w i t h you, t o come over 
here t o confer w i t h us upon t h i s subject? The 
b e n e f i t of h i s experience and advice would be 
g r e a t l y valued, and he could then place before you 
the t e n t a t i v e conclusions a t which we had a r r i v e d 
d u r i n g our conversations, and, i f necessary, we 
could place them before the Governments of the 
(Lq) Dominions." v 
49. CO. 9680, C042/1039; summarised i n D.B.F.P., Ser.I 
Vol. XIV, No.261, and i n Graham, Art h u r Meighen, 
Vol. I I , pp.71-2. 
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This attempt t o get the Canadian Government t o 
recognise the wide r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f the question, and 
the f a c t t h a t others were i n v o l v e d , m i s f i r e d completely,, 
Although d r a f t e d by P h i l i p Kerr, w i t h whom C h r i s t i e had 
r e c e n t l y had conversation i n London, (^0) most 
courteously worded, the telegram does have a s l i g h t 
tone o f superior wisdom and the references t o the wider 
issues were h a r d l y e x p l i c i t , although only those t o the 
League of Nations might be misleading. I t i s hard t o 
see, a l l the same, why C h r i s t i e should have regarded 
the message as i n s i n c e r e and have concluded t h a t the 
United Kingdom Government were moving away from 
Anglo-American co-operation. He apparently completely 
misunderstood the reference t o naval questions^ and 
be l i e v e d t h a t the B r i t i s h wished t o bla c k m a i l the 
United States i n t o ceasing naval b u i l d i n g and e n t e r i n g 
the League, (^l) 
Meighen's answer t o Lloyd George, on 1 A p r i l , was 
t h e r e f o r e argumentative. He dismissed the wider 
considerations, claimed t h a t Canadians knew more about 
the United States than committees s i t t i n g i n London, 
h i n t e d t h a t Canada might refuse t o j o i n a renewed 
Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e , and repeated t h a t h i s proposal 
50. Lower i n Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review, XLVII (1966), 
p. 41. 
51. C h r i s t i e ' s comments summarised b r i e f l y i n Graham, 
Arth u r Meighen, Vol. I I , p.72, and at greater 
l e n g t h by M.G. Fry i n Journal of Modern H i s t o r y , 
XXXIX (1967), pp.54-5o 
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should be acted upon. With g r e a t e r i n j u s t i c e , he argued 
t h a t the f r e e d e c i s i o n of the I m p e r i a l Conference was 
more l i k e l y t o be pr e j u d i c e d i f they d i d not know i n 
advance the American a t t i t u d e towards a possible 
a l t e r n a t i v e . w ' The t h r e a t of independent Canadian 
a c t i o n was alarming, and the Far Eastern Department 
recommended sending the Foreign O f f i c e committee's r e p o r t 
t o the Dominions as soon as p o s s i b l e . (^3) ^ soothing 
r e p l y , d r a f t e d by Curzon, was sent t o Meighen on 26 
A p r i l , promising t h a t the d e c i s i o n o f the I m p e r i a l 
Conference would be completely f r e e , p o i n t i n g out t h a t 
the A u s t r a l i a n a t t i t u d e made i t e s s e n t i a l not t o 
pr e j u d i c e the question of a P a c i f i c conference, and 
urg i n g the" Canadian Government not t o approach Washington 
independently a t t h i s stage. (54) 
The reference t o the A u s t r a l i a n a t t i t u d e i s 
presumably one t o Hughes's speech i n the House of 
Representatives on 8 A p r i l , recommending renewal of the 
a l l i a n c e i n some modified form. Apart from an enquiry 
52. CO. 15957, CO 42/1033; summarised i n D.B.F.P., 
Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.26l, and i n Graham, Arthur 
Meighen, Vol. I I , p.72. Since the copy i n the 
Borden Papers bears no date of despatch, Graham was 
u n c e r t a i n whether the telegram was ever sent, and 
says t h a t t h e r e was apparently no r e p l y . 
53. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.261. 
54. CO. 15857, CO 42/1033; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, 
No.261, n.13. C h r i s t i e ' s memory was e v i d e n t l y a t 
f a u l t when he t o l d A.R.M. Lower i n 1938 t h a t the 
B r i t i s h Government wished t o leave the a l l i a n c e o f f 
the agenda of the I m p e r i a l Conference and t h a t the 
Canadians had had t o press hard t o get i t included; 
Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review, XLVII (1966), p.41. 
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i n A p r i l 1920, when i t was s t i l l expected t h a t the 
I m p e r i a l Conference would be h e l d t h a t year, asking f o r 
i n f o r m a t i o n about any conversations w i t h the Japanese 
and saying t h a t the A u s t r a l i a n Government would wish t o 
discuss the a l l i a n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o the Far East 
(55) 
s i t u a t i o n as a whole, K ^ J > no A u s t r a l i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
on the subject appear t o have been made i n London. 
The Cabinet discussed the whole question on 30 May. 
Curzon introduced the subject by rehearsing the h i s t o r y 
o f the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e and the arguments f o r and 
against renewal. As t o h i s own recommendations, Curzon 
said t h a t the n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n was t o suggest a 
t r i p a r t i t e agreement i n c l u d i n g the United States. The 
d i f f i c u l t y was t h a t the a n t i - B r i t i s h p a r t y there would 
probably not t o l e r a t e one, and t h a t i t would f a i l i n the 
Senate. Moreover, as Geddes had stressed, there was no 
guarantee of c o n t i n u i t y i n American p o l i c y . The 
a l t e r n a t i v e which Curzon was i n c l i n e d t o favour, and 
which he thought everyone but the Canadians would accept, 
was t o admit a t once t h a t the present agreement must be 
modified and, w h i l e proposing t o Japan t o renew i t i n a 
r e v i s e d form, t o claim the r i g h t t o consult other 
i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . He thought t h a t the Government 
should take t h i s l i n e a t the I m p e r i a l Conference. An 
55. F 656, 733/199/23, FO 371/5358. The Times on 27 
May repo r t e d Massey as t e l l i n g a correspondent t h a t 
t h e r e was a good deal t o be gained from renewal and 
noth i n g t o be l o s t . 
148 
agreement might he made w i t h the United States a t the 
same time, but he would not propose American p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n the Anglo-Japanese agreement a t present-
C h u r c h i l l s a i d t h a t Canada was c e r t a i n l y against 
renewal and had proposed a P a c i f i c conference, and he 
thought t h a t A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand were actuated more 
by f e a r o f Japan than by f r i e n d l y sentiment. A l l the 
same i t was as w e l l t h a t they had advocated renewal, f o r 
i t would be a very serious matter f o r the United Kingdom 
Government t o o v e r r i d e the Dominion Prime M i n i s t e r s i f 
they were u n i t e d against renewal. He thought t h a t i t 
would be p o s s i b l e t o get agreement, and t h a t even the 
Canadians d i f f e r e d more over method than over the aim. 
I t would be of enormous advantage i f something could be 
done t o b r i n g the United States and Japan together. The 
one-power standard would be very expensive f o r B r i t a i n 
i f American-Japanese competition continued, and the 
Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e would spur the American on. 
Everything p o s s i b l e should be done t o obviate r i v a l r y 
w i t h the United States, but he d i d not know what the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would say. H e w o u i Q l i k e t o e x p l a i n 
56. On 23 May the Senate had passed the Borah 
Resolution a u t h o r i s i n g and requesting the President 
t o i n v i t e B r i t a i n and Japan t o a conference f o r the 
purpose of reducing naval armaments i n the P a c i f i c . 
The House of Representatives approved the r e s o l u t i o n 
on 28 June. During the f i r s t h a l f of 1921 evidence 
and advice reaching London about the a t t i t u d e t o 
l i m i t a t i o n and the s t r e n g t h o f the naval lobby i n 
the United States was c o n f l i c t i n g : f i l e A 18/45, 
FO 371/5616. 
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t o the Dominion Prime M i n i s t e r s the importance o f 
renewing the a l l i a n c e , and t e l l them t h a t the B r i t i s h 
Government favoured h o l d i n g a conference, f a i l i n g which 
the agreement should be renewed i n a r e v i s e d form w i t h 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s t o make sure t h a t the United States 
Government understood t h a t i t was not i n any way d i r e c t e d 
against American i n t e r e s t s . 
Chamberlain suggested t h a t there would be a great 
d i f f e r e n c e between B r i t a i n summoning the conference and 
the United States doing so. He thought t h a t i t would be 
o 
very u s e f u l i f they could get the President t o c a l l i t . 
B a l four suggested combining Curzon's and C h u r c h i l l ' s 
proposals. He d i d not see why they should not t e l l the 
Japanese and the Americans'that they~thought"a"general"~ 
agreement d e s i r a b l e . He favoured renewing the a l l i a n c e 
f o r a short term, but a t the same time they should say 
t h a t they wanted a P a c i f i c conference. Bearing i n mind 
the r e s t r i c t i o n s on Japanese immigration elsewhere, they 
should be c a r e f u l about t r y i n g t o keep the Japanese out 
of China. 
Lee stressed the importance o f Anglo-American 
r e l a t i o n s . He said t h a t he had r e c e n t l y discussed the 
r i v a l r y between the two c o u n t r i e s w i t h the former 
American naval commander i n Europe, Admiral Sims. 
According t o the Admiral, the American people were 
vehemently opposed t o the a l l i a n c e and as long as i t 
continued i t would be very d i f f i c u l t t o curb the demand 
f o r more ships. There was no l i m i t t o the United States' 
capacity t o b u i l d ships: she could compete w i t h B r i t a i n 
and Japan combined. He d i d not agree w i t h Geddes's 
op i n i o n t h a t the a l l i a n c e would r e s t r a i n hot-headed 
Americans: on the c o n t r a r y , he thought t h a t they were 
determined t o see the United States the strongest naval 
power. He was i n c l i n e d t o favour C h u r c h i l l ' s view and 
would suggest t h a t the United States Government should 
be p r e v a i l e d upon t o c a l l a conference. I t would be 
worth t r y i n g , and they could not a f f o r d a d i f f e r e n c e 
o f o p i n i o n w i t h i n the Empire. v ' 
Montagu spoke of Japanese a c t i v i t i e s i n I n d i a and 
the necessity o f removing I n d i a from the scope of a new 
agreement. He favoured renewal i n a modified form and 
the""hblding of a conference. Curzon sai d t h a t a ~ 
conference would take time t o arrange and t h a t the 
agreement, which was about t o ex p i r e , would have t o be 
renewed f i r s t . Lloyd George summed up by saying t h a t 
i f the agreement were not renewed Japanese resentment 
would be intense. He thought Curzon's arguments 
i r r e s i s t i b l e , and a German-Russian combination a f u t u r e 
p o s s i b i l i t y . Japan had been a l o y a l a l l y : i f B r i t a i n 
a l i e n a t e d her, i t would be n a t u r a l f o r her t o respond 
t o Russo-German advances. He s i n c e r e l y hoped t h a t no 
one would contemplate dropping Japan, and he d i d not 
see why they should. The Cabinet agreed t o support a t 
57. I n a memorandum w r i t t e n f o r the Cabinet on 21 May 
Lee had advocated a t r i p a r t i t e agreement on the 
P a c i f i c , and sounding the Americans at once: 
CP. 2957, CAB 24/123. 
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the Imperial Conference the proposal that the United 
States should be asked to summon a conference of Pacific 
powers, but only a f t e r i t had been made clear to Japan 
and other countries concerned that B r i t a i n had no 
in t e n t i o n of dropping the allianc e . They also agreed 
that the terms of the new agreement must be consistent 
with the Covenant and must be such as not to offend 
American s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s . There should be conversations 
with the United States and China before the agreement was 
renewed, and Japan should be f u l l y informed. Meanwhile 
the agreement would be renewed pr o v i s i o n a l l y f o r three 
months at a time. The Cabinet also asked f o r a paper 
from the Committee of Imperial Defence on the strategic 
consequences i n the Far East i f the alliance"were 
terminated. (^8) 
This paper was available on 17 June. I t s 
conclusions were, f i r s t , that from the strategic point of 
view renewal of the alliance would have the advantage of 
making war wi t h Japan a more remote p o s s i b i l i t y ; second, 
that , leaving aside the p o l i t i c a l complications, B r i t a i n 
would have much to gain from renewal unless a f r i e n d l y 
understanding w i t h both the United States and Japan were 
a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y ; t h i r d , that whether or not the 
alliance were renewed the B r i t i s h naval p o s i t i o n i n the 
Far East must be improved and bases developed; but 
58. C. 43(21), CAB 23/25; summarised b r i e f l y i n Graham, 
Arthur Meighen, Vol. I I , pp.72-3, and at length by 
M.G. Fry i n Journal of Modern History, XXXIX 
(1967). 
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fo u r t h , that i f the alliance were terminated the 
provision of naval bases would, become urgent and the 
whole strategic s i t u a t i o n would have to be reviewed, 
Curzon also circulated to the Imperial Conference 
an account of opinions on the Pacific said to be held 
by the United States Government. That ocean, wi t h 
Latin America, was expected to be the main theatre f o r 
promoting American interests and f o r an active foreign 
policy. The A t l a n t i c would be v i r t u a l l y abandoned to 
B r i t a i n , but i n return she must acknowledge American 
predominance i n the Pacific and the Dominions there must 
look to the United States f o r protection. Geddes 
was now revising h is e a r l i e r view that renewal of the 
alliance would"not cause p a r t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the 
United States, and was recommending an attempt to reach 
a t r i p a r t i t e agreement. He floated the idea to the 
Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, on 2 3 June and 
was given some encouragement. 
The Dominion representatives had arrived i n London 
by the middle of June, and Meighen's i n t e n t i o n to 
59. C.I.D. Paper 144-C, CAB 5/4, ci r c u l a t e d f o r the 
Imperial Conference as paper E. 15, CAB 32/6. 
60. E. 14, CAB 3 2 / 6 . The information came i n d i r e c t l y 
from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Theodore Roosevelt Jr: Washington desp. 565, 5 
Jun. 1921, A 4202/2027/45, FO 371/5693= The views 
were similar to those of William Howard Gardiner, 
a leading f i g u r e i n the United States Navy League, 
discussed by Fry i n Journal of Modern History, sea DV 
(1967)o XXXIX 
6 1 • D«B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.294, 308; F.R.U.S., 
1921, Vol. I I , pp.314-16. 
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oppose renewal of the alliance was known, K } When 
the conference began on 20 June the opening speeches 
of the various Prime Ministers, although couched i n 
general terras, revealed t h e i r d i f f e r e n t views on the 
future of the alliance,. Hughes and Massey recommended 
renewal, subject to specific exclusion of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t w i th the United States arising,, 
Meighen claimed that Canada's voice should carry special 
weight i n decisions a f f e c t i n g r e l a t i o n s with the United 
States, and said that alliances of any kind were 
inconsistent with the purposes of the League of 
Nations. 
Serious discussion of the alliance i n the 
conference began 6h728 June, Curzon said that the" 1911 
agreement had e f f e c t i v e l y been denounced i n July 1920 
and was therefore about to expiree Four courses of 
action were open: to abandon the alliance altogether; 
to renew i t i n terms consistent w i t h the Covenant; to 
expand i t i n t o a t r i p a r t i t e agreement; and to renew 
i t i n a d i f f e r e n t form during or a f t e r a conference of 
Pacific powers. He i n c l i n e d , he said, to prefer the 
fo u r t h course. (^4) -^ext day Meighen and Hughes expressed 
diametrically opposed views. Meighen repeated that 
62o Hankey to Lloyd George, 15 Jun. 1921, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/25/1/41. 
6 3 c E. 2nd and 6th meetings, 21 and 24 Jun. 1921, CAB 
32/2. 
64. E. 8th meeting, CAB 32/2. 
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Canada d i s l i k e d a l l alliances, but l a i d greatest stress 
on the p o s i t i o n of the United States. He believed that 
any kind of Anglo-Japanese agreement would harm r e l a t i o n s 
w ith the United States and render agreement on disarmament 
impossibleo He discounted Japanese resentment at 
non-renewal, but thought that American opinion would 
favour a t r i p a r t i t e agreement, Hughes questioned 
Meighen's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of American opinion, which did 
not square w i t h Geddes's e a r l i e r reports or wi t h what the 
United States Ambassador had j u s t said to Curzon. ^-*) 
The Empire, he said, must not have i t s pol i c y dictated 
by the United States. The future of the alliance was a 
matter of security f o r Australia, and he would only 
support~~ab andoning T t i f "the ~UhTtM"~S1^tes~ w^M~gi ve 
assurances about security,, The question must be 
discussed i n r e l a t i o n to naval policy. Smuts temporised: 
on the one hand Japan must not be offended; on the 
other hand alignment with the United States was of 
fundamental importance. He favoured negotiations on the 
whole complex of questions, Massey supported Hughes, 
saying th a t New Zealand's p o s i t i o n was the same as 
Australia's, and that she did not wish to look to the 
65. On 28 June Curzon outlined the problem to Colo Harvey, 
and asked whether, i f the conference decided on 
renewal i n some form, t h i s would necessarily meet an 
unfavourable reception by the United States 
Governmento Harvey said not necessarily; whatever 
decision was taken would be treated r e s p e c t f u l l y by 
his Governmento I t only transpired a week l a t e r 
that Harvey was not representing his Government's 
views; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol, XIV, Nos.313, 317, 
323, 326, 329o 
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United States f o r p r o t e c t i o n 
Before the next meeting of the conference the 
Cabinet, on 30 June, discussed the po s i t i o n thus revealed. 
They noted that the Canadian objection to renewal was 
even stronger than they had expected, and that Geddes 
was now changing his advice. They were i n a d i f f i c u l t y 
over alterna t i v e proposals because they d id not know the 
views of the United States and Japanese Governments. 
They f i n a l l y decided t o investigate anew the legal 
p o s i t i o n about the expiry of the agreement, and to 
propose to the conference a f u l l exchange of views w i t h 
the United States and Japan. 
The same afternoon Lloyd George put the proposal to 
the conference. Friendship with the United"States, he 
said, was so fundamental a point of imperial p o l i c y that 
i t seemed almost bad taste to mention i t . Certainly 
they could never embark on a policy that would involve 
a breach. But he did not accept that renewing the 
alliance would mean a breach; i t would, a f t e r a l l , not 
be a new policy. Refusal to renew, however, would 
c e r t a i n l y mean a breach with Japan. He did not regard 
a Japanese-American c o n f l i c t as i n e v i t a b l e , and s t i l l 
thought i t possible to influence Japanese poli c y i n 
China. He thought th a t the positions could be reconciled, 
6 6 . E. 9th and 10th meetings, CAB 32/2. Discussion of 
naval po l i c y did not begin u n t i l 4 July. 
6 7 c C. 56(21), CAB 23/26. 
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and that there was no need to do anything about the 
alliance before a conference was held, since the Lord 
Chancellor now advised that the n o t i f i c a t i o n to the 
League i n 1920 did not constitute notice of termination. 
Birkenhead i n his r o l e of deus ex machina then explained 
his reasons f o r t h i s opinion. I t was greeted w i t h 
general r e l i e f : the immediate problem was solved. 
There was s t i l l disagreement, however, about the 
future of the alliance. On 1 July Meighen argued that 
i t should be denounced before the conference met: 
Hughes said that they should go to the conference with 
the i n t e n t i o n of renewing i t . Curzon explained that to 
denounce the agreement on the eve of the conference 
without Japanese consent would be an a r b i t a r y act, and 
suggested that they should wait to see whether the 
conference would produce a new arrangement. I n the end 
i t was agreed that nothing should be said about the 
agreement either way f o r the time being, but that Curzon 
should ask the United States, Japanese, and Chinese 
(69 
Governments whether they would j o i n i n a conference. v 
U n t i l the B r i t i s h archives were opened, w r i t e r s 
dealing with the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
mainly from the Canadian angle tended to overestimate 
Meighen's triumph i n supposedly securing singlehanded a 
68. E. 11th meeting, CAB 32/2. 
69. E. 12th and 13th meetings, CAB 32/2. 
1 5 7 
reversal of imperial policy. u ' The defect of the 
Canadian p o s i t i o n at the time was the f a i l u r e to 
appreciate the Pacific problem i n naval terms, which 
loomed so large f o r Australia and New Zealand that they 
i n t u r n underestimated the importance of Anglo-American 
re l a t i o n s . Canadian blindness to sea power, natural f o r 
a continental people protected against outsiders by the 
B r i t i s h navy and dependent on the goodwill of t h e i r 
larger land neighbour, i s r e f l e c t e d i n the accounts of 
w r i t e r s using mainly Canadian material. None of them, 
7 0 , The best of these accounts i s tha t of M.G. Fry i n 
Journal of Modern History, XXXIX ( 1 9 6 7 ) . Others 
include; J.B. Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese 
-Alliance and the Washington Conference,!!_in — 
P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, L ( 1 9 3 5 ) , p p . 4 5 - 4 7 ; 
J.B. Brebner, North A t l a n t i c Triangle, New York 
1 9 4 5 , p p . 2 8 1 - 3 ; J=S. Galbraith, "The Imperial 
Conference of 1 9 2 1 and the Washington Conference," 
i n Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review, XXXIX ( 1 9 4 8 ) , pp. 
1 4 3 - 5 2 ; M. Tate and P. Foy, "More l i g h t on the 
abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," i n 
P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, LXXIV ( 1 9 5 9 ) , p p = 5 3 2 - 5 3 ; 
J . C o Vinson "The Imperial Conference of 1 9 2 1 and 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," i n Pacific H i s t o r i c a l 
Review, XXXI ( 1 9 6 2 ) , p p . 2 5 7 - 6 6 ; Graham, Arthur 
Meighen, Vol. I I , p p . 8 9 - 9 6 ; A.R.M. Lower, "Loring 
Christie and the genesis of the Washington 
Conference," i n Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review, XLVII 
( 1 9 6 6 ) , p p . 3 8 - 4 8 " I n a recent study based on the 
B r i t i s h archives, B r i t i s h Strategy i n the Far East 
1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 9 , London 1 9 7 1 , Wm Roger Louis concludes tha t 
but f o r Meighen the B r i t i s h Government would have 
renewed the allianc e . On the other hand M.G. Fry 
now concludes ( I l l u s i o n s of Security. North A t l a n t i c 
Diplomacy 1 9 1 8 - 2 2 , Toronto 1 9 7 2 , p p . 1 5 1 - 2 ) that 
Meighen's success was not great i n so f a r as the 
B r i t i s h Government retained the option of renewing 
the alliance i f a t r i p a r t i t e agreement were not 
achieved. 
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f o r example, seems to have put together the discussions 
i n the Imperial Conference on the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and on naval policy, or to have noted the 
Canadian refusal to contribute anything to naval defence-
Neither the Canadians at the time, nor these w r i t e r s , 
appear to have realised how greatly a t r i p a r t i t e 
agreement was desired i n London as the ideal solution, 
nor on the other hand how doubtful, i n the l i g h t of past 
experience both i n the Far East and i n Europe, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a l American co-operation was bound to 
seem. However the idea of a conference of Pacific powers 
does seem to have come o r i g i n a l l y from Canada, and 
Meighen's intransigence at the Imperial Conference does 
appear to have brought i t to the f o r e f r o n t f o r immediate 
action. I t may w e l l be, also, that Meighen's 
intransigence was responsible f o r producing Birkenhead's 
opinion that the 1911 agreement had not been denounced, 
an opinion which overruled that of the Law Officers and 
broke the immediate deadlock. This i s not, however, to 
say that Birkenhead's opinion was simply a matter of 
expediency: i t accorded with what Curzon himself 
(71) 
thought, w ' although he f e l t bound to pass on the 
legal advice given to him, and w i t h the view of the 
Japanese Government. 
71. Minute, 14 Jun. 1921, D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, 
No.588, n.2. 
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The Washington Conference 
I n accordance w i t h the decision of the Imperial 
Conference Curzon on 4 and 5 July asked the Japanese, 
Chinese, and United States representatives i n London 
whether t h e i r Governments would j o i n i n a conference on 
Pacific questions, to be called by the United States 
Government. On 10 July the United States Government 
made known t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to c a l l a disarmament 
conference i n Washington. There ensued some weeks of 
confusion as to whether there should be preliminary 
t a l k s on Pacific questions while the Dominion Prime 
Ministers were s t i l l available; but owing to American 
refusal the idea was abandoned, and on 11 August the 
formal" i n v i t a t i o n s to a single conference" i n Washington ~ 
(72) 
were issued. v ' 
The l i s t of subjects proposed f o r the agenda by 
the United States Government was extremely wide and 
(71) 
general, and doubts were f e l t i n London whether 
without preliminary discussions the conference could be 
ef f e c t i v e . Crowe did not rate the chances of a general 
disarmament agreement highly. As regards the 
Anglo-Japanese all i a n c e , the Prime Minister stated i n 
the House of Commons that the Government would welcome 
i t s merging i n t o a t r i p a r t i t e understanding, but would 
72. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Ch. V; F.R.U.S., 1921, 
Vol. I , pp. 18-51. 
73. F . R c U . S . 9 1921, Vol. I , pp.67-8. 
74. Minute, 13 Aug. 1921, A 5907/18/45, FO 371/5618. 
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not abandon i t unless something equally good could be 
(75) 
substituted. w v y The Americans were t o l d that B r i t a i n 
was prepared to discuss the alliance at Washington, but 
only p r i v a t e l y . Geddes, reporting on 21 September that 
the atmosphere had e n t i r e l y changed from the suspicions 
of July, said that Hughes was aiming at a t r i p a r t i t e 
agreement on East Asia and the Pacific. 
The Foreign Office drew up notes f o r the delegation 
to Washington on every possible topic r e l a t i n g to China, 
the Far East, and the Pacific. But as Wellesley pointed 
out i n a covering memorandum of 20 October, a l l questions 
such as the Chinese Eastern Railway, t a r i f f r evision, 
and even the Open Door, were subsidiary to the r e a l l y 
fundamental questions of a naval agreement and" a 
t r i p a r t i t e understanding between B r i t a i n , the United 
States, and Japan. B r i t i s h p o l i c y at the conference 
should therefore be to concentrate on gett i n g agreement 
on the two main subjects, as f a r as possible leaving the 
rest - so f a r as they could be solved at a l l i n the 
present state of China - f o r settlement by other means 
75. H.C. Deb.. 5th ser., Vol. 146, cols. 1704-06. 
76. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.377, 380-1. 
77. Op. c i t . , No.404. Of the papers annexed to t h i s 
memorandum and not printed i n D.B.F.P., the only 
one of i n t e r e s t f o r t h i s study i s one.on B r i t i s h 
n e u t r a l i t y i n a Japanese-American war. I t concluded 
that such a war was not impossible but would be a 
disaster f o r B r i t a i n whatever i t s outcome: the only 
remedy was prevention: F 3012/2905/23, FO 371/6705. 
(77) 
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On a t r i p a r t i t e agreement two suggestions were 
considered, both on the l i n e s of a declaration of 
common policy. The f i r s t was what Geddes had considered 
i n July to be the essential from the United States point 
of view, namely a guarantee £sicj of the t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y of Pacific states, the f i r m establishment of a 
pol i c y of equal commercial and economic opportunity 
throughout the area, and possibly a policy of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
co-operation i n developing other Pacific states besides 
China. The second was a formula drafted by Sir J. Jordan, 
i n which the three countries would agree to respect one 
another's t e r r i t o r i a l possessions i n East Asia and the 
Pacific and promote peace and s t a b i l i t y i n the region, 
would~resolve to support the independence and i n t e g r i t y ~ 
of China and the p r i n c i p l e of equal opportunity, and 
would undertake to communicate fr a n k l y w ith one another 
i n case of danger to the agreement. This l a s t provision, 
i t was thought, might have some p r a c t i c a l value and be 
something posit i v e to put i n the place of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. But i t was suggested that the 
i n i t j j p i t i v e i n p u t t i n g forward a formula be l e f t to the 
United States. w ' 
The naval question was discussed by the Committee 
of Imperial Defence on 14 October. The Admiralty had 
prepared a scheme based on l i m i t i n g the number of c a p i t a l 
ships, counting post-Jutland ships only, and giving 
78. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.326, 405-
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B r i t a i n and the United States equality and each of them 
a 3:2 superiority over Japan. The Committee agreed that 
numbers of c a p i t a l ships was the only possible basis 
f o r l i m i t a t i o n , although a l l other ships being b u i l t 
should be declared. The size of the programme to be 
aimed at was not discussed, but there was general 
agreement that B r i t a i n must maintain a f l e e t equal to 
any other. The Cabinet agreed that the one-power 
standard should be adhered t o , and that the delegation 
should have di s c r e t i o n to use a notional b u i l d i n g 
programme f o r bargaining purposes. 
Since the conference was called to discuss the 
question of disarmament i n general, consideration was 
also given to land and a i r armaments. The General Staff- - -
pointed out that the strength of the B r i t i s h army was 
now 11,000 men less than i n 1913 and said that i n view 
of the s t r a i n of actual commitments no f u r t h e r reduction 
could be expected. They did not think that France was 
l i k e l y to increase her army, because of cost and the 
reluctance of public opinion; but she was equally 
u n l i k e l y to be able to reduce i t to any great extent 
u n t i l she was reassured, over a period of f i v e or six 
years, as to Germany's intentions and power to take 
revenge. The Air Staff opposed any discussion of a i r 
armaments, because l i m i t a t i o n s would be too easily evaded. 
79. C.I.D. Paper 277-B, CAB 4/7; C.I.D. 145th meeting, 
CAB 2/3. 
80. C. 83(21), CAB 23/27. 
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They also pointed out that the R.A.F. was f u l l y extended 
and was even now inadequate f o r the defence of Great 
(81) 
B r i t a i n . v ; The Cabinet, however, decided that the 
l i m i t a t i o n of a i r armaments ought to be taken up at the 
conference, and that French agreement should be sought 
i n r e t u r n f o r support over the 1919 guarantee. (^2) 
During the weeks of preparation f o r the conference 
the B r i t i s h t r i e d to maintain consultation w i t h the 
Japanese and to demonstrate consideration f o r t h e i r 
feelings. The confusion about preliminary conversations 
added to the nervous defensiveness w i t h which the 
Japanese reacted to the proposal f o r a Pacific 
conference. There was general welcome f o r a discussion 
of armaments l i m i t a t i o n , but the Pacific conference-was 
widely regarded as an attempt to summon Japan before a 
court where she would have to explain and j u s t i f y her 
policy. (^3) i x i r i n g August E l i o t continued to report 
Japanese anxiety: the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s were said 
to be anxious to maintain the alliance w i t h B r i t a i n and 
to emphasise Japan's special p o s i t i o n i n Asia. When 
81. C.I.D. Papers 276-B, 279-B, CAB 4/7; C.I.D. 146th 
meeting, CAB 2/3. For the question of home a i r 
defence see below, pp. 
82. C. 83(21), CAB 23/27. For the question of the 
guarantee see above, p. as, 
83. D^F^P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.34l, 355, 357, 365 TNOT355 was sent at the instance of the Prime 
Min i s t e r ) ; Tokyo desp. 402, 29 J u l . 1921, A 6282/18/45, 
F0 371/5618. 
84. Tokyo t e l . 291, 7 Aug. 1921, F 2960/2905/23, FO 
371/6704; Tokyo t e l . 310, 14 Aug., A 5966/18/45, F0 
371/5618; Tokyo desp. 419, 15 Aug., A 6787/18/45, 
F0 371/5619; D.3^ F.JP., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, N o s . 3 6 l , 3 6 5 . 
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the American proposals f o r the conference agenda arrived 
the Foreign Office, at Lloyd George's instance, asked 
f o r the Japanese Government's views and suggested coming 
to an agreement about the agenda. (®^) 
However, although the Foreign Minister asked f o r 
B r i t i s h views, the Japanese did not prove forthcoming 
about t h e i r own preparations. E l i o t explained t h e i r 
reticence by suggesting that they were anxious not to 
arouse American suspicion, and that they also found the 
B r i t i s h reserved. I n t r u t h , despite t h e i r professions 
of consideration, neither Government took the other i n t o 
i t s confidence. By t h e i r nature many of the B r i t i s h 
memoranda could not have been shown to the Japanese, and 
i n any case the slowness of sea communication between 
London and Tokyo would have made an exchange of papers 
d i f f i c u l t . But whatever t h e i r reservations about 
B r i t a i n , the Japanese Government instructed t h e i r 
delegation that the alliance w i th her was preferred to 
(87) 
a t r i p a r t i t e agreement. v ' 
85. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.378; A 6804/18/|4|; 
FO 371/5619. 
86. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.376, 382, 397, 548; 
Tokyo t e l . 401, 14 Oct., A 7530/18/45, FO 371/5620; 
Tokyo desp. 541, 21 Oct., A 8647/18/45, FO 371/5623. 
S. Asada, "Japan's 'Special Int e r e s t ' and the 
Washington Conference," i n American H i s t o r i c a l Review, 
LXVII (1961), p.65, stresses that the Japanese were 
determined to defend t h e i r special p o s i t i o n i n 
Manchuria and north China, and that the Americans were 
aware of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n and had no i n t e n t i o n of 
challenging i t . 
87. Nish i n Studies i n International History, edd. Bourne 
and Watt, p.380. 
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The Canadians also early showed a desire f o r 
information about B r i t i s h preparations. Before the end 
of August Christie at his l e v e l was asking f o r Foreign 
Office papers, and Meighen at his was asking f o r papers 
as w e l l as enquiring about Dominion representation at 
(88 \ 
the conference. ^ ; The form of Domination representation 
caused some d i f f i c u l t y w i t h Smuts, who did not assert any 
South African i n t e r e s t i n the subject matter of the 
conference but wished the other Prime Ministers to i n s i s t 
on separate i n v i t a t i o n s . Predictably Hughes of Australia 
disagreed and thought that Lloyd George's proposal of a 
single Empire delegation but separate f u l l powers f o r the 
Dominion members went too f a r . This solution was adopted, 
and thus n o - d i f f i c u l t y was caused wi t h the- Americans, who — 
f o r domestic reasons would almost c e r t a i n l y have objected 
to separate Dominion representatives. o n ] _ v 
remaining d i f f i c u l t y was the po s i t i o n of South A f r i c a i n 
any t r e a t i e s signed at Washington, since Smuts did not 
nominate any South African representative. After a plea 
from Lloyd George on 1 December Smuts relented and 
provided f u l l powers f o r Balfour to sign f o r South Afr i c a . 
88. F 3176/2905/23, FO 371/6705; CO. 42646, CO 532/174; 
Canadian Sessional Papers, 1922, No.47A, c i t e d i n 
R.M. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status 
1900-1936, London 1937, p.217. 
89. CO. 49075, CO 532/199; CO. 49268, 49867, 49868, 
50749, 52186, 53100, 53220, 53444, CO 532/175; CO. 
51750, CO 532/181. The Canadian share of the correspon-
dence i s i n Canadian Sessional Papers, 1922, No.47A, 
cit e d by Dawson, op. c i t . , pp.218-20. The Australian 
p o s i t i o n i s discussed^by J.C Vinson, "The problem of 
Australian representation at the Washington Conference 
fo r the Li m i t a t i o n of Naval Armaments," i n Australian 
Journal of P o l i t i c s and History, IV (1958), pp.155-64. 
90. CO. 60173, CO 532/202; CO. 6089, CO 532/176. 
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The proceedings of the Washington conference, both 
formal and informal, are so f u l l y published ^ 1 ) that 
space w i l l only be devoted here to the negotiation of 
what became the Quadruple Treaty, to p o l i t i c a l aspects 
of the armaments negotiations, and to Chinese questions 
so f a r as they affected these two main preoccupations 
of the B r i t i s h delegation-
On his way across the A t l a n t i c Balfour, who headed 
(op) 
the B r i t i s h Empire delegation, w ' succeeded i n 
separating the two questions which had h i t h e r t o been 
intertwined i n the ten t a t i v e formulae f o r a t r i p a r t i t e 
agreement, namely the respect of the three countries 
f o r each other's t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s and t h e i r j o i n t or 
in d i v i d u a l respect of China. This technical change 
enabled the problems to be discussed separately, and was 
ce r t a i n l y an improvement. The d r a f t Pacific agreement 
which Balfour produced on the voyage was intended, he 
wrote: "(a) to enable the Americans to be parties to a 
t r i p a r t i t e arrangement without committing themselves to 
9 1 . Formal proceedings (plenary sessions and committees, 
but not sub-committees) i n Conference on the 
Li m i t a t i o n of Armaments, Washington, November 1 2 , 
1 9 2 1 - F e b r u a r y 6 , 1 9 2 2 , Washington 1 9 2 2 ; informal 
conversations and correspondence i n F.R.U.S., 1 9 2 2 , 
Vol. I and D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Ch. VI. 
Accounts of the conference include Harold and 
Margaret Sprout, Towards a New Order of Sea Power, 
Princeton 1 9 4 0 , Chs.9-15; R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, 
p p . 3 1 0 - 2 8 . Braisted, The United Stales Navy In the 
P ^ i f i c _ ] J f 9 - 1 9 J 2 , p p . 5 6 7 - 6 5 3 , i s very f u l l and uses 
unpublished^American and Japanese material. 
9 2 . Lloyd George had s i g n i f i e d h i s i n t e n t i o n of going 
f o r at least part of the time, but was retained i n 
London by the I r i s h negotiations. 
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m i l i t a r y operations; (b) to bring the ex i s t i n g 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance to an end without hurting the 
feelings of our A l l y ; (c) to leave i t open to us to 
renew a defensive alliance w i t h Japan i f she should 
again be threatened by Germany or Russia; (d) to frame 
a Treaty which w i l l reassure our Australasian Dominions; 
(e) to make i t impossible f o r American c r i t i c s to suggest 
t h a t our Treaty w i t h Japan would require us to stand 
aside i n the case of a quarrel between them and Japan, 
whatever the cause of that quarrel might be," (93) j n 
the d r a f t the three countries undertook to respect each 
other's exi s t i n g t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s i n the Pacific 
islands and bordering t e r r i t o r i e s and to consult whenever 
they were thought to be~threatened by the action of 
another power. Further any two of theft parties could, 
i n the case of any such threat, protect themselves by 
a purely defensive a l l i a n c e . Any previous t r e a t y on the 
defence of t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s i n the region was to be 
(94) 
superseded. w ' 
At his f i r s t conversation w i t h Hughes on 11 November, 
Balfour altered the words "treaty" and "alliance" to 
"arrangement" throughout the drafto Since Hughes seemed 
worried at the suggestion that he might show i t to the 
Japanese, Balfour at his f i r s t conversation w i t h Prince 
93. D.B.F.P.. Ser0 I , Vol. XIV, No.415. 
94. Washington del. desp. 1, 11 Nov. 1921, F 4466/2905/23, 
FO 371/6706; F.R.U.S., 1922, Vol. I , pp.2-3. 
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Tokugawa confined himself to the general observation 
that he thought i t might be suitable to have a t r i p a r t i t e 
agreement while r e t a i n i n g the r i g h t to renew the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance i f necessary. Balfour 
wanted the f i r s t overtures f o r close consultation to 
come from the Japanese, but nothing happened u n t i l 18 
November,, Then the Counsellor i n the Japanese Embassy 
i n Washington came to see Hankey and t o l d him that 
Japan desired the renewal of the alliance but would 
welcome the extension of i t s p r i n c i p l e s to a t r i p a r t i t e 
agreemento (^6) 
The Japanese did not follow up t h i s overture f o r 
some days, mainly because Baron Shidehara, the delegate 
responsible" f o r p o l i t i c a l " questions, was i l l . On 23 
November Balfour gave Baron Kato his d r a f t . Prince 
Tokugawa, who spoke to Hankey l a t e r , was enthusiastic 
about i t ; but Shidehara apparently foresaw American 
objections to the provision f o r an alliance between two 
(97) 
of the parti e s , and decided to drop i t . w ' ' His new 
95. FoR.U.S., 1922, Vol. I , pp.1-2; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , 
Vol. XIV, No75l6. 
96. S.W.2, CAB 30/27. Lord Lee, who arrived i n Washington 
before the rest of the delegation and spent the 
intervening days renewing acquaintances, gathered 
not only that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was s t i l l 
intensely unpopular but that the Americans thought 
that the B r i t i s h wanted to renew i t ; Hankey to 
Lloyd George, 11 Nov. 1921, CAB 63/34. 
97o Hankey to Lloyd George, 17 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George 
Papers, F / 6 2 / l / l ; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.449, 
encl. 
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d r a f t , however, included j o i n t protection of the v i t a l 
i n t e r e s t s , as we l l as the t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s , of the 
parties " i n the region of the Pacific Ocean and the Far 
East." The next d r a f t , an American one, omitted 
the Far East and the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s and confined the 
scope of the agreement to island possessions i n the 
Pacific. This "became the basis of the f i n a l t e x t , which 
i s said to have been largely the work of Hughes. 
The t r e a t y was announced on 10 December at a 
plenary session^ of the conference. I n i t the parties 
agreed to respect each other's r i g h t s i n t h e i r island 
possessions i n the region of the Pa c i f i c , and to hold a 
conference i f controversy arose between them out of any 
Pacific question. I f t h e i r r i g h t s were threated by any 
other power, they would communicate w i t h one another as 
to the measures to be taken. The t r e a t y was to remain 
i n force f o r ten years, and to continue i n e f f e c t 
thereafter unless denounced. Upon i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n the 
Anglo-Japanese agreement was to terminate. (100) The 
f i n a l treaty^a quadruple one: the inclusion of France 
98. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.449; Washington del. 
t e l . 50, 23 Nov. 1921, F 4326/63/23, FO 371/6676; 
Nish i n Studies i n International History, edd. 
Bourne and Watt, pp.380-2. 
99. Asada i n American H i s t o r i c a l Review, LXVII (1961), 
p.66; Washington del. t e l s . 59, 70, F 4372, 
4373/2905/23, FO 371/6706; F.R.U.S., 1922, Vol. I , 
pp.3-4; Braisted, The United States Navy i n the 
Pac i f i c , pp.621-2. 
100. B.F.S.P., Vol. CXVI, pp.627-31, 633-4. 
was Hughes's suggestion, and was not welcomed i n 
London., ^ 1 0 1^ But neither t h i s , nor the subsequent 
h i t c h over the question whether the t r e a t y covered the 
main islands of Japan, affected the general f e e l i n g of 
satisfaction,, As Hankey wrote to Lloyd George, one of 
the great tasks f o r which they had come to Washington 
had been accomplished., The change from the o r i g i n a l 
atmosphere of American-Japanese suspicion and American 
antipathy to the alliance, to the present atmosphere of 
"utmost good w i l l " was, Hankey wrote, mainly due to 
Balfour's s k i l l and convincing s i n c e r i t y . (102) 
The Japanese are generally said to have resented 
the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance«, The 
resentment was directed more against the United States 
than against B r i t a i n , who was regarded w i t h sorrow 
rather than with anger. The obvious conclusion, that 
i f she had to choose between them, B r i t a i n would prefer 
the United States to Japan doubtless held significance 
f o r the future; but i t i s suggested that the ending of 
the alliance was taken less t r a g i c a l l y than i t might 
have been, because the Japanese could be no more sure 
than anyone else how e f f e c t i v e the new agreement might 
prove. 
101. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.458, 478. 
102. Hankey to Lloyd George, 12 Dec. 1921, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/62/1/9. 
103. Nish i n Studies i n International History, edd. 
Bourne and Watt, p.384. 
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The Pacific agreement was negotiated outside the 
conference proper, the main subject of which was the 
l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments. The American proposals 
f o r t h i s , put forward by Hughes at the opening session, 
had been kept e n t i r e l y secret. Balfour wrote at the end 
th a t the statement was conceived i n a s p i r i t of 
statesmanship which raised the whole l e v e l of debate and 
which alone saved the lengthy technical discussions from 
being l o s t i n petty disputations. What enabled 
the statesmanship to be shown, however, was the strength 
of the American po s i t i o n , the f a c t that only three 
countries were r e a l l y involved, and the desire of a l l 
three to l i m i t expenditure. I n the case of B r i t a i n , as 
already shown, the desire was almost .overwhelmingly 
strong. I n Japan too economic d i f f i c u l t i e s were growing, 
and E l i o t reported that i t was u n l i k e l y that the 
exi s t i n g naval programme could be carried out. (1^5) 
Although f i n a n c i a l considerations did not a f f e c t the 
United States to the same extent, there was strong 
demand f o r the reduction of taxes and the popular f e e l i n g 
f o r disarmament proved more powerful than the navy lobby. 
There was thus a considerable degree of common i n t e r e s t 
i n l i m i t a t i o n and despite the t a l k of an i n e v i t a b l e 
Japanese-American clash there was no immediate cause of 
quarrel, especially i f the Americans decided not to 
104. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.585. 
105. Tokyo t e l . 446, 15 Nov. 1921, A 8571/18/55, FO 
372/5 623. 
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challenge the Japanese po s i t i o n i n Manchuria. 
The r a t i o f o r c a p i t a l ships to be a l l o t t e d to Japan 
was regarded by Hughes as the core of the whole scheme 
of l i m i t a t i o n ; and a f t e r the experts had f a i l e d to 
agree the question became one of high-level negotiations 
i n which the Japanese eventually reduced t h e i r claim from 
70 to 60 per cent of the United States and B r i t i s h 
figures i n return f o r a s t a n d s t i l l on f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and 
naval bases i n the western Pacific. (-*-(-)6) After some 
hes i t a t i o n the United States delegation agreed to the 
s t a n d s t i l l provided Hawaii was excluded and the Japanese 
accepted the quadruple tr e a t y . ( 1 0 7 ) After prolonged 
discussion i n Tokyo the Japanese Government/ i n t u r n 
i 
accepted, and the st a n s t i l T was extended to B r i t i s h and 
French bases as w e l l . ( 1 0 8 ^ The exact description of 
the area to which the s t a n d s t i l l was to apply s t i l l 
caused some d i f f i c u l t y , but Singapore was d e f i n i t e l y 
excluded. ( 1 0 9 ) The s t a n d s t i l l provided, i n Hankey's 
words, "a great neutralised area separating America and 
Japan.« < 1 1 0> 
106. D.B.F.P.9 Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.432, 460. 
107. Op. c i t o , Nos.465, 470. F.R.U.S., 1922,1 Vol. I , 
pp.74-83. 
108. Tokyo t e l . 494, 10 Dec. 1921, A 9188/18/45, F0 
371/5625; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.494,° 
F.R.U.S., 19J2, Vol. I , pp.90-9. 
109. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.494, 541, 544, 545, 
563. 
110. Hankey to Lloyd George, 13 Jan 1922, Lloyd George 
Papers, F /62 /1 /13 . 
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The Japanese insistence on ret a i n i n g the 
nearly-completed battleship Mutsu was a matter of national 
pride and popular sentiment. Bowing to i t did not a l t e r 
the r a t i o between the three countries, since the t o t a l 
American and B r i t i s h tonnage was increased i n proportion 
and the scrapping arrangements altered. The size l i m i t 
on replacements caused B r i t a i n technical trouble and 
additional expense i n abandoning the projected 48,000-ton 
"super-Hoods" and su b s t i t u t i n g smaller ships. 
The American proposal f o r a ten-year cessation of 
c a p i t a l shipbuilding raised considerable doubts among 
the B r i t i s h experts, who feared that the naval armament 
and construction firms would decay and then have to be 
r e a c t i v a t e d at great expense^-for a period of feverish 
b u i l d i n g . The United States delegation themselves had 
second thoughts, but the Cabinet favoured the proposal 
and i t was accepted by the conference. From the B r i t i s h 
point of view there were p r a c t i c a l advantages i n 
preventing r i v a l r y i n design; the arguments about 
labour and subsidies were f a i r l y evenly balanced; and 
the p o l i t i c a l and psychological arguments f o r a complete 
holiday as against continuous slow building were very 
strong. Moreover, as Hankey wrote, "the menace from 
American or Japan bears no comparison to the former 
menace from Germany, or, i n e a r l i e r days, from France.... 
111. D^BJTJ?., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.501, 502, 504; 
Washington del. t e l . 169, 15 Dec. 1921; t e l . 
140 to Washington del., 18 Dec, A 9338/18/45, 
F0 371/5626. 
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We can take r i s k s ( i f they can r e a l l y be called r i s k s ) 
i n the one case, which we could not do i n the other," ( 1 1 2 ) 
The greatest i l l f e e l i n g i n the conference i t s e l f 
( that i s , apart from the Shantung question which was 
dealt w i t h outside i t ) was undoubtedly caused by the 
French po s i t i o n and the B r i t i s h reaction to i t . I t 
appears that the French Government and French opinion as 
a whole approached the conference almost exclusively 
from the European and m i l i t a r y standpoint. ( 1 1 3 ) 
also appears that Briand hoped to reach an agreement 
wi t h the United States, possibly a r e v i v a l of the 1919 
guarantee: i t was even suggested that he hoped f o r an 
agreement at B r i t i s h expenses, or at least without 
B r i t a i n , perhaps as a reward f o r mediating i n the" 
Anglo-American disagreement which the French expected. 
I f Briand made an approach to Hughes he was evidently 
soon disappointed, f o r he t o l d Balfour on 20 November 
that he thought Hughes knew and cared nothing about 
Europe. Nevertheless, bound by his own declarations 
112. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.417, 420, 426, 430, 456, 
463, 485; t e l . 140 to Washington del., 18 Dec. 1921, 
A 9338/18/45, FO 371/5626; Hankey to Lloyd George, 
25 Nov., Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/5, CAB 30/31. 
113. L. Archimbaud, La Conference de Washington, Paris 
1923, pp.70-2o From t h i s charge Archimbaud, and 
Briand ?s biographer Suarez, make and exception of 
Albert Sarraut, then Minister f o r the Colonies. 
114. D.B.F0P0, Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.437, 438; Lord Burnham 
to Lloyd George, 13 Dec. 1921, LLoyd George Papers, 
F/5/8/9. 
(114) 
115. D.B.F.P.9 Ser 0 I , Vol. XIV, No.437o 
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made "before leaving France, Briand continued the theme 
of France's need f o r security and f o r guarantees which 
alone would permit her to l i m i t her armaments. His 
speech at the plenary session of the conference on 21 
November, w i t h i t s plea f o r A l l i e d s o l i d a r i t y i n the 
face of German p o t e n t i a l , won applause f o r i t s eloquence; 
but i t was out of tune with the mood of the conference, 
and aroused an angry reaction i n London, ( l - ^ ) 
The Cabinet had a report of Briand's speech before 
them on 22 November. The view was expressed (by whom i s 
not stated) that as long as France retained her 
powerful army i n being the state of Europe would remain 
unsettled, and that i t would be a serious matter i f as 
a r e s u l t of the conference B r i t a i n were the only 
European power to be disarmed. No one i s recorded as 
having pointed out that B r i t a i n ' s m i l i t a r y and a i r 
disarmament were e n t i r e l y voluntary. The Cabinet referred 
to Briand's speech to the Committee of Imperial Defence 
and t h e i r views were sent to Balfour. ( 1 1 7 ) At the 
Committee's meeting next day, w i t h Churchill i n the 
chair, Briand !s statements about German strength were 
c r i t i c i s e d . The General Staff believed that Germany 
could at present put i n t o the f i e l d 10 f u l l y equipped 
divisions supported by a r t i l l e r y ; another 4-5 m i l l i o n 
116. Conference on the L i m i t a t i o n of Armaments, pp.116-35; 
Suarez, Briand, Vol. V, pp.267-79. 
117. C. 88(21), CAB 23/27; D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, 
No.439; Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. I , 
p.178. 
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men could probably be mobilised, but there were not 
enough small arms f o r them, no a r t i l l e r y , no tanks, and 
very few a i r c r a f t . France on the other hand, from the 
forces i n the country i t s e l f and not counting troops 
overseas or i n Germany, could immediately put 49 divisions 
i n t o the f i e l d and her t o t a l strength a f t e r mobilisation 
would be about 100 divisions. Briand had also referred 
to the capacity of German industry to manufacture 
equipment at short notice, and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
concealed manufacture. He c e r t a i n l y underestimated the 
time that i t would take to s t a r t production again, but 
the Committee of Imperial Defence made no attempt to 
reach a better estimate. I n t h i s case they were concerned 
only w i t h the present,"and concluded that Germany was" not 
now a m i l i t a r y threat to France. But when i t came to the 
French programme of submarine b u i l d i n g they were 
alarmed f o r the future, and unanimously concluded that 
a very serious s i t u a t i o n might arise i f France were 
strong on land and sea and i n the a i r while B r i t a i n was 
weak a l l round; i n such circumstances "the Empire 
would be merely exi s t i n g on the good w i l l of her 
neighbours - a s i t u a t i o n which had not been tolerated i n 
the past and could not be tolerated i n the fut u r e . " ( 1 1 S ) 
118. C.I.Do 150th meeting, CAB 2/3. On German 
rearmament the C.I.D. remarked merely that i t was 
impossible to say how long, once the Control 
Commissions were withdrawn, i t would take Germany 
to manufacture the material to equip the formations 
f o r which she had the manpower. They do not seem 
ever to have discussed the execution of the 
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Many of these considerations were telegraphed to 
Balfour the same night. "The po s i t i o n of t h i s country 
vis-a-vis France," the telegram stated, " w i l l become 
impossible i f B r i t i s h navy i s to be r e s t r i c t e d i n 
accordance with American proposals while French army 
continues on the scale of at least a hundred divisions 
together w i t h overwhelming aviation and the i n t e n t i o n to 
b u i l d a very large f l e e t of submarines. ...Anxious as 
we are and have proved ourselves to disarm and to march 
hand i n hand w i t h the United States, we cannot contemplate 
a s i t u a t i o n where Great B r i t a i n would be i n a few years 
at the mercy of France i f the present happy rela t i o n s 
were to deteriorate. We think that the Americans ought 
to be made to understand the g r a v i t y of the s i t u a t i o n 
and to j o i n w i t h us i n endeavouring to procure a 
general disarmament rather than disarmament by B r i t a i n 
alone." A second telegram, i n Lloyd George's name, 
suggested that the most v i t a l question was submarines. 
The delegation should take an uncompromising l i n e on 
land and a i r armaments, but might modify t h e i r a t t i t u d e i f 
by so doing they could secure the t o t a l a b o l i t i o n of 
118. (Cont) 
disarmament of Germany. The War Office and the 
Foreign Office dealt w i t h t h i s matter w i t h the 
Ambassadors' Conference i n Paris and t h e i r m i l i t a r y 
advisers: both, and especially the Foreign Office, 
were sceptical about the p o s s i b i l i t y of maintaining 
German disarmament f o r any length of time. For 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the M i l i t a r y Control Commission 
see Brigadier-General J.H. Morgan, Assize of Arms, 
London 1945; General C.M.E. NolletTTfae """ 
Expedience du desarmement, Paris 1932. 
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submarines. v ' 
Meanwhile a meeting of the conference committee on 
l i m i t a t i o n on 23 November had been about to end w i t h 
speeches of farewell to Briand, who was going home, when 
Balfour received the telegram sent a f t e r the Cabinet 
meeting the previous day, and i n consequence f e l t bound 
to revive the question of land armaments. ( 1 2°) But he 
deprecated his i n s t r u c t i o n s . The great danger when the 
conference began, he telegraphed back to London, was the 
United States c a p i t a l ship programme. Thanks to 
American statesmanship t h i s problem was on the way to 
solution, but agreement could s t i l l f a i l i f France 
in s i s t e d on having a b a t t l e f l e e t comparable w i t h the 
one she had had'before the war. Would i t ~ n o t be f o o l i s h 
to wrangle over her army, which only affected B r i t a i n i n 
so f a r as i t made general land disarmament impossible? 
I n any case, as the General Staff had recognised i n 
October, France would not reduce her army unless the 
United States r a t i f i e d the t r e a t y of guarantee - and t h i s 
was not going to happen. " I am to t r y , " Balfour went on, 
" i f possible to induce the French to agree to a very 
small b a t t l e f l e e t , so as to leave us free to accept 
American proposals without modification. Having 
persuaded them to deprive themselves of t h i s form of 
119. D.B.F.P.9 Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.442, 443. 
120. Op._cit., No.447, Briand's reply. Conference on 
^^^^^ion_of =Armame^ts J pp. 438-41. 
naval defence, I am then to persuade them tha t they 
r e a l l y require no submarines, because a war between 
France and England i s unthinkable. This task being 
successfully accomplished, I am to ask them to reduce 
the number of t h e i r a i r c r a f t , seeing that we cannot 
sleep securely i n our beds l e s t i n a war w i t h France 
London should be burned to the ground.1 For a task so 
complex as t h i s I fear a trained diplomatist i s 
required." Balfour also pointed out that the conference 
could not deal w i t h land disarmament because a l l the 
interest^powers were not present. The Americans had 
t a c i t l y admitted as much when Hughes i n his opening 
speech had not mentioned land armaments. 
~0n 26 November^the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, who had been absent from the previous meeting, 
injected some m i l i t a r y common sense i n t o the proceedings 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He pointed out 
that the French army was the only e f f e c t i v e one i n 
Europe, that i n the present state of the continent i t 
was lucky that one of the most p a c i f i c of a l l nations 
should have realised that power was needed to carry out 
the orders of the Supreme Council, and t h a t B r i t a i n was 
121. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.448. On 13 
November Balfour had asked the other United States 
delegates, Senator Lodge and Elihu Root, what 
they proposed to do about m i l i t a r y l i m i t a t i o n . 
They re p l i e d that the American people thought of 
armaments l i m i t a t i o n solely i n naval terms, and 
they apparently did not expect the conference to 
deal w i t h other aspects: Hankey to Lloyd George, 
14 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/2. 
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very fortunate to have such a f r i e n d at such a time* ( 1 2 2 ) 
Lloyd George, however, was unrepentant. He telegraphed 
again to Balfour that Briand must not be allowed to get 
away with "faked and disingenuous figures," and that the 
American public should be made aware of the facts about 
Germany's impotence l e s t they believe France to be i n 
danger of renewed German aggression. (123) 
Lloyd George has been accused of i n s t i g a t i n g an 
anti-French press campaign before and during the 
conference. Anti-French a r t i c l e s c e r t a i n l y appeared i n 
the B r i t i s h press, but the denunciation i n Washington 
of the French naval claim was started by Lord Riddell. 
Curzon and Churchill both included references to 
m i l i t a r i s m i n speeches at the end of November. Lloyd 
i 
George, however, does seem to have become p a r t i c u a r l y 
excited about the French position. His motives are 
obscure; but some Ministers became alarmed at the public 
quarrel. Lord Lee telegraphed from Washington that i t 
might a f f e c t the prospects of the conference. He hoped 
that Lloyd George would have an early meeting w i t h 
Briand, and enquired whether i n the meantime Lloyd 
George would consider p u b l i c l y renewing the pre-war 
B r i t i s h undertaking to defend the French coasts. This, 
he thought, would e f f e c t i v e l y counter the French claim 
122. C.IoD. 151st meeting, CAB 2/3-
123. D.B.FcP., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.452. 
124. Op. c i t . , No.517; Balfour to Jusserand, 19 Dec. 
1921, CAB 30/31o 
181 
to naval armaments and save the naval agreement w i t h i t s 
"incalculable boon" of the disappearance of the United 
States and Japanese c a p i t a l ship programmes. He agreed 
wi t h h i s experts i n Washington that the present French 
naval strength offered no menace to B r i t a i n even i f her 
f l e e t were reduced i n accordance w i t h the American 
proposals. ( 1 2^) Churchill, who had taken the chair 
at the Committee of Imperial Defence and at Lloyd 
George's request had been responsible f o r at least one 
of the angry telegrams to Balfour, f e l t bound to 
record his general view of Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s . He 
thought that willingness to keep the promise about 
guaranteeing the French f r o n t i e r ought to be the 
foundation of Anglo-French and Anglo-German re l a t i o n s 
whether or not the United States came i n . He would 
include t h i s willingness i n any discussion with the 
French about armaments; on that basis he would go to 
great lengths to stop the French bui l d i n g a large 
submarine f l e e t and would use the French army and a i r 
force as bargaining counterse Churchill also favoured 
bringing B r i t i s h policy on Turkey i n t o l i n e w i t h the 
French, a move which he knew Lloyd George would not l i k e , 
and thought that they ought to work f o r an understanding 
between B r i t a i n , France and Germany f o r the 
reconstruction of Central Europe and Russia. " A l l these 
aspects require to be treated together. I am not at a l l 
125. Lee to Lloyd George, 25 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/31/2/67. 
182 
i n agreement with the way i n which our r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
France are now being treated. I t would be an enormous 
shock to the B r i t i s h public, who have 600,000 graves i n 
France, i f t h e i r statesmen were to t e l l them that we 
backed the wrong horse." ( 1 2 6 ) 
Land armaments were now t a c i t l y dropped at the 
Washington Conference; i t also became clear upon 
examination that l i m i t a t i o n of a i r forces was impossible. 
But French naval demands and the general question of 
submarines remained to trouble proceedings. I n the f i r s t 
stage of negotiating the c a p i t a l ship r a t i o s Hughes 
regarded i t as essential to f i x the a l l o c a t i o n between 
the three great naval powers before embarking on 
subsidiary questions. On 28 November Balfour reported 
that the French delegation had p r i v a t e l y agreed to a 
r a t i o of 5:15 with B r i t a i n and the United States and 5?9 
wi t h Japan ( s l i g h t l y less than the 1.75;5:3 which they 
u l t i m a t e l y accepted); and as l a t e as 9 December Hughes 
(128) 
was not expecting great d i f f i c u l t i e s . v ' Therefore 
the French claim, put forward on 15 December, to r e t a i n 
t h e i r ten c a p i t a l ships and to s t a r t replacing them 
without a naval holiday came as a shock and touched Hughes 
126. Churchill to Lloyd George, 28 Nov. 1921, Lloyd 
George Papers, F/lO/l/48. 
127. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.440, 476, 477 = 
128. Op. c i t . 9 Nos.432, 456, 489. 
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on the c e n t r a l p o i n t o f the conference. ( 1 2 9 ) During 
the i n t e r v a l between Hughes's appeal t o Briand t o 
reduce the c l a i m and the French r e p l y , (-^O) Lee 
re v e r t e d t o h i s suggestion t h a t B r i t a i n should guarantee 
the s e c u r i t y of the French coasts. He thought t h a t such 
an o f f e r would help t o get the French out of t h e i r 
present impossible p o s i t i o n , which threatened t o wreck 
the conference, and could h a r d l y be refused. He also 
thought t h a t i f the French were compelled t o give way 
over c a p i t a l ships they would be more i n t r a c t a b l e over 
submarines, and he hoped t h a t Lloyd George might be 
able t o exact, i n r e t u r n f o r the o f f e r , a French under-
t a k i n g t o abandon t h e i r submarine programme, (^l) 
The o r i g i n a l United States p l a n provided f o r the 
l i m i t a t i o n o f a l l classes of naval vessel, i n c l u d i n g 
submarines. The smaller naval powers were g e n e r a l l y 
averse t o l i m i t i n g vessels other than c a p i t a l ships, 
and the question was t e c h n i c a l l y much more d i f f i c u l t . 
129. D.B.F.P.t Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.305, 506. Geddes commented l a t e r : "France has done much more than 
ask f o r surface ships and submarines i n excess 
of a l l reasonable needs f o r s e c u r i t y , she has 
committed the heinous offence o f i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h 
the f i r s t great i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference h e l d i n 
America, and t h i s p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t o f the 
a t t i t u d e i s the one which w i l l be remembered": 
Washington desp. 37, 13 Jan. 1922, A 587 /2/45, 
FO 371/7247. 
130. F.R.U.S.. 1922, Vol. I , pp.130-3, 135-6. 
131o B a l f o u r t o Lloyd George, 18 Dec. 1921, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/lO/l / 70 . 
184 
The French demand f o r smaller vessels, i n c l u d i n g 
submarines, g r e a t l y exceeded the f i g u r e s i n the American 
plan. For t h e i r p a r t the B r i t i s h , as has been said, 
were anxious t o secure the t o t a l a b o l i t i o n of submarines. 
Although the B r i t i s h case, based on humanitarian grounds, 
made a considerable appeal t o American p u b l i c opinion, 
i t was opposed by a l l the other naval powers i n c l u d i n g 
the smaller ones not at the conference. (^2) 
st a t e d the B r i t i s h case, f o r the record, i n the committee 
on l i m i t a t i o n on 22 December, and i t was discussed on 
subsequent days. The only outcome was the Root 
r e s o l u t i o n s on submarine warfare, embodied i n a t r e a t y 
signed on 6 February 1922 which was never f u l l y 
(133) 
" r a t i f i e d . v ' A b o l i t i o n - o f - submarines Slaving been 
r e j e c t e d , B r i t a i n too i n s i s t e d on complete freedom i n 
132. D.BoFoP., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.513, 547. 
133. Text i n Cmd 1627 of 1922, Conference on L i m i t a t i o n 
of Armament, Washington, 1921-22, T r e a t i e s , = = ~ 
Resolutions, etc. I n s t a t i n g the B r i t i s h case Lee 
made use of an a r t i c l e by a French naval o f f i c e r 
expounding, and commending, German p o l i c y on 
submarine warfare. The French resented t h i s 
a t t a c k , maintaining, t h a t the o f f i c e r had only been 
d e s c r i b i n g German views; l a t e r a statement was 
issued i n Washington t h a t he had been expressing a 
p u r e l y personal view. Capitaine de f r e g a t e R.V.P. 
Castex, Synthese de l a guerre sous-marine Paris 
1920 (the book was a r e p u b l i c a t i o n of a r t i c l e s which 
appeared i n the Revue maritime i n the f i r s t h a l f of 
1920); Paris desp. 3254, 23 Nov. 1921, A 8729/18/45, 
FO 371/5623; Paris t e l . 1, 1 Jan.. 1922; Washington 
d e l . statement, 4 Jan., A 3, 169/2/45, FO 371/7245; 
t e l . 208 t o Washington d e l . , 19 Jan., A 487/2/45, 
FO 371/7246. 
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b u i l d i n g smaller surface vessels. The five-power naval 
t r e a t y signed on 6 February l i m i t e d only the numbers, 
size and armament of c a p i t a l ships and a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . 
B r i t i s h s e n s i t i v i t y t o the French submarine 
programme seems t o have been excessive. I t was l a r g e l y 
confined t o the p o l i t i c i a n s , none of whom seems t o have 
imagined t h a t the French might, f o r example, want 
submarines t o p r o t e c t troop shipments from North A f r i c a 
against I t a l i a n i n t e r f e r e n c e . The r e a c t i o n may be p a r t l y 
ascribed t o p r o p i n q u i t y ( i n the sense of Hankey's 
observation t h a t a powerful neighbour was much more o f a 
t h r e a t than a powerful d i s t a n t c o u n t r y ) , and p a r t l y t o 
the g e n e r a l l y suspicious s t a t e of Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s 
at the time and f e a r s about French p o l i c y . The c o n t r a s t 
w i t h the g e n e r a l l y dispassionate d i s c u s s i o n of 
competition w i t h the United States and Japan i s marked. 
But Hardinge i n Paris thought from the s t a r t t h a t the 
French programme was t o a l a r g e extent intended as a 
bargaining counter, or t h a t the French, desperately 
anxious f o r a B r i t i s h guarantee, would not come t o terms 
134. T e l . 140 t o Washington d e l . , 18 Dec. 1921, 
A 9338/18/45, FO 371/5626; Washington d e l . t e l s . 
193, 22 Dec; 197, 23 Dec; 199, 25 Dec, 209, 
30 Dec, A 9591, 9595, 9602, 9711/18/45, FO 
371/5627. Naval t r e a t y , B.F.S.P., Vol. CXVII, 
pp.453-70. 
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on submarines w i t h o u t i t . y P J ' As has been seen i n 
Chapter 1, the French programme f e a t u r e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
i n the general settlement discussed i n January 1922, 
but t h e r e a f t e r i t receded from view. 
The Chinese issues a t the Washington Conference, 
many o f them of a t e c h n i c a l nature, formed the subject 
of a d e c l a r a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s i n the Nine-Power 
Treaty of 6 February 1922 i n which the p a r t i e s undertook 
t o respect the sovereignty, independence and i n t e g r i t y 
of China, t o provide t o China the f u l l e s t o p p o r t u n i t y 
t o develop a st a b l e government, t o e s t a b l i s h and 
maintain the p r i n c i p l e of equal o p p o r t u n i t y , and t o 
r e f r a i n from seeking s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s . A t r e a t y on 
t a r i f f s was also signed, and r e s o l u t i o n s passed on such 
matters as e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , f o r e i g n armed f o r c e s , 
and p o s t a l agencies. (-^6) The question of Shantung 
was d e a l t w i t h outside the conference, i n d i r e c t 
135o D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, Nos.438, 527. A 
p a r t i c u l a r cause of B r i t i s h resentment i n the 
autumn of 1921 was the signature by a French 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , F r a n k l i n - B o u i l l o n , o f a separate 
agreement w i t h the Turkish n a t i o n a l i s t s . 
136. Nine-Power Treaty, B.F.S.P.. Vol. CXIX, pp.562-7; 
T a r i f f t r e a t y , op. c i t . 9 pp.557-62; r e s o l u t i o n s 
i n Cmd 1627 of 1922. 
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Sino-Japanese n e g o t i a t i o n s aided by Hughes and Balfour. 
Pressure on both sides was needed t o b r i n g about 
agreement, which was the more e s s e n t i a l because from 
the American p o i n t of view Shantung was probably the 
key t o the quadruple t r e a t y and the naval agreement. 
Of the r e s u l t i n g Sino-Japanese t r e a t y B alfour wrote t h a t , 
w i t h the Nine-Power Treaty, i t was " i n complete harmony 
w i t h the general p o l i c y o f His Majesty's Government ... 
and w i l l provide the foundation of a s o l i d and enduring 
peace i n the regions o f the P a c i f i c and the Far 
On the t e x t s of the various agreements, such o f f i c i a l 
optimism was perhaps not excessive. But the a c t u a l s t a t e 
of China d i d not encourage i t ; the execution o f - t h e 
t a r i f f t r e a t y and the r e s o l u t i o n on e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l i t y 
were c o n t i n u a l l y h e l d up i n subsequent years by c i v i l 
war and dis o r d e r . The Nine-Power Treaty conformed t o 
the p o l i c y recommended by the Foreign O f f i c e , of seeking 
a d e c l a r a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e on Chinese i n t e g r i t y and the 
Open Door w i t h o u t embarrassing commitments. No means of 
enf o r c i n g respect f a r the independence and i n t e g r i t y of 
China were ever contemplated: even before 1914 n e i t h e r 
B r i t a i n nor the United States had f o r years considered 
armed i n t e r v e n t i o n on the mainland except t o p r o t e c t 
t h e i r own subjects. Now, w i t h American power excluded 
137. D.B.F.P., Ser. I , Vol. XIV, No.585; Sino-Japanese 
t r e a t y , B.F.S.P., Vol. CXVI, pp.676-88. 
East." (137) 
188 
from the western P a c i f i c and B r i t i s h power reduced, the 
maintenance of a " s o l i d and enduring peace" would 
depend on what k i n d of China emerged from the r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
t u r m o i l , on Japanese r e s t r a i n t , and on such i n f l u e n c e as 
the United States and B r i t a i n were s t i l l able and 
w i l l i n g t o exercise. 
The defence o f Great B r i t a i n against a i r a t t a c k 
The alarm f e l t i n B r i t a i n about the French 
submarine programme i n the w i n t e r of 1921-22 was 
p a r a l l e l e d i n 1922 by alarm over the prospects of a i r 
a t t a c k . One of the questions asked by the s e c r e t a r i a t 
of ~~the Committee o f I m p e r i a l Defence i n t h e i r survey ~ i n ~ 
September 1920 of the m i l i t a r y , naval and a i r o b l i g a t i o n s 
o f the B r i t i s h Empire had been: " I s the scheme f o r home 
defence t o be r e v i s e d and i f so should i t be based f o r 
the time being on the p o s s i b i l i t y of France being the 
enemy?" (-^8) For most of 1921 c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s 
q uestion was postponed w h i l e on the one hand the more 
urgent problem of naval p o l i c y was discussed, and on the 
other hand the R.A.F. str u g g l e d f o r independence o f the 
other Services. I n the autumn, w h i l e the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
problem was s t i l l u n s e t t l e d but the preparations f o r the 
Washington Conference had been made, the A i r M i n i s t r y were 
ready t o press f o r examination of an a i r programme of 
138. C.I.D. Paper 257-B, CAB 4/7: see above, pp. H3-is. 
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home defence. 
The Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence deprecated making 
plans f o r defence against France, but agreed t o set up a 
sub-committee of Service advisers t o consider the 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the B r i t i s h I s l e s t o a i r a t t a c k and the 
measures necessary t o meet the danger. (-^9) ^ r 
S t a f f disclaimed any i n t e n t i o n of arguing t h a t a i r 
a t t a c k was l i k e l y , but h e l d t h a t i t was a more probable 
t h r e a t t o n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y than United States or 
Japanese naval b u i l d i n g . They asserted, as an example, 
t h a t France now possessed bombing a i r c r a f t s u f f i c i e n t t o 
d e l i v e r , a t the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s , d a i l y a t t a c k s 
of 31 tons of h i g h explosives by day and 13 tons by 
n i g h t , compared w i t h the'heaviest German a i r r a i d o f the 
(ILQ) 
war of 10.5 tons. v ' Before the sub-committee 
repo r t e d , a new French programme of a i r c r a f t c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
which was supposed t o produce 150 machines a month, 
caused the Cabinet t o agree t h a t French a i r development 
c o n s t i t u t e d a formidable danger, ( - ^ l ) 
The sub-committee, c o n s i s t i n g of the three Chiefs 
of S t a f f and other o f f i c e r s from each Service, r e p o r t e d 
i n A p r i l 1922. They began by saying t h a t they had not 
taken p o l i t i c a l c onsiderations i n t o account. Although 
139. C.I.D. 147th meeting, 31 Oct. 1921; 148th meeting, 
9 Nov., CAB 2/3. 
140. C.I.D.'Paper 156-C, CAB 5/4; C.I.D. Paper 102-A, 
CAB 3/3. 
141. C. 18(22), 15 Mar. 1922, CAB 23/29; CP. 3901, 
CAB 24/136. 
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war w i t h France could not now be regarded as w i t h i n the 
bounds of reasonable p o s s i b i l i t y , France had been taken 
as the basis of the enquiry because she was the nearest 
neighbour and had the most powerful a i r f o r c e i n Europe. 
Any measures t h a t would meet an a i r a t t a c k from France 
would t h e r e f o r e be more than enough t o meet an a t t a c k 
from any other European country. On Balfour's 
i n s t r u c t i o n s they had discussed a i r a t t a c k on i t s own, 
but i t was u n r e a l i s t i c t o assume t h a t the other two 
Services would not be in v o l v e d , and the m i l i t a r y as w e l l 
as p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s which would deter France from 
a t t a c k i n g ought t o be borne i n mind. Even on the narrow 
problem put t o them, the sub-committee warned t h a t the 
A i r S t a f f ; , s p i c t u r e of the scale and " e f f e c t s of a i r 
a t t a c k was based on estimates of the po s s i b l e f u t u r e 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f a i r power, not on a c t u a l experience. 
The A i r S t a f f had c a l c u l a t e d t h a t the French a i r f o r c e 
was a t t h a t time i n a p o s i t i o n t o drop 1,500 tons of 
bombs a month on Great B r i t a i n , and t h a t a t t a c k s on t h i s 
scale would d i s l o c a t e the machinery f o r p u t t i n g the 
country on a war f o o t i n g and would probably make i t 
necessary t o move the seat of government from London t o 
the n o r t h of England. They considered t h a t i f a 
continuous day and n i g h t a t t a c k were maintained 
i n d e f i n i t e l y , " r a i l w a y t r a f f i c would be disorganised, 
food supplies would be i n t e r r u p t e d , and i t i s probable 
t h a t a f t e r being subjected f o r several weeks t o the 
s t r a i n of such an a t t a c k the p o p u l a t i o n would be so 
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demoralised t h a t they would i n s i s t upon an a r m i s t i c e . " 
The A i r S t a f f recommended t h a t i n order t o meet the 
danger the establishment of the a i r f o r c e a t home should 
be increased, i n order t o enable an o f f e n s i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
t o be b u i l t up, and t h a t a zone o f defence should be 
organised. 
The sub-committee recognised t h a t i t was not 
p r a c t i c a b l e t o safeguard the country against a l l the 
contingencies of war, and t h a t i t was f o r the Government 
t o decide whether the r i s k o f a i r a t t a c k was s u f f i c i e n t l y 
serious t o necessitate p r o v i d i n g defences t o meet i t . I f 
a gr e a t e r s t a t e of preparedness were regarded as necessary, 
they recommended t h a t the a i r f o r c e a t home should be 
strengthened by i n c r e a s i n g i t s s i z e , forming a reserve, 
and f o s t e r i n g c i v i l a v i a t i o n . 
This r e p o r t was discussed i n the Committee of I m p e r i a l 
Defence on 24 May. Balfour s a i d t h a t the question was 
very embarrassing. I f the A i r S t a f f ' s f o r e c a s t were 
c o r r e c t , an enemy could s t r i k e a blow t h a t would render 
the country almost powerless: but from the p o l i t i c a l 
p o i n t o f view such an a t t a c k by France was almost 
inconceivable. The question was so important t h a t t h e r e 
should be a s p e c i a l meeting w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r , and 
f 143) 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer should also attend. v ^' 
Balf o u r then wrote a paper s e t t i n g out the problem as he 
142. C.I.D. Paper 106-A, CAB 3/3. Meetings o f the 
sub-committee and memoranda, CAB 16/39. 
143. C.I.D. 157th meeting, CAB 2/3. 
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saw i t - l a r g e l y accepting the A i r S t a f f ' s p i c t u r e -
and the p o s s i b l e courses of a c t i o n . The f i r s t was "to 
leave t h i n g s as they are, and t r u s t t o the i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the two A l l i e s coming t o blows. The o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s 
course i s t h a t the impossible may a f t e r a l l occur; and 
t h a t even i f i t does not occur, the mere f e a r of i t may, 
i n q u i t e conceivable circumstances, g r e a t l y weaken 
B r i t i s h diplomacy and may put temptation i n the way of 
French statesmen which they would f i n d hard t o r e s i s t . " 
The second course was t o expand the a i r f o r c e a t home. 
This would be expensive but could be done. 
Thus the Service advisers' cautioner i n using France 
merely as an example was discarded, France was taken as a 
p o s s i b l e enemy, and "the problem of a i r defence was how 
being discussed w i t h a mixture of r e a l i s m and d i s t a s t e 
which, as C o l l i e r p o i n t s out, had the long-term drawbacks 
t h a t , on the t r i p l e ground t h a t economy was paramount, 
the t h r e a t u n r e a l , and the remedy u n c e r t a i n , e f f e c t i v e 
measures t o meet an a i r a t t a c k from any quarter were 
(145) 
postponed u n t i l the cost became very h i g h . v 
However the t h r e a t from France was now used t o 
o b t a i n some a c t i o n t h a t would probably not have been taken 
144. C.I.D. Paper 108-A, CAB 3/3. 
145. B a s i l C o l l i e r , The Defence of the United Kingdom, 
H i s t o r y of the Second World War, United Kingdom 
M i l i t a r y Series, London 1957, p.8. 
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otherwise. The f u l l - d r e s s meeting o f the Committee of 
Im p e r i a l Defence f o r which Balfour had asked took place 
on 5 J u l y w i t h Lloyd George i n the c h a i r and w i t h Home 
and C h u r c h i l l present i n a d d i t i o n t o Balfou r , the Service 
M i n i s t e r s and the Chiefs of S t a f f . Trenchard expounded 
two a l t e r n a t i v e schemes, one c o s t i n g £600,000 a year 
and p r o v i d i n g s i x squadrons f o r home defence, the other 
c o s t i n g £2 m i l l i o n a year and p r o v i d i n g f i f t e e n service 
squadrons, f i v e a u x i l i a r y squadrons and an a u x i l i a r y a i r 
f o r c e as reserve. Home said t h a t money spendb on the 
a i r f o r c e ought t o he saved on the other Services, but 
Lee, Worthington°Evans and Balf o u r a l l s a i d t h a t t h i s 
was impossible. Some M i n i s t e r s were d o u b t f u l whether 
the programme was l a r g e enough," since the French were 
sa i d t o have 220 squadrons, but the R.A.F. were not 
anxious t o expand more. 
Further meetings and papers were devoted t o the 
question of cost, and t o a s l i g h t l y r e v i s e d A i r M i n i s t r y 
scheme, u n t i l on 2 August the Committee of I m p e r i a l 
Defence agreed t o recommend the adoption of a scheme, 
s t a r t i n g i n the autumn of 1922, t o provide 501 a i r c r a f t 
f o r home defence a t a cost of £2 m i l l i o n a year. 
Further expansion was not t o be precluded, and would be 
considered next year i n the l i g h t of the f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n and the a i r p o l i c y of other c o u n t r i e s . The 
Cabinet accepted the recommendation on the f o l l o w i n g day; 
146. C.I.D. 158th meeting, CAB 2/3. 
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and the programme was announced t o Parliament. ( l Z f7) 
Meanwhile i n March the Government had confirmed the 
separate existence of the A i r M i n i s t r y and the autonomy 
of the R.A.F., but had decided t o i n s t i t u t e an enquiry 
i n t o the proper method of achieving co-operation between 
i t and the navy. 
Thus a beginning was made i n p r o v i d i n g f o r the a i r 
defence of Great B r i t a i n . Although the A i r S t a f f ' s 
f o r e c a s t of the consequences of a i r a t t a c k were not 
f u l l y worked out u n t i l the sp r i n g of 1922, the ideas 
were s u f f i c i e n t l y c u r r e n t e a r l i e r t o account f o r the 
attempts t o secure some measure o f a i r disarmament a t 
the Washington Conference and l a t e r . I f France could 
have been induced t o cut down her a i r f o r c e , the 
necessity of spending money on a home defence a i r f o r c e 
might have seemed t o disappear. The twenty-three 
squadron scheme was not i n f a c t l a r g e enough t o meet a 
r e a l t h r e a t from France, but despite the drawbacks o f 
using her as a y a r d s t i c k i t was something t o have any 
y a r d s t i c k a t a l l i n 1922. 
147. C . I . D . Papers 109-A, 111-A, CAB 3/3; C.I.D. 162nd 
meeting, 163rd meeting, CAB 2/3,° C. 43(22), CAB 
23/30; HoC. Deb.. 5 t h ser., Vol. 157, c o l . 1662. 
148. C.I.Do Papers 135 -C, 136 -C, 139 -C, 140 -C, 141 -C, 
149 -C, 150 -C, 151 -C, 153 -C, 159 -C, 160 -C, 163 -C, 
CAB 5/4; C.I.D. 147th meeting, CAB 2/3; C. 16(22)? 
C. 18(22), CAB 23/29; H.C. Deb., 5 t h ser., Vol. 
151, c o l . 2457. 
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Chapter 3 
General S e c u r i t y and Western Europe 1923-24 
A f t e r the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r an Anglo-French pact came 
t o an end i n the summer of 1922, the question of r e g i o n a l 
s e c u r i t y i n western Europe was not discussed again i n 
London f o r almost a year. I n the meantime the f i r s t 
proposals f o r general guarantees of s e c u r i t y a d d i t i o n a l 
t o those contained i n the Covenant, and l i n k e d w i t h 
r e d u c t i o n of armaments, were produced a t Geneva. 
The B r i t i s h Government were confronted thereby w i t h 
the divergence, which had been apparent a t the Peace 
Conference, between those c o u n t r i e s who " d e s i r e i w r i t t e n 
guarantees and those who desired moral o b l i g a t i o n s only; 
... those who expected t o receive under the Covenant and 
those who expected t o g i v e , " ^ and by the equivocal 
p o s i t i o n o f t h e i r country, l e f t by the abs t e n t i o n of the 
United States as the c h i e f producer o f s e c u r i t y and w i t h 
a p u b l i c which b e l i e v e d emotionally i n the League but 
ignored the i m p l i e d o b l i g a t i o n s . The d r a f t Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance s a t i s f i e d p r a c t i c a l l y no one and was 
easy t o r e j e c t even though one of i t s p r i n c i p a l authors 
was B r i t i s h : the more c a r e f u l l y worked out proposal o f 
1. J.R.M. B u t l e r , i n H i s t o r y of the Peace Conference of 
P a r i s , ed. H.W.V. Temperley, Vol. V I , London 192^, 
p.441. S i r A l f r e d Zimmern, The League o f Nations and 
the Rule of Law, London 1936, pp.325-32, gives a 
masterly summing up of the p o s i t i o n i n the League i n 
i t s e a r l y years. 
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1924, t o be discussed i n the next chapter, presented a 
more d i f f i c u l t problem. 
The question of French s e c u r i t y came t o the surface 
again i n 1923 i n connexion once more w i t h reparations., 
The question now was whether the fundamental French 
motive f o r occupying the Ruhr was a desire f o r s e c u r i t y 
and, i f i t were, whether any o f f e r on the l a t t e r would 
b r i n g about a settlement. The B r i t i s h and German 
Governments both considered the question, but n e i t h e r 
found a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer. When a dispassionate 
examination of the r e p a r a t i o n problem a t l a s t began 
e a r l y i n '. 1924 the new B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r , Ramsay 
MacDonald, shelved the s e c u r i t y question. MacDonald's 
ideas on s e c u r i t y were as d i f f e r e n t from those of h i s 
predecessors as they were from those of the French, of 
both L e f t and Right. For a short time he and H e r r i o t 
seemed t o come together a t Geneva, but i t was not only 
the f a l l of the Labour Government t h a t doomed the Geneva 
Pro t o c o l . 
The Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
The proposals of 1922-23 f o r general guarantees o f 
s e c u r i t y arose out of the discussions i n the League, from 
1920 onwards, about the general r e d u c t i o n of armaments i n 
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fea accordance w i t h A r t i c l e 8 o f the Covenant. K ' 
A f t e r a suggestion i n 1921 by Lord Esher f o r a l i m i t a t i o n 
o f land forces according t o a f i x e d r a t i o had been 
c r i t i c i s e d by European members f o r t a k i n g no account of 
va r y i n g needs f o r s e c u r i t y , Lord Robert C e c i l took the 
i n i t i a t i v e i n t r y i n g t o l i n k r e d u c t i o n o f armaments w i t h 
general guarantees of s e c u r i t y . 
C e c i l submitted p r o p o s i t i o n s t o t h i s e f f e c t t o the 
Temporary Mixed Commission i n J u l y 1922 and a t the same 
time showed them t o c e r t a i n members o f the Government i n 
London. One of the fe a t u r e s was a proposal t h a t the 
o b l i g a t i o n t o give assistance should be confined t o 
co u n t r i e s i n the same p a r t of the globe as t h a t where an 
attack-took place. This attempt-to overcome the 
reluctance o f co u n t r i e s f a r from the l i k e l y scene of 
t r o u b l e t o undertake general o b l i g a t i o n s was t o prove 
one o f the major o b j e c t i o n s t o the Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance so f a r as B r i t a i n and the Dominions were 
concerned, and both Worthington-Evans and Bal f o u r 
c r i t i c i s e d i t a t once. They were also both, although 
f o r r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t reasons, c r i t i c a l of the advance 
2. Summarised i n F.P. Walters, A H i s t o r y of the League 
of Nations, London 1952, Vol. I , pp.219-23, and i n 
Survey of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1924, pp.17-21. 
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m i l i t a r y planning suggested; and Balfour doubted whether 
France would ever be s a t i s f i e d w i t h anything t h a t the 
(*) 
B r i t i s h Empire would be w i l l i n g t o giv e . v ' 
However on 22 September 1922 the Assembly of the 
League of Nations adopted a r e s o l u t i o n commending the 
suggestions of the Temporary Mixed Commission as t o the 
methods by which a t r e a t y of mutual guarantee could be 
made e f f e c t i v e , and s t a t i n g t h a t (1) No scheme f o r the 
re d u c t i o n o f armaments could be f u l l y e f f e c t i v e unless 
i t were general; (2) Many c o u n t r i e s could not s e r i o u s l y 
reduce t h e i r armaments unless they received a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
guarantee of t h e i r s a fety; (3) Such a guarantee could 
be found i n a defensive agreement, open t o a l l c o u n t r i e s , 
b i n d i n g them to"render immediate and e f f e c t i v e assistance -
according t o a prearranged p l a n , provided t h a t the 
o b l i g a t i o n t o give assistance were l i m i t e d i n p r i n c i p l e 
I 
t o the c o u n t r i e s s i t u a t e d i n the same p a r t of the wor^d; 
(4) Previously consent t o the r e d u c t i o n o f armaments was 
the f i r s t c o n d i t i o n f o r the Treaty o f Mutual Guarantee. 
The Assembly asked the Council t o examine the proposals 
and send them t o the various governments f o r observations, 
3. Worthington-Evans t o C e c i l , 11 Aug. 1922; C e c i l t o 
Worthington-Evans, 14 Aug.; Ba l f o u r t o C e c i l , 15 
Sep., C e c i l Papers, B r i t i s h Museum Add. MS. 51095. 
At some stage C e c i l saw the Chief of the I m p e r i a l 
General S t a f f , Lord Cavan, and asked him t o have the 
p l a n studied i n the War O f f i c e ; but he was given no 
encouragement: C e c i l t o P. Noel Baker, 22 Mar. 
1924, BM Add. MS 51106. 
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and the Temporary Mixed Commission was asked to prepare 
(k) 
a d r a f t t r e a t y . v ' 
During the remainder of 1922 and the f i r s t h a l f of 
1923 discussion of the proposal f o r a t r e a t y proceeded 
i n London at the same time as d r a f t s were discussed i n 
Geneva by the Temporary Mixed Commission and the m i l i t a r y 
advisers of the Council, the Permanent Advisory Committee. 
But B r i t i s h Government Departments have never l i k e d 
discussing hypothetical proposals, and there was no sense 
of urgency. On 14 December the Committee of Imperial 
Defence decided to ask the Service Departments f o r 
(5) 
papers. v Cecil was anxious f o r an early discussion. 
He wrote to Hankey that the French Government were taking 
the "scheme "seriously and were t r y i n g to use the Permanent 
Advisory Committee to get schemes of specific pacts 
adopted which would give France security but involved no 
disarmament. He had had very l i t t l e success i n getting 
the matter considered i n London, and nothing much would 
be done u n t i l the Committee of Imperial Defence set the 
Departments moving. The Temporary Mixed Commission was 
due to meet i n January and he was hoping to present an 
elaborated scheme f o r a tre a t y ; but he would immediately 
4. League of Nations, Resolutions and Recommendations 
adopted by the Assembly during i t s Third Session, 
Geneva 1922, pp.24-7. 
5. C .IcD. 168th meeting, CAB 2/3. The Admiralty had 
already sent i n some c r i t i c a l observations; C.I.D. 
Paper 381-B, CAB 4/8. 
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be asked what the Government thought, and at present he 
would have to reply that "the B r i t i s h Government do not 
think. " ^ Cecil also sent i n the t e x t of his d r a f t 
t r e a t y and a note on i t s working., The proposal was f o r 
a general t r e a t y with supplementary conventions r e l a t i n g 
to any country which believed i t s e l f to be i n p a r t i c u l a r 
danger. Cecil wrote t h a t i f the t r e a t y were universal 
i t would c e r t a i n l y prevent aggression. I f i t were 
accepted by a majority of states, he believed t h a t 
aggression would be prevented and disarmament secured 
provided that the majority included the Great Powers 
(among them Germany and Russia or at least one of them). 
I f Great Power co-operation were not secured, the project 
would f a i l . 
A l l the Service Departments c r i t i c i s e d the scheme. 
The A i r Staff and the General Staff both considered 
that the plan would not provide f o r e f f e c t i v e assistance 
and therefore could not be a basis f o r reduction of 
armaments. The General Staff thought that p a r t i a l t r e a t i e s 
could give a greater p o s s i b i l i t y of advance planning but 
would not necessarily lead to disarmaments they also 
considered that the continental l i m i t a t i o n was impossible 
f o r the B r i t i s h Empire. ^ The Admiralty sent i n a 
6. Cecil to Hankey, 15 Dec. 1922, Cecil Papers, BM Add. 
MS 51088. 
7. C.I.Do Paper 383-B, CAB 4 /8 . 
8. C.I.D. Paper 387-B, CAB 4/8; C.I.D. Paper 395-B, 
CAB 4/9c 
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second paper i n February, i n which the^maintained that 
a t r e a t y of t h i s kind would involve B r i t a i n i n 
commitments of unknown magnitude. The spread of the 
Empire committed her i n a l l parts of the world regardless 
of the continental l i m i t a t i o n . Naval forces were 
l i k e l y to be called on f i r s t , and a large part of the 
burden would be §ound to f a l l on B r i t a i n : i f the 
t r e a t y did involve fresh commitments the navy would 
have to be expanded. The Admiralty thought that i t 
would be dangerous f o r a signatory state to reduce i t s 
armaments i n reliance on assistance from others while 
non-signatory states were free t o develop t h e i r strength 
(q) 
as the^chose. K ' 
The Foreign Office were also asked f o r a paper on 
guarantees i n general. Discussing what was wanted w i t h 
a member of the Western Department concerned w i t h 
League of Nations a f f a i r s , C.W. Orde, Hankey pointed out 
that the e x i s t i n g guarantee i n A r t i c l e 10 of the 
Covenant had not brought any m i l i t a r y help to Poland i n 
1920. He also thought i t necessary to consider how f a r 
i t would be possible to f u l f i l such guarantees without 
increasing forces. At present i f B r i t a i n earmarked, 
say, a quarter of her forces f o r League of Nations 
purposes the whole army would be immobilised. ^ 1 0^ A 
memorandum sent to the Committee of Imperial Defence on 
9. C.I.D. Paper 405-B, CAB 4/9. 
10. Hankey to Crowe, 7 Feb. 1923 and minutes, 15 Feb., 
W 1075/30/98, FO 371/9418. 
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3 A p r i l stated the current positions unless A r t i c l e 10 
were given a peremptory interpreation, which seemed 
un l i k e l y , the Covenant imposed on B r i t a i n no obligations 
to take m i l i t a r y action without the concurrence of her 
representatives on the Council„ I n a second part to the 
paper the H i s t o r i c a l Adviser to the Foreign Office 
wrote that i n the past general guarantees had not been 
ef f e c t i v e i n preventing war, but they had always been 
fo r l i m i t e d periods. Cecil's proposal was i n e f f e c t one 
f o r a general defensive alliance of unlimited duration, 
and i f kept might tend to produce a p o l i t i c a l union,, 
Headlam-Morley thought that the question whether 
t r e a t i e s of guarantee could be depended on was r e a l l y 
one of p o l i t i c a l w i l l , which'only the Government, 
Parliament, and the nation could answer. I f a B r i t i s h 
Government, a f t e r f u l l discussion and debate, f e l t 
themselves authorised to become parties to such a t r e a t y 
and make i t s maintenance a permanent part of B r i t i s h 
p olicy - including defence policy - then B r i t a i n ' s 
power and influence were such that i n the long run the 
tr e a t y would succeed. But i f the Government were 
half-hearted, then the t r e a t y would break down., 
Meanwhile Cecil had been sounding the views of the 
Labour Party, without f i n d i n g much encouragement. 
MacDonald wrote that h i s hopes f o r the future were based 
more on p o l i t i c a l and voluntary organisations such as 
11. C.I.D. Paper 416-B, CAB 4/9; W 2878/30/98, FO 371/ 
9418. 
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the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l i s t movement rather than on an 
organisation of governments such as the League. But 
since he was aware that he might have governmental 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y before long, he offered some c r i t i c i s m s 
of the scheme: he thought th a t p a r t i a l agreements might 
t u r n i n t o alliances, and that giving the power to make 
decisions to the Council would lead to a Great Power 
(12) 
directorate. v ' 
Work by the Committee of Imperial Defence was 
stimulated by a request from Geneva f o r the observations 
on the Assembly resolution and by the imminence of the 
next meeting of the Permanent Advisory Committee, which 
was to examine Cecil's d r a f t . The d r a f t i t s e l f was 
being amended. To meet c r i t i c i s m s - t h a t assistance could 
be paralysed by lack of unanimity on the Council, Cecil 
proposed that the Council should decide on the i d e n t i t y 
of the aggressor by a three-quarters majority. The 
Service Departments at once objected that t h i s meant 
that the Council would be able to commit B r i t i s h forces 
(13) 
against the vote of the B r i t i s h Government. v The 
Committee of Imperial Defence agreed on 11 A p r i l that 
the d r a f t t r e a t y should be considered by the Cabinet and 
that meanwhile the B r i t i s h representatives on the 
Permament Advisory Committee might discuss p r a c t i c a l 
questions but not p o l i t i c a l issues. The l a t t e r were 
12. MacDonald to Cecil, 22 Feb. 1923, Cecil Papers, BM 
Add. MS 51081. 
13. C.I.D. Papers 406-B, 408-B, 412-B, CAB 4/9. 
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defined as the questions whether mutual guarantees 
should be given at a l l , whether they could be considered 
e f f e c t i v e , whether the Council should decide by a 
majority vote, whether members should provide a f i x e d 
proportion of t h e i r e f f e c t i v e s , whether there should 
be a general t r e a t y w i t h special conventions or p a r t i a l 
(14) 
t r e a t i e s leading to a general one. v ' 
On technical grounds alone the Permanent Advisory 
Committee decided that Cecil *s t r e a t y was unworkable 
and would involve an increase rather than a reduction 
i n armaments. But the French were anxious to keep the 
idea of mutual guarantees a l i v e , and the Temporary Mixed 
Commission set to work again. Cabinet consideration, 
however, was s t i l l postponed. Instead the Committee of 
Imperial Defence discussed the proposed t r e a t y on 29 
June. The whole conception of general guarantees was 
questioned by Amery, the F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, &^<L 
by Curzon who also thought th a t the t r e a t y was u n l i k e l y 
to s a t i s f y France. Cecil, who was now a member of the 
Government, said that he thought that the French 
considered that a general t r e a t y could be valuable, 
although i t would have to be supplemented by special 
agreements. The Committee decided that memoranda on 
14. C.I.D. 171st meeting, CAB 2/3; CO. 18855/23, 
CO 532/241. 
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the t r e a t y should be circulated to the Cabinet. 
The f i r s t of these memoranda was by Amery, who 
questioned the whole idea of pursuing disarmament 
through security guarantees. He denied the contention, 
so frequently advanced a f t e r the F i r s t World War, that 
armaments were a cause of war. He argued that where 
competition had grown up without a r e a l c o n f l i c t of 
in t e r e s t s , i t could be reduced by frank discussion; 
t h i s had been achieved at Washington over c a p i t a l ships 
and he thought that i t should be t r i e d w i t h France over 
a i r forces. But where there were fundamental differences 
of po l i c y disarmament either was impossible or, i f 
achieved, would not lead to peace. Furthermore a 
tr e a t y "of mutual guarantee was bound to be a guarantee 
of the status quo; i t therefore would not lead to peace 
because i t would be unacceptable to the former enemy 
countries. And B r i t i s h public opinion would not agree 
to being dragged i n t o war to preserve every d e t a i l of a 
settlement which by i t s nature could not be wholly 
equitable. As he had done at the meeting of the Committee 
15o C.I.Do 173rd meeting, CAB 2/3. Among papers 
submitted f o r t h i s meeting was one by Cecil 
defending the t r e a t y and two by Hankey, questioning 
whether countries would i n practice f u l f i l a 
general guarantee at any moment and reissuing a 
paper of 1905 to the same e f f e c t by his predecessor 
as secretary of the C.I.D,: C.I .D. Papers 415-B, 
420-B, CAB "4/9; C.I .D. Paper 431-B, CAB 4/10. 
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of Imperial Defence, Amery also maintained that B r i t i s h 
commitments under such a t r e a t y would f a r outweigh the 
advantages gained, and he saw no reason why B r i t a i n need 
become involved i n European c o n f l i c t s . The continental 
l i m i t a t i o n , he said, i f carried to i t s l o g i c a l 
conclusion would mean the end of the B r i t i s h Empire. 
The Foreign Office did not succeed i n producing a 
Cabinet paper before the end of the summer. The head of 
the Western Department, G.H. V i l l i e r s , wrote a short 
paper intended f o r the purpose, pointing out that 
experience over A r t i c l e 10 of the Covenant had already 
shown that a general guarantee w i t h commitments would not 
be accepted, and that p a r t i a l t r e a t i e s were l i k e l y to 
revive the system of alliances and would not reduce 
(17) 
armaments. v ' This memorandum was submitted to Curzon 
i n August, but Curzon kept i t because, as he said 
nothing was l i k e l y to be done at the end of the 
(18) 
parliamentary session. v ' Meanwhile Crowe had w r i t t e n 
16. CP. 311(23), CAB 24/161. 
17o Memorandum by V i l l i e r s , 21 Jun. 1923, ¥ 5252/30/98, 
FO 371/9419. 
18. Minute by Curzon, 7 Oct. 1923, W 7982/30/98, FO 371/ 
9421. I n a debate i n the House of Commons on 23 July, 
on a motion by MacDonald asking the Government to 
summon an i n t e r n a t i o n a l disarmament conference, 
Baldwin said that the d r a f t t r e a t y , when presented, 
would be examined w i t h sympathy and i n t e r e s t and w i t h 
"an earnest desire, at the f i r s t moment when i t appears 
to be practicable, that the aims of the League, i f not 
i n the exact form i n which the League have suggested 
they should be brought about, s h a l l be brought i n t o 
e f f e c t i n Europe." MacDonald i n his speech said t h a t 
he did not believe that a scheme of guarantees of 
assistance would ever work out: the only possible 
foundation f o r peace was a f e e l i n g of security based on 
j u s t i c e , f a i r play, open decent conduct and 
neighbourliness; H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 167, cols. 
75-182. 
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some more far-reaching c r i t i c i s m . I n the f i r s t place he 
believed that a general scheme f o r the reduction of 
armaments was impossible. He doubted whether the 
Washington naval t r e a t y would ever have been negotiated 
had not B r i t a i n been "inspired by the wish to save money 
and by a suspicion that c a p i t a l ships might be, under 
conditions of modern warfare, a bad investment." He 
doubted whether France would agree to any substantial 
reduction of her forces even i n retur n f o r a general or 
a p a r t i c u l a r guarantee: "Do we expect her to diminish 
the number of her divisions, or the strength of her 
a r t i l l e r y and a i r squadrons i n reliance on a powerful 
B r i t i s h expeditionary force coming to her assistance? 
Can we honestly ask her to do so?" He also doubted 
whether disarmament, i f achieved, could be maintained: 
"Germany i s 'disarmed' owing to the operation of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Yet i t i s the recorded opinion of 
a l l the a l l i e d a u t h o r i t i e s that i t i s i n practice quite 
impossible to prevent her from r e c o n s t i t u t i n g a 
formidable force, more or less s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y , and t h a t 
preparations f o r so doing are undoubtedly i n existence." 
Crowe also maintained that A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant did 
not bind members of the League to reduce t h e i r present 
armaments. I n the second place he questioned the idea 
that general guarantees could be e f f e c t i v e . Headlam-Morley 
had w r i t t e n that guarantee alliances i n the past had 
been e f f e c t i v e : i n so f a r as t h i s was true, Crowe 
argued, i t was because such t r e a t i e s had l a i d down very 
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precise conditions f o r t h e i r operation. The proposed 
tre a t y contained only general s t i p u l a t i o n s ; i f 
threatened states were to be induced to cut down t h e i r 
armaments the guarantees would have to go beyond what 
was contemplated i n A r t i c l e s 10 and 16 of the Covenant, 
but even i n t h e i r present form these a r t i c l e s had 
already caused d i f f i c u l t y . Crowe also put his finger 
on one of the fundamental points that divided, and was 
to continue to divide, the protagonists of c o l l e c t i v e 
security from those whom Cecil called the "reactionary 
elements": "Lord R. Cecil endeavours to meet the 
objections raised i n respect of the serious burden thrown 
upon t h i s country i n p a r t i c u l a r i n v i r t u e of the 
far-reaching "nature of the commitments involved i n the 
d r a f t t r e a t y , by urging that these are not i n f a c t 
l i k e l y to arise, and need not therefore be seriously 
considered. But t h i s argument i s hardly calculated to 
inspire the absolute confidence th a t i f a s i t u a t i o n d id 
arise which brought the commitments i n t o play, we 
should unhesitatingly stand by them." Without such 
confidence nations would not reduce t h e i r armaments. 
Crowe thought that they were u n l i k e l y to do so i n any 
case, and th a t B r i t a i n ought not to go on taking the 
(19) 
i n i t i a t i v e . v ' 
19. Memorandum by Crowe, 24 Jun.1923, W 5047/30/98, 
FO 371/9419. Ever since 1920 Canada had been t r y i n g 
to delete A r t i c l e 10 from the Covenant. At the 
Assembly of 1923 a resolution was passed by a 
majority s t a t i n g that the Council should take i n t o 
account the special circumstances and geographical 
p o s i t i o n of each member when recommending m i l i t a r y 
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I n August the Temporary Mixed Commission approved 
by a majority a new version of the tr e a t y , now renamed 
the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was a compromise 
between the draf t s of Cecil and the French Colonel 
Requin. The t e x t was j u s t ready i n time to be put 
before the Assembly of the League i n September. I t 
passed through a committee without substantial amendment, 
but the Assembly was not prepared to approve or 
disapprove i t , and i t was sent to the governments 
without commento Among the countries which had sent 
observations on the 1922 resolution was Canada - the 
only Dominion to do so - who r e p l i e d b r i e f l y on 27 July 
that she could not p a r t i c i p a t e i n a tr e a t y of mutual 
guarantee. 
Cecil's p o s i t i o n i n the whole a f f a i r was anomalous. 
In 1921 and 1922 he was neither a member of the 
Government nor a B r i t i s h representative at the Assembly; 
instead, he represented South A f r i c a . While members of 
the Permanent Advisory Committee were m i l i t a r y 
19. (Cont) 
measures, and that i t should be f o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s of each state to decide i n what degree 
i t was bound to use i t s m i l i t a r y forces. The 
resol u t i o n received one adverse vote and therefore 
d i d not become blin d i n g , but nevertheless carried 
much weight. I n 1921 the Assembly had resolved t h a t 
the Council might, i n the case of p a r t i c u l a r members, 
postpone the coming i n t o force of any economic 
measures decided on, i f such a postponement would 
f a c i l i t a t e the attainment of the object of the 
measures or was necessary to minimise loss and 
inconvenience to such members; League of Nations, 
Monthly Summary,, 1923, p. 198; Resolutions and 
Recommendations adopted by the Assembly during i t s 
Second Session, Geneva 1921. 
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representatives of governments members of the Council, 
members of the Temporary Mixed. Commission were chosen as 
individuals. Cecil became Lord Privy Seal i n Baldwin's 
Cabinet i n May 1923, charged w i t h League of Nations 
a f f a i r s , and B r i t i s h representative on the Council. 
His r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s capacity w i t h Curzon were uneasy: 
Cecil complained of Curzon's refusal to give him a room 
i n the Fore|g%i Office and of lack of consultation about 
League matters; Curzon complained about Cecil t a l k i n g 
to foreigners about B r i t i s h policy i n general and sending 
papers on League matters to the Cabinet without 
consulting the Foreign Office. ^ 2 0^ Curzon was c e r t a i n l y 
jealous of his authority as Foreign Secretary and was 
c l e a r l y not muc"h"interested^"in the League, ~ having been 
content w i t h the previous arrangement whereby Balfour 
and Herbert Fisher represented B r i t a i n without any 
continuing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But i t i s also clear th a t 
Cecil was demanding, and that he pursued his own view of 
a League poli c y without attempting to re l a t e i t to 
foreign p o l i c y i n general. Cecil's personal prestige 
i n League of Nations c i r c l e s was great, and he could not 
but appear at Geneva as representing the influence of 
20. See t h e i r correspondence of June 1923 i n FO 800/149 
and Cecil Papers, BM Add. MS 51077; Cecil to 
Baldwin, 20 jun., BM Add. MS 51080 and Baldwin Papers, 
University Library, Cambridge, F.2 (Vol. 114); 
also Viscount Cecil, A Great Experiment, London 1941, 
pp. 145-6, and A l l the Way, London 1949, p.178. 
U n t i l October 1922 League of Nations work was 
channelled through the Cabinet Secretariat. There-
a f t e r i t was transferred to the Foreign Office. 
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B r i t a i n . I t was therefore, as V i l l i e r s wrote, 
"undoubtedly awkward that the or i g i n a t o r and prime 
mover of a scheme which i s v i o l e n t l y opposed by every 
Dept. of H.M. Govt should be the p r i n c i p a l representative 
(21) 
of H.M.G. at Geneva." v ' Matters became even more 
d i f f i c u l t when Cecil, without i n s t r u c t i o n s , voted at the 
Assembly of 1923 i n favour of resolutions on budgetary 
l i m i t a t i o n and the manufacture of arms, based on the work 
of the Temporary Mixed Commission. The Service Departments 
disapproved of several of the resolutions and Cecil 
himself, as B r i t i s h representative, would therefore 
probably have to reg i s t e r the Government's objection to 
them when they came before the Council. Another member 
of"the Western Department wrote to Curzon that i t was 
d i f f i c u l t to see how Cecil could continue both as a 
member of the Temporary Mixed Commission and as p r i n c i p a l 
B r i t i s h representative on the Council, and he recommended 
the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Commission. Curzon sent the 
21. Minute by V i l l i e r s , 14 Sep. 1923, W 7127/30/98, 
F0 371/9420. Amery also wrote to Curzon expressing 
concern at Cecil going ahead w i t h the Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance and p r a c t i c a l l y forcing on the 
Government the odium of r e j e c t i n g a scheme of 
which t h e i r representative had been the p r i n c i p a l 
a r c h i t e c t . Amery was the more against the t r e a t y 
now tha t Canada had rejected i t : Amery to Curzon, 
21 Sep., Curzon Papers, Box 65, Letters 1923. 
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memorandum to Cecil and asked f o r his views. ^ ' 
Cecil r e p l i e d that the d i f f i c u l t y was r e a l , but he 
did not think that i t would be cured by dissolving the 
Temporary Mixed Commission.. I t might be that his views 
on the Treaty of Mutual Assistance were so d i f f e r e n t 
from those of the rest of the Government that he would 
have to resign, but that point had not yet been reached 
since the Government had not considered the revised 
t r e a t y . He took the opportunity of stressing that i t 
was no use the Service advisers taking a purely negative 
a t t i t u d e . The t r e a t y might be objectionable, but they 
had to consider how what he regarded as the obl i g a t i o n 
i n A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant was to be carried out; and 
any plan that France regarded as a p r a c t i c a l step 
(23) 
towards disarmament was worthy of consideration. v ^' 
The Treaty of Mutual AssiJ;ance was sent by the 
Assembly to the Council f o r transmission to governments 
on 29 September: i t did not reach London i n time f o r 
Departments to comment on i t before the Imperial 
Conference met i n October. At the Committee of Imperial 
Defence on 2 October Amery suggested that the question 
should be discussed at the Conference since i t was the 
l a s t opportunity f o r personal consultation w i t h the 
Dominions before the next Assembly. But other members 
22. Memorandum by Campbell, 26 Nov. 1923, W 9218/30/98; 
Cecil Papers, BM Add. MS 51077. 
23. Cecil to Curzon, 28 Nov. 1923, ¥ 9336/30/98, FO 
371/9421; BM Add. MS 51077. 
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f e l t that the Cabinet should consider the t r e a t y f i r s t , 
and t h i s was not done. Cecil suggested that he should 
explain the t r e a t y to the conference, but he would appear 
to have been discouraged. He gave an account of League 
matters to the conference on 11 October, without at 
f i r s t mentioning the d r a f t t r e a t y . The Australian Prime 
Minister, Bruce, said that his country would be very much 
af r a i d of i t , and Cecil then said t h a t he did not know 
whether there would be time to discuss the tr e a t y ; he 
(24 
would only say now that j o i n i n g i t would be voluntary. v 
There was no fu r t h e r mention of the t r e a t y i n the 
Imperial Conference. The main reason thereafter f o r lack 
of discussion i n the Committee of Imperial Defence and 
the Cabinet was no doubt the p o l i t i c a l upheaval caused by 
Baldwin's espousal of the cause of protection. 
Government Departments did, however,sand t h e i r comments to 
the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
Curzon, as has been said, had held up the d r a f t of 
a Foreign Office paper i n the summer. Now he wrote that 
the s i t u a t i o n had been changed by the r e d r a f t i n g of the 
tr e a t y , by the Assembly resolution on A r t i c l e 10, and by 
the present aspect of the European s i t u a t i o n . He also 
thought Villagers's paper too general, and asked f o r i t 
24. C.I.D. 176th meeting, CAB 2/4; Hankey to Cecil, 3 
and 5 Oct. 1923, Cecil Papers, BM Add. MS 51088; 
Salisbury to Baldwin, 7 Oct., Baldwin Papers, F.4.1 
(Vol. 192); E. 6th and 7th meetings, 11 Oct., CAB 
32/9. 
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to be rewr i t t e n . v J' I n a fresh memorandum Orde pointed 
out that i n the revised t r e a t y the o r i g i n a l obligations 
had been reduced, the Council was no longer directed to 
determine the nature of the help to be given, and the 
necessity f o r unanimity i n the Council had been restored. 
Neither the general nor the p a r t i a l guarantees were to 
come i n t o e f f e c t f o r any country u n t i l the Council 
c e r t i f i e d that i t had at least begun to reduce i t s 
armaments i n accordance w i t h the plan of reductions 
contemplated. He commented? "The general guarantee 
offered i s dependent on the e x p l i c i t consent of each 
i n d i v i d u a l State called upon to help. I t i s needless to 
consider whether i t would i n practice work: the obvious 
r i s k of i t s - n o t working w i l l c l e a r l y be s u f f i c i e n t to 
prevent any State from th i n k i n g any reduction of 
armaments possible on the strength of i t . " The t r e a t y 
might produce certain p o l i t i c a l advantages, but against 
t h i s there was the danger of i l l u s o r y guarantees and the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t between the League and i n d i v i d u a l 
states as to the existence of an obligation. I t was 
hardly conceivable that the United States would j o i n " t n e 
t r e a t y u n t i l she joined the League; and whatever a 
small continental European state might do, i t would be 
impossible f o r the B r i t i s h Empire to r e s t r i c t i t s 
armaments so long as a powerful or p o t e n t i a l l y powerful 
25. Minute by Curzon, 7 Oct. 1923, ¥ 7982/30/98, FO 
371/9421. 
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country i n any part of the world stood aloof. 
The Service Departments did not change t h e i r views 
on the tr e a t y . The Government of India also expressed 
(27) 
t h e i r opposition. v ' There the matter rested u n t i l i t 
was taken up, s t i l l without urgency, by the Labour 
Government. 
The Committee of Imperial Defence considered the 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance on 3 A p r i l 1924. Then, i n 
view of the unanimous opposition of the Departments, 
l i t t l e discussion was required before the Committee 
decided that they could not recommend the t r e a t y to the 
Cabinet. The main objections were the unlimited nature 
of the obligations, the d i f f i c u l t y f o r the B r i t i s h 
Empire of the continental limit-at-ion, the- di-ff-i-cu-l-ty-of— 
defining an aggressor, the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of preparing 
plans i n advance, the inevitable slowness of operation, 
26. Memorandum by Orde, 18 Oct. 1923, ¥ 8091/30/98, FO 
9421. The United States Government to which, w i t h 
those of other states not members of the League, 
the t r e a t y was sent i n December 1923, rejected i t 
i n June 1924: League of Nations, O f f i c i a l Journal, 
Aug. 1924, pp.1035-6; F.R.U.S., 1924, W , y . - 813. 
27. C.I.D. Papers 464-B, 465-B, CAB 4/10; C.I.D. 
Paper 484-B, CAB 4/11; India Office to Foreign 
Office, 28 Dec. 1923, W 10050/30/98, FO 371/9421. 
The Secretary of State f o r A i r , Hoare, forwarding 
the A i r Staff's paper, expressed sympathy f o r the 
idea of a general moral guarantee and regional 
arrangements w i t h d e f i n i t e commitments without, 
however, discussing what the moral guarantee would 
add to the Covenant nor how i t might contribute to 
a reduction of armaments. 
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the danger of new alliances, and the extension of the 
(28) 
powers of the Council. v ; MacDonald was not anxious 
to announce the Government's decision at once, possibly 
because he wanted to deal w i t h the problem of 
reparations before taking up security and guarantees i n 
a d i f f e r e n t way. The d r a f t reply to the League was 
not sent to the Dominions f o r comment u n t i l the end of 
May; the Government's r e j e c t i o n of the t r e a t y was 
f i n a l l y sent to Geneva on 5 July. 
The Treaty of Mutual Assistance brought i n t o the 
open a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s about general security guarantees 
which were i m p l i c i t i n parts of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. The fundamental problem, as 
Headlam-Morley pointed out, was that of the w i l l of the 
governments and peoples; and as Crowe pointed out, the 
protagonists of general guarantees did not i n the long 
run do t h e i r cause any good by arguing that i f the 
guarantees existed they were u n l i k e l y to be needed. On 
paper, A r t i c l e 10 of the Covenant was such a guarantee; 
28. C.I.D. 183rd meeting, CAB 2/4; C o P. 311(24), CAB 
24/167. 
29. Hankey to Crowe, 28 Apr. 1924, W 3539/134/98, F0 
371/10568; T. Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. I , pp. 
272-3. 
30. ¥ 3539, 4368/134/98, F0 371/10568; ¥ 4857, 5558/ 
134/98, F0 371/10569; CO. 20417/3A, CO 532/186; 
CO. 28235/24, CO 532/274; CP. 309(24), CAB 24/l67; 
C 34(24), C 35(24), CAB 23/48; Cmd 2200 of 1924, 
Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and 
IKe League of Nations respecting the proposed Treaty 
of Mutual Assistance; League of Nations, O f f i c i a l 
Journal, Aug. 1924, pp.1036-9. 
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but i n practice no state had yet regarded t h i s a r t i c l e 
as binding i t to any pos i t i v e action. When, i n the 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the attempt was made to 
provide machinery f o r applying the guarantee and 
supplying actual assistance, i t came up against the 
second fundamental problem, that any such assistance, to 
be effective^ must involve a s a c r i f i c e of national 
decision such as no power that was i n a pos i t i o n to 
provide assistance was w i l l i n g to make- Compared wi t h 
these problems most of the other points c r i t i c i s e d i n 
the t r e a t y - the d i f f i c u l t y of defining the aggressor, 
the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of preparing plans to defend a l l 
countries against a l l other countries, the fear that i t 
would lead to increases rather than reductions i n 
armaments - were subsidiary„ 
For B r i t a i n the problem of the Dominions was also 
of great importance, i n both m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l 
terms. The continental l i m i t a t i o n was an imaginative 
attempt to l i m i t l i a b i l i t i e s and so to overcome the 
well-known reluctance of non-European countries to 
become involved i n European c o n f l i c t s : i t could also 
have been regarded as a safeguard f o r the Monroe 
Doctrine. But i t could not s a t i s f y B r i t a i n , f o r three 
f ^ l ) 
reasons. v ' The f i r s t was the spread i n every continent 
31. I t did not s a t i s f y the Dominions either, nor Uruguay, 
the only Latin American country to submit 
observations, who pointed out that d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
communications made the northern countries of South 
American- f a r t h e r away from her than much of Europe: 
Survey of Intern a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1924, pp.32-4. 
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of the Colonial Empire, f o r the defence of which B r i t a i n 
was d i r e c t l y responsible. The second was the Indian 
Army's po s i t i o n as the main source of <S» rea d i l y 
available manpower f o r imperial defence. The t h i r d was 
the f a c t that B r i t a i n , by providing the navy, was also 
responsible f o r a l l but the minimum l o c a l defence of the 
Dominions. This l a s t f a c t never seems to have been 
stated i n these terms, presumably f o r p o l i t i c a l reaons 
and because imperial defence was s t i l l treated i n London 
as a whole, while none of the Dominions was i n danger. 
In p o l i t i c a l terms, the t r e a t y raised the s t i l l unsettled 
problem of imperial foreign p o l i c y and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
status of the Dominions. v I t had been possible since 
1919 to envisage a B r i t i s h commitment to France that did 
not necessarily involve the Dominions, although even t h i s 
aroused doubts and heartburnings down to 1926. But when 
i t came to general security arrangements i t was 
inconceivable that B r i t a i n could undertake commitments 
outside Europe soak that the Dominions would not themselves 
consider. Cecil might protest that while the Dominions 
must be consulted they could not be given a liberum veto 
over B r i t i s h p o l i c y : v ' i n cases such as the Treaty of 
32. The p o s i t i o n i n the 1920 ,s i s discussed f u l l y i n 
Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of B r i t i s h Commonwealth 
A f f a i r s : Problems of External Policy 1931-39, 
London 1952, pp.49-81. 
33. Cecil to MacDonald, 25 Jun. 1924, Cecil Papers, BM 
Add. MS 51081; H.L. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 58, cols. 
994-5. 
219 
Mutual Assistance and, l a t e r , the Geneva Protocol, t h e i r 
objections were bound to weigh very heavily indeed w i t h 
any B r i t i s h Government. I n the former case the Dominions' 
objections were not decisive: both Baldwin's and 
MacDonald's Governments were s u f f i c i e n t l y opposed to the 
tr e a t y themselves, and neither suggested to the Dominions 
that they might consider an a l t e r n a t i v e . 
French security i n 1923 
Among the arguments used by Cecil i n support of the 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance was one r e l a t i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y 
to France: that disarmament on land was impossible 
without France, and that there was reason to believe that 
the t r e a t y would promote a reduction of French armaments. 
French representatives c e r t a i n l y put a good deal of work 
i n t o the t r e a t y i n 1923 as a step towards security, 
presumably intending that one of the p a r t i a l t r e a t i e s to 
accompany i t would be one concerning t h e i r country. But 
Cecil was surely deceiving himself i f he believed t h a t 
without such a p a r t i a l t r e a t y , and one that included 
B r i t a i n , France would disarm. 
As the French Government, from the London conference 
of August 1922 onwards, i n s i s t e d more and more upon 
"productive pledges," the connexion between reparations 
and French security was i n the minds of many people i n 
Europe. However the attempt of the German Chancellor, 
Cuno, i n December to stave o f f the expected French 
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seizure of pledges by making a security o f f e r was not 
w e l l conceived. Although the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n 
Be r l i n , Lord D'Abernon, l a t e r became enamoured of the 
Cuno o f f e r , he had nothing to do with i t s o r i g i n s . 
The proposal, that the powers interested i n the Rhine 
should solemnly agree among themselves, and promise to 
the United States as trustee, that they would not go to 
war w i t h one another f o r a generation without being 
authorised to do so by a p l e b i s c i t e , was formally made 
to Hughes on 15 December wi t h the i n t e n t i o n that i f i t 
were found acceptable the United States Government would 
put i t forward as t h e i r own. Hughes consulted the French 
Government only, and on learning that Poincare rejected 
the proposal he-told the German Ambassador that there 
34. For the origins of the Cuno o f f e r , and of the 
proposal f o r an expert committee to examine 
Germany's capacity to pay reparations put forward 
i n Hughes's speech at New Haven on 29 December 1922, 
see F.R.U.S., 1922, Vol. I I , pp.163-203 and D.B. 
Gescher, Die VereTnigten Staaten von Nordamerika 
und die Reparationen 1920-1924, Bonn 195b, pp.114-55. 
The security proposal was suggested to the State 
Department by the United States Ambassador i n 
B e r l i n , A.B. Houghton, on 22 October; according to 
L o Zimmermann, Deutsche Aussenpolitik i n der Kra 
der Weimarer Republik, Gottingen 1958, pp.138-42, 
the idea probably came,originally from a German 
o f f i c i a l and the Austra4n Minister i n B e r l i n . The 
two proposals, although^! kept d i s t i n c t , were connected 
i n the minds of Houghton and R.W. Boyden, the American 
observer with the Reparation Commission, who thought 
that evidence of Germany's w i l l to peace would be 
necessary to secure from the A l l i e s the concessions 
necessary f o r German f i n a n c i a l and economic 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . 
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was no object i n pursuing i t . K J J ' The news of the 
proposal leaked to the press i n Paris and Cuno therefore 
referred to i t i n a speech at Hamburg on 29 December, 
without mentioning the United States by name. This was 
the f i r s t t h a t D'Abernon had heard of i t . Having sought 
de t a i l s from the Chancellor and the Minister f o r Foreign 
A f f a i r s , he commented to the Foreign Office that there 
was j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r Cuno's contention that the o f f e r 
was more important f o r coming from a government supported 
by a l l p arties. He therefore thought i t important not to 
l e t the present occasion pass or allow the proposal to be 
dismissed without examination. Curzon, however, 
regarded the proposal as a "piece of impertinence," and 
when-the-Britxsh Charge d 1 A f f a i r e s " a t the r Vatican" 
reported t h a t the Cardinal Secretary of State was wondering 
whether the Pope should put forward the proposal again i n 
(37) 
a modified form, he was instructed to make no comment. v ' 
35. F.R.U.S.. 1922, Vol. I I , pp.203-11; German Foreign 
Ministry archives, Rosenberg t e l s . to Wiedfeldt 
(Washington), 13, 20, 27 Dec. 1922; Wiedfeldt t e l s . 
to Rosenberg, 15, 19, 28 Dec, 3243/D718462-64, 
D718492, D718553-54, D718641, D718684-85. The 
documents •'a^ d the f i l e s of the German Foreign Ministry 
c i t e d here and subsequently are i d e n t i f i e d by the 
s e r i a l and frame numbers of the c o l l e c t i o n of 
microfilm copies i n the Public Record Office. 
tel. 
36. B e r l i n t e l . 3, 2 Jan. 1923; B e r l i n ttft. 4, 3 Jan.; 
Be r l i n desp. 13, 4 Jan., C 178, 186, 432/178/18, 
F0 371/6696; memorandum by; Rosenberg, 4 Jan., 
3243/D718858-59. Poincare' described the o f f e r to 
the conference at Paris on 2 January, stressing t h a t 
there had been no formal proposal or refusal. 
37. Vatican t e l . 2, 13 Jan. 1923; t e l 2 to the Vatican, 
17 Jan., C 721/178/18, F0 371/8696. 
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By t h i s time the Reparation Commission had declared 
Germany to be i n default and the Franco-Belgian 
occupation of the Ruhr had begun,, I t i s not part of the 
purpose of t h i s study to examine the course of the Ruhr 
occupation. But i n so f a r as i t involved, or was 
believed to involve the question of security, some account 
of Anglo-French rel a t i o n s concerning the occupation i s 
necessary f o r the discussion of the security question 
i t s e l f . 
With the r e j e c t i o n of Bonar Law's reparation plan 
at the Paris conference of early January 1923, ^ 
was evident that the occupation of the Ruhr was imminent. 
However much t h i s was deplored, since the Government 
believed that i t would neither help to solve the problem 
nor produce much money, there was no desire f o r a breach 
(39 
w i t h France and no i n t e n t i o n of undertaking mediation. w 
Extraordinary French measures i n the Allied-occupied 
Rhineland caused d i f f i c u l t i e s throughout the year, but 
38. See Cmd 1812 of 1923, I n t e r - a l l i e d Conferences on 
Reparations and I n t e r - A l l i e d Debts held i n London and 
Paris, December 1922 and January 1923; France, 
Documents diplomatiques, Demande de moratorium du 
governement allemand a l a Commission des 
Reparations (14 novembre 1922j. Conference de Londres 
(9-12 dgcembre 1922), Conference de Paris (2-4 
janvier 1923), Paris 1923. ~ " 
39. C. 1(23), 11 Jan. 1923, CAB 23/45; desp. 41 to B e r l i n , 
8 Jan., C 499/1/18, FO 371/8626; P.P.I., Vol. I , No. 
344. Immediately a f t e r the occupation began 
St-Aulaire found his p o s i t i o n i n London easier than 
f o r some time: Confession d'un vieux diplomate, 
pp. 649-54, 656-60, bb4. 
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the Foreign Office were reluctant to contemplate 
withdrawing B r i t i s h troops or the High Commission unless 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n became in t o l e r a b l e , and on the whole the 
B r i t i s h representatives i n Belgium, France and Germany 
agreedo ^Zf0^ The Cabinet decided that the forces should 
be maintained, and every e f f o r t made to avoid incidents 
that might rouse public opinion to demand withdrawal. 
For the f i r s t few months l i t t l e was done even to t r y 
to elucidate French and Belgian motives, although reports 
about them were collected. I n the second h a l f of 
February the Belgians took pains to disclaim any p o l i t i c a l 
(Lp) 
motive f o r the occupation. v ' But the French motives 
seemed to be more mixed: during March there was a good 
deal of press discussion about the terms of a possible 
settlement, i n which security was a feature= Pertinax 
and Philippe M i l l e t , i n p a r t i c u l a r , wrote about a 
permanent organisation of the l e f t bank of the Rhine to 
40. Grahame to Waterlow, 23 Jan. 1923, C 1898/313/18, 
FO 371/8708; B e r l i n t e l . 52, 24 Jan; D'Abernon 
to Lampson, 25 Jan., C 1567, 1558/313/18, FO 
371/8707; Paris t e l . 106, 27 Jan.; Kilmarnock to 
Lampson, 27 Jan., C 1709, 1861/313/18, F0 371/8708; 
Central Dept. memorandum, 8 Feb., C 2258/313/18, 
F0 371/8710. 
41. Meeting of Ministers, 24 Jan. 1923, CAB 21/270; 
C. 3(23), 26 Jan., CAB 23/45; t e l s . 14 to Coblenz, 
19 to B e r l i n , 43 to Paris, 24 Jan., C 1301/313/18, 
FO 371/8706. 
42. Brussels desp. 137, 16 Feb. 1923, C 3109/313/18, 
FO 371/8714; Brussels t e l . 30, 24 Feb.; desp. 202 
to Brussels, 26 Feb., C 3472, 3626/313/18, FO 
371/8716. 
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ensure i t s continued d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n a f t e r the end of 
the A l l i e d occupation. Later i n the month there 
was some discussion of an Anglo-French pact, which 
French correspondents i n London believed was being 
reconsidered. Phipps, the Charge d'Affaires i n Paris, 
suggested that Poincare might be holding out the prospect 
of a pact to the French public as a consolation f o r the 
day when i t became necessary to admit that the Ruhr 
(44) 
occupation had f a i l e d , v ' French discussion of 
security was fur t h e r stimulated by the cessation of the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the M i l i t a r y Control Commission i n Germany 
owing to the r i s k of incidents; and Grahame from 
Brussels reported signs that the French were t r y i n g to 
s t i f f e n Belgian resolution by introducing the question of 
German armaments. (^5) ^-t end of the month Phipps 
found the President of the Comite des Forges and a 
direc t o r of the Banque de Paris c h i e f l y interested i n 
security and demanding permanent i n t e r n a t i o n a l control 
over the Rhineland and the Ruhr. 
43. Echo de Paris, 1 and 2 Mar. 1923; Europe nouvelle, 
3 and 10 Mar. M i l l e t ' s views were said to have been 
generally approved by Poincare and Millerand: Paris 
desp. 551, 5 Mar.; Paris t e l . 260, 6 Mar., C 4l67 9 4184/1/18, FO 371/8632. 
44. Paris t e l . 315, 19 Mar. 1923; Paris t e l . 334, 25 
Mar.; Paris t e l . 341, 27 Mar., ¥ 2080, 2261, 2338/ 
1585/17, FO 371/9394; Paris desp. 829, 2 Apr., 
C 6110/313/18, FO 371/8726. 
45. Paris t e l . 311, 18 Mar. 1923; Brussels t e l . 64, 19 
Mar., C 5019, 5179/313/18, FO 371/8723* 
46. Paris t e l . 345, 28 Mar. 1923, C 5825/313/18, FO 
371/8723. 
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But o f f i c i a l l y Poincare now, as l a t e r , denied any 
security motive f o r the occupation. Security was not 
mentioned i n the communique issued at the end of a 
meeting between French and Belgian Ministers on 12 
March, an omission f o r which the Belgians claimed 
(47) 
c r e d i t , v ' I n preparation f o r an impending debate i n 
Parliament Curzon asked the French Ambassador on 21 
March f o r a statement on France's aim i n the Ruhr and 
on how the measures being taken were expected to bring 
about i t s r e a l i s a t i o n . The French reply stated that the 
aim was reparation, and confirmed e a r l i e r statements 
that France would only evacuate the Ruhr as Germany 
(LQ) / 
carried out her reparation obligations. v Poincare 
made another statement to t h i s e f f e c t on 27 March and 
again denied any annexationist aims i n a speech i n the 
4 7 o Brussels t e l . 5 5 , 1 4 Mar. 1 9 2 3 ; desp. 2 7 3 to 
Brussels, 1 5 Mar., C 4 8 1 1 , 4 8 3 5 / 3 1 3 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 
8 7 2 2 . 
48. Desp. 1011 to Paris, 21 Mar. 1923, C 5302/313/18, 
FO 371/8724; memorandum from French Ambassador, 
23 Mar., C 5783/313/18, FO 371/8725. On 26 March 
Curzon turned down a suggestion by Crowe that i t 
might be worth enquiring whether the French 
Government would see a way out of the Ruhr i f 
B r i t a i n renewed the o f f e r of a pact: minute on 
2261/1585/17, FO 371/9394. 
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Chamber two days l a t e r , K y j 
Meanwhile D'Abernon had been encouraging the 
Germans to repeat the Cuno o f f e r or make new proposals 
on security. The idea of reviving the Cuno o f f e r had 
been i n D'Abernon's mind since January, and on 11 March 
he wrote to ask Crowe whether i t might not be possible 
to reopen the discussions, The occupation of the 
Ruhr convinced him that Germany needed security against 
France more than France needed security against Germany, 
and he was now turning over i n his mind the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of mutual guarantees of non-aggression. The Germans 
themselves were considering various ideas: the Minister 
f o r Foreign A f f a i r s t o l d Houghton that the proposal that 
the Government were about to make would be based on a--
49. Journal o f f i c i e l , Chambre des deputes, 29 Mar 1923« 
In f a c t d i f f e r e n t French personalities seem to have 
had d i f f e r e n t expectations and motives. President 
Millerand hoped f o r advantages i n both reparations 
and security, but Poincare seems to have been 
pri m a r i l y concerned to put pressure on Germany -
and also i n d i r e c t l y on B r i t a i n and the United States 
to take some i n i t i a t i v e on reparations and war debts 
See i n p a r t i c u l a r Jacques Chastenet, Raymond Poincare, 
Paris 1948, pp.240-6; Raoul P e r s i l , Alexandre 
Millerand, Paris 1949, pj?. 150-1; Bertrand de 
Jouvenel, D'une gugrre a 1'autre, Vol. I , Paris 1940, 
p^o305-06, A recent a r t i c l e by Denise Artaud, 
"A propos de l'occupation de l a Ruhr," i n Revue 
d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, XVII (1970), 
pp. 1-21, i s based on the proce*s-verbaux of Senate 
committees. 
50, Viscount D'Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace, Lord 
D'Abernon's Diary, London 1929-30, Vol. I I , pp.157, 
184-5, 18b, 190, 196, 200-01, 203-04; D'Abernon to 
Crowe, 11 Mar. 1923, D'Abernon Papers, BM Add, MS 
48926, 
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Rhine pact guaranteeing French security. K J ' This 
feature did not, however, appear i n the German approach 
to the B r i t i s h and United States Governments of 16 
March, which merely repeated the proposal f o r a committee 
of experts to examine Germany's capacity to pay; but 
the reception of the approach suggested that the 
security question might u s e f u l l y be raised again. v ' 
Accordingly on 22 March the German Ambassador came to 
see Curzon with a reply to the advice which Bonar Law and 
Curzon had given him, that Germany should make substantial 
proposals. Sthamer said that h is Government could neither 
propose nor agree to anything that would impair German 
sovereignty, and the French demand f o r additional security 
was unjustified'; but they were w i l l i n g to renew the Cuno 
o f f e r . Curzon said t h a t he did not believe that i t gave 
any hope f o r an early settlements even without the 
p l e b i s c i t e idea (which Sthamer said could be dropped) he 
did not think that the French would accept i t . The 
German Government should produce a plan that r e a l l y met 
the present s i t u a t i o n instead of repeating proposals which 
had already been rejected.(53) 
51. Gescher, Die Vereinigten Stfaaten und die Reparationen, 
p.168. 
52. Minute by Crowe, 10 Mar. 1923, C 4585/313/18, FO 371/ 
8721; C. 15(23), 14 Mar., CAB 23/45; desp. 394 to 
Be r l i n , 14 Mar., C 4876/1/18, FO 371/8632; Sthamer 
t e l . , 16 Mar., 3H6/D639167-70; Rosenberg to Sthamer, 
18 Mar., 3H6/D639171-73; Earl of Ronaldshay, The 
L i f e of Lord Curzon, London 1926, Vol. I l l , p.347; 
Gescher, Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Reparationen, 
pp.168-9. 
53= Desp. 450 to B e r l i n , 22 Mar. 1923, C 5439/313/18, FO 
371/8724. 
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Sthamer's inst r u c t i o n s had said that i f the Rhine 
pact offered i n December would not s u f f i c e , i t could be 
replaced or extended by a far-reaching German-French 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement. Provided that the engagement 
were reciprocal, Germany could declare herself ready to 
submit a l l p o l i t i c a l disputes to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l body 
i n accordance with the Bryan system, and i n no case to 
go to war before t h i s body delivered i t s opinion. 
Sthamer did not succeed, on 22 March, i n convincing 
Curzon that t h i s suggestion was any better than the 
Cuno o f f e r , and he was therefore instructed to t r y again. 
He was t o l d that the p l e b i s c i t e proposal could be 
retained f o r use i f either party refused to accept the 
award of the international"body. I t was hard to see 
what other guarantees would be more r e a l . An 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l gendarmerie i n the Rhineland, and control 
by the League, were objectionable as infringements of 
German sovereignty. Sthamer saw Curzon again on 29 
March, but was merely t o l d that the German Government must 
make proposals on reparations without attaching impossible 
C54) 
conditions. K ' 
54. Tel. to Sthamer, 20 Mar. 1923, 2406/D501196-97; 
Sthamer t e l . , 22 Mar.; t e l . to Sthamer^,fcerV, 25 Mar., 
3116/D639181-82; D639184-90; desp. 490 to B e r l i n , 
29 Mar., C 5906/313/18, FO 371/8725. The "Bryan 
system" i s evidently a reference to the Peace 
Commission t r e a t i e s between the United States and a 
number of European and Latin American countries, 
concluded i n 1913 and 1914. They were not 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s i n the f u l l sense but provided 
f o r c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery„ 
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An i n t e r n a t i o n a l gendarmerie i n the Rhineland was 
one of the proposals brought to London i n the f i r s t 
week of A p r i l by Loucheur, who was out of o f f i c e but 
came wi t h the knowledge and probably w i t h the approval 
of Poincare and Millerand. The suggestions which 
Loucheur put to Bonar Law on 7 A p r i l were f o r a 
reparation settlement based on Germany restoring her 
finances, the t o t a l debt being f i x e d at 40 m i l l i a r d 
gold marks plus the t o t a l of A l l i e d debts to the United 
States ( a l l other i n t e r - A l l i e d debts being cancelled), a 
series of i n t e r n a t i o n a l loans, and evacuation of the 
Ruhr by stages related to German payments. Loucheur 
fu r t h e r proposed that the Rhineland should be separated 
from Prussia and completely demilitarised, with-an -
in t e r n a t i o n a l gendarmerie under League of Nations 
supervision; that the railways should be managed by an 
in t e r n a t i o n a l board under the League; and that the 
Saar should become a special state under League control 
( 5 5 ) 
and the mines remaining French property. v-/^/ 
The immediate Foreign Office reaction was that 
League control presented obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s , because 
i t would be an infringement of German sovereignty, 
because i t might not be covered by the terms of the Treaty 
of Versailles, and because the League was hardly equipped 
55. Foreign Office memoranda of 7, 13 and 17 Apr. 1923, 
C 6300/1/18, FO 371/8632; C 6338/129/18, FO 371/ 
8660; C 8383/313/18, FO 371/8730; Curzon Papers, 
Box 22, Rhineland; Loucheur, Carnets secrets, 
pp.117-18. 
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to organise i t . Nevertheless some members of the 
Central Department thought that something on these l i n e s 
offered the least objectionable solution i f i t were the 
case that reparations could not be s e t t l e d u n t i l France 
were given additional security. However, although 
Loucheur returned to Paris op t i m i s t i c that B r i t i s h and 
French views were drawing closer together, discussion of 
his v i s i t brought a disavowal from the French 
Government. Semi-official statements on 17 A p r i l 
were uncompromising on reparations and said that so long 
as the l e f t bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads were 
held France was assured against aggression. No fu r t h e r 
i n t e r - a l l i e d agreement would be needed u n t i l the end of 
the period of occupation, and i n the French Government's 
(57) 
view that period had not yet begun to run. K ' 
D'Abernon, however, was s t i l l recommending 
tr a n s f e r r i n g the centre of discussion from reparations, 
on which he thought agreement impossible, to what he 
regarded as the more f r u i t f u l subject of security. When 
he returned to B e r l i n from leave at the end of the f i r s t 
week i n A p r i l , he advised Rosenberg to ret u r n to the 
56. Paris t e l s . 377, 382, 10 Apr.1923, C 6480, 6482/1/18, 
FO 371/8633; conversation between Bonar Law and 
St-Aulaire, 12 Apr., C 6697/313/18, FO 371/8727; 
memorandum by T y r e l l , 13 Apr., C 8384/313/18, FO 
371/8730; Paris t e l . 410, 17 Apr., C 6913/313/18, 
FO 371/8727. 
57. According to one French i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Treaty 
of Versailles the period of occupation only began 
with the f u l f i l m e n t of the peace terms. The B r i t i s h 
view was that i t began wi t h the entry of the tr e a t y 
i n t o force on 10 January 1920. 
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Rhine pact and to say t h a t Germany was ready f o r any 
agreements which were based on r e c i p r o c i t y and l e f t 
German sovereignty unimpaired. (58) ^ e r e p 0 r t e d to the 
Foreign O f f i c e t h a t German opinion was ready to f u r n i s h 
f a r - r e a c h i n g guarantees provided t h a t the pledges were 
r e c i p r o c a l , and he thought t h a t many Frenchmen would not 
(59) 
r e s e n t r e c i p r o c i t y . w 1 But Phipps thought t h a t the 
French would be even more i n t r a n s i g e n t i f s e c u r i t y were 
r a i s e d before r e p a r a t i o n s were s e t t l e d . They would not 
contemplate r e c i p r o c a l guarantees t h a t would p l a c e 
B r i t a i n i n the p o s i t i o n of a r b i t e r , and he doubted 
whether any French Government f o r a generation would be 
strong enough to end the occupation of the Rhineland and 
the bridgeheads. (^Qj--- — 
During the l a s t week i n A p r i l the Germans were 
preparing a new note on r e p a r a t i o n s , and they considered 
i n c l u d i n g an o f f e r on s e c u r i t y . One of the proposals, 
submitted by Gaus, the l e g a l a d v i s e r to the Foreign 
M i n i s t r y , and Schubert, head of the department d e a l i n g 
w i t h the B r i t i s h Empire and the United S t a t e s , was 
d i f f e r e n t from anything considered before. I t foreshadowed 
58. Memorandum by Rosenberg, 8 Apr. 1923, 3243/D719345-
47. 
59. B e r l i n desp. 259, 11 Apr. 1923, C 6880/313/18, FO 
371/8727; D'Abernon to Fhipps, 16 Apr., D'Abernon 
Papers, BM Add. MS 48926; B e r l i n desp. 268, 17 Apr., 
C 7315/313/18, FO 371/8729. 
60. Phipps to D'Abernon, 24 Apr. 1923, BM Add. MS 48926. 
the proposals of January 1925 i n suggesting t h a t : ( l ) 
The Western European powers (Germany, France, Great 
B r i t a i n , Belgium, the Netherlands, S w i t z e r l a n d , and 
Luxembourg) should undertake to r e s p e c t the i n t e g r i t y 
of t h e i r present t e r r i t o r i e s and mutually and s e v e r a l l y 
guarantee to f u l f i l the undertaking; (2) I n the same 
sense the powers would guarantee the f u l f i l m e n t of the 
o b l i g a t i o n s l a i d on Germany i n the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s 
i n r e s p e c t of the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Rhineland; 
(3) Germany and France would undertake, under the . 
guarantee of the other Western European powers, to d e a l 
w i t h a l l d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g between them which could not 
be s e t t l e d by diplomacy by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l procedure 
c o n s i s t i n g of a r b i t r a t i o n -for-disputes of a j u r i d i c a l 
nature and f o r other d i s p u t e s a c o n c i l i a t i o n procedure 
on the model of the Bryan t r e a t i e s ; (4) the pact would 
have a d u r a t i o n of 99 year> 
However n e i t h e r t h i s proposal nor a r e p e t i t i o n of 
the Cuno o f f e r was s p e l t out i n the German r e p a r a t i o n 
note of 2 May. A d e t a i l e d o f f e r a t t h i s stage would not 
have achieved any r e s u l t . I n a d d i t i o n to the French 
s e m i - o f f i c i a l statement of 17 A p r i l , Curzon had s a i d i n 
61. Memorandum by Schubert, 25 Apr. 1923, 3243/D719278-
82; undated d r a f t s of r e p a r a t i o n note, 3243/D719150, 
D719162, D719170-80. The proposal was i n c l u d e d i n 
some of the d r a f t s of the note, and one v e r s i o n 
contained the f u r t h e r proposal t h a t alongside t h i s 
pact Germany would be ready to conclude a general 
t r e a t y of a r b i t r a t i o n w i t h her other neighbours 
as w e l l . 
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the House of Lords on 20 A p r i l t h a t s e c u r i t y was not 
immediately r e l e v a n t to the r e p a r a t i o n question. (^2) 
The German Charge d ' A f f a i r e s i n P a r i s , Hoesch, a l s o 
reported t h a t s e c u r i t y was now i n the background i n 
France. (^3) ^ g ^ w a g s e n-^ } the German note contained 
only a b r i e f general statement on s e c u r i t y , to the 
e f f e c t t h a t the German Government were ready f o r any 
agreement c a l c u l a t e d to secure peace which was based on 
r e c i p r o c i t y . More e s p e c i a l l y they were ready f o r an 
agreement binding Germany and France to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
procedure f o r s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s . So f a r as the main 
subject-matter,, r e p a r a t i o n s , was concerned, the note was 
bound to seem inadequate to a l l the A l l i e s ; but the 
a c t i o n of the -French and B e l g i a n Governments i n 
r e j e c t i n g i t without c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n caused not 
merely annoyance i n London but a l s o doubts whether 
62. H.L. Deb., 5th s e r . , Vol. 53, c o l . 794. 
63. Hoeseh desp. 24 Apr. 1923, 3243/D719469-78. The 
German Ambassador had been withdrawn from P a r i s 
when the Ruhr was occupied. Hoesch d i d so w e l l as 
charge d ' a f f a i r e s i n d i f f i c u l t circumstances t h a t 
a t Poincare's request he was appointed ambassador 
i n February 1924. 
64. France, Documents diplomatiques, Documents r e l a t i f s 
aux notes allemandes des 2 mai e t 5 .juin 1923 sur . 
l e s r e p a r a t i o n s , 2 mai-3 aout 1923, P a r i s 1923? No.l; 
Belgium, Documents diplomatiques r e l a t i f s aux 
r^gargEions, du 26~d6cembre 1922 au 27 aou^T923, 
B r u s s e l s 1923, No.20; desp. 574 to B e r l i n , 2 May; . 
note from German Ambassador, C 7832, 7896/1/18, F0 
371/8633. 
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Poincare wanted a settlement a t a l l . (^5) B r i t i s h 
r e p l y to the German note was a l s o a r e j e c t i o n , but i t 
ended with an i n v i t a t i o n to the German Government to 
submit a b e t t e r o f f e r . 
Although D'Abernon denied p r e s s r e p o r t s t h a t the 
German Government were c o n s u l t i n g him on what to do next, 
he d i d i n f a c t suggest to Rosenberg t h a t before answering 
Curzon's note they should make soundings i n London to 
f i n d out what would be an acceptable answer, and.gave 
h i s own opinion. On 29 May the Germans approached 
the B r i t i s h and I t a l i a n Governments f o r advice on the 
l i k e l y a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a new communication. Stfehmer 
was i n s t r u c t e d to say t h a t s i n c e the B r i t i s h note d i d 
not mention-security the question was not d e a l t w i t h i n 
the present memorandum; but Germany was ready to give 
France and Belgium any p o l i t i c a l guarantees so long as 
they were based on r e c i p r o c i t y and d i d not a f f e c t the 
freedom of the Rhineland. But Curzon d e c l i n e d to r e c e i v e 
65. T e l s . 191 to P a r i s , 66 to B r u s s e l s , 3 May 1923; 
desp. 1535 to P a r i s , 3 May, G 7832, 7837/1/18, FO 
371/8633; B r u s s e l s t e l . 92, 3 May; P a r i s t e l . 454, . 
3 May; t e l . 69 to B r u s s e l s , 4 May; t e l . 192 to 
P a r i s , 4 May; P a r i s t e l . 457, 4 May; B r u s s e l s t e l . 
101, 5 May; B r u s s e l s t e l . 102, 5 May; fiesaseasssbat 
igiE5=55iSa3E; t e l . 201 to P a r i s , 5 May; t e l . 72 to 
B r u s s e l s , 5 May, C 7899, 7903, 7966, 8049, 8050, 
8071, 8072/1/18, FO 371/8634. 
66. Note to the German Ambassador, 13 May 1923, C 8311/ 
1/18, FO 371/8635. 
67. Memorandum W Rosenberg, 14 May 1923, 3H6/D638581; 
B e r l i n t e l . 212, 25 May, C 9274/1/18, FO 371/8637. 
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the German note and re f u s e d to give advice on what the 
French and B e l g i a n Governments might accept. 
Curzon was, however, being d r i v e n to the c o n c l u s i o n 
t h a t B r i t a i n would have to do something i f the next 
German proposals were reasonable and were r e j e c t e d by-
France o He hoped f o r I t a l i a n support, and even hoped 
t h a t i t might be p o s s i b l e to win the Belgi a n s over. 
The next German note, presented to the A l l i e d and the 
United S t a t e s Governments on 7 June, d e c l a r e d w i l l i n g n e s s 
to accept the d e c i s i o n of an i m p a r t i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r i b u n a l as to the amount and method of payment and to 
provide f i n a n c i a l guarantees, and asked f o r a 
conference. When d e l i v e r i n g the note Sthamer t o l d Curzon 
t h a t - h i s Government would o f f e r any guarantees on - -
s e c u r i t y t h a t were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h German sovereignty.. (70) 
I n the d i s c u s s i o n of the answer to be sent to t h i s note, 
the c r u c i a l question was the demand of the French and 
Be l g i a n Governments f o r the abandonment of p a s s i v e 
r e s i s t a n c e i n the Ruhr before any d i s c u s s i o n of 
r e p a r a t i o n s could take p l a c e , and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y or 
68. I n s t r u c t i o n s to Sthamer, 27 May 1923, 3243/D720185-
89; desp. 802 to B e r l i n , 29 May, C 9451/1/18, F0 
371/8637; D.D.I., Vol. I I , No.62. 
69. Desp. 704 to Rome, 31 May 1923, C 9592/1/18, F0 371/ 
8 6 i f ; D.D.Io, Vol. I I , No.65» 
70. Cmd 1943 of 1923, Correspondence w i t h the A l l i e d 
Governments r e s p e c t i n g Reparation Payments by 
Germany, No.2; France, Documents r e l a t i f s aux notes 
allemandes des 2 mai et 5 j u i n , No.17;,Belgium, 
Documents diplomatiques r e l a t i f s aux r e p a r a t i o n s , 
No.27; desp. 836 to B e r l i n , 7 Jun., C 9940/1/18, 
F0 371/8638. 
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u n w i l l i n g n e s s to s t a t e e i t h e r what they would accept on 
r e p a r a t i o n s or what would happen to the occupation i f 
p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e ceased. The Foreign O f f i c e decided 
not to r a i s e the s e c u r i t y question, mainly because i t 
was not c l e a r how important i t was to the French a t 
(71) 
present. w ' 
Attempts during the remainder of June and the f i r s t 
week of J u l y to secure c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the French terms 
were u n s u c c e s s f u l , and although the B e l g i a n Government 
were more c o n c i l i a t o r y i n tone the hopes of detaching 
t • 
them from France proved v a i n . F i n a l y on 6 J u l y Curzon 
t o l d the French Ambassador t h a t he would d r a f t a j o i n t 
r e p l y to the German note; i f the A l l i e d Governments could 
C72) 
not" agree to i t , i t would be sent by~the B r i t i s h alone. v ' 
Renewed suggestions t h a t s e c u r i t y might be considered 
came from the I t a l i a n s and from the Ambassador i n P a r i s , 
Lord Crewe. Curzon t h e r e f o r e t o l d S t - A u l a i r e on 10 J u l y 
71. The Temps had published, on 10 May and 6 June, some 
more a r t i c l e s about an Anglo-French agreement f o r 
mutual p r o t e c t i o n of sea communications and a i r 
defence; but even these s t r e s s e d t h a t s e c u r i t y had 
no p l a c e i n f i n a n c i a l n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Germany, 
and Poincare had again s t a t e d p u b l i c l y on 17.May 
t h a t the Ruhr occupation had nothing to do w i t h 
s e c u r i t y : P a r i s desp. 1334, 4 Jun. 1923; P a r i s t e l . 
565, 6 Jun., C 9831/313/18, FO 371/8732; memorandum 
by Crowe and minute by Curzon, 9 Jun., C 10092/1/18, 
FO 371/8639o 
72. Correspondence between 8 June and 6 J u l y p r i n t e d i n 
Cmd 1943 of 1923; France, Documents r e l a t i f s aux 
notes allemandes des 2 mai e t 5 .iuin; Belgium, 
Documents diffplomatiques r e l a t i f s aux r e p a r a t i o n s . 
Also desp. 1955 to P a r i s , 11 Jun., C 10185/1/18, FO 
371/8639; desp. 2021 to P a r i s , 15 Jun., C 10512/1/18, 
FO 371/8640; desp. 2185 to P a r i s , 2 J u l . , C 11506/ 
1/18, FO 371/8641; desp. 720 to B r u s s e l s , 3 J u l . ; 
desp. 2227 to P a r i s , 3 J u l . ; desp. 733 to B r u s s e l s , 
6 J u l . ; desp. 2267 to P a r i s , 6 J u l . , C 11638, 11639, 
11802, 11803/1/18, FO 371/8642. 
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t h a t B r i t a i n would c e r t a i n l y d i s c u s s i t i f the French 
Government wished; but the Ambassador s a i d d e f i n i t e l y 
t h a t France d i d not regard the Ruhr i s s u e as i n any 
way bound up w i t h the question of s e c u r i t y . v'^ y 
The note to the A l l i e d Governments, w i t h a d r a f t 
r e p l y to the German Government, was sent on 20 J u l y . 
I t proposed the end of p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e , p r o g r e s s i v e 
evacuation of the Ruhr, an* independent enquiry i n t o 
Germany's c a p a c i t y to pay and the nature of s u i t a b l e 
guarantees, and i n t e r - A l l i e d d i s c u s s i o n s on a comprehensive 
f i n a n c i a l settlement. The note ended w i t h a statement 
(7L) 
t h a t B r i t a i n was ready to d i s c u s s s e c u r i t y i f d e s i r e d . w ' 
The French and B e l g i a n r e p l i e s were both unfavourable. 
•The—French one, which Curzon described~as a r e b u f f , 
r e s t a t e d the previous French p o s i t i o n and ended by saying 
t h a t the French Government would be glad to t a l k about 
s e c u r i t y but the question had nothing to do w i t h the Ruhr. 
The B e l g i a n note welcomed the o f f e r of a d i s c u s s i o n on 
(75) 
s e c u r i t y but was no more s a t i s f a c t o r y about r e p a r a t i o n s . v ' 
73. Crewe to Curzon, 21 Jun. 1923, 25 Jun., 7 J u l . , 
Curzon Papers, Box 22, Crewe l e t t e r s ; Crewe Papers, 
U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , Cambridge, C/12; D.D.I.-, Vol. I I , 
Nos. 110, 111,. 112; desp. 855 to Rome, 6 J u l y . ; desp. 
2307 to P a r i s , 10 J u l . , C 118.01, 12052/1/18, F0 371/ 
8642. 
74. Cmd. 1943 of 1923, No.5; C 12540/1/18, F0 371/8644. 
75. Cmd. 1943 of 1923, Nos.6-7; France, Documents 
r e l a t i f s aux notes allemandesdes 2 mai e t 5 j u i n , 
No.35; Belgium, Documents diplomatiques r e l a x i f s aux 
r e p a r a t i o n s , Nos. 43-4; desp. 827 to B r u s s e l s , 30 
J u l . ^ C 13160, • 13162/1/18, FO 371/8645. l.;g 13162/1/18, FO 371/8645. 
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The I t a l i a n Government, a f t e r some h e s i t a t i o n , r e p l i e d 
favourably, and so d i d the Japanese. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of B r i t a i n t a k i n g independent 
a c t i o n , such as s e t t i n g up an enquiry i n t o Germany's 
c a p a c i t y without France and Belgium, had been d i s c u s s e d 
(77) 
i n London and di s c a r d e d as i m p r a c t i c a b l e . w , / The 
Cabinet now decided not to pursue the correspondence w i t h 
the German Government but to p u b l i s h what had a l r e a d y 
passed, w i t h a f i n a l note i n the nature of an appeal to 
(78) 
world p u b l i c opinion. v ' The note sent on 11 August 
to the French and B e l g i a n Governments was Curzon a t h i s 
most m a g i s t e r i a l . Near the end i t s a i d t h a t , s i n c e 
according to the French Government the Ruhr had nothing 
"to" do w i t h " s e c u r i t y , t h e r e was no ob j e c t i n pursuing the 
(79) 
question. 
76. Cmd 1943 of 1923, Nos.8-9; D.D.I., Vol. I I , Nos. 
146-8, 152. 
77. See Foreign O f f i c e memorandum, 29 Jun. 1923, C 11456/ 
1/18, FO 371/8641; Curzon to Crowe, 17 J u l . , 
memorandum by Cadogan, 19 J u l . , Curzon Papers, Box 22, 
Germany 1921-4; memorandum by Crowe, 31 J u l . , 
C 13652/1/18, FO 371/8648. 
78. C. 44(2 3 ) , 1 Aug.; C. 46(23 ) , 9 Aug., CAB 23/46. 
There was some disagreement among M i n i s t e r s on the 
nature of the f i n a l note: C P . 376(23), CAB 24/161; 
C h u r c h i l l , Lord Derby, pp.512-17. C e c i l saw 
Mi l l e r a n d i n P a r i s on 4 August and spoke to him about 
a new d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e p a r a t i o n r e c e i p t s . For doing 
so he was rebuked by Baldwin and Curzon: t e l . 296 to 
P a r i s , 7 Aug.; P a r i s t e l . 740, 7 Aug., C 13536, 13547/ 
1/18, FO 371/8647; Curzon to Baldwin, 7 Aug., Baldwin 
Papers, F.2 (Vol. 114); C e c i l to B a l d w i n , 9 Aug., 
BM Add. MS 51080, a l s o 51096. 
79o Cmd 1943 of 1923, No.10. 
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E n t e r i n g upon a d i s c u s s i o n w i t h Poincare by-
published note was not l i k e l y to advance a settlement. 
Curzon h i m s e l f d i d not l i k e proceeding i n t h i s way; ^ 8 0 ^ 
Poincare's powers as a draftsman were c e r t a i n l y not 
i n f e r i o r to h i s ; and the p u b l i c argument d i d l i t t l e but 
harden opinion on both s i d e s . The French r e p l y of 20 
August was lengthy and contentious although courteous i n 
tone. A f t e r d e a l i n g a t length with the occupation, i t 
d e c l a r e d again t h a t France was ready to examine s e c u r i t y 
a t any time, but even e f f e c t i v e guarantees a g a i n s t 
aggression (and those o f f e r e d i n 1922 had not been 
e f f e c t i v e ) could not deprive France of her r i g h t to 
r e p a r a t i o n s . The B e l g i a n r e p l y was l e s s argumentative and 
contained a h i n t t h a t an agreement on s e c u r i t y would make 
Belgium more forthcoming on other matters, but i t too 
(81) 
o f f e r e d l i t t l e hope of progress. v 
There was now some f e a r i n London t h a t Poincare' 
might succeed i n p u t t i n g the blame f o r a breach on to 
B r i t a i n , but there seemed to be nothing more t h a t the 
Government could do except w a i t f o r the end of p a s s i v e 
(82) 
r e s i s t a n c e i n Germany. ^ ; But h i n t s came from P a r i s 
80. Minute by Curzon, 23 Aug. 1923, C 14380/1/18, FO 
371/8650; Curzon to Baldwin, 27 Aug., Baldwin Papers, 
F.2 (Vol. 114). 
81. France, Response du gouvernement f r a n c a i s a l a 
l e t t r e du^g^uyej^mign^ b r i t a n n i q u e sur l e s 
rgparations7~20 aoflt 1925; Belgium, Documents, 
diplomatiques r e l a t i f s a u x r e p a r a t i o n s , No.5^» 
82. Minutes by T y r e l l and Curzon, 23 and 29 Aug. 1923, 
C 14380/1/18, FO 371/8650. 
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t h a t Poincare was anxious f o r a settlement w i t h B r i t a i n 
and t h a t a meeting between him and Baldwin ought to take 
p l a c e w h i l e the l a t t e r was on h o l i d a y a t Aix. The 
Belgi a n s too were s a i d to be anxious f o r t a l k s . (®^) 
However when Baldwin stopped i n P a r i s on 19 September on 
h i s way home, h i s co n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Poincare d i d not 
produce anything d e f i n i t e , nor even much improved 
understanding. Baldwin t a l k e d of the s t a t e of p u b l i c 
opinion i n B r i t a i n , the f e a r t h a t f u r t h e r delay would 
make a settlement more d i f f i c u l t , the d i s l i k e of m i l i t a r y 
occupations, the doubt whether present methods would 
produce the d e s i r e d payments from Germany. Poincare 
claimed t h a t he was supported by 99 per cent of French 
p u b l i c opinion and that" the t r o u b l e was due not to the 
occupation but to German r e s i s t a n c e . As f o r the l a c k of 
understanding between B r i t a i n and France, t h i s was due 
not so much to the f a i l u r e of the pact n e g o t i a t i o n s the 
previous year - f o r French opinion was w e l l aware t h a t 
the proposed pact was v a l u e l e s s without a m i l i t a r y 
convention - as to the f a c t t h a t a t every i n t e r - A l l i e d 
conference France had made s a c r i f i c e s and B r i t a i n had 
not supported her. Poincare d i d say t h a t he would welcome 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s as soon as p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e ceased, but 
83. P a r i s t e l . 778, 23 Aug. 1923, C 14484/1/18, FO 
371/8650; P a r i s t e l . 791, 28 Aug., C 14752/1/18, 
FO 371/8652; P a r i s t e l . 801, 30 Aug.; B r u s s e l s 
t e l s . 198, 199, 31 Aug., C 14872, 14950, 14951/ 
1/18, FO 371/8654. 
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Baldwin concluded t h a t he had no plan. 
The meeting between the two Prime M i n i s t e r s may-
have done some good i n showing the d e s i r e of both to 
prevent a breach, but i t advanced matters not at a l l . 
Meanwhile the sands were running out f o r Germany. 
Stresemann had become Chanc e l l o r and M i n i s t e r f o r Foreign 
A f f a i r s on 13 August. From the end of the month he t o l d 
D'Abernon t h a t the German Government would accept the 
p o l i c y o u t l i n e d i n the B r i t i s h note of 20 J u l y ; he 
asked f o r B r i t i s h r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s acceptance when he 
made i t p u b l i c a t S t u t t g a r t on 2 September; and he 
appealed f o r B r i t i s h help i n a v e r t i n g a complete c o l l a p s e . 
Stresemann a l s o t r i e d to secure from the French and 
Belgian" Government s""some promise of b e t t e r C o n d i t i o n s 
i n the Ruhr when p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e ceased. I n h i s 
S t u t t g a r t speech and i n these n e g o t i a t i o n s , Stresemann 
expressed German w i l l i n g n e s s to j o i n i n a pact of powers 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the Rhine to guarantee the s t a t u s quo i n 
84. Notes of conversation, CAB 21/271; i n t e r p r e t e r ' s 
notes i n Baldwin Papers, F . l . l ( V o l . 108). 
85. B r i t i s h observers i n P a r i s thought t h a t the meeting 
had done good: Crewe to Curzon, 21 Sep. 1923, 
Crewe Papers, C/12; S i r I . Malcolm to Baldwin, 3 
Oct., Baldwin Papers, F.2.1 (Vol. 114). But K e i t h 
Middlemas and John Barnes i n t h e i r biography 
Baldwin, London 1969, Ch. 9, i n my opinion over-
estimate i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
86. B e r l i n t e l . 292, 31 Aug. 1923, C 14921/313/18, FO 
371/8740; B e r l i n t e l . 296, 1 Sep.; B e r l i n t e l . 303, 
4 Sep.; B e r l i n t e l . 306, 6 Sep.; B e r l i n t e l . 312, 
11 Sep., C 15052, 15320, 15459, 15797/1/18, FO 371/ 




the area. K ' 
I t seemed to the Foreign O f f i c e t h a t s i n c e Poincare' 
had made c l e a r h i s i n t e n t i o n of keeping security-
d i s t i n c t from r e p a r a t i o n s , there was no point i n 
d i s c u s s i n g Stresemann's suggestion a t t h i s stage. 
Anxiety was expressed about the p o s s i b i l i t y of e x c l u s i v e 
Franco-German agreements, but i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the 
ne g o t i a t i o n s was not thought p o s s i b l e . T h i s p o s i t i o n 
was maintained when p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e ended and as i t 
became c l e a r t h a t the French had no pl a n beyond l o c a l 
i n d u s t r i a l arrangements and were u n w i l l i n g to negotiate 
w i t h the German Government about anything. (^9) B u^. o n 
3 October Curzon t o l d S t - A u l a i r e t h a t the French 
Government must take an i n i t i a t i v e i n r e - s t a r t i n g 
conversations on r e p a r a t i o n s , and t h a t he was going to 
say so i n t h a t p a r t of h i s statement to the I m p e r i a l 
Conference on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s t h a t would be published. 
T h i s Curzon did. The Dominion Prime M i n i s t e r s , w i t h 
87 • Gustav pStresemann, Verma"chtnis; der Nachlass i n 
d r e i Banden, ed. Henry Bernhard, B e r l i n 1932-3, Vol. I , 
pp.100, 104-; B e r l i n t e l . 302, 4 Sep. 1923; B r u s s e l s 
t e l . 200, 5 Sep.; B e r l i n desp. 606, 6 Sep.; desp. 
2877 to P a r i s , 8 Sep., C 15335, 15404, 15714, 
15565/1/18, FO 371/8654. 
88. Foreign O f f i c e memorandum, 10 Sep. 1923, C 15855/1/18, 
FO 371/8655o 
89. Correspondence 18 Sep.-l Oct. 1923, f i l e s C 1/18, 
C 313/18, FO 371/8656, 8742-4, passim. 
90. Desp. 3174 to P a r i s , 3 Oct. 1923, C 17141/313/18, 
FO 371/8743. 
243 
the exception of Smuts, g e n e r a l l y expressed sympathy f o r 
France and a n x i e t y f o r an e a r l y settlement; but they 
had no proposals to make. Smuts, as expected, was 
a n t i - F r e n c h and c a l l e d f o r a conference. Curzon 
had foreshadowed to the Cabinet on 26 September a f r e s h 
attempt to get the United S t a t e s Government to help by 
r e j o i n i n g the Reparation Commission, but he was not 
confident e i t h e r t h a t they would agree or t h a t the French 
would j o i n i n i n v i t i n g them. I t does not appear 
t h a t Curzon had taken any steps i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n before 
P r e s i d e n t Coolidge s t a t e d on 9 October t h a t the United 
S t a t e s Government stood by Hughes's speech of December 
1922, a statement which, taken up by the B r i t i s h 
Government, l e d e v e n t u a l l y to the" s e t t i n g up of the two 
Expert Committees under General Dawes and S i r Reginald 
Mackenna. 
During these weeks there was no d i s c u s s i o n of 
s e c u r i t y . When i n the middle of December the German 
Government decided to approach the French and B e l g i a n 
Governments to negotiate an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e modus v i v e n d i 
f o r the occupied t e r r i t o r y , D'Abernon heard t h a t they 
were prepared to renew the o f f e r of s e c u r i t y guarantees 
91. E. 3rd, 4th, and 5th meetings, 5 and 8 Oct.«, 1923, 
CAB 32/9. Smuts had been demanding independent 
B r i t i s h a c t i o n and support of Germany s i n c e March: 
telegrams exchanged between him and Bonar Law and 
Baldwin are i n CO 532/238. For h i s e f f o r t s f o r a 
conference and American support when he was i n 
London, see W.K. Hancock, Smuts, Vol. I I , The F i e l d 
of Force, London 1968, pp.132-9. 
92. C. 4 7 ( 2 3 ) , CAB 23/46. 
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i f the French r a i s e d the question. K ^ D ) But the Foreign 
O f f i c e thought t h a t such an o f f e r would be premature, 
and i n f a c t the question was not r a i s e d u n t i l February 
1924. 
MacDonald and H e r r i o t 
The French encouragement of s e p a r a t i s t movements i n 
the Rhineland and the P a l a t i n a t e a t the end of 1923 
convinced D'Abernon more than ever t h a t the urgent 
question was s e c u r i t y r a t h e r than r e p a r a t i o n s (which i n 
any case had now been removed from the p o l i t i c a l sphere 
by the appointment of the Expert Committees), and t h a t 
what was needed was p r o t e c t i o n m o t - f o r France" a g a i n s t 
Germany but f o r Germany a g a i n s t France. Diplomats 
f r e q u e n t l y take on something of the colour of the country 
i n which they r e s i d e , and i t i s not strange t h a t 
D'Abernon, the "Lord P r o t e c t o r , " who had no previous 
diplomatic experience, should have so completely shared 
German apprehensions. I t i s somewhat s u r p r i s i n g , i n view 
of h i s f i n a n c i a l e x p e r t i s e , t h a t he should apparently, i n 
a s s e s s i n g the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of the two c o u n t r i e s , 
have ignored the b a s i c economic s u p e r i o r i t y of Germany 
over France. However i n the circumstances of the w i n t e r 
of 1923-4, i t was n a t u r a l t h a t D'Abernon's thoughts on 
93= B e r l i n t e l . 491, 10 Dec. 1923, C 21359/313/18, 
FO 371/8751. 
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s e c u r i t y were concentrated on the Rhineland and the Ruhr. 
The Germans themselves, a f t e r the negative r e s u l t s 
of the approach to Poincare f o r a modus v i v e n d i i n 
December, were t h i n k i n g of t r y i n g to get n e g o t i a t i o n s on 
a broader b a s i s and of e n l i s t i n g B r i t i s h help. They were 
made the more anxious to do so because, even though the 
t h r e a t of separatism had c o l l a p s e d , the French p r e s s was 
again d i s c u s s i n g n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of the Rhineland and 
permanent c o n t r o l over the r a i l w a y s . At the beginning of 
February Hoesch, who had been r e c a l l e d f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n , 
returned to P a r i s w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r a new approach 
to Poincare; (94) ^u^_ i,efore i n s t r u c t i o n s were sent to 
Sthamer to t a l k about Germany's p o s i t i o n w i t h MacDonald, 
D'Abernon r a i s e d the s e c u r i t y question h i m s e l f . On" 2 
February he came to see Schubert about an a r t i c l e i n the 
Temps advocating a n e u t r a l Rhineland under League of 
Nations s u p e r v i s i o n , and suggested t h a t a regime might 
be p o s s i b l e t h a t would make the Rhineland a b a r r i e r to 
aggression from e i t h e r s i d e and s t i l l p r e serve German 
sovereignty. v > y A f t e r t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n D'Abernon 
94. Hoesch's i n s t r u c t i o n s were confined to the search 
f o r a [Hodus v i v e n d i i n the occupied t e r r i t o r y and 
s a i d nothing about s e c u r i t y : K936/K239303-09. 
95. Memorandum, 2 Feb. 1924, marked "Not sen t , " 
D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MS 48927; memorandum by 
Schubert, 2 Feb., 2368/490724-28. D'Abernon had 
w r i t t e n i n December t h a t he s t i l l thought t h a t the 
Cuno o f f e r would be a b e t t e r s e c u r i t y f o r France 
than an independent Rhinelandi memorandum, 6 Dec. 
1924, D'Abernon Papers, l o c . c i t . 
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reported to the Foreign O f f i c e t h a t he "believed t h a t the 
German Government were prepared to make an o f f e r f o r the 
d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Rhineland going beyond A r t i c l e s 
42-44 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , provided t h a t German 
sovereignty were not impaired and the s e c u r i t y p rotected 
both s i d e s . The Cuno o f f e r could perhaps be r e v i v e d and 
combined w i t h some scheme i n v o l v i n g the League of 
Nations. A few days l a t e r D'Abernon t a l k e d about 
the matter w i t h the M i n i s t e r f o r Foregin A f f a i r s . 
According to him, Stresemann s a i d t h a t he saw no 
d i f f i c u l t y i n d e c l a r i n g the Rhineland and the P a l a t i n a t e 
d e m i l i t a r i s e d provided German sovereignty remained i n t a c t ; 
but i t would have to be n e u t r a l i s a t i o n , p r o h i b i t i n g use 
of the t e r r i t o r y f o r m i l i t a r y purposes i n pcasgEgg^te^ 
(97) 
peace and i n war by France as w e l l as by Germany. v ' 
Meanwhile the German Ambassador i n London had 
r e c e i v e d i n s t r u c t i o n s to speak to MacDonald about s e c u r i t y 
and to t e l l him t h a t although the German Government 
96. B e r l i n t e l . 49, 5 Feb. 1924, C 2048/2048/18, FO 371/ 
9818; memorandum by Schubert, 5 Feb., 2368/490734-37. 
I t should be noted t h a t Schubert, according to h i s 
own r e c o r d of 2 Feb., was non-committal about any 
o f f e r t h a t the German Government might be prepared 
to make. Where i t i s p o s s i b l e to compare both 
p a r t i e s ' records of D'Abernon's con v e r s a t i o n s , i t i s 
found t h a t t h e r e are sometimes more than the normal 
d i s c r e p a n c i e s between them. 
97. Diary entry, 7 Feb. 1924, BM Add. MS 48927, not i n 
Ambassador of Peace. B e r l i n desp. 105, 11 Feb., 
C~25647737/18, FO 371/9801, r e p o r t s a c o n v e r s a t i o n 
w i t h Stresemann t h a t day. I n view of the apparent 
l a c k of a German rec o r d of Stresemann's c o n v e r s a t i o n 
and the e x i s t e n c e of a r e c o r d of a c o n v e r s a t i o n 
between Schubert and D'Abernon on 11 February, 
247 
considered that the Treaty of Versailles provided ample 
guarantees f o r French security, they were prepared f o r 
an agreement on the lines of the Cuno o f f e r or Stresemann's 
Stuttgart speech, or indeed any safeguards conceivable 
between independent and equal states so long as they did 
not diminish the sovereignty of the Reich over the 
Rhineland. The French t a l k of a demilitarised Rhineland 
under the League of Nations, however, was c l e a r l y meant as 
a f i r s t step to the separation of the t e r r i t o r y from 
Germany, and no German Government could lend themselves to 
such a step. Infringements of German sovereignty going 
beyond the Treaty of Versailles could only be discussed 
i f France accepted the same conditions f o r herself. (98) 
Sthanrer" l e f t a memorandum to t h i s e f f e c t at the Foreign 
Office on 11 February, but he was not able to discuss i t 
97. (Cont) 
F.G. Stambrook,"'Das Kind'- Lord D'Abernon and the 
origins of the Locarno Pact," i n Central European 
History, I (1968), pp.233-63, i s i n some doubt whether 
D'Abernon did see Stresemann. According to his 
diary D'Abernon had tea w i t h the Stresemanns on 7 
February and the social nature of the occasion may 
account f o r the lack of a German record. D'Abernon 
reported i n his despatch of 11 February that 
Stresemann said that he was anxious f o r a meeting 
w i t h MacDonald, a statement u n l i k e l y to be made by 
Schubert. I t seems probable that D'Abernon did see 
Stresemann about t h i s time, but whether once or 
twice, and on which day or days, i s not clear. 
98. Desp. to Sthamer, 4 Feb. 1924, K126/K102934-46. 
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wit h MacDonald. On the same day Schubert gave 
D'Abernon a similar paper; t h i s one said that the 
question of an agreement over the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of 
the Rhineland had been raised by D'Abernon, but the 
l a t t e r asked f o r his name to be deleted. I t also said 
that a proposal on the subject should preferably come 
from France, ^ 1 0 0^ 
The B r i t i s h Embassy i n Paris commented that the 
French were u n l i k e l y to favour n e u t r a l i s a t i o n and would 
probably i n s i s t on the continuance of control over the 
d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Rhineland. The l i n e of the 
Rhine, they said, was v i t a l to France even i f she had a 
pact with B r i t a i n . ( ^ l ) The l i n e of the Rhine was also 
v i t a l f o r France's a l l i e s : t h i s would have been one of 
the advantages of n e u t r a l i s a t i o n from the German point 
of view. D'Abernon ignored t h i s factor. I f the 
Germans needed reminding of i t , which i s u n l i k e l y , i t was 
pointed out by Poincare and the French Ambassador i n 
B e r l i n , both of whom stressed that France could not 
99. C 2602/2048/18, FO 371/9818; K126/K103012-16. 
100. Memorandum by Schubert, 11 Feb. 1924, 2368/ 
490748-56; B e r l i n desp.unnum., 19 Feb., 
C 2842/2048/18, FO 371/9818. D'Abernon Papers, 
BM Add. MS 48927, contains two dra f t s of an 
agreement on the permanent d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of 
the Rhineland. 
101. Paris desp. 587, 14 Mar. 1924; Paris desp. 600, 
16 March, C 4393, 4411/2048/18, FO 371/9818. 
confine her concern to her own security. ( 1 0 2 ) 
The Foreign Office did not wish to discuss security 
at present; ( 1 0 3 ) but they were discussing the 
implications f o r B r i t a i n of French policy i n the 
Rhineland. Early i n December the idea of an autonomous 
Rhineland under League of Nations auspices was not 
dismissed out of hand i f i t were to form part of a new 
settlement. At the beginning of February a member 
of the Central Department, J.C. Sterndale Bennett, 
raised the question of French policy f o r more detailed 
consideration. He started from the premise that Poincare' 
aim was to secure that control of the Rhineland which 
Clenenceau had had to abandon at the Peace Conference i n 
102. Hoesch t e l . , 12 Feb. 1924, 3243/D722655-61; 
memorandum by Stresemann, 12 Feb., 3243/D722671-75, 
Vermachtnis, Vol. I , pp.295=8; Hoesch desp., 4 
Mar., K1885/K474497-99o I n view of t h i s 
consideration Stresemann at the beginning of March 
consulted Hoesch and the Minister i n Warsaw, 
Rauscher, about the a d v i s a b i l i t y of taking 
pre-emptive action by o f f e r i n g Poland a c o n c i l i a t i o n 
or a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y without recognition of the 
f r o n t i e r . Rauscher was discouraging and the idea 
was not pursued; 4356/E148361-68, E148359, 
E148354-57, E148345-46. 
103. The Embassy i n B e r l i n were instructed to t e l l 
Stresemann that MacDonald thought that a solution 
of the problem should be aimed at "not through 
regional combinations of i n d i v i d u a l States, which 
might savour of the old system of alliances, but 
through general and more universal arrangements f o r 
ne u t r a l i s a t i o n and non-aggression." MacDonald spoke 
i n very general terms to Sthamer on 17 March: desp. 
363 to B e r l i n , 26 Feb. 1924, C 2564/737/18, F0 371/ 
9801; Sthamer t e l . 17 Mar., K126/K013037-40. 
104. Crewe to T y r e l l , 7 Dec. 1923 and minutes, C 21579/ 
129/18, F0 371/8691. 
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return f o r the guarantee t r e a t i e s , and he suggested that 
permanent French control might be an economic threat to 
B r i t a i n . An arrangement would therefore have to be found 
to take the place of the guarantee t r e a t i e s and so to 
induce France to give up control over the Rhineland. 
The various plans that had been proposed f o r n e u t r a l i s a t i o n 
called f o r sac r i f i c e s by Germany that would not be 
warranted without some compensating advantage. Might not 
Alsace and Lorraine be demilitarised as well? (-^5) 
MacDonald and the Lord President, Parmoor, were 
incl i n e d to doubt whether the French r e a l l y were actuated 
by a f e e l i n g of ins e c u r i t y , but the Service Departments, 
the Board of Trade, and the Embassies i n Paris and B e r l i n 
were asked f o r t h e i r comments. Phipps, ^ rom Paris, at 
once dismissed the idea of ne u t r a l i s i n g Alsace and 
Lorraine as beyond the realm of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s . 
Addison, the Counsellor i n Be r l i n , wrote that s a t i s f a c t i o n 
f o r both sides was needed, and repose, and t h i s implied 
evacuation of German t e r r i t o r y and some guarantee that 
France would not be attacked. There would be d i f f i c u l t i e s 
about n e u t r a l i s i n g a substantial part of German t e r r i t o r y , 
but a combination of the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of a s t r i p w i t h 
a mutual pact of non-aggression might give time f o r 
105. Memorandum by Sterndale Bennett, 5 Feb. 1924, 
C 2028/1346/18, FO 371/9813. 
106. Phipps to Nicolson, 20 Feb. 1924, C 2946/1346/18, 
FO 371/9813o 
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a t t i t u d e s to change. ( 1 0 7 ) 
As f o r the e f f e c t on B r i t a i n of a permanent French 
control of the Rhineland, the Board of Trade considered 
that the customs and the railways would not matter, but 
an i n d u s t r i a l combination of the Ruhr with Lorraine 
would be detrimental to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . ^1^>8^ The 
Ai r Staff thought that control over the Rhineland by any 
power at war with B r i t a i n , whether i t were Germany or 
France, would be a threat because i t would enable that 
power to influence the Netherlands and Belgium. ( 1 0 9 ) 
Similarly the Admiralty were c h i e f l y concerned w i t h the 
Low Countries. •^'•^ ^ The General Staff, however, were 
quite f i r m that the only threat came from Germany and 
that that dangerous time would come when the Rhineland 
was evacuated. They had f o r the time being abandoned the 
advocacy of a B r i t i s h guarantee to France. Instead they 
now recommended strengthening the League and signing a 
short-term alliance w i t h France providing f o r naval and 
a i r assistance only, 
107. Addison to Nicolson, 1 Mar. 1924, C 3814/1346/18, 
FO 371/9813. 
108. Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 12 Mar. 1924, 
C 4218/1346/18, FO 371/9813. 
109. A i r Ministry to Foreign Office, 18 Mar. 1924, 
C 4640/1346/18, FO 371/9813. 
110. Admiralty to Foreign Office, 22 Mar. 1924, 
C 4893/1346/18, FO 371/9813. 
111. War Office to Foreign Office, 28 Mar.ak. 1924, 
C 5185/1346/18, FO 371/9813. 
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Lampson, the head of the Central Department, was less 
sure than the General Staff that "war between B r i t a i n and 
France i s as impossible as war between B r i t a i n and 
Germany i s in e v i t a b l e " ; but having explored the question 
thus f a r the Department were able to drop i t i n view of 
MacDonald's decision to concentrate f i r s t on reparations. 
Lampson's parting thought f o r the time being was that 
eventually something might prove possible on the l i n e s of &, 
non-aggression t r e a t y between Germany and a l l her 
neighbours. But even t h i s was open to the objection that 
i t would i m p l i c i t l y involve a B r i t i s h commitment. 
With the advent of the new B r i t i s h Government the 
French too began new approaches on security. On taking 
o f f i c e MacDonald exchanged c i v i l l e t t e r s w i t h Poincare, 
which included some general references to security. (^2) 
Poincare's language i n public was as intransigent as 
ever, but the P o l i t i c a l Director at the Quai d'Orsay, 
P e r e t t i d e l l a Rocca, t o l d Phipps th a t Poincare's one wish 
was to come to a speedy agreement w i t h the B r i t i s h 
Government on security and reparations. He agreed w i t h 
Phipps that negotiations about reparations would be 
pointless before the expert committees reported; but 
Poincare t o l d Phipps that St-Aulaire was going to approach 
the Foreign Office on security. 
112. The Times, 4 Feb. and 3 Mar. 1924. 
113. Paris t e l . 173, 17 Mar. 1924; Paris t e l . 175, 
17 Mar.; Paris t e l . 177, 18 Mar., C 4545, 4546, 
4604/1288/18, FO 371/9813. 
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St-Aulaire had his interview with MacDonald on 24 
March and, i n contrast w i t h the previous year, said t h a t 
i t was the view of the French Government that security 
and reparations were bound up together. He had brought 
no d e f i n i t e proposals, but said that h is Government were 
w i l l i n g to take a wider view of security than merely an 
Anglo-French arrangement, and to bring i n the League. 
MacDonald said that he was not w i l l i n g to discuss 
security u n t i l agreement had been reached about reparations; 
and he indicated, i n somewhat cloudy language, that he 
thought that a satisfactory reparation settlement which 
Germany could accept would go f a r towards solving the 
security problem as w e l l . 
After the l u b r i c a t i o n and acceptance, i n A p r i l , "of" 
the Dawes Report the security question was i n abeyance 
while the A l l i e s discussed p u t t i n g the plan i n t o e f f e c t . 
The chief problem i n i t i a l l y was the French and Belgian 
desire f o r guarantees of j o i n t action i n case of future 
German default, whereas MacDonald refused to discuss 
specific sanctions. When the Belgian Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister, Theunis and Hymans, v i s i t e d him at 
Chequers on 2 and 3 May, MacDonald said that he would be 
w i l l i n g to declare that a w i l f u l German default would 
automatically bring the A l l i e s together to take common 
action; but he would hold out no hope of going f u r t h e r . 
114. Desp. 961 to Paris, 24 Mar. 1924, C 4992/32/18, 
FO 371/9730; A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol. 71. 
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Security was not discussed. 
The Belgian Ministers' v i s i t was to have been 
followed by one from Poincare, but t h i s had to be 
cancelled when, as a r e s u l t of the general election i n 
France, he announced his Government's i n t e n t i o n to 
resign. I n a l e t t e r to MacDonald on 14 May Poincare set 
out what he would have wished to discuss, presumably, 
since the l e t t e r was published, with the i n t e n t i o n of 
embarrassing his successor. He was anxious, he said, 
f o r agreement on guarantees and control of the Rhineland 
railways; and he would have hoped to t a l k about security 
i n view of the evidence of German breaches of the 
m i l i t a r y clauses of the peace t r e a t y and the need to 
-make up f o r the Anglo-American guarantees for-the time 
when the A l l i e d occupation of the Rhineland ended, (^k) 
After a pause f o r a new French Government to be 
formed, a v i s i t by the Prime Minister, Herriot, was 
fi x e d f o r 21-22 June. Before leaving f o r England, Herriot, 
i n a statement i n the Chamber of Deputies, drew a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between guarantees f o r the executive of the 
Dawes Plan which he intended to discuss with MacDonald, 
and guarantees f o r security which he said were necessary 
but implied that he did not mean to raise now. But to 
Hymans, who was passing through Paris, Herriot stressed 
115. Record of conversation, 2-3 May 1924, C 7427/70/18, 
FO 371/9743. 
116. The Times, 29 May 1924. 
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the need f o r some arrangement about security as w e l l as 
fo r guarantees. 
Accompanied by P e r e t t i and another o f f i c i a l , and 
by an i n t e r p r e t e r , Herriot spent the night of 21-22 
June at Chequers. MacDonald was accompanied by Crowe. 
The greater part of the conversation was about p u t t i n g 
the Dawes Plan i n t o e f f e c t . Herriot accepted MacDonald's 
promise to declare p u b l i c l y that a w i l f u l German default 
would bring the A l l i e s together to take common action, 
instead of agreeing on sanctions i n advance. He gave 
way to some extent on the question of negotiating w i t h the 
Germans about the application of the Dawes Plan i n so f a r 
as i t went beyond the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. 
MacDonald suggested an expert- examination- of- the-
question of i n t e r - A l l i e d debts, a f t e r refusing to have 
them discussed at the conference to be held i n London about 
the Dawes Plan. 
F i n a l l y Herriot raised the question of security and 
asked whether, once reparations had been se t t l e d , B r i t a i n 
would j o i n i n studying a pact of mutual guarantee w i t h i n 
117. Journal o f f i c i e l , Chambre des Deputes, 19 Jun. 1924; 
Brussels t e l . 89, 20 Jun., C 9842/70/18, FO 371/ 
9748. MacDonald had recently commented i n the 
Foreign Office that B r i t a i n must not raise the 
question of security i n any form: i f i t were to be 
raised at a l l the i n i t i a t i v e must come from France. 
After t h i s Phipps was warned to go very slowly on 
security: minute by MacDonald, 11 Jun,, C 9078/ 
2048/18, FO 371/9818; Lampson to Phipps, 26 Jun., 
C 9313/2072/18, FO 371/9820. 
256 
the framework of the League of Nations and including 
Germany. He envisaged f i r s t a pact between a l l i e s and 
then another offered to Germany under the guarantee 
provided by the League. P e r e t t i added some d e t a i l s about 
organising the guarantees a r i s i n g out of the m i l i t a r y and 
the Rhineland clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and 
suggested that they should also t r y to agree on the t e x t 
of a new pact, perhaps analogous to the recent 
Franco-Czechoslovak t r e a t y . (H®) Once such an 
Anglo-French pact had been concluded a non-aggression 
pact with Germany could be considered, and f i n a l l y the 
two pacts could be included as regional arrangements i n 
the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. MacDonald said that he 
was very desirous of going-deeply i n t o the -whole- question -• 
of security but he must mention various d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The Dominions were one, Lloyd George another. But apart 
from these, his own view was opposed to a pact. The 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance was not l i k e l y to be accepted. 
He would agree to a f u l l examination of the whole 
question of security, and he threw out some ideas of 
widening i t by bringing i n the United States i n connexion 
w i t h disarmament. Herriot r e p l i e d with a speech about 
France's danger i f one day Germany refused to pay 
118. B.F.S.P.. Vol. CXX, pp.181-3. The t r e a t y provided 
f o r consultation and concerted action i n case of 
threats to the two countries' security or to the 
s i t u a t i o n created by the peace t r e a t i e s . There was 
no m i l i t a r y convention. See Wandycz, France and 
Eastern A l l i e s , pp.297-301. 
reparations and expelled the control organs. France 
could not r e l y only on an in t e r n a t i o n a l conference and 
the United States was f a r away. France could not face 
a new war: could they not t r y to f i n d a formula of 
guarantee against a danger of a kind that would make the 
Dawes Plan useless? 
MacDonald said t h a t he would do a l l i n his power to 
avoid a new war and would j o i n i n a study of the 
question, but he was not able to o f f e r France a m i l i t a r y 
guarantee of security. He offered to v i s i t Paris, once 
the Dawes Report was out of the way, and discuss debts 
and security and other matters. He said t h a t he had no 
complete plan i n mind but a profound conviction, and he 
indicated that the conviction was mainly concerned w i t h 
enlightening public opinion. He spoke of "a vast 
conception of broad pol i c y and continuous collaboration," 
and Herriot summed up the r e s u l t of t h e i r meeting as "a 
sort of moral pact of continuous co-operation." On that 
note the t a l k s ended. 
Since the French i s the main record of the 
119. Record of conversations, 21-22 Jun. 1924, C 11976/ 
70/18, FO 371/9751. The accounts of the meeting i n 
Georges Suarez, Herriot 1924-32, Paris 1932, pp. 
55-148; Edouard Herriot, Jadis, Vol. I I , Paris 
1952, pp. 139-45; Michel Soulie^, La Vie p o l i t i q u e 
d* Edouard Herriot, Paris 1962, pp.159-bl, are a l l 
based on the French record of the t a l k s , which 
Suarez p r i n t s i n f u l l . The notes were made by the 
French i n t e r p r e t e r , M. Camerlynck, and the B r i t i s h 
record i s a t r a n s l a t i o n . 
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conversations and i s pe r f e c t l y clear on t h i s point i t 
seems u n l i k e l y t h a t , as Snowden wrote i n his 
Autobiography, ( l 2°) Herriot derived a d i f f e r e n t 
impression from MacDonald as to what they had agreed. 
I t i s more l i k e l y that i n reporting an interview w i t h 
Herriot on 24 June the Independance Beige misconstrued 
Herriot's reference to MacDonald's promise of s o l i d a r i t y 
i n case of future German default as being a promise of 
s o l i d a r i t y i n case of future German aggression, although 
Herriot did not say so precisely a f t e r MacDonald?s 
denial i n the House of Commons. Hymans at any rate 
was clear that Herriot t o l d him that security would be 
discussed a f t e r the London Conference and that MacDonald 
(122) 
had refused to o f f e r a new guarantee. v - I t does 
seem, however, from the record of the Chequers t a l k s that 
MacDonald did not explain h is own d i s l i k e of guarantees. 
Publication of an aide-memoire sent to the I t a l i a n 
Government w i t h the i n v i t a t i o n to the London Conference 
caused a g i t a t i o n i n France because i t seemed to ignore 
French views about negotiations w i t h the Germans, defaults, 
and the relationship between the Dawes Plan and the 
Treaty of Versailles. ( 1 2^) MacDonald therefore v i s i t e d 
120. London 1934, Vol. I I , pp.667-9. 
121. Soulie, V i e p o l i t i q u e d'Edouard Herriot, pp.162-3; 
H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 175, cols. 593-6. 
Confusion was the easier because the word "guarantee" 
was used i n both connexions. 
122. Brussels t e l . 94, 25 Jun. 1924, C 10151/70/18 F0 
371/9748. 
123. Cmd. 2184 of 1924, Correspondence concerning the 
Conference which i t i s proposed to hold i n London on 
July l b , 1924, to consider the measures necessary to 
"bring the Dawes Plan i n t o operation. 
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Paris on 8-9 July. Besides these matters, security was 
discussed again. The subject was raised by the French. 
Their d r a f t of proposals concerning the London Conference 
ended by saying that the problem of security was t i e d to 
that of reparations; the Government did not think that 
any of the problems that concerned France could be 
regarded as completely resolved u n t i l a satisfactory 
solution had been found f o r t h a t of security; and the 
present German a t t i t u d e on disarmament made the security 
question p a r t i c u l a r l y urgent. As Herriot said? "on the 
day that Germany finds herself strong enough to refuse to 
pay us she would i n e v i t a b l y bring about a new war." 
MacDonald said that the danger was possible, but a l l 
that they" were concerned-about at the-moment was"the- -
wording of a paragraph i n a j o i n t memorandum on the 
London Conference. The other was a d i f f i c u l t problem to 
be s e t t l e d between the two countries. His d i f f i c u l t i e s 
were that the Dominions would not agree to B r i t a i n 
j o i n i n g a m i l i t a r y pact, and B r i t i s h public opinion would 
not agree to a pact with any country. He had already 
said t h a t when the question of security was dealt w i t h 
two considerations should be kept i n mind. F i r s t , the 
greatest security was that i t was a question of honour; 
secondly, i n his view the only guarantee lay not i n 
armaments or alliances but i n an entente between the two 
countries, general^ security, and the establishment of 
peace i n Europe. I t would be r e a l l y unfortunate i f they 
could not f i n d a way of bringing about a complete entente 
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between them: i t would be necessary to begin to work out 
a common polic y by educating public opinion i n both 
countries. He knew the French d i f f i c u l t i e s , but i f they 
would help him they would together succeed i n 
"establishing psychological conditions which w i l l permit 
us to dissipate the reasonable fears of your country i n 
regard to security. This security w i l l be achieved to 
o 
the greatest possible extent i f we succeed to obtaining 
disarmament." (-^4) 
After dinner MacDonald reverted to the subject and 
asked Herriot what could be said that would s a t i s f y the 
Chamber without contradicting the declarations that he 
himself had already made. Herriot said that i n general 
French opinion remained wedded to the idea of a pact w i t h 
B r i t a i n , but he had explained at Chequers the idea of a 
mutual pact of non-aggression i n t o which Germany could be 
introduced. The f a c t must be faced t h a t when the 
guarantees on the l e f t bank of the Rhine expired France 
would be exposed: i f there were no defensive system he 
124. Record of conversation, 8 J u l . 1924, C 12031/10794/ 
18, FO 371/9869. I n a minute on a General S t a f f 
paper on strengthening the League, sent to the 
Foreign Office on 24 June, MacDonald wrote: "The 
one thing that matters i s psychology. A l l the sage 
ma t e r i a l i s t s and s e l f - s t y l e d r e a l i s t s w i l l never be 
able to produce anything but wars. That i s t h e i r 
natural o f f s p r i n g . Unless we change the q u a l i t i e s 
of our minds we had better arm to the teeth. From 
that point of view we ought to consider League of 
Nations problems." On a f u r t h e r memorandum by the 
Central Department MacDonald noted on 17 July that 
"a d e f i n i t e m i l i t a r y agreement would be the very 
worst possible security"; C 10067, 11164/2048/18, 
FO 371/9818. 
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he would be unable to ask the Assembly f o r m i l i t a r y 
reorganisation and reduction of the period of 
conscription. 
MacDonald said that the next United States President 
was c e r t a i n to c a l l a disarmament conference, and i f he 
were s t i l l i n o f f i c e he would do his utmost to have the 
fundamental question of general security discussed. The 
question must be put broadly, f o r a number of people i n 
B r i t a i n regarded French m i l i t a r y preparations as a possible 
threat to B r i t i s h security. On the other hand i t had 
already been agreed that he and Herriot and perhaps other 
Prime Ministers would go to Geneva i n September. This 
would make i t clear t h a t they were taking a wider view 
than-that of-exclusively-national s e c u r i t y . — I f he were 
a French minister he would explain that the two 
Governments wished to create a general system and that 
i n contributing to i t each country would benefit i t s e l f . 
Herriot said that he shared these general ideas; such a 
programme could be stated as: "The security of each 
nation i s a p a r t i c u l a r instance of the general security 
of the world." But before they arrived at that i d e a l 
state there would be an intermediate period when France 
would be unprotected. P e r e t t i asked whether they could 
be assured that the period of security on the l e f t bank 
of the Rhine would l a s t u n t i l a guarantee had been found 
equivalent to that which had been promised i n 1919. 
MacDonald repl i e d that a guarantee had been t r i e d 
and f a i l e d twice: they must f i n d other means. Perhaps 
the League of Nations would supply a way out, once Germany 
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joined i t , by way not only of demilitarised zones but a 
pact, registered w i t h the League and including Germany. 
"Through the channel of the League of Nations on the 
one hand, through that of disarmament on the other, the 
solution of the problem would be attained; but i f they 
confined themselves w i t h i n the actual l i m i t s and went 
on t a l k i n g about a Franco-British Pact of Guarantee, 
they would only meet wi t h a check." Crewe pointed out 
that the French had not put aside the idea of a general 
pact, but they wanted something l i k e a m i l i t a r y alliance 
f i r s t . He feared, however, that t h i s would make the 
conclusion of a general pact more d i f f i c u l t . 
Herriot said that the Covenant i t s e l f envisaged 
p a r t i a l pacts. I n any case France was not wedded "to any 
p a r t i c u l a r formula; she simply wanted security. There 
were a great many technical problems that could u s e f u l l y 
be studied by experts, and i t would be a s a t i s f a c t i o n to 
French opinion to know tha t the Governments were t a c k l i n g 
the question. MacDonald rejected t h i s idea. He would 
prefer, he said, to go on t a l k i n g i n that "moral 
collaboration" of which he had spoken at Chequers, w i t h 
frequent meetings which might not always be confined to 
t h e i r two Governments. I n the mean time the French might 
send him a note, and Herriot could t e l l the Chamber that 
the two Governments were agreed that they would not 
neglect the security problem and i t would be taken up 
again at an early meeting. (-^^) 
125. Record of conversation, 8 J u l . 1924, C 11468/10794/ 
18, FO 371/9849. 
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Despite H e r r i o t ' s a n x i e t y t o have something more 
concrete t o t e l l the Chamberf and the f e a r he expressed 
t h a t once re p a r a t i o n s were s e t t l e d s e c u r i t y would be 
f o r g o t t e n , t h a t was as f a r as MacDonald would go. Even 
i f he had not done so a t Chequers, he made i t reasonably 
p l a i n i n these conversations i n Paris t h a t he had no 
other idea of s e c u r i t y than a general p a c i f i c a t i o n 
coupled w i t h disarmament„ He showed no si g n of 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o consider a s p e c i a l arrangement f o r French 
s e c u r i t y , nor much sig n o f having thought out the 
problem of general s e c u r i t y . The F r a n c o - B r i t i s h 
memorandum published a t the end of the Paris meeting, 
embodying an agreed approach t o the London Conference, 
ended w i t h a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t the two Governments agreed 
"to co-operate i n d e v i s i n g , through the League of Nations 
or otherwise, as o p p o r t u n i t y presents i t s e l f , " means o f 
securing the complete p a c i f i c a t i o n demanded by p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n , and "to continue the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
question u n t i l the problem o f general s e c u r i t y can be 
f i n a l l y solved." ^ 1 2 6 ^ 
A l l questions other than t h a t of p u t t i n g the Dawes 
Plan i n t o o p e r a t i o n were excluded from the agenda o f 
the London Conference o f July-August 1924, and even i f 
s e c u r i t y was a f a c t o r i n the Franco-German n e g o t i a t i o n s 
on the evacuation of the Ruhr the B r i t i s h Government were 
126. Cmd 2191 of 1924, F r a n c o - B r i t i s h Memorandum of 
J u l y 9, 1924, concerning the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
Sawes Scheme. 
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not i n v o l v e d since, not having taken p a r t i n the 
occupation, they kept out of the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r i t s 
t e r m i n a t i o n . The records of the conference meetings 
are not n e a r l y so f u l l as those of other i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
conferences of the e a r l y 1920's, and no record was made 
of meetings of the heads of the A l l i e d delegations or 
of p r i v a t e conversations of B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s . i t 
emerges f a i r l y c l e a r l y from the conversations of German 
o f f i c i a l s w i t h t h e i r B r i t i s h counterparts t h a t they 
hoped f o r B r i t i s h pressure on the French f o r e a r l y 
evaucation of the Ruhr. I t also appears t h a t MacDonald 
had the idea of a r b i t r a t i n g i n favour of e a r l y evacuation 
but found h i m s e l f unable t o do so because the United 
States Ambassador, Kellogg, committegcL h i m s e l f ""to the 
(128) 
view t h a t a p e r i o d of one year was reasonable. v ; As 
f o r t a l k s on s e c u r i t y , there i s no d i r e c t evidence i n the 
127. The proces-verbaux of the plenary meetings and the 
t e x t s of the important documents were published i n 
Cmd 2270 of 1924, Proceedings of the London 
Reparation Conference, J u l y and August 1924". As a 
good conference secretary Hankey r e g r e t t e d the la c k 
of records. He d i d h i s best, however, t o record, 
and i n f o r m the Foreign O f f i c e o f , anything t h a t he 
witnessed; Hankey t o Troutbeck, 26 Sep. 1924, 
C 14650/11495/18, FO 371/9859. Published accounts 
o f , t h e conference i n c l u d e : Soulie, Vie p o l i t i q u e 
d'Edouard H e r r i o t , pp.170-2; H e r r i o t . Jadis, Vol. 
I I , pp.152-67; ^tresemann, Vermachtnis, Vo1. I I , 
pp.469-98; Paul Otto Schmidt, S t a t i s t l i u f 
d i plomatischer Buhne, Bonn 1949, pp.49-63« 
128. F i l e C 11495/18, FO 371/9855-8; German Foreign 
M i n i s t r y archives, 3398/D739833-740585; 4492/ 
E099507-100401, passim. 
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B r i t i s h archives and very l i t t l e i n the German records. 
I n B e r l i n German o f f i c i a l s were dropping h i n t s t h a t the 
French should be content w i t h s e c u r i t y on t h e i r own 
f r o n t i e r and stop worrying about Poland. ( 1 2 9 ) Qn 11 
August Schubert t o l d Lampson t h a t i t should not be 
d i f f i c u l t t o conclude a s e c u r i t y pact provided t h a t the 
French motives were simply f e a r o f Germany, since Germany 
had every reason t o seek s e c u r i t y against French a c t i o n . 
But i f France had other aims i n view, a pact was not 
l i k e l y t o come o f f . 
On r e t u r n i n g from h i s v i s i t t o Paris t o consult h i s 
colleagues and Marshal Foch about the evacujTation of the 
Ruhr, but b e f o r e o f i n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , H e r r i o t sent t o 
129. T e l . t o Stresemarm, London, 12 Aug. 1924, 3398/ 
D740365-67; D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, Vol. I l l , 
pp.87-8; Wandycz, France and her EasterrT"Allies, 
p.313. 
130. Memorandum by Schubert, 11 Aug. 1924, 4492/E100325-
29. According t o Henry L. B r e t t o n , Stresemann and 
the Revision o f V e r s a i l l e s , Stanford 1953, p.81, 
th e r e i s evidence t h a t i n London Stresemann o f f e r e d 
t o r e v i v e the Cuno proposal; but B r e t t o n does not 
quote any of i t and I have found none i n the 
Reichsminister's or the State Secretary's f i l e s on 
the conference. On 7 June D'Abernon had suggested 
t o Maltygzane t h a t N a t i o n a l i s t support f o r the 
l e g i s l a t i o n necessary t o implement the Dawes Plan 
might be secured i f an agreement were o f f e r e d 
combining a n e u t r a l i s e d s t r i p on both sides of the 
German western f r o n t i e r w i t h the evacuation of a l l 
A l l i e d troops from Germany and the withdrawal of the 
Control Commission. .Malts®-^  d i d not t h i n k t h a t the 
r i g h t - w i n g p a r t i e s would approve such an o f f e r , and 
I have found no evidence t h a t i t was pursued: i t 
would c e r t a i n l y have been r e j e c t e d i n t h i s form. 
4492/E098727-30. 
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MacDonald the note on French s e c u r i t y which had been 
suggested i n Paris i n J u l y . I t set out the French 
p o s i t i o n , as based f i r s t l y on the guarantees against 
German aggression provided i n the Treaty o f V e r s a i l l e s , 
both permanent and temporary. The French Government 
asked f o r : "The s t r i c t , complete and e f f e c t i v e 
execution of the guarantees assured t o them by the Peace 
Treaty," by the completion of the disarmament of Germany, 
by the " o r g a n i s a t i o n of the r i g h t of i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
a p p l i e d t o d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n i n the Rhineland" (under 
A r t i c l e 213 o f the T r e a t y ) , and by the maintenance of 
the occupation o f the Rhineland under the c o n d i t i o n s 
provided i n the Treaty ( i . e . as long as the guarantees 
r e s u l t i n g from the Treaty were not organised). Then 
there was the question of supplementary guarantees t o 
replace the Anglo-American t r e a t i e s o f 1919. Here the 
French asked f o r : "(a) Conclusion between France and 
England of a defensive pact destined t o replace t h a t 
concluded i n 19195 t h i s pact, an e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r i n the 
maintenance of peace i n Europe, would be completed by 
s i m i l a r defensive pacts concluded between the A l l i e s 
neighbouring on Germany; (b) conclusion between the 
s i g n a t o r i e s of the above-mentioned pacts and Germany of 
a r e c i p r o c a l undertaking of non-aggression, t h i s 
undertaking and these pacts being placed under the 
safeguard of the League of Nations; (c) Reinforcement 
of the e f f e c t i v e a u t h o r i t y of the League of Nations by 
the e f f i c a c i o u s o r g a n i s a t i o n of mutual assistance against 
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States g u i l t y of aggression." The French Government, 
the note concluded, were ready t o examine any proposals 
made t o them, but i f French o p i n i o n were t o be 
p a c i f i e d the guarantees o f f e r e d must be e f f e c t i v e . The 
n e g o t i a t o r s of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s had understood 
t h a t when they provided i n A r t i c l e 429 t h a t i f a t the 
moment f i x e d f o r the end o f the occupation of the 
Rhineland the guarantees against German aggression were 
not considered s u f f i c i e n t , the evacuation might be 
delayed. The French Government hoped t h a t i t would not 
be necessary one day t o apply t h a t clause; but i t was 
a l l the more imperative f o r them t o seek r e a l l y 
e f f e c t i v e guarantees i n agreement w i t h t h e i r A l l i e s . ( ^1) 
The a n x i e t i e s expressed by~the "French about German 
disarmament duri n g the summer o f 1924 derived from the 
long drawn out argument w i t h the German Government over 
the c a r r y i n g out o f a general i n s p e c t i o n t o f i n d out 
whether the p o s i t i o n was the same as t h a t a t the end o f 
1922, a f t e r which, i f the p o s i t i o n were found t o be 
s a t i s f a c t o r y , the A l l i e s proposed t o l i m i t c o n t r o l t o 
f i v e aspects of disarmament - r e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f the p o l i c e , 
a daptation of f a c t o r i e s , surrender of unauthorised war 
m a t e r i a l , p r o v i s i o n o f f i g u r e s of war m a t e r i a l e x i s t i n g 
a t the time of the a r m i s t i c e and of pr o d u c t i o n before and 
since, and promulgation of l e g i s l a t i o n on trade i n war 
131= H e r r i o t t o MacDonald, 11 Aug. 1924, C 12870/2048/18, 
F0 371/9819; A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol. 71. 
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m a t e r i a l and on r e c r u i t i n g and army o r g a n i s a t i o n . A f t e r 
t h e i r meeting a t Chequers MacDonald and H e r r i o t appealed 
t o the German Chancellor, Marx, not t o r e j e c t the l a t e s t 
note from the Ambassadors' Conference and warned him 
t h a t a f r e s h f a i l u r e over disarmament would s e r i o u s l y 
a f f e c t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n j u s t a t the moment 
when the r e was a hope of a d e f i n i t e settlement of the 
r e p a r a t i o n problem which, i t was hoped, would pave the 
way t o a general and genuine p a c i f i c a t i o n . The German 
Government agreed t o the i n s p e c t i o n , which was f i x e d 
t o begin i n September. At the London Conference the 
French d e l e g a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y General N o l l e t , who had 
been head of t h e M i l i t a r y C o ntrol Commission and was now 
M i n i s t e r of War, t r i e d t o get^MacDonald t o agree t o a 
d e c l a r a t i o n t o the Germans about the general i n s p e c t i o n . 
MacDonald, having already w r i t t e n t o Marx on the 
importance of a l l o w i n g i t t o be c a r r i e d out w i t h o u t 
o b s t r u c t i o n , refused; but he agreed t h a t the matter 
should be taken up by the Ambassadors' Conference i f 
l a t e r i n f o r m a t i o n showed t h a t o b s t r u c t i o n was t a k i n g 
place. <" z> 
132. Conversation between MacDonald and Marx, 12 Aug. 
1924, 4492/E099932-40, 3398/D740363-64; 
MacDonald t o Marx, H e r r i o t , Theunis, De S t e f a n i 
and Hayashi, 13 Aug.; H e r r i o t t o MacDonald, 14 
Aug.; Marx t o MacDonald, 16 Aug.5 Lampson t o 
Hankey, 19 Aug.; desp. 1544 t o B e r l i n , 25 Aug., 
C 12830, 13070, 13247, 13346/9/18, F0 371/9727; 
Schubert t o Lampson, 25 Aug., C 13724/9/18, F0 
371/9728. For a summary of the n e g o t i a t i o n s of 
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The French were also preparing the ground f o r the 
eventual s u p e r v i s i o n o f German disarmament by the League 
of Nations a f t e r the A l l i e d c o n t r o l commission was 
withdrawn. I n June the Permanent Advisory Committee 
had been i n s t r u c t e d by the Council t o prepare 
supervision schemes f o r A u s t r i a , Hungary, and B u l g a r i a 
under the r e l e v a n t clauses o f the Tr e a t i e s of St-Germain, 
Trianon, and N e u i l l y . On a r r i v i n g a t Geneva a t the end 
of August the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n found t h a t the French 
wanted t o inc l u d e Germany as w e l l . The Foreign O f f i c e 
had been opposed t o t h i s , because they expected t h a t 
the French would want a more complicated scheme f o r 
Germany and feared t h a t they would t r y t o s t r a i n the 
Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s ; and they d i d not want the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of the German question, which was not urgent 
since c o n t r o l had not been completed, t o delay the 
establishment of supervision f o r the other three c o u n t r i e s . 
But they withdrew t h e i r o b j e c t i o n on being assured by the 
del e g a t i o n t h a t the Permanent Advisory Committee's scheme 
was sound. T h e c o u n c i l accepted the scheme on 27 
132. (Cont) 
1924 see Survey of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1923, 
Vol. I I , pp.172=9; f o r a f u l l account from the 
German side, Michael Salewski, Entwaffnung und 
M i l i t a r k o n t r o l l e i n Deutschland 1919-1927. Munich 
1965, pp.240-64. 
133. Geneva t e l . unnum., 29 Aug. 1924; Geneva t e l . 44, 
5 Sep.; Geneva t e l . 45, 5 Sep.; t e l . 54 t o Geneva, 
6 Sepv>, C 13825, 14093, 14099/2616/18, FO 371/ 
9823. 
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September, but d e t a i l s of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n remained t o be 
worked out. 
Meanwhile H e r r i o t ' s note of 11 August had been sent 
t o the Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence and the comments of 
the Service Departments i n v i t e d . The A i r S t a f f ' s f i r s t 
comments were much coloured by t h e i r a n x i e t y over the 
supposed French t h r e a t t o B r i t a i m They p o i n t e d out t h a t 
the range of the R.A.F.'s a i r c r a f t was too short t o allow 
them t o a t t a c k Germany from home bases; and they could not 
be sent t o operate from France w i t h o u t advance 
p r e p a r a t i o n of i n s t a l l a t i o n s t h ere. And the value of 
France as a b u f f e r between B r i t a i n and Germany was t o 
them discounted by France's a b i l i t y t o a t t a c k B r i t a i n . 
I n a l a t e r paper the A i r S t a f f — s a i d that-German-air 
r e v i v a l had not y e t taken place, but the p o s i t i o n would 
be very d i f f e r e n t i n twenty t o t w e n t y - f i v e years. Then, 
i f t h ere were a pact w i t h France, the a i r menagce from 
Germany would be n e g l i g i b l e compared w i t h t h a t i n a war 
between B r i t a i n and France. They saw some advantage, i n 
good w i l l and the p o s s i b i l i t y of planning, i n g i v i n g an 
undertaking now; but Belgium would have t o be included 
too. 
The Admiralty concluded t h a t from the naval p o i n t 
o f view there was no advantage i n simply guaranteeing 
France against Germany; but there would be advantage i n 
134. C.IoD. Papers 518-B, 1 Oct. 1924, CAB 4/11; C.I.D. 
Paper 560-B, 17 Dec, CAB 4/12. 
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a more general a l l i a n c e t h a t would secure French naval 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n the Mediterranean and elsewhere. (-^5) 
The f i r s t , and the longest, comment came from the 
General S t a f f . I n considering whether a pact w i t h 
France were e s s e n t i a l t o the s e c u r i t y of B r i t a i n or 
would add so m a t e r i a l l y t o i t as t o be worth the 
commitments i n v o l v e d , they s t a r t e d from the premise t h a t 
the peace of Europe a f f e c t e d B r i t a i n c l o s e l y and t h a t 
"under c o n d i t i o n s as they are now and are l i k e l y t o be 
f o r many years t o come renewed German aggression i s the 
g r e a t e s t danger t h a t faces us, and French s e c u r i t y i s our 
s e c u r i t y . " They had concluded e a r l i e r i n the year (^6) 
t h a t there were only two d i r e c t i o n s i n which t o look f o r 
s e c u r i t y , a strong and e f f e c t i v e -League - of—Nations or a 
defensive a l l i a n c e w i t h France. The f i r s t was s t i l l too 
remote f o r present French needs; the second had twice 
f a l l e n through but had now come up again as a d e f i n i t e 
proposal. Provided t h a t a pact were kept w i t h i n l i m i t s , 
the General S t a f f b e l i e v e d t h a t i t would have d e f i n i t e 
advantages f o r B r i t a i n . I f the o p p o r t u n i t y arose renewed 
German aggression was a t l e a s t p o s s i b l e i n the present 
generation; such aggression would c e r t a i n l y i n v o l v e d 
France; and considerations of B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y , q u i t e 
apart from any o b l i g a t i o n s , would i n e v i t a b l y i n v o l v e 
B r i t a i n on the side of France. A pact would thus be no 
135. C.I.D. Paper 345-B, 8 Dec. 1924, CAB 4/12. 
136. See pp. asi, 2io,»-
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more than a formal r e c o g n i t i o n of an e x i s t i n g commitment. 
But t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n would be of great value t o 
the French, since i t would enable them t o reckon on 
B r i t a i n being w i t h them a t the e a r l i e s t and most c r i t i c a l 
moment. I t would open the way f o r c l o s e r s t a f f contacts 
and f r e e r exchange o f m i l i t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n . For B r i t a i n , 
w i t h her low standard o f m i l i t a r y preparedness, i t would 
give the immense advantage of having d e f i n i t e l y e n l i s t e d 
the most powerful army and a i r f o r c e i n Europe as a 
screen between h e r s e l f and Germany. 
I t was g e n e r a l l y agreed, the General S t a f f s a i d , 
t h a t t h e r e was l i t t l e chance o f German aggression i n the 
immediate f u t u r e : a t present Germany could not defend 
h e r s e l f against the armed strength-of' the A l l i e s . -Her- — 
f u t u r e capacity t o engage i n war depended on manpower 
and armaments. German f i t manpower (^7) g r e a t l y exceeded 
t h a t o f France and Belgium combined (by about 3 m i l l i o n 
i n 1924 according t o French c a l c u l a t i o n ) and would do so 
137. I.e 1. men between the ages of 20 and 36 p h y s i c a l l y 
f i t f o r b a t t l e s e r v i c e . I n view of doubts about 
the accuracy of the f i g u r e s i n t h i s paper, 
expressed by some members of the C.I.D., the 
estimates of French and German manpower were l a t e r 
r e c a l c u l a t e d by the Government Actuary and the 
Regis-t§ir-General. The r e v i s e d f i g u r e s showed t h a t 
the General S t a f f had not made s u f f i c i e n t allowance 
f o r the e f f e c t s of the war and had overestimated 
both French and German f i t manpower f o r the next 
f i v e years; but also t h a t the German f i t male 
p o p u l a t i o n aged between 20 and 35 would exceed the 
French by 1.6 m i l l i o n i n 1924, 2.5 m i l l i o n i n 1929, 
3.3 m i l l i o n i n 1934, 2.8 m i l l i o n i n 1939, and 
2.6 m i l l i o n i n 1944: C.I.D. Paper 654-B, Dec. 
1925, CAB 4/14. 
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even more i n the 1930's. Germany had ample i n d u s t r i a l 
c apacity t o rearm i f she were allowed t o do so. I t was 
t h e r e f o r e of the utmost importance t o the A l l i e s t h a t 
Germany should not be allowed t o rearm i n peacetime; 
" i n no circumstances must the A l l i e s be so supine as t o 
s a c r i f i c e the i n i t i a t i v e i n a f u t u r e war." This i m p l i e d 
a p o l i c y based on a f i r m h o l d on Lorraine and, f o r the 
time being, on the Saar, and on the f i r m maintenance of 
the c o n d i t i o n s of A r t i c l e s 42-44 and 429 of the Treaty 
of V e r s a i l l e s . To implement t h i s p u r e l y defensive p o l i c y 
France and Belgium needed the moral and m a t e r i a l support 
of Great B r i t a i n . 
On the terms o f the a l l i a n c e thus advocated, the 
General S t a f f made the f o l l o w i n g recommendations. 
B r i t a i n could not s t a t e even approximately the number of 
land forces t h a t she could c o n t r i b u t e i n the case o f 
German a t t a c k , but she must c o n t r i b u t e t o and not trade 
upon the s t r e n g t h of the combination. I n p a r t i c u l a r she 
must not weaken her home defences, and i n case of war 
she must c o n t r i b u t e w i t h a l l three Services. She must 
not undertake o b l i g a t i o n s except i n respect o f the defence 
of France and Belgium, but Belgium must be included. I f , 
as H e r r i b t proposed, other pacts were concluded by the 
A l l i e s neighbouring on Germany, they should not extend 
B r i t a i n ' s commitment. The General S t a f f would welcome 
the conclusion o f r e c i p r o c a l undertakings of 
non-aggression w i t h Germany, and considered t h a t i n due 
course they might supersede the a l l i a n c e w i t h France. 
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They would also welcome the strengthening o f the League, 
but r e a l i s e d t h a t i t was l i k e l y t o be many years before 
l o c a l pacts would be unnecessary. (138) 
These papers were not discussed by the Committee of 
I m p e r i a l Defence. By the time t h a t even the f i r s t was 
submitted, the question of French s e c u r i t y had been 
t e m p o r a r i l y superseded by t h a t of the Protocol f o r the 
P a c i f i c Settlement of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Disputes drawn up a t 
the League Assembly i n September. On h i s r e t u r n from 
Geneva before the Protocol was oncluded, MacDonald wrote: 
"On French views of s e c u r i t y we must be r i g i d . We 
cannot accept them. By t u r n i n g down the D r a f t Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance we have saved the country from a 
serious danger, but the b a t t l e has s t i l l to~be fought." v 
At a meeting of the Committee o f I m p e r i a l Defence on 2 
October MacDonald said t h a t the French question was a 
p o l i t i c a l as w e l l as a m i l i t a r y problem, and g i v i n g 
France s e c u r i t y might have undesirable p o l i t i c a l 
consequences. He asked the Service Departments t o keep 
" p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y " i n mind when considering the French 
question. Haldane, a f t e r MacDonald had l e f t the meeting, 
advised w a i t i n g f o r the t e x t o f the Geneva Pro t o c o l 
before discussing anything, and the question was 
adjourned. 
138. C.I.D. Paper 516-B, 29 Sep. 1924, CAB 4/11. 
139. Minute, 10 Sep. 1924, C 13819/1288/18, FO 371/9813. 
140. C.I.D. 188th meeting, CAB 2/4. 
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H e r r i o t ' s note of 11 August was sent a f t e r the 
B r i t i s h Government had r e j e c t e d the Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance and before h i s "moral c o l l a b o r a t i o n " w i t h 
MacDonald produced a t Geneva the f r u i t of the Protocolo 
This instrument, i f accepted, would meet the t h i r d of 
h i s requests f o r supplementary guarantees 
reinforcement of the a u t h o r i t y of the League by the 
e f f i c a c i o u s o r g a n i s a t i o n of mutual assistance. I t 
remained t o be seen whether H e r r i o t would press the other 
two requests, and how they would a f f e c t the s t r i c t 
execution of the guarantees assured by the Treaty of 
V e r s a i l l e s . 
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Chapter 4 
The Geneva Protocol and the Origins of Locarno 
The Protocol for the P a c i f i c Settlement of International 
Disputes of October 1924 brought the B r i t i s h Government to 
one of the most d i f f i c u l t decisions on foreign policy of 
the post-war yearso In t h i s chapter i t w i l l be shown how 
the decision was reached a f t e r lengthy weeks of argumentp 
and reasons suggested why at l a s t i n March 1925 the 
Government took a positive, a l b e i t limited step to promote 
western European s e c u r i t y 0 The Protocol arose out of the 
moral collaboration of MacDonald and Herriot 9 and out of 
the determination of the League of Nations Assembly of 1924 
to pursue the cause of disarmament and security despite the 
r e j e c t i o n of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee 0 In l e s s than 
a month from the adoption of a resolution i n v i t i n g two of 
i t s committees to consider s e c u r i t y p disarmaments, the 
obligations of the Covenants, and the settlement of disputes, 
the Assembly received the complete Protocol and unanimously 
recommended i t to the member governments0 
The main features of the Protocol were firsts, an 
undertaking by the signatories that they would i n no case 
go to war except with the sanction or at the behest of the 
Council of the League 0 This undertaking was supposed to 
stop the "gap" i n A r t i c l e 15 of the Covenants, under which 
members recovered t h e i r freedom of action i n the event of 
the Council f a i l i n g to reach a recommendation0 To ensure 
that there could be no such f a i l u r e the second feature was 
elaborated provision for the compulsory settlement of a l l 
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international disputes 0 Signatories were to accept the 
compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Permanent Court of 
International J u s t i c e for the four categories of l e g a l 
dispute enumerated i n the optional clause of i t s statutes 
the interpretation of a treaty? any question of international 
law? the existence of any f a c t which, i f established, would 
constitute a breach of an international obligation? and 
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for such 
a breach,, For non= j u r i d i c a l disputes further stages were 
added to the procedures l a i d down i n A r t i c l e 15 of the 
Covenants the establishment by the Council of a sp e c i a l 
body of arbitrators? report by the Council i f the par t i e s 
to the dispute did not consent to arbitration? submission 
by the Council of the dispute to a r b i t r a t i o n - i f i t - c o u l d 
not make a unanimous report„ I n each case the signatories 
undertook to accept the award made0 While a dispute was 
pending the partie s would not increase t h e i r armaments or 
e f f e c t i v e s Thirdly the Protocol provided a more automatic 
d e f i n i t i o n of an aggressor than any found hitherto, namely 
that a state which resorted to war i n defiance of the 
obligations of the Covenant or the Protocol, that i s which 
refused to submit a dispute to the procedure l a i d down, 
which refused to comply with an award, or which violated 
measures enjoined by the Council for the period while 
proceedings were i n progress, was presumed to be an 
aggressor unless the Council unanimously declared 
otherwiseo Fourth, i f aggression took place the Council 
would c a l l upon signatories to apply the sanctions 
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provided for i n A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant. Their 
obligation to do so became operative at once, and each was 
bound to co-operate l o y a l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y so f a r as i t s 
geographical position and i t s m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n allowed. 
General plans of economic action were to be drawn up. 
Signatories might make promises to the Council as to 
contributing forces; existing m i l i t a r y agreements were , 
to stand provided that they were open to accession by 
other countries and would not come into operation 
u n t i l the Council c a l l e d upon signatories to apply m i l i t a r y 
sanctions. F i n a l l y a disarmament conference was to meet 
i n June 1925, and the Protocol was not to come into effect 
u n t i l a plan of reduction of armaments was accepted and 
(A ) 
- c a r r i e d o u t rK ^ 
None of t h i s had been prepared or studied i n London 
before the Assembly meeting. MacDonald had sought some 
advice from Geneva i n advance, but does not appear to 
(2) 
have consulted h i s colleagues. v ' The B r i t i s h delegates, 
Parmoor and Henderson, acted very much on t h e i r own i n 
helping to draft the Protocol. The Service representatives 
at Geneva were not consulted, and i t was the F i r s t Lord of 
1. The text of the Protocol and the Assembly resolution 
are i n CflfAd 2273 of 1924, League of Nations. F i f t h 
Aj5semb_^.__ JAr^^ andJBla^l ion"^^ ArmamentsT~ Protocol aiSTRejoj :utionsadopted b y t h e 
^ A~fUircontemporary commentary is""™ 
P.J. Noel Baker, The Geneva Protocol. London 1925. 
2. S a l t e r to Selby, 11Aug. 1924; Drummond to Selby, 22 Aug., 
W 7259/134/98, FO 371/10569; S i r Frederick Maurice, 
Haldane, Vol. I I , London 1939, p. 167. 
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the Admiralty p Lord Chalmsford, who asked f o r a Cabinet 
meeting before the resolution recommending the Protocol 
(^) 
was voted at Geneva<>w/ The Dominion delegates were 
uneasy about the terms and complained of being rusheds at 
the Colonial Office's suggestion MacDonald sent the 
Dominion Prime Ministers telegrams reassuring them tha t 
they had not been committedo^ On 22 September MacDonald 
reassured a meeting of Ministers t h a t the obligations of 
the Protocol did not exceed those of the Covenant, but 
s t i l l a week l a t e r the Cabinet expressed alarm th a t t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n might be prejudiced by the Protocol being signed 
before they had had a chance to examine i t o Additional 
i n s t r u c t i o n s were sent t o Parmoor to emphasise tha t 
governments and parliaments would have to examine the 
(5) 
P r o t o c o l 0 w 7 The differences of approach, not only between 
the B r i t i s h and French delegations at Geneva but also 
w i t h i n the Labour Government, are so w e l l known as not to 
need discussion here e MacDonald's a t t i t u d e immediately 
a f t e r h is re t u r n from Geneva i s shown by the hope tha t 
he expressed to Herriot, that the work would not be spoiled 
3o Admiralty to Foreign Office, 26 Sep0 1924, W 8271/134/98, FO 371/10570? CoPo 456(24), CAB 24/l68„ 
4o Summary of B0E0D0 meetings, 31 Aug0=30 Sep0 1924? Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 23 Sepa, ¥ 8073, 8226/134/98, FO 371/10570„ Hugh Dalton was c e r t a i n l y 
mistaken i n suggesting (Towards the Peace of Nations, 
London 1928, p c 132) tha t the declarations of the Dominion representatives showed tha t the Dominions 
would have accepted the Protocol had the United 
Kingdom done so„ 
5o Co 51(24), CAB 23/48o The telegram t o Parmoor has 
been weeded from the $ i l e 0 
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by an attempt to regard i t as "unalterable gospel" since 
whatever emerged would have t o be the subject of new 
negotiations o 
Consideration of the Protocol by Government departments 
had barely begun before the di s s o l u t i o n of Parliament on 
9 October,. There had been an idea of completing the process 
i n time f o r discussions to be held w i t h the Dominion 
delegates t o the Assembly before they went homes, so that 
they could inform t h e i r Governments about the B r i t i s h 
position,, This plan broke down because Ministers became 
absorbed i n the election campaign and Departments d i d not 
wish to commit themselveso The Service Departments also 
wanted a preliminary discussion i n the Committee of Imperial 
Defence o—Just—before pol-l-i-ng—day- Chelmsford cir c u l a t e d to 
the Cabinet another memorandum expressing concern about the 
Protocols, especially over the p o s i t i o n of the Dominions and 
of the United S t a t e s 0 ^ 
Despite the lack of thorough examination and discussions, 
60 Herriots, Jadis„ Vol» I I , pp« 174=5, 177=8s Herriot f o r 
h i s part indicated t h a t France would want more than the 
Protocol before she could disarm,. See also MacDonald, 
"Protocol or Pacts," i n Intern a t i o n a l Conciliation,, No„ 212j, 
September 1925? Lord Parmoorn A Retrospect a London 1 9 3 6 , pp„ 234=41? Mary Agnes Hamilton,, Arthur Henderson,, London 
1938s, pp 0 247=50? Jo Paul=Boncour0 Bntre deux guerres P Volo I I , Paris 1 9 4 5 , p» 151? A 0J„P 0 Taylor- The Trouble-makers, London 1 9 5 7 , PP° 1 7 3=4o 
7 o Minutes, 11=15 0ct o 1 9 2 4 , on ¥ 9 0 4 6 / 1 3 4 / 9 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 5 7 1 ? C0P0 478(24) s , 27 Octo, CAB 2 4 / l 6 8 „ The Chiefs of Staff 
also sent t o the C I 0 D 0 a j o i n t memorandum expressing 
grave anxiety about the Protocol and complaining of lack 
of consultations C.LDo Paper 527=B, CAB 4 / 1 1 „ 
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the evidence of Departmental and Dominion objections to the 
Protocol and of d i v i s i o n w i t h i n t h e i r own ranks i s strong 
enough to make i t appear extremely u n l i k e l y that the 
Labour Governments, had they remained i n o f f i c e , would have 
been able to sign the Protocol without amendments so f ar= 
reaching as to ensure i t s eventual failure„ I t i s most 
u n l i k e l y that they would have found a way out of the 
impasse about automatic sanctions any more than the next 
Governments, even though they would probably have been 
more prepared to accept compulsory arbitrationo 
Examination of the Protocol„ November 124°January 1 9 2 5 
- Even a f t e r the-formation of the new--Conservative 
Government i t was some weeks before detailed discussion of 
the Protocol beganD Other more urgent matters took up 
much of the Cabinet's times, among them the murder of the 
Governor-General of the Sudan,, The new Foreign Secretary, 
Austen Chamberlain, was at pains to express no opinion on 
the Protocol before the Government examined its, and not to 
allow the impression to get abroad tha t i t was already 
deado v ' I n the l a s t week of November, however, he was 
urging Baldwin to get the discussion organised, and passing 
8 o For example desp» 3 5 8 6 to Paris, 1 4 Nov0 1 9 2 4 , C 1 7 3 5 9 / 
32/18, . FO 3 7 1 / 9 7 3 1 ? Chamberlain to Lord Burnham, 2 1 Nov.,, 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 5 1 / 3 3 P FO 8 0 0 / 2 5 6 ? Chamberlain to Grahame, 1 Dec, AC 5 1 / 1 3 6 ? desp» 7 1 1 to Warsaw, 1 Dec, 
¥ 1 0 4 6 5 / 1 3 4 / 9 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 5 7 2 o Much of Chamberlain's correspondence as Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s 
i s t o be found both i n the Chamberlain Papers and i n the 
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on as h i s own a suggestion from Cecil that the Protocol 
should be examined not by the Committee of Imperial Defence 
but by a sub=committee of the Cabinet w i t h Liberal and 
Labour personalities included<> ^ 
Cecily who was not altogether a supporter of the 
Protocols, was also a member of the new Government and was 
once more concerned w i t h League of Nations a f f a i r s . But 
Chamberlain, although w i l l i n g to discuss the Protocol 
fr a n k l y w i t h him, was determined to assert h i s own 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r foreign p o l i c y as a whole., ^ 1 0^ He 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious to restore close r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
France 9 and from the s t a r t was preoccupied w i t h French 
reactions and the question of how f a r the Protocol, i f 
accepted, would meet—the-French desire f o r security.. As 
w i l l be seen below t h i s was one of Chamberlain's chief 
concerns on his v i s i t s to Paris and Rome at the beginning 
of December,, Crewe had expressed some doubt on the point 
at f i r s t ? but i n a despatch to the new Foreign Secretary 
8 o (Cont) 
Public Record Office„ Letters which were "entered" i n 
the p o l i t i c a l f i l e s of the Foreign Offices are hereafter 
i d e n t i f i e d by these r e g i s t r y numbers only, even i f 
copies also e x i s t i n the Chamberlain Papers„ But a 
number of the copies i n the Private Secretary's f i l e s 
were made l a t e r , and i n these cases references are given 
f i r s t t o the Chamberlain Papers and secondly, f o r 
convenience, to the FO 8 0 0 series<> 
9 o Chamberlain to Baldwin, 2 5 Nov0 1 9 2 5 , AC 5 1 / 2 1 , FO 
8 0 0 / 2 5 6 , Baldwin Papers, F o 2 (Volo 1 1 4 ) , p r i n t e d i n 
Sir Charles Petrie, L i f e and Letters of the Rj.ght Hon,, 
Sir Austen Chamberlain,, hereafter c i t e d as L i f e and Letters „ 
Vole I I , London 1 9 4 0 , pp Q 2 5 3 = 4 . 
10o Cecil t o Chamberlain, 1 7 Nov„ 1 9 2 4 ; Chamberlain to Cecil, 1 9 Novo$ Cecil to Chamberlain, 2 1 Novo, Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 5 1 / 4 1 , 4 2 , 4 5 , FO 8 0 0 / 2 5 6 o For t h e i r 
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he wrote that he thought that the Protocol would 
substantially meet French wishes i f i t were coupled w i t h a 
scheme of League of Nations supervision of the armaments 
of the ex-enemy countries and of the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of 
the Rhineland, and w i t h the entry of Germany i n t o the League» 
Crewe stressed that the French Government believed that i n 
the summer the prospect had been held out to them th a t an 
accomodating a t t i t u d e on the Dawes Plan would help to make 
others more accomodating on security and debtso A B r i t i s h 
r e j e c t i o n of the Protocol would be a severe blow and would 
probably make the French s t i f f e r on German disarmament„^11^ 
By the end of November c r i t i c a l papers on the Protocol 
were reaching the Committee of Imperial Defence0 The 
-first-produced-in- the -Foreign Office was a memorandum by 
Crswe of 17 Novembera^12^ 
10 o (Cont) rel a t i o n s see Douglas Johnson, "Austen Chamberlain and the 
Locarno Agreements," i n University of Birmingham 
H i s t o r i c a l Journal, V I I ( 1 9 6 1 p p c 67=8„ But Cecil was not asking, as Johnson states, t o see a l l Foreign Office 
paperso Not even the Secretary of State or the Permanent 
Under-Secretary necessarily saw them a l l s apart from 
any other consideration they were too numerous - i n 
1924 61,238 papers were "entered" by the r e g i s t r i e s f o r 
the p o l i t i c a l departments ( i 0 e 0 not including Consular, Library and Treaty papers) 0 Cecil was asking f o r a l l the c o n f i d e n t i a l p r i n t , the more important correspondence 
printed and ci r c u l a t e d i n the Foreign Office and to 
missions abroado But even t h i s was more than any other 
Minister received, and Crowe feared t h a t granting the 
request would set an undesirable precedent and cause 
trouble i n the Cabinets memorandum by Crowe, 20 NovD 1924s Chamberlain to Cecil, 21 Nov0 j Cecil to Chamberlain, 22 Novo, Chamberlain Papers, AC 51/83, ^3, 46, FO 800/256, 
Cecil Papers, BM Addo MS 41078c 
11c Paris despo 2186, 6 Oct„ 1924, C15567/2048/18, FO 371/9820? 
Paris despo 2453, 11 Novo, ¥9781/134/98, FO 371/10571= 
12 0 There had been a departmental memorandum of 10 November, 
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Crowe's c r i t i c i s m s were expressed i n f a i r l y general terms 
and were confined to the major questions of compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n and sanctions. On a r b i t r a t i o n , he pointed 
out that the Coali t i o n Government had decided i n 1920 not 
to accept what became the Optional Clause of the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of In t e r n a t i o n a l Justice, and t h a t 
the Lord Chancellor i n the l a t e Government had recently 
advised ea-rl-isr against signature of the clause. K J l 
Now the Protocol extended the provisions f o r imposed 
a r b i t r a t i o n . Contrary to what he supposed tha t i t s authors 
believed, Crowe thought t h a t these prescriptions f o r 
erecting an absolute bar to any possible appeal to arms 
might create fresh causes of d i s t r u s t . For any country 
there-were-questions -of v i t a l — i n t e r e s t to which—arbitration 
was inapplicable. One might underjtake the ob l i g a t i o n i n 
the hope that the case would never arise. But i t might do 
12. (Cont) 
but i t w i l l be discussed i n a revised version, below.pp. 
13. C. 59 (20), Appendix V, CAB 23/23. The main reason f o r 
the refusal i n 1920 was fear of the e f f e c t on the exercise 
of blockade measures. The matter was considered again, i n 
the summer of 1924 since the Labour Party favoured 
accession to the Optional Clause. Crowe advised against 
acceptance, pointing out among other considerations t h a t 
a parliamentary government could not guarantee passage 
of the l e g i s l a t i o n necessary to carry out an adverse award 
i n cases where v i t a l i n t e r e s t s were involved. Haldane 
advised against acceptance, pointing out t h a t since the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the B r i t i s h Empire was non-unitary i t was 
undesirable to give unqualified undertakings which i t 
might prove impossible to f u l f i l . The question never came 
before the Labour Cabinet. Papers were sent to the 
Dominions at the beginning of September and the matter was 
2 8 5 
so, and then there would arise a f e e l i n g t h a t the national 
i n t e r e s t might c a l l f o r "a repudiation of the most solemn 
engagement entered i n t o w i t h the League, i f t h i s o f f e r s 
the only means of resistance to a p o l i t i c a l arrangement 
which a free country w i l l not accept at foreign d i c t a t i o n " •„ 
With regard to the system of sanctions, Crowe then 
discussed the question whether they did or did not add to 
the obligations of the Covenant„ He thought that they 
were c l e a r l y meant to be more f i r m , precise, and automatic, 
and pointed out that the trend had been towards a r e s t r i c t e d 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A r t i c l e s 1 0 and 1 6 D Now the Protocol 
committed the signatories to impose i n c e r t a i n circumstances 
the whole complicated machinery of a blockade 0 The technical 
and physical d i f f i c u l t i e s of doing t h i s were enormous<= The 
interference w i t h the l i f e of the nation and the Empire which 
blockade involved, and the f i n a n c i a l cost, raised questions 
of national i n t e r e s t quite apart from the r i s k of c o n f l i c t 
w i t h the United Stateso The r e a l i t y of the l a t t e r danger 
was shown by the experience of the wars i t was no 
exaggeration to say that i f B r i t a i n signed the Protocol 
she might f i n d herself having to choose between breaking i t s 
obligations or having to pay blackmail to or actually 
going to war w i t h the United States 0 The problem would be 
less l i k e l y to arise i f the United States were a member 
1 3 c (Cont) 
then overtaken by the Geneva Protocol? but on 1 3 
November the New Zealand Government expressed t h e i r 
strong objection to the proposal that B r i t a i n should 
adhere to the Optional Clause. F i l e ¥ 3 3 8 / 9 8 , 
FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 5 7 3 = 
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of the League? hut the Protocol would c e r t a i n l y make her 
less l i k e l y to j o i n . 
The supporters of the Protocol claimed, Crowe wrote, 
tha t i t was a major step towards the absolute prevention 
of war and therefore conferred the highest degree of 
security upon a l l members of the League» He doubted whether 
i n f a c t i t went much fa r t h e r than the provisions of the 
Covenant, which were already strong provided t h a t the 
obligations were taken seriously. But t h i s proviso 
applied equally to the Protocol, and i n his view only a 
c e r t a i n t y that war would indeed be prevented would j u s t i f y 
the acceptance of changes open to so many d i f f e r e n t 
objections, "considered formidable by our competent home 
authorities,- calculated-to-cause^grave embarrassments i n 
our r e l a t i o n s w i t h other countries, more especially America, 
and very l i k e l y not welcomed by our Dominions". 
Crowe's c r i t i c i s m i s a good exposition of the funda-
mental difference between what MacDonald i n another context 
had called "idealism" and "practicalism". v J ' Subsequent 
papers largely rehearsed the same arguments, and w i l l only 
be treated at length when they introduce new points. I n 
a l l the contemporary discussion of the Treaty of Mutual 
Assistances the Protocols, and c o l l e c t i v e security i n 
generals, i t i s noteworthy that these basic differences 
14. Memorandum by Crowe, 17 Nov0 1924, ¥ 9974/134/98, FO 371/10571? C o I o D o Paper 538=B, CAB 4/12. 
15. Minute, 23 J u l . 1924, C 10067/2048/18, FO 371/9818. 
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were hardly ever discussed fra n k l y . One may suppose tha t 
both sides would have regarded i t as improper as w e l l as 
inexpedient to mention the r i s k of c o n f l i c t w i t h the United 
States. The more experienced among the " i d e a l i s t s " -
whatever may be true of the rank and f i l e - were c e r t a i n l y 
not b l i n d t o the danger that despite the paper guarantees 
nations would s t i l l resort to force and could not necessarily 
be r e l i e d upon to f u l f i l t h e i r obligations. But between 
t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t the prevention of a l l war overrode a l l 
other i n t e r e s t s , t h a t c o l l e c t i v e security provided the 
only means, tha t strengthening the system made breaches 
less l i k e l y , and that i f sanctions were provided they would 
hardly ever be needed, and on the other hand the fear of 
t h e " p r a c t i c a l i s t s " that the case would arise and that 
p u t t i n g t h e i r hand to something th a t would not be universally 
observed was dangerous and dishonest, the g u l f was hard to 
bridge. 
A memorandum by R.H. Campbell of the Western Department 
of 20 November gave a more detailed analysis of the Protocol, 
c r i t i c i s i n g some more points and quoting objections already 
made by the Admiralty and comments on economic sanctions 
made by the Treasury i n 1923. Campbell concluded that the 
Protocol d i d introduce new obligations, and a form of 
commitment which B r i t i s h Governments and opinion p a r t i c u l a r l y 
d i s l i k e d ~ the o b l i g a t i o n t o use force i n circumstances 
which could not be foreseen and under conditions which 
could not be gauged. Against these objections the 
supporters of the Protocol maintained t h a t i t (a) provided 
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the only basis f o r the f u r t h e r reduction of armaments, 
(b) strengthened the League, and (c) gave France s t r i k i n g 
new guarantees of security. On (a) Campbell conceded t h a t 
the a t t i t u d e of B r i t a i n would influence the chances of 
other major powers accepting the Protocol and thus 
enabling the disarmament conference to be called, but he 
was not sanguine as to i t s outcome. On (b) he considered 
that f a r from strengthening the League the system of the 
Protocol would jeopardise i t s existence as soon as a shot 
was f i r e d . On (c) he concluded th a t the Protocol 
abundantly met French requirements. Summing up the balance 
of advantages and disadvantages, Campbell drew a t t e n t i o n t o 
two additional factors. The p o s i t i o n of the Dominions was 
- as-yet-unknown -but-might w e l l be-ho sti- l e . - I f - the - B r i t i s h — 
Government decided that acceptance was necessary f o r the 
sake of Europe but f a i l e d t o persuade the Dominions, "no 
consideration of any kind should be allowed to outweigh 
the consequences of d i v i d i n g the Empire on so v i t a l a 
question". The other point was the e f f e c t on France of 
B r i t i s h defection from a scheme of Anglo-French o r i g i n . 
I f the Government decided against the Protocol, i t would 
be essential to resume the discussion of French security 
(16) 
and to take up again the question of a guarantee. v ' 
16. Memorandum by Campbell, 20 Nov. 1924, W 10151/134/98, 
FO 371/10572. The f i l e copy i s incomplete: the f u l l 
t e x t i s i n C.I.D. Paper 540-B, CAB 4/12. 
At the time of the Cor$u# c r i s i s i n 1923 the Treasury 
had expressed anxiety about the complicated machinery 
th a t would be required i f economic sanctions were to 
to applied e f f e c t i v e l y : Treasury to Foreign Office, 
4 Sep. 1923, C15356/15065/62, FO 371/8615. 
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Immediately the new Government took o f f i c e the Foreign 
Office had drawn t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to the f a c t that Herriot's 
note of 11 August had never been answeredc The Protocol 
had cut across events? but i f i t f e l l through or were 
found not to be an adequate safeguard of French security, 
the whole question would be reopenedo Then unless B r i t a i n 
showed herself w i l l i n g to consider French security w i t h 
every desire to reach a satisfactory solution there would 
be renewed accusations of bad f a i t h and r e l a t i o n s would 
(17) 
deteriorate again,,v '' 
At the same time D'Abernon was w r i t i n g about the problem 
again 0 At the beginning of September, when the League 
Council adopted the scheme of supervision of the disarmament 
of the ex-enemy countries, he had- reported that-the-Germans— 
would probably accept a scheme that was combined w i t h 
security f o r Germany against aggression or a renewed 
(18) 
occupation of the Ruhr 0 v ' About the beginning of November 
he composed some "Notes on a Guarantee of French Security 
and the methods to be employed to t h i s end"0 D'Abernon set 
out t o prove that the European balance was threatened by 
Franceo Her deficiency i n population was compensated f o r 
by her eastern a l l i e s , Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania 
and Yugoslavia, whereas Germany could count at best on 
17o Foreign Office memorandum? 4 Novo 1924, C 16913/2048/18, FO 371/9820? CPo 481 (24), CAB 24/168<, 
18. B e r l i n tele 399, 7 Sep„ 1924, C14175/9/18, FO 371/9728O 
19„ D'Abernon appears to have assumed t h a t because France 
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Hungary and Austria,, D'Abernon did not include Russia i n 
his calculations because the Soviet Government were un-
r e l i a b l e and because "any m i l i t a r y combination between the 
a r i s t o c r a t i c i m p e r i a l i s t leaders i n Germany, and the 
communist forces i n Soviet Russia i s unthinkable". Germany, 
he believed, could not again become the strongest m i l i t a r y 
power i n Europe except as the r e s u l t of another war. 
B r i t a i n ' s t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y on the European balance had 
been to throw her weight against the strongest power, and 
i f she were now to make an agreement to defend France i t 
must besupplemented by measures to defend Germany. 
D'Abernon had now l o s t f a i t h i n the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the 
Rhineland as a safeguard, and was driven back on to some 
form of security established under the League-.(-20) 
D'Abernon sent copies of t h i s paper to Headlam-Morley 
and to Grahame, who had been reporting discussion i n 
Belgium about a return t o guaranteed n e u t r a l i t y . Despite 
19. (Cont) 
had an alliance w i t h Czechoslovakia the other two members 
of the L i t t l e Entente were also her a l l i e s . She did not 
sign t r e a t i e s w i t h them u n t i l January 1926 and November 
1927 respectively, and then they were t r e a t i e s of f r i e n d -
ship rather than of allianc e . 
20. D'Abernon to Headlam-Morley, 13 Nov. 1924? D'Abernon to 
Grahame, 10 Dec, D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MSS. 48927, 
48928. D'Abernon sent a revised version of the f i r s t 
p art of h i s paper to the Foreign Office o f f i c i a l l y early 
i n January. Chamberlain questioned h i s assumption t h a i 
Russo-German collaboration was unthinkable, and t h j point 
was also taken up by the Assistant M i l i t a r y Attache i n 
Paris, who pointed to what was known about current 
m i l i t a r y collaboration between the two countries. He 
also stressed that D'Abernon was describing the German 
m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n as i t was supposed to be, not as i t 
was actually known to bes B e r l i n desp. 17, 7 Jan.1925, 
C 459/459/18, FO 371/10726? Sargent to Lampson, 18 Feb., 
C 2464/459/18, FO 371/10727. 
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the f a c t that the Belgian Government were saying once more 
that they wanted a pact w i t h B r i t a i n , Grahame thought that 
Belgian n e u t r a l i t y would have advantages a l l round. For 
B r i t a i n i t would mean that " a l l Europe might be i n flames, 
but we need not i n t e r f e r e so long as no army crossed the 
Belgian f r o n t i e r " . For France i t would mean a B r i t i s h 
guarantee of her northern f r o n t i e r , and f o r Germany security 
(21) 
that she would not be attacked through Belgium. v ' 
Grahame did not, however, think t h a t D'Abernon's idea of an 
"i r o n c u r t a i n " or f r i n g e of t e r r i t o r y which neither side 
could cross without becoming the aggressor was the answer 
to the problem, p a r t l y because France would not accept i t 
and p a r t l y because other countries would ask f o r one too 
(22) 
and then the whole peace settlement would be frozen. v 
I t was perhaps as a r e s u l t of t h i s objection that D'Abernon 
came back to the idea of reviving the Cuno o f f e r . 
I n addition to the memoranda by Crowe and Campbell, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence received papers on the Geneva 
Protocol from the Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State 
f o r A i r , the Treasury, the Board of Trade, and Hankey. 
The Chiefs of Staff discussed technical problems and concluded 
that B r i t a i n ought not to accept the Protocol unless a l l the 
21. D.D.B.. Vol. I , No. 241; Brussels desp. 876, 14 Nov. 
1924; Grahame to Chamberlain, 12 Dec, W 9992, 11201/ 
9992/4. FO 371/10531; desp. 1630 to Brussels, 3 Dec, 
¥ 10544/134/98, F0371/10572; Grahame to D'Abernon, 
18 Dec, BM Add. MS 48928. 
22. D'Abernon to Grahame, 10 Dec. 1924; Grahame to 
D'Abernon, 18 Dec; D'Abernon to Grahame, 9 Jan. 1925, 
tm. MS 48928. 
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other Great Powers did likewise„ The Naval Staff 
considered the consequences f o r B r i t a i n i f she signed 
w h i l s t other major naval powers did not, and found them 
(21) 
dangerouso v Hoare was opposed to the Protocol, l i k e 
the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, on the ground that new 
commitments would necessitate increased forces? but he 
realised t h a t r e j e c t i o n would not solve the question of 
European security„ He was reluctant to refuse the French 
demand f o r security yet again, but doubted whether publis 
opinion would accept the al t e r n a t i v e of a defensive pact,, 
He therefore suggested t r y i n g to amend the Protocol i n 
such a way as to reduce i t to a moral guarantee, which would 
s t i l l have some weight„ He also thought that there was no 
need for-haste, since—France was safe f o r ten years and by ~" 
that time the problem of security might have become l e s s 0 
The wisest course seemed to be to gain time rather than t o 
(2 
raise the issue at once by r e j e c t i n g the Protocol o u t r i g h t o v 
The Treasury and the Board of Trade concentrated on 
f i n a n c i a l and economic sanctions» Both emphasised t h a t 
unless sanctions were applied by a l l countries they could 
not be e f f e c t i v e , so tha t the a t t i t u d e of the United States 
was c r u c i a l o Both pointed out tha t complicated machinery 
would be needed, some of which could only be introduced i n 
B r i t a i n i f a state of war were declared„ Going i n t o greater 
d e t a i l the Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, S i r H„ 
2 3 o C o I c D o Paper 5 2 7 - B , 2 9 0ct o 1 9 2 4 , C A B 4 / l 1 0 
2 4 o C o I o D o Paper 5 4 2 - B , 1 Dec0 1 9 2 4 , C A B 4 / 1 2 0 
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Llewellyn Smith, concluded t h a t even the suspension of 
d i r e c t trading r e l a t i o n s w i t h the aggressor would damage 
the i n t e r e s t s of, and cause f r i c t i o n w i t h neutrals, and 
s t i l l more so the pressures possible under a state of war. 
I t was not certain that states would be w i l l i n g t o declare 
war on the recommendation of the League Council i n cases 
where most of them had only a s l i g h t i n t e r e s t , nor was i t 
possible to r e l y on the stringent application of blockade 
measures i n face of strong neutral protests. I f the United 
States were neutral a B r i t i s h Government could not be so 
sure of success as to be able to give traders the guarantees 
necessary to induce them to submit to suspension of business. 
The President of the Board of Trade doubted whether the 
-United—States-could guarantee a benevolent-attitude-towards 
measures taken by the League; and as a minister he regarded 
the p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y of passing the l e g i s l a t i o n 
necessary f o r imposing sanctions as almost insuperable i n 
view of the heavy loss to B r i t i s h trade that would follow 
immediately. 
The f i r s t meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
held to discuss the Geneva Protocol took place on 4 December. 
After Curzon, the Chairman, had set out the p o s i t i o n and 
suggested the questions t h a t the Committe should consider, 
there was only a general discussion. Cecil urged t h a t the 
cause of disarmament should be kept i n mind. Amery 
25. C.I.D. Papers 536-B,/24 and 26 Nov.sCAB 4/l2eHankey's paper, 539-B, 21 Nov., was c r i t i c a l tsut made no 
fresh points. 
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suggested that the Covenant should be amended i n such a 
way as to get r i d of embarrassing obligations. Churchill 
said that he believed i n series of understandings between 
groups of powers, eventually covering the whole world, 
rather than i n unlimited and indefinable obligations . 
At the next meeting, on 11 December, l i t t l e progress was 
made and doubts were expressed whether i t would be possible 
to complete the examination of the Protocol i n time f o r 
the March meeting of the Council. 
Meanwhile Chamberlain had been attending the December 
Council meeting i n Rome and had there asked f o r postponement 
of the discussion of the Protocol because the new B r i t i s h 
Government needed time to examine i t . Passing through Paris 
on hi-s-way—to-Rome-Chamberlain saw Herriot and t r i e d to 
f i n d out whether the Protocol would s a t i s f y the French 
desire f o r security. Herriot d id not give a d e f i n i t e 
answer but l e f t Chamberlain w i t h the impression th a t France 
would s t i l l want a pact as w e l l . He did say, however, 
that what France would value i n a pact was an assurance 
tha t the B r i t i s h Empire would stand by France, not 
(28) 
precise conditions of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . v ' I n Rome 
26. C.I.D. 190th meeting, CAB 2/4. 
27. C.I.D. 191st meeting, CAB 2/4. 
28. Record of conversation, 5 Dec. 1924, C 18401/1288/18, 
FO 571/9813? Chamberlain to Crowe, 6 Dec, W 11388/ 
631/17, FO 371/10540? Chamberlain's statement to C.I.D. 
192nd meeting, CAB 2/4. According to Height's record 
of the conversation, he did t e l l Chamberlain that he 
wanted a pact as w e l l as the Protocol? and a d r a f t of 
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Chamberlain saw Briand, to whom he explained the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s that he saw i n compulsory arbitration,. He 
t o l d BriacL that he had always favoured an Anglo-French 
alliance but that a proposal f o r one now would meet wi t h 
greater opposition than i n 1922, especially from the 
Dominions upon whom the value of B r i t a i n ' s support la r g e l y 
depended0 Chamberlain came home i n no doubt that Briand 
did not f e e l that the Protocol by i t s e l f gave France a l l 
( 2 9 ) 
the security that she needed* ' 
Mussolini revealed to Chamberlains, as he had already 
done to the B r i t i s h Ambassador Sir Ronald Graham, a d i s l i k e 
of the Protocol but said t h a t he did not want to be the 
f i r s t t o r e j e c t i t D He was p a r t i c u l a r l y opposed to 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n i n case s -affecting a country 8s 
v i t a l interestso On 10 December Chamberlain saw Hymans, 
28 0 (Cont) of a pact, dated 3 December, i s preserved i n the French 
Archives? AoA°E„, Grande Bretagne, V o l o 71° According 
t o Louis Fischer, The Soviets i n World Affairs„London 
1930, pp 0 578=9s, Chamberlain at t h i s meeting t r i e d to harness France f o r a combined anti-=Soviet p o l i c y and 
offered i n return an Anglo-Franco-Belgian agreement0 As has been shown, the l a t t e r part of the story i s not 
trues there i s no evidence f o r the former other than 
one French newspaper report., The l a t e s t w r i t e r t o 
accept Fischer's story without examination i s Jurgen 
Spenz, Die diplomatische Vorgeschichte des B e i t r i t t s 
Deutschlands zum Vdlkerbund 1924°192b,ppo 52-3° Spenz 
i s not w e l l informed about B r i t i s h policy„ 
29° Record of conversation, 9 Dec° 1924, ¥ 10867/134/98, 
FO 371/10572? Chamberlain's statement to C°I°D° 
192nd meeting, CAB 2/4° 
30 o Rome desp01038, 5 Dec° 1924; record of conversation, 7 Dec, ¥ 10620, 10747/134/98, FO 371/10572; Chamberlain's 
statement to C I o D 0 192nd meeting, CAB 2/4° 
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who made i t clear that he was not enamoured of the Protocol 
and th a t the only thing that he r e a l l y wanted was some 
form of B r i t i s h guarantee„ Chamberlain was sure th a t even 
i f B r i t a i n signed the Protocol Belgium would ask f o r a 
(31) 
pact as well„ w ' The l a s t of Chamberlain 8 s important 
conversations i n Rome was one w i t h Benes, who described 
the d i f f i c u l t y that he had had as rapporteur of the Third 
Committee i n reconciling French and B r i t i s h views i n 
d r a f t i n g the Protocol» Benes regarded i t as a European 
instrument, thoroughly sati s f a c t o r y from the Czechoslovak 
point of viewo He had no desire to make i t more d i f f i c u l t 
f o r the United States to j o i n the League, and said t h a t he 
appreciated the p e c u l i a r i t y of the B r i t i s h position? but 
he had no~suggesti~ons~f or meeting it„ Chamberlain said 
t h a t i t was becoming obvious th a t many powers would make 
reservations when signing the Protocol, the cumulative 
e f f e c t of which might be to make i t s machinery unworkable? 
and he suggested th a t i t might be better to reduce i t to a 
document on which a l l could agree so that at least there 
would be a clear code° Benes r e p l i e d t h a t what c h i e f l y 
mattered to Czechoslovakia was that Germany should not go 
to war, and she would not do so i f France and B r i t a i n were 
(32} 
united i n an a l l i a n c e 0 
31o Record of conversation, 10 Dec0 1924, ¥ 10865/9992/4, FO 371/10531? Chamberlain's statement to 192nd 
meeting, CAB 2/4? D,D0Bo„ Vole I I , NoD 1 0 
3 2 o Record of conversation, 11 Dec0 1924, ¥ 10866/134/98, FO 371/10572? Chamberlain's statement to C d o D o 
192nd meeting, CAB 2/40 
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Chamberlain reported these conversations and h i s 
impressions to the Committe of Imperial Defence on 16 
December„ He said t h a t he had been l e f t w i t h a profound 
sense of the importance of the decision that they had to 
take and a great anxiety that a solution should be foundo 
The dominant f e e l i n g i n Europe was fearo Unless they 
could make B r i t i s h policy = the p o l i c y of the Empire •= 
such as to give Europe a sense of security 9 there would 
sooner or l a t e r be another war D I t would be easy to" t u r n 
down the Protocol, but to do nothing more would be an 
absolute disaster 0 He had one suggestion to make but 
would l i k e t o hear other opinions <> 
Baldwin said that there had already been a general 
— feeling-that-they-could n o t t u r n down the Protocol without 
t r y i n g t o put something i n i t s place „ w - y ' Cecil? agreeing 
w i t h Chamberlain's picture of the state of Europe,suggested 
that they should t r y to revise the Protocol rather than 
substitute something quite d i f f e r e n t 0 Curzon was much 
impressed by Chamberlain's evidence that the Protocol 
alone would not be enough to s a t i s f y France and Belgium 9 
and not surprised by Mussolini's attitude» Turning to 
33° On 10 December Baldwin had t o l d the r e t i r i n g French 
Ambassador tha t B r i t a i n would not be able to accept 
the Protocol but that he would seek some other 
p o l i c y on security to establish guarantees more 
po s i t i v e although more limited? St-Aulairej, 
Confession d'un vieux diplomate 0 pp 0 762=3? A o A o E o , Grande Bretagne, V o l o ^ f l * 
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procedure and timings, Curzon suggested that papers should 
be sent to the Dominions and t h a t they should be asked to 
send preliminary opinions by the time that Parliament 
reassembled i n February 0 Meanwhile a subcommittee should 
examine the Protocol and the Departmental c r i t i c i s m s , and 
report how f a r the Protocol could be amended or what 
pr i n c i p l e s should be adopted i f i t were decided to 
substitute something else 0 He also asked about the a t t i t u d e 
of the United States« Chamberlain said that the evidence 
that he had received about t h i s was c o n f l i c t i n g , and he 
would t r y to elucidate i t o He hinted that his preferred 
solution was a pact w i t h France, and also urged th a t they 
should get s u f f i c i e n t l y f a r w i t h t h e i r discussions f o r him 
to be able to have preliminary conversations w i t h France 
and I t a l y by March0 
Amery thought i t u n l i k e l y t h a t the Dominions could be 
consulted by correspondence alone, but that i t might be 
possible to get representatives sent to London by the 
beginning of Marcho Cecil thought th a t Chamberlain could 
have conversations w i t h other powers as soon as he l i k e d 5 
but he believed that great d i f f i c u l t i e s would arise i f a 
pact w i t h France and Belgium were chosen instead of the 
Protocol, because permanent peace i n Europe could not be 
assured without taking account of Germany0 Chamberlain 
re p l i e d that a pact w i t h France and Belgium might be 
followed by one w i t h Germany5 but the French would not 
have such an arrangement i n the o r i g i n a l document« The 
Committeg agreed to ask the Dominions to send t h e i r Prime 
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Ministers, i f possible, to London i n March and to set up a 
sub-committee to report on the Protocol, on how f a r i t 
could be amended, and on the p r i n c i p l e s to be adopted i f 
i t were decided to substitute some other proposals» 
The telegrams to the Dominions went o f f on 19 December<, 
The f i r s t r e p l i e s made i t clear t h a t i t would be impossible 
to organise a conference and that most of the Dominion 
Governments were not interested i n an a l t e r n a t i v e policy<> w ' 
Their views on the Protocol were mostly received i n 
January,, The New Zealand, Australian, and South African 
Governments a l l said that they could not accept i t , f o r 
various reasons including the extension of compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n ( p a r t i c u l a r l y about b e l l i g e r e n t r i g h t s at 
-sea- and-immigration) and fear -of -the-effect- on the United 
StateSo The Canadian Government did not reply u n t i l March0 
They were ready to go a stage f a r t h e r on a r b i t r a t i o n but 
34o CoIoDo 192nd meeting, CAB 2/4° The sub-committee 
consisted of Hankey (chairman), Crowe, Sir Arthur 
H i r t z e l (Under-Secretary of State f o r India) and 
S i r Henry Lambert (Acting Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State f o r the Colonies)o Hurst attended several 
of the meetings, and representatives of the Treasury, 
the Board of Trade, and the Chiefs of Staff were 
called i n to adviseo 
35° CoOo 59996/24, CO 532/283o Most of the correspondence 
wi t h the Dominions was published i n Cmd 2458 of 1925, 
Protocol f o r the Pacific Settlement of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Bjsputeso Correspondence r e l a t i n g t o the p o s i t i o n of 
lEhe Dominions. and some i n Cmd~~2~301 of~T925~9 Consultation on matters of foreign p o l i c y and general 
Imperial interest„ Correspondence w i t h the Governments 
of the self-governing Dominions <> On more than one 
occasion the Foreign Office had to ask f o r amendments 
to Colonial Office d r a f t s of messages suggesting th a t 
discussion of the Protocol could be postponed u n t i l 
the next Imperial Conferences C 00 o4895/24, CO 532/283? 
CoOo 2897/25 P CO 532/316„ 
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were not w i l l i n g to undertake any o b l i g a t i o n to apply 
sanctions, and they were p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about the 
United States<> None of the Governments had any amendments 
or p o s i t i v e suggestions to make<>^^ 
The Ambassador i n Washington, S i r Esme Howard, 
approached Hughes about the Protocol at Chamberlain's 
request„ Hughes said that he had hoped that the Protocol 
would die a natural death, f o r i f i t went through he saw 
i t as a source of troubles indeed the United States would 
hardly be able to avoid regarding the League as a 
"potential enemy"0 Trouble would arise, f o r instance, i f 
one of the Central American republics appealed to the 
League on account of United States action i n the Panama 
- Canal—Zone^ or out of the-exercise-of—neutral -rights-in 
case of a blockade Q Hughes thought th a t i n f a c t sanctions 
would be impossible to enforces he could hardly believe 
that the business int e r e s t s of any country would agree to 
allow t h e i r r e l a t i o n s to be suddenly cut o f f at the behest 
of the League; and Congress would never pass the l e g i s l a t i o n 
needed to put such measures i n t o e f f e c t , Howard asked 
whether i t would help to disarm American h o s t i l i t y i f the 
Governments of the Empire made a reservation s t a t i n g t h a t 
they would not be bound to apply any sanctions before they 
had reached agreement w i t h the United States« Hughes 
3 6 o ¥ 3 3 5 , 4 2 5 , 9 2 7 , 9 9 3 / 9 / 9 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 1 0 6 4 ? W 1 8 6 0 / 9 / 9 8 , 
FO 3 7 1 / 1 1 0 6 5 ? C0O0 5 4 5 7 / 2 5 , CO 5 3 2 / 3 1 1 ? C 0 I 0 D 0 Paper 
576=B, CAB 4 / 1 2 ? Cmd 2 4 5 8 of 1 9 2 5 ° 
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r e p l i e d t h a t i t might, hut they would have to do i t on 
t h e i r own initiative» W f ' 
Chamberlain r e p l i e d to Howard's report of t h i s 
conversation th a t he did not thin k t h a t such a reservation 
would be a solution, f o r i t would make the United States a 
super-power w i t h a veto over the decisions of the League* 
He also t o l d the United States Ambassador t h a t his 
Government ought to state t h e i r views publicly? i t was not 
f a i r to l e t European Governments sign i n ignorance a 
document which the United States regarded as un f r i e n d l y 0 
Howard wrote l a t e r that what the United States most feared 
was that the League would u l t i m a t e l y withdraw South America 
from her sphere of influence.. This fear had to be removed 
i f there were to be any hope of ge t t i n g her t o collaborate 
w i t h the League and apply sanctions against an aggressor -
and without her collaboration sanctions would be worse than 
uselesso As f o r h i s suggested reservation, i t only recognised 
that the United States was i n f a c ^ a super-power„ 
3 7 o Chamberlain to Howard, 2 2 Dec0 1 9 2 4 , W 1 1 1 9 9 / 1 3 4 / 9 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 5 7 2 ? Howard to Chamberlain, 9 Jam 1 9 2 5 , 
¥ 1 1 7 4 / 9 / 9 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 1 0 6 4 ? see also FoRoUoSc 1 9 2 5 , 
Vol 0 I , pp 0 1 6 = 1 8 O A report of Hughes's views was circ u l a t e d to the Cabinet and the C . I . D . : CPo 4 8 ( 2 5 ) , 
CAB 2 4 / 1 7 1 ? C 0 I 0 D 0 Paper 5 7 3 - B , CAB 4 / 1 2 0 
3 8 o Chamberlain to Howard, 2 8 Jam 1 9 2 5 , Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 5 2 / 4 7 9 , FO 8 0 0 / 2 5 7 ? memorandum by Chamberlain, 1 0 
Febo, ¥ 1 1 5 1 / 9 / 9 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 1 0 6 4 0 
3 9 o Howard to Chamberlain, 1 3 Febo 1 9 2 5 , Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 5 2 / 4 8 2 , FO 8 0 0 / 2 5 7 . 
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Examination o f the Protocol and an al t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y 0 
January-February 1923 
Hankey's sub-committee began work on 18 December0 By 
Christmas they had agreed th a t i t was v i r t u a l l y impossible 
to amend the Geneva Protocol since compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n 
was the keystone without which the whole would f a l l t o the 
ground, and they had been encouraged by Chamberlain to 
assume tha t the Government would r u l e out both compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n and the automatic application of sanctions« 
They were also agreed that B r i t a i n could not adhere to the 
Protocol i f i t were not also accepted by the Dominions., 
The sub-committee then turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to principles» 
I n a paper on sanctions Hurst gave i t as h i s opinion t h a t 
under the Covenant, although the Council could only advise 
on measures to be adopted, members were bound to co-operate 
i n support of the League - i f necessary i n the l a s t resort 
by force of armso^^ Hankey, . who was unalterably sceptical 
about sanctions ever being applied against a Great Power, 
wrote a paper demonstrating that c e r t a i n features of the 
Protocol had been considered and rejected, mostly on 
B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e , when the Covenant was draftede He 
sent a copy to Cecil, asking him to check i t s accuracy 0 
Cecil r e p l i e d t h a t the continental countries had always 
favoured compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n more than the B r i t i s h and 
Americans, and the Covenant represented a compromiseo 
40o Sub-committet 1st-4th meetings, CAB l6/56 0 
41o Note by Hurst, Jam 1925; Hankey to Hurst, 22 Jan 0, 
CAB 21/289o 
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The security provisions had been made as mild as possible 
f o r the sake of B r i t i s h and American opinions, and there-
fore the provisions on disarmament were weak. I f now i t 
were desired to do more about disarmament, the security 
provisions should n a t u r a l l y be strengthened-^ 2^ 
At the sub-committee1s meeting on 30 December Hankey 
raised the question of France's desire f o r a pact i n 
addition to the Protocol„ Crowe said t h a t the question of 
a pact was one of high pol i c y which only the Government 
could" decide, but he thought th a t they could point out 
the possibility,, A declaration of poli c y might be more 
acceptable to the Dominions than a t r e a t y 0 v 
Examination of the Protocol was weakening Hankey's 
4 2 o C o l o D o Paper 558-B, 8 Jan» 1925, CAB 4/12; Hankey to 
Cecil, 13 Jan cs Cecil t o Hankey, 14 Jam, Cecil Papers, BM A d d o MS 51088o I t i s not at a l l clear from his own w r i t i n g s what Cecil thought the automatic 
obligations should be to be effective» I n a l e t t e r 
to Churchill asking f o r support on the Protocol Cecil 
urged th a t a general plan ought to be t r i e d , and 
maintained th a t i t need not involve burdensome 
obl i g a t i o n s 0 Would, he asked, an ob l i g a t i o n to "break o f f r e l a t i o n s " |the kind unspecified] and then consult 
as to what to do next, be burdensome? He thought not D Cecil to Churchill, 16 Jan 0, Churchill Papers, C 18/8 ( I am indebted f o r t h i s reference to Mr0 Martin Gi l b e r t , Churchill's biographer)<, I n view of his 
experience as Minister of Blockade during the war 
Cecil ought to have been aware of the complexity as 
w e l l as of the ultimate power of economic measureso 
This aspect of his thought needs c l a r i f i c a t i o n 0 David Carlton, "Disarmament w i t h guarantees; Lord Cecil 
1922-1927"» i n Disarmament and Arms Control. an 
Inte r n a t i o n a l Journal,, 19b5„ PP° 145°b4, does not 
provide it» 
43o Sub-committee, 6 t h meeting, CAB l 6 / 5 6 o 
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opposition t o a pact w i t h France. He wrote on 23 January 
that he had never doubted th a t i f France were again 
menaced by Germany B r i t a i n would go to her assistance, but 
he had believed that a formal guarantee would bring more 
d i f f i c u l t i e s than advantages. He had now changed h i s 
mind f o r three reasonss f i r s t , the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t B r i t a i n 
would be i n a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n i f she were at loggerheads 
wi t h France; second, the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t there was a r e a l 
danger of being at loggerheads i f the Protocol were 
rejected and nothing put i n i t s place; t h i r d , Crowe's new 
proposal which removed some of the dangers that he had 
seen i n a pact. I n any case a pact, which would be 
geographically l i m i t e d , precise, and w i t h i n B r i t i s h c o n t r o l , 
was preferabl-e-to~the—Protocol which~was" vague^" u n l i m i t e d T — 
and applicable either automatically or by a majority vote 
of the Council.^ 4 4^ 
The new proposal by Crowe was embodied i n the r e ^ p i # t 
of the sub-committee, dated 27 January. I t began w i t h a 
r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of the origins of the Protocol and a 
reminder of the B r i t i s h pledge of 1924 to co-operate i n 
devising means of providing f o r French security. The 
Protocol tended to emphasise and extend provisions of the 
Covenant which were o r i g i n a l l y accepted w i t h h e s i t a t i o n 
and had been viewed w i t h misgiving by B r i t i s h Government 
Departments ever since the United States decided not to 
44. Memorandum by Hankey, 23 Jan. 1925, C.I.D. Paper 571-B, 
CAB 4/12. Roskill's account of Hankey's views at t h i s 
point (Hankey, Vol. I I , pp. 393-6) i s somewhat 
misleading. 
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become a member of the League - a l l those provisions which 
emphasised the use of force rather than the moral influence 
of the League i n preventing war. I t therefore represented 
a parting of the ways f o r the future development of the 
League0 The B r i t i s h Government, the sub-committee assumed, 
would prefer that the League should continue to develop 
on the l i n e s of achieving p a c i f i c a t i o n by forming the habit 
among nations of bringing t h e i r differences to the Council 
f o r settlement, w i t h moral force as the p r i n c i p a l weapon 
and material force i n the background as the l a s t resort» 
As a general observation, the sub-committee said that they 
thought i t undegsirable th a t the Protocol should be a 
separate instrument from the Covenants they recommended 
therefor-e_a_procedure-of -amendments to the Covenant,—and - _ 
suggested a revised d r a f t protocol of a r t i c l e s to be added 
to the Covenanto 
The report then examined the Protocol i n d e t a i l , making 
and r e i n f o r c i n g a l l the previous c r i t i c i s m s and adding some 
more0 The sub-committee thought t h a t the question of 
disarmament should be separated from that of the Protocol., 
The t h i r d part of the report dealt w i t h French and Belgian 
securityo Their recommendations, the sub-committee wrote, 
made such fundamental changes i n the character of the 
Protocol t h a t i t was no longer l i k e l y t o be regarded as of 
any use from t h i s point of view 0 They f e l t bound to draw 
att e n t i o n to the only a l t e r n a t i v e to the Protocol that 
was l i k e l y to o f f e r any s a t i s f a c t i o n t o France, namely some 
kind of pact of guarantee j and they considered that of the 
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two alternatives a pact was the less objectionable from 
the B r i t i s h point of view 0 They submitted the d r a f t of a 
declaration^ which they thought Prance and Belgium might 
accept as a s u f f i c i e n t B r i t i s h guarantee of t h e i r security<, 
I n i t the three Governments would declare that the 
maintenance of the independence and i n t e g r i t y of t h e i r 
t e r r i t o r i e s bordering on the North Sea and the English 
Channel constituted a v i t a l i n t e r e s t of t h e i r respective 
countrieso Recognising that any infringement of the 
t e r r i t o r i a l status quo i n t h e i r respective countries could 
not but greatly a f f e c t t h e i r national safety, they under-
took t o n o t i f y the Council of the League that they would 
regard any unprovoked aggression threatening the said 
independence and~integrity as one of the contingencies i n 
which they were determined to make t h e i r maximum m i l i t a r y 
e f f o r t to oppose and defeat the aggressor 0 This n o t i f i c a t i o n 
would be made under an a r t i c l e of the d r a f t revised protocol 
which stated that i n view of the m i l i t a r y sanctions 
provided f o r by A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant, members of the 
League might inform the Council of the specific contingencies 
i n which they would be prepared to make t h e i r maximum 
e f f o r t o 
This d r a f t , the sub-committee said, rested on the 
assumption that B r i t a i n was i n f a c t prepared to f i g h t i f 
there were any danger of the French and Belgian North Sea 
ports passing under the control of another power*, They 
thought that i t went as f a r as B r i t a i n could ask the 
Dominions to go i n meeting the French and Belgian desire 
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f o r securityo They had considered whether a pact of t h i s 
kind could be so framed as to embrace Germany0 However, 
i n French eyes the problem of security was not confined 
to the Franco=German f r o n t i e r but extended to the whole 
t e r r i t o r i a l settlement of the Treaty of Versailles« The 
French Government had therefore always sought to provide 
against the danger of German aggression against Poland 
and Czechoslovakia as w e l l as to secure a purely Anglo-
French pact 0 The B r i t i s h Government had equally steadily 
regarded t h i s as not p r i m a r i l y a B r i t i s h concern,, To 
include Germany i n a pact on the basis of a reciprocal 
guarantee of the t e r r i t o r i e s of the signatory states would 
necessarily involve B r i t a i n i n an undertaking to defend the 
t e r r i t o r i a l — s t a t u s - q u o on-Germany's eastern f r o n t i e r o For 
t h i s reason the proposed declaration was l i m i t e d to France 
and Belgium? but the form could be adapted to other 
declarations by other states, so that Germany could be 
(45) 
brought i n t o a more comprehensive system,,v ' 
45o CsfEwe also drafted a Franco=Belgian=German declaration, 
which was not included i n the report„ I n i t the three 
Governments would declare t h a t they j o i n t l y and severally 
guaranteed the present f r o n t i e r between France and 
Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other, and 
would maintain the sanctity of the demilitarised zone0 They n o t i f i e d the League t h a t they would make t h e i r 
maximum e f f o r t i n defending the f r o n t i e r against 
unprovoked aggression from any quarter,, A reference to 
A r t i c l e 10 of the Covenant implied that Germany would 
be a member of the League; but the declaration said 
nothing about France's obligations to her eastern 
a l l i e s o C 6582/459/18, FO 371/10731. 
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I n conclusion the sub=committee recommended that when 
an understanding had been reached w i t h the Dominions and 
India, the Government should t r y to come to terms w i t h 
France and Belgium and other members of the Council before 
replying o f f i c i a l l y to the League on the Protocol„ Since 
there would not be time f o r a l l t h i s before the March 
Council meeting, they suggested a b r i e f i n t e r i m reply before 
then intimating t h a t B r i t a i n found i t impossible to accept 
the Protocol as i t stood but was consulting the Dominions 
and India on the terms of a f u r t h e r communicatioho^ 4^" 
While the sub-committee were examining the Protocol 
Chamberlain was i n i t i a t i n g i n the Foreign Office a 
discussion of an alternative„ To begin w i t h he asked f o r 
a clear statement of the problem,. The f i r s t two parts_ of 
such a paper were obvious? a statement of the present 
p o s i t i o n and an h i s t o r i c a l background by Headlam=Morley0 
"But then there remains Chapter I I I which should be The 
Solution, and here I am f r a n k l y at a losso Can we propose 
an Anglo=Franco=Belgian pact of guarantee to be followed 
by a Quadruple Pact embracing Germany? Or ought we to 
propose a u n i l a t e r a l declaration of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s and 
of what we should regard as a casus b e l l i ? Or again i s 
there some t h i r d course? And how i n any case are we going 
to defend our v i t a l i n t e r e s t s i n the West w h i l s t safe-
guarding ourselves against being dragged i n t o a quarrel 
4 6 c CoIoDo Paper 5 5 9 - B , CAB 4 / 1 2 . 
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over Lithuania or Latvia or Poland or Bessarabia? And 
what i s or ought to be our pol i c y i n r e l a t i o n to these 
countries? V ^ 4 7 ^ 
A statement of the present s i t u a t i o n came i n a 
memorandum by Harold Nicolson, a member of the Central 
Department, which also went some way towards discussing 
the "Solution"o Nicolson started by recognising that the 
people of the Empire would not accept the task of 
guaranteeing the complete security desired by the European 
nationso The most tha t could be hoped f o r was to achieve 
"an atmosphere of greater c e r t a i n t y and more sincere 
co-operation i n which a new generation, possessed of 
stronger nerves, can a t t a i n to what we must a l l hope w i l l 
be a calmer maturity"„ Nicolson then analysed the-present 
s i t u a t i o n , leaving Russia out of account not because she 
was not important - she was indeed "the most menacing of 
a l l our uncertainties" - but because she was at present 
an Asian rather than a European problQ(3n> and her future 
was so uncertain t h a t a p o l i c y of security must be framed 
" i n spite of Russia, perhaps even because of Russia"» 
For the r e s t , b r i e f l y , " a l l our l a t e enemies desire t o 
recover what they l o s t ; and a l l our l a t e a l l i e s are fear-
f u l of losing what they won"0 Austria was only a problem 
i n so f a r as she desired fusion with Germany; but i n 
terms of French security t h i s was s u f f i c i e n t l y disturbing, 
f o r i t would be hazardous to suppose tha t i n f i f t e e n years' 
47. Minute, 4 Jam 1925, W 362/9/98, FO 371/110640 
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time the A l l i e s would be able to prevent "so l o g i c a l and 
so inevitable a union"„ Hungary was a serious nucleus of 
inse c u r i t y i n Central Europs Bulgaria equally was biding 
her time i n the south-east 0 But the s i t u a t i o n of the 
smaller ex-enemy countries threw i n t o r e l i e f the essential 
cause of insecurity, namely that whereas the lesser peace 
t r e a t i e s were secured by a preponderance of manpower on 
the side of the v i c t o r s , i n the case of the Treaty of 
Versailles the preponderance of manpower t o l d against the 
status quoo 
I t might be taken as axiomatic that the vast majority 
of the German people did not accept the Treaty of Versailles 
as permanento Germany hoped one day to be i n a p o s i t i o n 
to rWerse~ the verdicts she would "doubtless prefer-to~do so 
by agreement but f a i l i n g agreement she would use forceo 
She would attempt not to be faced again by an alliance between 
France, B r i t a i n and Russia? France on her own could be 
defeated? Russia could be secured as a f r i e n d ; B r i t i s h 
h o s t i l i t y must not be reagwakened<> For t h i s reason, and 
because the p r i n c i p a l German grievance related to Poland, 
the German attack, when i t came i n f i f t e e n to twenty years, 
would not be aimed at B r i t a i n nor even d i r e c t l y at France, 
but at Polando France's a t t i t u d e was one of fear, based 
on the recent experience of invasion and her declining 
population,. Some fear of Germany was i n e v i t a b l e , but 
some of i t was due to causes f o r which B r i t a i n was p a r t l y 
responsible and which she might therefore help to remove„ 
One r e s u l t of French alarm was l i k e l y to have a l a s t i n g 
3 1 2 
i n j u r i o u s e f f e c t on European s t a b i l i t y , namely the network 
of alliances to the east of Germany0 This policy compromised 
rather than increased French security, f o r i t drained 
French resources, increased French commitments, and 
increased German resentment without being strong enough to 
contain i t * I f France could not be solaced and controlled 
she would provoke the German menace of which she stood i n 
terror» While the League of Nations might one day be able 
to deal w i t h deep-seated r i v a l r i e s , at present i n any v i t a l 
matter security could not come from Genevao 
In such an uncertain s i t u a t i o n the only l i n e f o r 
B r i t a i n t o follow was that of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 0 I s o l a t i o n 
was no longer possible^ The primary B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s were 
the defence of the Empire (which was outside the scope of 
t h i s paper) and the defence of Great Britain,, The l a t t e r 
required t h a t a h o s t i l e power should not be i n a p o s i t i o n 
to dominate the North Sea and Channel coastso A secondary 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s was the s t a b i l i t y of Europe.. To a 
cert a i n extent t h i s could be fostered by consistent support 
of the League, but i n the short term something must be done 
to diminish Franco=German h o s t i l i t y without over-burdening 
imperial resources<> The primary and the secondary 
inte r e s t s indicated the formation of a new entente w i t h 
France, and a supplementary pol i c y was needed to keep 
Germany and Russia aparto Germany might at present accept 
a series of non-aggression pacts, which would have some 
value although they would not carry permanent conviction 
u n t i l "the dangerous i n j u s t i c e s of the Silesian settlement, 
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and the Polish Corridor have "been, by mutual agreement, 
revised". I n the present mood of Europe i t would be 
f a t a l even to mention r e v i s i o n of any of the peace 
t r e a t i e s : gradually, however, the concert of Europe would 
he recreated provided France were quietened; but France 
would only be quietened i f B r i t a i n could speak to her as 
an a l l y . The f i r s t hope of European s t a b i l i t y therefore 
lay i n a new entente w i t h France. 
One of the resu l t s of t h i s remarkable paper (remarkable 
even though i t did not e n t i r e l y convince i t s author, who 
s t i l l hankered a f t e r an uncommitted policy because he did 
not believe that Germany was bound to be the enemy) was 
to s t a r t a discussion on the p o s i t i o n of the Dominions. 
R.H. Campbell suggested th a t althoughr it-was-desirable 
that, they should add t h e i r signatures to any pledgegiven 
by the B r i t i s h Government, i t was not absolutely essential. 
The Dominions should not be ignored, but the Government 
should not allow themselves to be "hypnotised i n t o 
impotence". They should c e r t a i n l y t r y to persuade the 
Dominions of the rightjness of whatever B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n 
Europe were decided upon; but they should not t r y to 
persuade them i n t o a fommal association w i t h i t , since a 
refus a l would be serious. Whatever the form was, i f 
B r i t a i n were again involved i n a European war i t was 
surely inconceivable t h a t the Dominions would not again 
come to her assistance. 
Lampson, on the other hand, argued that because 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y the whole Empire would be at war i f 
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B r i t a i n went to war s she must not put her hand to any 
agreement w i t h France and Belgium which the Dominions did 
not endorseo But he was confident that since the p o l i c y 
now proposed was one of protecting B r i t a i n i t could unite 
the whole Empire i f properly presented,. There was 
(LQ 
general agreement th a t i s o l a t i o n f o r B r i t a i n was impossible. 
The second paper which Chamberlain had suggested, the 
h i s t o r i c a l one, came on 1 2 February from Headlam-Morley, 
who pointed out that one of the d i f f i c u l t i e s about the 
Geneva Protocol, and about the League of Nations i n 
generalj, was that they universalised problems th a t might 
be better dealt w i t h by something more l i k e the Concert of 
Europeo He then demonstrated that B r i t a i n had always been 
part of Europe and -that-the Concert had worked best when 
B r i t a i n took an active parte She was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
interested i n northern France and the Low Countries, and 
i t was generally agreed th a t she could not i n any 
circumstances allow t h i s area to f a l l under German control 
or influence,. I t was much better to say t h i s c l e a r l y , and 
the o b l i g a t i o n to defend Belgium and northern France 
necessarily implied an ob l i g a t i o n to prevent a German 
v i o l a t i o n of the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Rhinelando 
4 8 o Memorandum by Nicolson, 2 3 Jan 0 1 9 2 5 , and minutes, 
¥ 2 0 3 5 / 9 / 9 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 1 0 6 5 O Writing t o Hankey on 2 7 
January Crowe remarkedi " I t a l l b o i l s down t o t t h i s , then, that you must f i n d some sort of formula^which 
shows the man i n the street i n London and the Llominions 
tha t a l l we are committing ourselves to i s s e l f -
protection i f and when the need arises"? C 1 2 1 8 / 
4 5 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 2 7 c 
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Beyond t h i s , Headlam-Morley saw a much more d i r e c t 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n central and eastern Eurpjfe than other 
w r i t e r s had done. I t was a r e a l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t , he 
wrote, to prevent Germany breaking through i n the east and 
acquiring new t e r r i t o r y and new strength which would 
i n e v i t a b l y be brought to bear i n the westo Some d e t a i l s 
of the present f r o n t i e r s could be improved without v i t a l 
i n j u r y to the states affected, but: "Has anyone attempted 
to r e a l i s e what would happen i f there were to be a new 
p a r t i t i o n of Poland, or i f the Czechoslovak State were to 
be so c u r t a i l e d and dismembered that i n f a c t i t disappeared 
from the map of Europe? The whole of Europe would at once 
be i n chaos. There would no longer be any p r i n c i p l e , 
~ " meaning- or sense i n ^ t h e - t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements of the 
continent. Imagine, f o r instance, that under some improbable 
condition Austria rejoined Germany, tha t Germany, using the 
discontented minority i n Bohemia, demanded a new f r o n t i e r 
f a r over the mountains ... and at the same time, i n 
alliance w i t h Germany, the Hungarians recovered the southern 
slope of the Carpathians. This would be catastrophic, and 
even i f we neglected to i n t e r f e r e to prevent i t happening, 
we should be driven to i n t e r f e r e , probably too l a t e " . 
What the smaller states of Europe r e a l l y wanted was 
confidence that i n a serious c r i s i s they could count on 
ef f e c t i v e support. I t was not enough f o r B r i t a i n to say 
i n general terms that she would carry out her obligations 
under the Covenant. She should i n some way state c l e a r l y 
that she was interested i n the maintenance of the new 
316 
system i n Europe and could not regard w i t h equanimity the 
f o r c i b l e overthrow of any of the new stateSo This should 
not take the form of alliances, but rather of an o f f i c i a l 
statement of B r i t i s h p o l i c y linked w i t h a protocol f o r 
dealing w i t h European matters, an agreement tha t must 
include Germany. Most of the foreseeable European c o n f l i c t s 
would probably be minors only i f Germany or Russia were 
involved would a general war break outo Germany could at 
present be dealt with? but Russia must not be ignored f o r 
she could become a great danger and as long as she 
remained i n her present state there could be no f i r m 
security f o r her neighbours <> Headlam-Morley thought i t 
both possible and desirable f o r B r i t a i n to have a European 
policy- separate from the Dominions •> He was not worried 
about the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t e c h n i c a l i t y , since so long as 
B r i t i s h command of the seas were secure the Dominions 
would not be i n danger<> ^ 
The Committee of Imperial Defence began discussion of 
the report on the Geneva Protocol on 13 February and 
concluded i t s i x days later« No one favoured accepting the 
Protocol but there agreement ended0 The issues, l e f t f o r 
the Cabinet to resolve, were; (1) Should the Government 
send a simple r e j e c t i o n to the League, or a provisional 
reply i n d i c a t i n g t h a t they were considering another p o l i c y 
49o Memorandum by Headlam-Morley, 12 Febo 1925, W 1252/9/98, FO 371/11064, published i n Headlam=Morleyfs Studies i n 
Diplomatic History, London 1930, pp 0 173 f f o 
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i n consultation w i t h the Dominions9 or a reasoned reply 
i n d i c a t i n g an al t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y f o r western Europe? (2) 
I f the lasts, should B r i t a i n take part i n a regional 
arrangement i n any way? (3) Could the Dominions be brought 
to agree to a po s i t i v e B r i t i s h p o l i c y at a l l p and at best 
would the question have to wait f o r a conference w i t h them? 
(4) Should amendments to the Covenant be proposed? The 
very f u l l records of the meetings reveal c l e a r l y t h a t a 
majority of the members would have preferred to do nothings, 
but f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons.. Eleven M i n i s t e r s t o o k part 
i n at least three of the four meetings i n December and 
February at which the Protocol was discussed at lengtho The 
views that they expressed may be summarised as follows o 
Curzon as chairman did not express an opinion on some 
of the points at issue., He was against the Protocols, i n 
favour of proceeding cautiously, but i n the end s u f f i c i e n t l y 
impressed by Chamberlain's plea of urgency to hope that 
something might be done wi t h the Dominions without waiting 
a year f o r a conference» He favoured a reasoned reply to 
the League and was against t r y i n g to amend the Covenant0 
He was opposed to an Anglo=French pact but i n favour of 
B r i t a i n j o i n i n g one tha t included GermanyD 
Balfour was against the Protocol„ i n favour of a 
reasoned r e p l y 9 against t r y i n g to amend the Covenants, i n 
50o Balfour attended rather i n the r o l e of elder statesman 
and held no o f f i c e at tha t moment„ I n addition Baldwin 
presided over the f i r s t two meetings but expressed no 
opinion 0 The inclusion of leading figures from the Liberal and Labour parties was not pursuedo 
318 
favour of regional arrangements but against B r i t i s h 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n beyond a promise to France to consult at a 
l a t e r date i f danger arose. Churchill was against the 
Protocols, i n favour of a reasoned reply, but against any 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y other than t h a t of blessing a " r e a l " 
Franco-German peace giving Germany "the immediate evacuation 
of t e r r i t o r i e s which are being held" and a "substantial 
r e c t i f i c a t i o n of her eastern f r o n t i e r s " e Amery was not 
only against the Protocol; he wished to take t h i s 
opportunity of depriving the Covenant of a l l i t s coercive 
features. I n so f a r as he was spokesman f o r the Dominions 
he thought that they neither would nor should agree t o any 
pos i t i v e policy and f o r himself wished to go no f u r t h e r 
than a uni l a t e r a l - ~ d e c i a r a t i o n - o f - B r i t i s h - ; i n t e r e s t i n - the -
(*>1) 
independence of Belgium, K J ' 
Birkenhead, who admitted t h a t he knew very l i t t l e 
about Europe, contributed p r a c t i c a l l y nothing to the 
discussion but favoured a reasoned reply to the Leagueo 
51o Amery's r e c o l l e c t i o n seems to have been at f a u l t when 
he wrote i n him memoirs that "some df us" urged "a 
t h i r d course „ <> 0 meeting the objections both to the Protocol and to Austen's proposed tr e a t y of guarantee,, 
That was to l i m i t the general ob l i g a t i o n to intervene 
against aggression to the p a r t i c u l a r danger zone of 
the French f r o n t i e r , but to do so i m p a r t i a l l y as 
between France and Germany,, „«„ Our argument received 
an unexpected reinforcement when i n February 1925 the 
German Foreign Minister, Stresemann, himself suggested 
a pact of mutual security w i t h France" (Mv P o l i t i c a l 
L i f e , Vol I I , London 1953, PP* 301=02)0 This account not only misrepresents Amery's own po s i t i o n - i f he 
included himself i n "some of us" - but also suggests 
that some Ministers were thinking of a mutual guarantee 
arrangement before the a r r i v a l of the German proposalso 
With the possible exception of C h u r c h i l l t i t i s evident 
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Whether he had any views on an al t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y does 
not emerge from these meetingSo Cunliffe=Lister, the 
President of the Board of Trade, only expressed h i s 
Department's d i s l i k e of economic sanctions i n both the 
Protocol and the Covenant,, The Service Ministers also 
ref l e c t e d the views of t h e i r s t a f f s s Worthington-Evans 
and the General Staff were p a r t i c u l a r l y i n favour of an 
Anglo-French pact as an expression of a B r i t i s h v i t a l 
i n t e r e s t , but hoped tha t Germany might adhere to i t 
latere Bridgeman, the F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, 
generally agreed and the Naval Staff saw a f u r t h e r 
advantage i n the prospect th a t a pact would safeguard the 
B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the western Mediterranean,, Hoare and 
the-Air Staff were more-doubtful-o—They agreed t h a t — 
B r i t a i n would i n f a c t go to the help of France i f she 
were again attacked by Germany; but they feared that a 
guarantee would increase German h o s t i l i t y and were s t i l l 
worried about B r i t a i n ' s security against France„ At the 
same time they thought that France, although now un-
assailable, was going steadily downhill so tha t i n f i f t e e n 
or twenty years' time i t would be dangerous f o r B r i t a i n 
5 1 c (Cont) 
from the records that they were not„ Chamberlain 
mentioned the German proposals at the C o L D o meeting 
of 1 3 February as the possible basis of a poli c y of 
regional arrangements, but they were not discussed,. 
320 
to be t i e d to her 0 Hoare was against a reasoned reply to 
the League and would personally have preferred to do 
nothingo 
Cecil approached the problem from h i s own i n d i v i d u a l 
angleo He wanted above a l l things disarmaments, t o which 
none of the others paid more than l i p service except i n 
so f a r as i t was a matter of f i n a n c i a l savingo To tha t 
endj, although he did not care much f o r the Protocol, 
Cecil d i d want some European security arrangement,, A 
western European agreement "could form part of th i s j , but 
he did not favour a western pact outside a general frame-
workc He supported Chamberlain on some points, but the 
impression emerges tha t such support was something of 
—an-embarrassmento —-
Chamberlain was against the Protocol and a l l general 
arrangements but i n favour of a pact with France now and 
the inclusion of Germany later., He had become convinced 
t h a t the declaration of a po s i t i v e B r i t i s h p o l i c y was 
urgently necessary., A l l the European countries were 
waiting to know B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n s 5 i t was essential to 
encourage France i f she were to be induced to be reasonable 
about the evacuation of the f i r s t zone of the Rhinelandj 
the present s i t u a t i o n i n Germany was favourable f o r an 
encouragement of a p a c i f i c s p i r i t which alone could prevent 
a new attack when Germany was again i n a p o s i t i o n to 
launch one i n 1960 or 1970 o^ 5 2^ 
52o C o I c D c 195th meetings 13 Feb0 19255 196th meeting^ 
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Immediately a f t e r the meeting of 19 February Chamber-
l a i n circulated t o the Cabinet a revised version of 
Nicolson's January memorandum. I n h i s covering note 
Chamberlain wrote: "No Minister can conduct foreign 
a f f a i r s successfully xvlthout a policy. I t i s my duty to 
suggest one, and i t i s urgently necessary to know whether 
what I propose i s approved by the competent a u t h o r i t i e s " . 
The memorandum was a shortened version of the o r i g i n a l , 
leading t o the conclusion that the essential i n t e r e s t s of 
imperial defence were closely related to pol i c y of European 
security, and th a t the f i r s t hope of European s t a b i l i t y 
lay i n a new entente between the B r i t i s h Empire and 
(5^5) France. v 
52. (Cont) 
19 Feb., CAB 2/4. Hoare had also stated his views i n a 
memorandum of 5 February, the Admiralty and the Board 
of Trade had contributed f u r t h e r papers on economic 
sanctions, and Balfour had drafted a reply to the League: 
C.I.D. Papers 575-B, 577-B,581~B, 586-B, 587-B, CAB 4/12. 
After the meetings Cecil, Churchill, Worthington-Evans 
and Hoare sent to the Cabinet memoranda recording and 
amplifying t h e i r views: CP. 112(251 116(25), 118(25), 
121(25), CAB 24/172. 
53. CP. 106(25), CAB 24/172. I n a f u r t h e r paper of 26 
February Chamberlain wrote that i f t h i s p o l i c y were 
rejected he did not know what could be put i n i t s 
place: CP. 122(25). l o c cit.Nicolson's o r i g i n a l 
memorandum was not circulated outside the Foreign 
Office: the version of 19 February received a wider 
d i s t r i b u t i o n as a Cabinet Paper and i n the Foreign 
Office c o n f i d e n t i a l p r i n t ; but i t was not communicated 
to any foreign government. I t appeared i n some American 
newspapers i n May: see also Chapter 5, p.^ M• A l l t h i s 
time Chamberlain had been i n no p o s i t i o n to say much 
more to the French than he had said to Herriot on 5 
December. On 20 January he did t e l l the French 
Ambassador that he was not unhopeful th a t B r i t a i n 
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German disarmament and the evacuation of the Cologne zone 
I n the Committee of Imperial Defence on 13 February 
Chamberlain referred to the d i f f i c u l t i e s that he expected 
with the French over the evacuation of the f i r s t zone of 
the Allied-occupied t e r r i t o r y i n the absence of agreement 
on security. The question would have been awkward i n any 
event? a r i s i n g precisely at t h i s moment i t was both an 
embarrassing complication and a spur to a decision on 
According t o the Treaty of Versailles the occupation 
of the Rhineland was a guarantee f o r the execution of the 
tre a t y as a wholeo After the signature of the London 
Agreement the question of the evacuation of the f i r s t zone 
at the e a r l i e s t possible date, 1-0- January 1 9 2 5 9-hinged_in 
f a c t e n t i r e l y on German f u l f i l m e n t of the m i l i t a r y clauses 
of the Treaty, although the p o s s i b i l i t y remained t h a t other 
matters could be introduced.. By the end of November 1 9 2 4 
i t was apparent that the general inspection by the 
M i l i t a r y Control Commission would not be completed by the 
end of the year, and also that the German p o s i t i o n was 
not s a t i s f a c t o r y o K 1 With the approval of the Cabinet 
Curzon stated i n the House of Lords on 1 8 December tha t 
5 3 o (Cont) 
might be able to provide a solution to the security 
problem th a t would s a t i s f y Frances desp 0 2 7 0 to Paris, C 1 0 0 1 / 4 5 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 2 6 0 On 1 3 February, 
Siowever, when the reluctance of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence had been f u l l y revealed, Chamberlain 
t o l d Fleuriau that he could make no promises at a l l s 
desp0 5 6 9 to Paris, C 2 1 9 9 / 2 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 0 3 . 
5 4 o War Office to Foreign Office, 1 2 Nov 1 9 2 4 . C 1 7 1 8 3 / 9 / 1 8 , 
FO 3 7 1 / 9 7 2 8 ; War Office t o Foreign Office, 1 Dec0, 
policyo 
C 1 8 1 2 2 / 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 9 7 2 9 ; War Office to Foreign Office C 1{3122/9/ i3 , FU . j y i / y Y ^ y ; w r uince TO Foreign 
4 Dec . C 1 8 2 8 0 / 4 7 3 6 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 9 8 3 3 ; C o P c 5 2 7 ( 2 4 ) . 
CAB 2 4 / 1 6 9 o 
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evacuation could not be considered u n t i l the Control 
Commission's report was r e c e i v e d o w > ' And a f t e r an 
inte r i m report had come i n , on 5 January the A l l i e d 
Ambassadors i n B e r l i n delivered a note informing the 
German Government t h a t i n view of the German f a i l u r e to 
carry out the m i l i t a r y clauses of the Treaty, the reduction 
of the occupation th a t would have been possible on 10 
January i f Germany were l o y a l l y observing her engagements 
could not take place 0 
Although the Germans had been warned s e m i - b f f i c i a l l y 
that evacuation depended on the advice of the m i l i t a r y 
a u t h o r i t i e s , there was a public outcry over the decision,, 
Charges of s i n i s t e r motives were p a r t i c u l a r l y resented i n 
-London; ^ and—an apparent German attempt t o widen the 
grounds f o r the A l l i e d refusal and to cast doubt on other 
(57) 
obligations caused both annoyance and concern 0 v ' 
5 5 o Co 67(24), 17 Dec 1924, CAB 23/49? HoL„ Deb.; „ 5th 
ser„, Volo 60, cols„ 170=2„ 
56o Minutes by Lampson, 24 Nov0 and 6 Dec 1924, C 17812, 18451/4736/18, FO 371/9833; desp 0 2276 t o B e r l i n , 29 Dec; tel„ 248 to Be r l i n , 31 Dec; desp02275 to Be r l i n , 31 Dec, C 19472, 19562, 19563/4736/18, FO 
371/9834O The German reaction i s described by 
Salewski, Entwaffnung und M j l i t a V k o n t r o l l e , pp„ 282=7. 
57o The German press were saying th a t the decision would 
have a disastrous e f f e c t on the execution of the Dawes 
plan; and the Auswartiges Amt, while denying any 
in t e n t i o n of casting doubt on the reparation o b l i g a t i o n , 
said much the same; Stresemann to Hoesch and Sthamer, 
28 Dec. 1924, 9518/H282644-48; B e r l i n tele 494, 29 
Deco; telo 248 to Be r l i n , 31 Dec; telo 2 to B e r l i n , 1 
Jan 1925, C 19472, 19483/4736/18, FO 371/9834? B e r l i n 
telo 5, 4 Jan 0; B e r l i n despD 12, 6 Jan»; Chamberlains to D'Abernon, 12 Jan 0, C 134, 369/2/18, FO 371/107020 
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But although the o f f i c i a l l i n e was to stand f i r m l y by the 
terms of the Treaty, i t i s evident th a t by the end of 1924 
there was a f a i r l y general f e e l i n g i n the Central 
Department of the Foreign Office that p o l i t i c a l questions 
ought to take precedence over the remnants of t r e a t y 
enforcement. Thus the view was repeated that Germany was 
tr 
effectively disarmed and could not go to war w i t h an 
advanced country on a modern scale; and i t was held that 
since e f f e c t i v e control of German disarmament was 
impossible, control should be abandoned as soon as was 
possibly consistent w i t h the Treaty. Only by p o l i t i c a l 
means, i t was held, could Germany be prevented from making 
war i n the future. Hence i t i s possible to discern a note 
~of i r r i t a t i o n at^the-revelations^of the Control Commission-'-s 
report and w i t h the a t t i t u d e of the General Staff. At the 
beginning of January the l a t t e r produced a paper on the 
present and future m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n Germany. On the 
present s i t u a t i o n the General Staff more or less repeated 
t h e i r evaluation of the report of the Control Commission, 
which Lampson had found of no great help i n judging the 
importance of the German defaults although he had a f i r m 
(59) 
impression th a t they would not convince the public. 
58. War Office to Foreign Office, 1 Dec. 1924 and 
minutes, C 18122/9/18, FO 371/9729; minute by 
Lampson, 2 Jan. 1925., C 18874/2048/18, FO 
371/9820. 
59. Minutes on C 21/21/18, FO 371/10707; C 248/30/18, 
FO 371/10711; War Office to Foreign Office, 2 Jan. 
1925, C 112/21/18, FO 371/10707. 
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For the future, the General Staff expected Germany to 
recover and become increasingly nationalist? but to judge 
by the present state of her armaments and the f a i r l y 
l i m i t e d known plans f o r production, i t appeared that she 
would have to be "strong enough or have on her side a 
body of foreign public opinion s u f f i c i e n t t o enable her to 
disregard the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed upon her armaments by 
the Treaty of Versailles and to carry out a large part of 
her i n d u s t r i a l mobilisation before the commencement of a 
war" 0 I t was therefore essential that developments i n 
Germany should be watched and that the A l l i e s should be 
pe r f e c t l y clear about the course they intended to take to 
prevent Germany regaining by force what she had l o s t by 
the Treaty of Versai-l-les^ -The Department's comments on 
t h i s aspect of the paper were superficial? no attempt 
was made to discuss even the p o l i t i c a l consequences of 
condoning breaches of the Treaty of Versailleso 
The other side of the coin about German disarmament 
was the suspicion, widespread i n B r i t a i n and shared by 
Chamberlain as w e l l as by o f f i c i a l s , that the French would 
seek reasons f o r maintaining the occupation at least 
u n t i l B r i t a i n had made an acceptable o f f e r on security 
60o War Office t o Foreign Office, 6 Jan 0 1925, C248/30/18, F0 371/10711O The General Staff estimated the output 
of German plants i n the Soviet Union as 36 a i r c r a f t 
per month plus spares 0 
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(61) and possibly i n d e f i n i t e l y . K J On past French 
and newspapers, the suspicion was not far-fetched. Since 
there were respects, such as the t r i a l of war criminals, 
i n which the Treaty of Versailles was now incapable of 
f u l f i l m e n t , the B r i t i s h insistence oft, confining the 
discussion to disarmament and to major defaults at t h a t , 
was directed as much towards preventing the French from 
extending the area of disagreement as towards keeping 
the Germans to the points at issue. The coincidence i n 
time of the discussions of security and of the evacuation 
of the Cologne zone complicated the problem. From the 
end of December Chamberlain envisaged as the only 
solution negotiations w i t h the French and Belgian 
Governments to reduce - t h e - i i s t of German defaults-to a— -
61. The Germans held t h i s suspicion even more strongly. 
Hoesch had been reporting to t h i s e f f e c t since 
November, and D'Abernon frequently stressed the point. 
There was also a good deal of t a l k of t r y i n g t o l i n k 
the evacuation of the Cologne zone wi t h t h a t of the 
Ruhr, i n a compromise by which both would be 
evacuated i n May. D'Abernon favoured t h i s course, 
the Foreign Office d i d not, and Hoesch regarded i t 
as dangerous. Hoesch desp. 6 Nov. 1924, 4504/ 
E122204-15; Hoesch to Schubert, 3 Dec, 4504/E122070-75; 
Be r l i n t e l . 489, 24 Dec; desp. 2276 to B e r l i n , 29 
Dec, C 19301, 19562/4736/18, FO 371/9834; B e r l i n 
t e l . 22, 10 Jan. 1925, C492/2/18, FO 371/10702; 
D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 31 Jan., Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 52/255. 
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minimum, followed by a conference w i t h the Germans about 
the defaultso He foresaw divergence bet\^een the A l l i e s 
as to t h e i r significance, and French objections to 
negotiating with the Germans about a matter f a l l i n g wholly 
w i t h i n the terms of the treaty.. He also feared that the 
French wanted to keep the question of evacuation open 
u n t i l they knew the B r i t i s h decision on security-
Fears about the French and Belgian a t t i t u d e were reinforced 
by reports from B e r l i n that the French members of the 
Control Commission were t r y i n g to put a graver construction 
on the German defaults than the facts warranted, by 
suggestions from Brussels that the Belgian Government were 
t r y i n g to use the evacuation to put pressure on B r i t a i n 
over security, and by Herriot 1s~declaration—in—the-Chamber 
on 28 January that the question of Cologne was dominated 
by security,, The Germans did not help matters by 
62o Paris desp„ 2817, 24 Dec0 1924? Paris despo 2820, 28 Dec, wi t h minutes, C 19288, 19364/4736/18, 
FO 371/9834? Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 9 Jam 1925, 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/252, FO 800/257? Chamberlain 
to D'Abernon, 12 Jam, C 369/2/18, FO 371/10702; 
Chamberlain to Crewe, 23 Jan„ ? desp 0 425 to Paris, 30 Jan„, C 677, 1635/21/18, FO 371/10707O 
63. Brussels desp0 53, 18 Jan. 1925, W 528/21/4, FO 371/11041; Grahame to Chamberlain, 19 and 20 Jan„? Chamberlain to 
Grahame, 22 Jan,, Chamberlain Papers, AC52/416, 417, 
418, F0 800/257? Gen0 Wauchope to War Office, 1 Feb 0, C 1655/21/18, FO 371/10707? Journal O f f i c i e l , 
Chambre des deputes, 28 Jan» 
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demanding discussions and the f u l l reasons for non-
evacuation, but Chamberlain f e l t i t necessary to warn 
Herriot that the disarmament question must be dealt with 
s t r i c t l y i n accordance with the peace treaty and that any 
attempt to use i t to force B r i t a i n ' s hand over security 
would produce the opposite effect to the one desiredo 
But although the questions of evacuation and of 
security were d i s t i n c t t e c h n i c a l l y there was', as Herriot 
said to Crewe, a connexion of facto Herriot told 
Crewe that while he was determined not to mix up the two 
questions he saw great d i f f i c u l t y i n Chamberlain's 
conference s e t t l i n g the d e t a i l s of evacuation without 
talking about security„ Hymans, too, pointed out to the 
-Bri-ti-sh- Charge d'Affaires that many people i n France and 
Belgium genuinely believed that i t would be unwise to 
give up the existing guarantee on the Rhine unless some= 
thing equally weighty were forthcoming instead., There 
64» B e r l i n desp 0 36, 17 Jam 19255 tel»l4 to B e r l i n , 23 Jam, C 875, 972/2/18, FO 371/10702; B e r l i n telo 44, 27 Jam; 
minute by Lampson, 29 Jam, C 1276, 1428/2^18, FO 
371/10703? t e l 0 50 to Paris, 5 Febo, C 1682/21/18, F0 371/10707? desp 0 488 to Paris, 6 Febo, C1849/2/18, F0 371/10703? Chamberlain to Crewe, 6 Febo, Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 52/186, Crewe Papers, C/8, F0 800/257. 
65o In the B r i t i s h view the l a s t paragraph of Arto 429 of 
the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , which said that i f the 
guarantees against German aggression were not considered 
s u f f i c i e n t the evacuation might be delayed, referred 
only to the f i n a l evacuations Paris telo 50, 4 Febo1925? 
telo 50 to Paris, 5 Febo, C 1682/21/18, F0 371/10707? 
Paris telo 61, 12 Febo, C2085/459/18, F0 371/10727° 
66„ Paris telo 50, 4 Febo 1925, C 1682/21/18, F0371/10707? 
Crewe to Chamberlain, 5 Febo, Chamberlain Papers, AC 
52/184, Crewe Papers, C/8, F0 800/257? Brussels desp 0 107, 7 Febo, C 1 9 6 3 / 2 1 / 1 8 , F0 371/10708? desp 0 191 to Brussels, 12 Febo, C 2113/2/18, F0 371/10703? D . D . B . . 
Volo I I , Noso 14, 16, 17. 
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were also the consideration that i f Herriot could not 
s a t i s f y French popular feeling h i s Government might f a l l . 
To make matters more complicated the Permanent Advisory 
Committee, i n accordance with instructions given at the 
December Council meeting, produced on 5 February a scheme 
for applying the Council resolution of 27 September 1924 
to the demilitarised zone, which included the establishment 
there of a permanent resident organ. I n the B r i t i s h view 
A r t i c l e 213 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s did not cover bodies 
of t h i s kind, so that German consent to i t s establishment 
would be necessary. I t provfed, however, possible to have 
the question adjourned at the March Council meeting. 
The French were indeed averse to discuM;ion on d i s -
^rmament~'wi"tfir"the "Germans", because they f eared "being Ted 
into concessions on the substance. I t was also doubtful 
whether Herriot would be able to leave Paris before Easter. 
Chamberlain, who was anxious for the conversations to be 
held i n London and was now fighting hard over security i n 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, became agitated at the 
prospect of delay and told Crewe that he feared a divergence 
67. Hoesch t e l . , 3 Dec. 1924; Hoesch t e l . , 3 Jan. 1925, 
4504/E121921-26, E121869-72; Paris t e l . 61, 12 Feb., 
C 2085/459/18, FO 371/10727. 
68. Aide-mlmoire from Herriot, 5 Dec. 1924; memorandum by 
Troutbeck, 17 Dec, C 18874, 18924/2048/18, BO 371/9820; 
Law Officers to Foreign Office, 18 Jan. 1925; minutes, 
3, 19 and 20 Feb.; desp. 737 to Paris, 28 Feb., C 741, 
1636, 2337, 2932/741/18, FO 371/10749. 
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between the two countries that would undo a l l the work of 
the past year. However, he eventually agreed that 
the question of a conference with the Germans could be 
l e f t for consideration when the A l l i e d Ministers met, and 
that meanwhile the Control Commission's report could be 
discussed through diplomatic channelso The report 
had been received i n the middle of February 0 I t stated 
that apart from some reductions i n fac t o r i e s the position 
was very much as i t had been i n 1 9 2 2 . A l l the infractions 
noted then were s t i l l u n r e c t i f i e d and there had been some 
increases i n eff e c t i v e s , i n recruitment and training, i n 
armaments, and i n fortifications» The General Staff 
regarded twenty of the infractions as being of major 
importance, and twenty^nine as possible subjects of 
(71) 
concession,. v ' On 2 4 February Crowe set down h i s ideas 
on future procedure. Before Chamberlain went to Paris and 
Geneva at the beginning of March the War Office should 
produce a statement of what disarmament demands were 
e s s e n t i a l and a note to the German Government should be 
draftedo Chamberlain should secure Herriot's agreement 
6 9 o Desp» 5 0 3 to Paris, 9 Febo 1 9 2 5 ; desp» 5 6 9 to Paris, 
1 3 Febo, C 1 9 6 9 , 2 1 9 9 / 2 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 0 3 ? Crewe to 
Chamberlain, 1 7 Febo? Chamberlain to Crewe, 2 0 Febo, 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 5 2 / 1 9 0 , 1 9 1 , Crewe Papers, C / 8 , 
FO 8 0 0 / 2 5 7 ? despo 6 5 7 to Paris, 2 1 Febo; Paris t e l . 
7 5 , 2 2 Febo, C 2 5 7 8 , 2 5 5 7 / 2 1 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 0 8 ; Crewe 
to Chamberlain, 2 2 Febo, Chamberlain Papers, AC 5 2 / 1 9 2 , 
Crewe Papers, C / 8 , FO 8 0 0 / 2 5 7 . 
7 0 o Despo 6 8 0 to Paris, 2 4 Febo 1 9 2 5 , C 2 7 4 6 / 2 1 / 1 8 , FO 
3 7 1 / 1 0 7 0 8 o 
7 1 o F i n a l report, 1 5 Febo 1 9 2 5 ? General Staff comments, 
25 Febo, C 2 3 5 5 , 2 7 4 5 , 3 0 5 2 / 2 1 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 0 8 ; 
C o l o D o Papers 6 0 3 - B , 6 0 4 - B , CAB 4 / 1 3 . 
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when he was i n Paris. Then when the note had been sent and 
the Germans expressed a desire to present observations, a 
m i n i s t e r i a l conference would be held i n London (preferably) 
or Brussels. The conference would be primarily concerned 
with disarmament and evacuation, but opportunities would 
be sought at i t "for an excataige of views f i r s t between 
France and England, then between them and the other A l l i e s , 
and f i n a l l y between France (with or without her a l l i e s ) 
and Germany, concerning the general problem of a Four 
Power pact, not necessarily i n one document but preferably 
(72) 
i n one or more separate documents". ' 
When Crowe suggested t h i s timetable the fate of 
Chamberlain's pact policy had not been se t t l e d i n the 
Cabinet.. In_fact_the procedure was not-followed: on--the 
contrary discussion of German disarmament was delayed 
u n t i l a f t er that of the German security proposals had 
begun. 
The German security proposals 
The German proposals to which Chamberlain referred i n 
the Committee of Imperial Defence on 13 February i n i t i a l l y 
cut across the policy which he was trying to get h i s 
colleagues to accept, but i n the end provided a way out 
of the impasse. I t i s tempting to suppose that D'Abernon 
i 
72. Minute by Crowe, 24 Feb. 1925, C 264/21/18, FO 
371/10708. u 
promoted them for t h i s purpose5 but more careful 
examination shows not only that D'Abernon was proceeding 
quite independently of London, but also that the timing 
of the German move had nothing to do with the state of 
the discussion i n London. D'Abernon spent the l a t t e r 
part of November and the f i r s t h a l f of December 1924 i n 
England; and i t was common knowledge that the new 
Government were examining the Geneva Protocol, that they 
and the Dominions were unlikely to accept i t as i t stood, 
and that French security was i n the a i r again. The 
Embassy i n B e r l i n would have received copies of such 
documents as Crowe's memorandum on the Protocol of 17 
November, Campbell's paper of 20 November, the memorandum 
on French-security of 4 November , and the records of ~ 
Chamberlain's conversations i n Paris and Rome i n early 
December. But they would not have received Committee of 
Imperial Defence minutes or memoranda, or Cabinet papers 
emanating from Departments other than the Foreign Office, 
and there i s no evidence that D'Abernon was told d e t a i l s 
o r a l l y . I n any case the f u l l extent of the d i v i s i o n 
within the Government was not revealed i n the Committee 
of Imperial Defence u n t i l the middle of February s after 
the German proposals had been made. 
D'Abernon's object was no doubt at l e a s t partly to 
f o r e s t a l l an Anglo-Franco-Belgian pact, to which he was 
strongly opposed. On the German side the factors making 
for the i n i t i a t i v e , or the decision to take up D'Abernon' 
i n i t i a t i v e , were fear of an Anglo-French a l l i a n c e , the 
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need to find some way forward from the setback over 
disarmament and the non-evacuation of the Cologne zone, 
and the fear of League of Nations supervision over German 
(73) 
disarmamento v ^' The timing of the German approach owed 
a good deal to D'Abernon's i n i t i a t i v e i n r a i s i n g the 
security question with Schubert on 2 9 Decembero The 
method owed a good deal to D'Abernon's advice, which the 
Germans followed with misgivings that were f u l l y j u s t i f i e d 
by the i n i t i a l reception of the proposalso Their contents, 
ID 
however, owed much more to the Auswartiges Arat than to 
the Ambassador (who continued to hanker after the Cuno 
offer and an "iron c u r t a i n " ) , and was largely derived 
(75) 
from Gaus's and Schubert's suggestion of A p r i l 1 9 2 3 . v ' 
7 3 o The B r i t i s h generally supposed that the only point of 
d i f f i c u l t y was the question of permanent organs i n 
the demilitarised zone? but the Germans also objected 
to the investigation scheme of September 1 9 2 4 for the 
country as a wholes Salewski, Entwaffnung und 
Militarkontrolle, pp 0 2 6 8 - 7 0 „ 
7 4 o Memorandum by Schubert, 2 9 Dec. 1 9 2 4 , 4 5 0 9 / E 1 2 4 8 2 2 = 2 3 . 
This memorandum i s the f i r s t document i n the State 
Secretary's f i l e on the security question I n 
addition references i n correspondence during January 
show that the Germans regarded D'Abernon's i n i t i a t i v e 
(which they thought had probably been taken on 
instructions from London) as the r e a l starting-point 
of t h e i r proposals 0 
7 5 o See Gaus to BuloJ 1 2 Jan D 1 9 2 5 ? Dufour to Schubert, 
1 3 Jan 0 j memorandum by Schubert, 1 4 Jan.,, 4 5 0 9 / 
E 1 2 4 8 1 5 - 1 9 , E 1 2 4 7 9 1 = 9 3 . E 1 2 4 8 0 5 = 0 9 . 
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The German proposals were handed to D'Abernon on the 
morning of 20 January. The memorandum stated that the 
German Government were ready to discuss a treaty arrange-
ment to secure peace with France, and suggested various 
possible bases for i t . These were the Cuno proposal for 
a pact renouncing war between the powers interested i n the 
Rhine, a comprehensive a r b i t r a t i o n treaty (which Germany 
was prepared to conclude with a l l .states) or a pact 
guaranteeing the present t e r r i t o r i a l status on the Rhine 
and the fulfilment of A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 of the Treaty of 
V e r s a i l l e s . These suggestions could be combined i n 
different ways, and were s u f f i c i e n t to show that i f a l l the 
states concerned desired guarantees for peaceful evolution 
i t would not be d i f f i c u l t to work out a treaty.-^-^ 
D'Abernon followed up the memorandum with a despatch urging 
the merits of the Cuno offer and expressing the view that 
the new German Governments attitude was of "vast 
importance". He also wrote to Chamberlain urging that 
whether or not these precise proposals were immediately 
76. B e r l i n t e l . 34; B e r l i n desp. 49, 20 Jan. 1925, C 946, 
980/459/18, FO 371/10726; memoranda by Schubert, 20 
Jan., 4509/E124770-79. The memorandum i s printed i n 
Locarno-Konferenz 1925, [East] B e r l i n 1962, No. 2, and 
a tr a n s l a t i o n i n D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, 
Vol. I l l , pp. 276-9. The memorandum communicated to 
the French Government on 9 February and printed i n 
Cmd 2435 of 1925, Papers respecting the Proposals 
for a Pact of Security made by the German Government 
on February 9« "1925 a was i d e n t i c a l save that the 
f i r s t paragraph of the text of 19 January was omitted 
and a f i n a l sentence added refe r r i n g to the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a general security convention. 
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p r a c t i c a l , i t was important t o have them on record and t o base 
(77) 
discussions on them. The immediate r e a c t i o n i n the Foreign 
O f f i c e was t h a t the proposal v/as premature, and could not be 
discussed u n t i l the disarmament question had been disposed of and 
the A l l i e s had agreed among themselves on s e c u r i t y o Crowe wrote 
t h a t the German idea ought not t o be discouraged? he had spoken 
b r i e f l y about i t w i t h Sthamer, who had only received a summary of 
the memorandum and was disposed t o agree t h a t i t need not be regarded 
+ (78) as urgent o 
On 23 January D'Abernon reported f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n about the 
proposals given t o him by Schubert, i n f o r m a t i o n which was t o be o f 
considerable importance f o r the f u t u r e of the n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
Schubert explained t h a t i n the German view the model f o r the a r b i t r a -
t i o n t r e a t i e s should be the German-Swiss and German-Swedish a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s of 1921 and -\92.k0^^ Under these t r e a t i e s a l l disputes 
which were not s e t t l e d w i t h i n a reasonable time by diplomatic means 
were t o be submitted t o t r i b u n a l s o f a r b i t r a t i o n or c o n c i l i a t i o n -
j u r i d i c a l disputes t o an a r b i t r a t i o n t r i b u n a l whose awards would be 
bi n d i n g on the two governments, and p o l i t i c a l disputes t o a 
c o n c i l i a t i o n t r i b u n a l whose recommendations would not be binding., 
Schubert added t h a t Switzerland had r e c e n t l y signed an a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t y w i t h I t a l y under which a l l disputes were t o be submitted t o 
77o B e r l i n desp. 53, 21 Jan„ 1925, C1133A59/18, F O 371/10726; 
D'Abernon t o Chamberlain, 21 Jan, D'Abernon Papers, BM Add* MS 
*f8928o A new government under Dr„ Hans Luther had been formed 
oh 15 January,. I t i n c l u d e d , f o r the f i r s t time since 1918, 
members of the German N a t i o n a l i s t Party (D .NoVoPo)„Stresemann 
remained M i n i s t e r f o r Foreign A f f a i r s -
780 Minutes, 22 Jan, 1925, on C 980/^59/18, F O 371/107260 
Sthamer had i n f a c t been sent the t e x t o f the memorandum,, 
79- B o F o S o P o , V o l . CXIV, pp 820-7; Vol. CXXV, pp. 7^1-50. 
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compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n s the German Government d i d not propose t o 
"e l i m i n a t e c o n c i l i a t i o n " i n p o l i t i c a l d i s p u t e s , but t h i s was a 
" d e t a i l " which could be discussed. He confirmed t h a t Germany's 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o conclude a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s extended t o a l l 
c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g those on her eastern f r o n t i e r . Schubert also 
tt 
s a i d that, the expression "gegenwartigen Besitzstand am Rhein" i n 
the German memorandum meant the t e r r i t o r a i l s t a t u s under the peace 
t r e a t y , i . e . Germany would accept a pact expressly guaranteeing the 
present p o s i t i o n . 
The Foreign O f f i c e s t i l l thought the German proposal premature. 
Lampson suggested t h a t i t was bound t o be a f f e c t e d by Germany's e n t r y 
i n t o the League; the a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of the Covenant would 
make anything on the l i n e s of the German-Swiss t r e a t y p r a c t i c a l l y 
superfluous-. He suggested-that -Ghamberlain should express sympathy 
to Sthamer but say t h a t such questions of hi g h p o l i c y could not be 
h u r r i e d . I f Germany would apply t o j o i n the League other arrangemets 
would be more l i k e l y t o succeed. Crowe noted t h a t he had t o l d Baldwin 
t h a t they ought t o get cl e a r about the Anglo-French pact f i r s t and 
then see how t o b r i n g Germany i n . Chamberlain, who had been unwell 
f o r the past few days, wrote t h a t he would see Sthamer i n the f o l l o w i n g 
, (81) week. 
80. B e r l i n t e l . 39, 23 Jan. 1925, C 11*f3A59 / l 8 , FO 371/10727; 
Schubert t o D'Abernon, 22 Jan.; memorandum by Schubert, 23 Jan., 
if509/E12if739-61, El2 i f7 z ^-52. The I t a l o - S w i s s t r e a t y o f 192*f i n 
f a c t provided f o r a c o n c i l i a t i o n commission f o r a l l d i sputes, i n 
the f i r s t i n s t a n c e , and f o r a r b i t r a t i o n only i n l i m i t e d cases 
thereaftersB.F.S.P., V o l . CXX, pp 708-11. 
8 1 . Minutes, 27 and 28 Jan. 1925, on C 11^3A59/l8, FO 371/10727. 
The argument t h a t th@| Covenant and the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s 
were not both necessary was used by the Germans..in the summer: 
see Chapter 5. At the Assembly i n September 192*f MacDonald had 
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There was also some confusion about the German i n t e n t i o n i n 
making the proposal t o the B r i t i s h Government alone and under the 
seal o f secrecy. The reasons f o r t h i s confusion l a y i n Berl£m; 
p a r t l y i n u n c e r t a i n t y whether D'Abernon had acted on h i s own i n i t i a -
t i v e and i n doubt about h i s d i s c r e t i o n , p a r t l y i n a wish t o prepare 
the ground without premature p u b l i c i t y , p a r t l y i n u n c e r t a i n t y of 
touch and vague i n s t r u c t i o n s . When Sthamer was sent a copy of the 
German memorandum on 1 9 January he was t o l d not t o mention D'Abernon's 
conversations but merely t o sound the B r i t i s h Government's viewso 
The t a c t i c a l problems, r e a l and imagined, were explained. D'Abernon 
had advised approaching London alone, but the r e a l n e g o t i a t i n g p a r t n e r 
was France. B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t s were not i d e n t i c a l w i t h those of 
e i t h e r France or Germany, and D'Abernon's advice simply t o repeat the 
-Cuno o f f e r s i f - i t d i d come ^ rom"London~r~m±ght have -been meant t o - steer 
Germany away from making an o f f e r to France such as could i n v o l v e a 
B r i t i s h commitment. But h i s advice could not be ignored, and i t was 
8 1 . (Cont) 
t r i e d t o promote German e n t r y i n t o the League. The German 
Government sent, on 2 9 September, notes t o the members of 
the Council about c o n d i t i o n s f o r e n t r y , s p e c i f y i n g a permanent 
seat on the Council, release from any o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g from 
A r t i c l e 1 6 , no r e a f f i r m a t i - s ^ o f war g u i l t , and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
mandates. A f t e r the various governments had r e p l i e d t h a t the 
matter was one f o r the League i t s e l f , the German Government 
addressed on 1 2 December a l e t t e r t o the Secretary-General 
r e p e a t i n g the o b j e c t i o n s t o A r t i c l e 1 6 . See Survey of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1 9 2 , 5 , V o l . I I , pp. 1 2 - 1 5 and, f o r 
d e t a i l , Spenzj, Die diplornatische Vorgeschichte des B e i t r i t t s 
DeutschSlands zum Volkerfrmd, pp. 2 3 - 5 7 . 
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not at a l l certain how a serious offer would be received i n France„ 
The only answer seemed to be to explore the ground i n London and 
fQp) 
approach P a r i s rather l a t e r . A couple of days l a t e r Hoesch was 
instructed to s t a r t preparing the gpund i n P a r i s , but was told that 
i t had not yet been decided whether to make the content of the 
eventual offer depend on B r i t i s h approval«• I n reporting the 
proposal and Schubert's comments D'Abernon stated that the German 
Government were anxious to obtain the views of the B r i t i s h Government 
on i t and advice on the best way of bringing the German attitude on 
(84) 
security to the attention of the other A l l i e s o But to Crowe 
Sthamer said that he had no instructions to discuss security but 
(Re:) 
would be ready to talk about i t with Chamberlain i f the l a t t e r wished 
And when Sthamer saw Chamberlain on 3 0 January he did not convey that 
B r i t i s h - v i e w s were desired on the best; way of'approachlhg"tHe~French 
Governmento On the contrary he allowed Chamberlain to conclude that 
there was no immediate intention of communicating with the French, 
and consequently to suspect the German motives« 
By the time that Sthamer saw Chamberlain, not only had he been 
instructed to "develop a certain a c t i v i t y behind the scenes" i n 
8 2 . Desp. to Sthamer, 1 9 Jan. 1 9 2 5 , 4 5 0 9 / E 1 2 V 7 8 O - 8 6 ; Locarno -
Konferenz, No. 1 . 
8 3 . Desp. to Hoesch, 2 1 Jan c 1 9 2 5 , 4 5 0 9 / E 1 2 4 7 6 5 - 6 9 . 
84. B e r l i n t e l . 3 4 ; B e r l i n desp. 4 9 , 2 0 Jan. 1 9 2 5 , C946, 9 8 0 / 4 5 9 / 1 8 , 
FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 2 6 ; B e r l i n t e l - 3 9 , 2 3 Jan.,, C 1 1 4 3 / 4 5 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 l / l 0 7 2 7 c 
8 5 o Sthamer t e l . , 2 6 Jan. 1 9 2 5 ^ , 4 5 0 9 / E l 2 4 7 2 5 . 
8 6 . Desp. 175 to B e r l i n , 3 0 Jan. 1 9 2 5 , C 1454/459 / 18 , FO 5 7 1 / 1 0 7 2 7 ; 
Sthamer t e l . , 3 0 Jan., 3 1 2 3 / D 6 4 2 l 4 l - 4 3 . See also Chamberlain to 
D'Abernon, 11 Sep. 1 9 3 0 and Selby to Chamberlain, 2 9 Sep. 1 9 3 0 , 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 3 9 / l l 8 „ 
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London, but Hoesch had begun t o prepare the ground i n P a r i s and 
Schubert had spoken i n general terras t o the French and United States 
Ambassadors. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y i n view of a l l t h i s a c t i v i t y the 
French and German press began t a l k i n g of a s e c u r i t y proposal„ 
Stresemann, however, appeared t o be .having second thoughts. On 2 9 
January, a f t e r H e r r i o t ! s speech i n the Chamber, he t o l d D'Abernon 
t h a t he had gathered t h a t an i n i t i a t i v e on s e c u r i t y might be 
regarded i n P a r i s as a device t o evade discussion on disarmament. 
I t was most undegsirable t h a t an important proposal f o r the peace of 
Europe should be seen i n a wrong context, and i t was e s s e n t i a l f o r 
Germany's d i g n i t y t h a t she should not make fundamental proposals 
such as these except a t a moment when they would be p r o p e r l y 
appreciated. He was t h e r e f o r e i n c l i n e d t o postpone or even abandon 
the~idea~; D'Aberhon "commented t h a t these reasons might' be 'genuine 
or might a r i s e from re s i s t a n c e i n the German Cabinet; as he r e p o r t e d 
the conversation i t also sounded as though Stresemann was p r e p a r i n g 
t o l a y the blame on the French. D'Abernon, n a t u r a l l y i n view o f h i s 
share i n the proceedings, urged the Foreign O f f i c e t h a t i t would be 
a "vast p i t y " t o l e t the Germans recede from t h e i r proposals or t o 
l e t the o p p o r t u n i t y pass. But i n the Foreign O f f i c e i t was thought 
impossible t o urge the Germans not t o withdraw the proposal, because 
there were doubts about the possible r e c e p t i o n i n P a r i s . 
8 7 . Memorandum by Schubert, 2 3 Jan. 1 9 2 5 ; t e l . t o Sthamer, 2k Jan.; 
Hoesch t e l . , 2k Jan; Schubert t o Sthamer, 2 6 Jan.; t e l t o Hoesch, 
2 8 Jan.; memorandum by Schubert, 2 8 Jan., ^ 5 0 9 / 8 1 2 ^ 7 0 1 - 0 5 , 
E 1 2 V 7 3 0 - 3 3 , E 1 2 V 7 2 6 - 2 9 , E i 2 * t 7 l 6 ~ i 9 , E 1 3 V 7 1 0 - 1 2 , E i 2 * t 6 9 3 - 9 7 = 
There was an a r t i c l e on .Security i n the Germania, the organ of 
the Centre P a r t y , on 2 5 January. 
8 8 . B e r l i n t e l s . * f 9 , 5 0 , 2 9 Jan. 1 9 2 5 , C 1 3 7 2 , 1 * t l 6 A 5 9 / l 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 2 7 ; 
memorandum by Stresemann, 2 9 Jan., ^ 5 0 9 ^ 1 2 ^ 6 8 3 - 8 7 ; D'Abernon to 
Chamberlain, 31 Jan., Chamberlain Papers, AC 5 2 / 2 5 5 , D'Abernon 
Papers, BM Add. MS ^ 8 9 2 8 , FO 8 0 0 / 2 5 7 <> Cf. D'Abernon, Ambassador 
of Peace, Vol. I l l , pp. 1 3 2 - ^ f . 
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Chamberlain's a t t i t u d e , t h e r e f o r e , i n h i s conversation w i t h 
Sthamer on 3 0 January, was extremely cautious. He s a i d t h a t although 
he welcomed the evidence t h a t the German Government were considering 
what they could do t o a l l a y French f e a r s , he d i d not t h i n k i t 
p o s s i b l e t o discuss t h e i r proposal u n t i l the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e t o the 
Geneva P r o t o c o l and French s e c u r i t y had been defined.. Pressed by 
Sthamer t o give an opin i o n on the p r i n c i p l e of the German proposal, 
Chamberlain s a i d t h a t he c e r t a i n l y " d i d not exclude the idea a t the 
proper time of an agreement between Germany and France or Germany 
and the A l l i e s , g i v i n g a mutual guarantee t o the s i t u a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d 
by the peace t r e a t i e s on t h e i r common f r o n t i e r s , and <»oo the B r i t i s h 
Government would a t a l l times be glad i f i t could help t o promote a 
b e t t e r s t a t e o f f e e l i n g between Germany and France". And he asked 
why ~Germany_did not a t once j o i n the League. 
Chamberlain wrote t o D'Abernon t h a t h i s account of Stresemann's 
words on 2 9 January confirmed the impression t h a t the German proposal 
was prematureo He was sure t h a t the most e f f e c t i v e step t h a t Germany 
could take f o r the present was t o j o i n the League<> As t o the 
proposal, France might l a t e r be w i l l i n g t o consider something of the 
k i n d , but not u n t i l the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e t o French s e c u r i t y was more 
c l e a r l y d e f i n e d , and not a t a l l i f the proposal were intended t o 
depend on the evacuation of the whole of the Rhineland.^ To t h i s 
8 9 = Immediately afterwards Chamberlain t o l d F l e u r i a u of h i s conversation 
w i t h Sthamer and of the German proposal, but without saying t h a t 
i t had been made i n w r i t i n g s desp. 175 t o Berlins, desp. 3 8 5 t o 
P a r i s , 3 0 Jan. 1925, C 1 4 5 4 , 1 4 5 5 / 4 5 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 2 7 ; Sthamer 
t e l . , 3 0 Jan., 3 1 2 3 / D 6 4 2 l 4 l - 4 3 . 
9 0 . ChamberMn t o D'Abernon, 3 Feb. 1 9 2 5 , Chamberlain Papers, AC 
5 2 / 2 5 6 , D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MS 4 8 9 2 8 . 
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l a s t p o i n t D'Abernon r e p l i e d : " I have ascertained t h a t the 
evacuation of the whole of the occupied t e r r i t o r y was not contem-
(91) 
p l a t e d as p a r t of the German proposal". 
Chamberlain's statement t o Sthamer on 3 0 January t h a t he 
would not ne g o t i a t e behind France's back (which i m p l i e d t h a t he was 
going t o inform the French) and the press rumours (which increased 
a f t e r a speech by Luther t o the f o r e i g n press on the same day) 
decided the Germans t h a t the approach i n P a r i s must be made soon 
even though the French press ounded unfavourable. I n s t r u c t i o n s t o 
Hoesch t o speak t o H e r r i o t were t h e r e f o r e sent on 5 February, i n a 
despatch c l e a r l y s e t t i n g out the German motives. The French, 
Stresemann wrote, would c e r t a i n l y i n s i s t on the s t r i c t f u l f i l m e n t o f 
German disarmament but there could be no doubt t h a t they would use 
1Ae~di~sarmament —qtfestion~primar^ 
p o l i t i c a l aims. The a r r i v a l o f the t r e a t y date f o r the evacuation 
o f the Cologng zone confronted them w i t h the choice between pursuing 
i n some form the permanent p o s i t i o n on the Rhine demanded a t the 
Peace Conference and f i n a l l y accepting the s o l u t i o n contained i n 
the Treaty. H e r r i o t had perhaps not yet made up h i s mind, but i n a l l 
p r o b i l i t y the second a l t e r n a t i v e could only be carr i e d through i f he 
could show t o French op i n i o n a s e c u r i t y settlement equal i n value t o 
the guarantee t r e a t i e s o f 1 9 1 9 » The Geneva Pr o t o c o l could h a r d l y be 
considered an adequate s u b s t i t u t e ; but together i v i t h the f a i l u r e of 
9 1 . D'Abernon t o Chamberlain, 7 Feb. 1 9 2 5 , Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 5 2 / 2 5 7 , D'Abernon Papers, l o c . c i t . , FO 8 0 0 / 2 5 7 ° Chamberlain 
passed t h i s assurance on t o Crewe i n a l e t t e r o f 1 6 February, 
C 2 ^ 5 0 / ^ 5 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 2 7 , p r i n t e d i n P e t r i e , L i f e and l e t t e r s , 
V o l . I I , pp. 2 5 8 - 6 0 . 
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the guarantee t r e a t i e s i t gave France a means of p u t t i n g pressure on 
B r i t a i n t o provide one. Stresemann b e l i e v e d t h a t the B r i t i s h 
Government intended t o t r e a t the evacuation of the Cologne zone 
s o l e l y as a matter of disarmament, but he was d o u b t f u l whether they 
could make t h e i r view p r e v a i l w i t h the French- The v/hole h i s t o r y of 
the s e c u r i t y question so iar gave grounds f o r a f e a r t h a t i n connexion 
w i t h the evacuation B r i t a i n would i n the end give France assurances 
on s e c u r i t y t h a t would be i n t o l e r a b l e f o r Germany, e i t h e r (and more 
probably) the s o - c a l l e d p h y s i c a l guarantees i n the Rhineland or a 
pact. Hence Germany must take the i n i t i a t i v e . They must work against 
the establishment of dangerous guarantees and t r y t o prevent those 
already mentioned i n the League's i n v e s t i g a t i o n scheme from being put 
i n t o e f f e c t . I f they waited f o r p r o j e c t s t o come from the other side 
t h e i r own proposals would seem t o be mere defensive measures^ The 
proposals were se r i o u s , but i f they f a i l e d they would at l e a s t have 
strengthened the German p o s i t i o n i n combatting dangerous designs from 
(92) 
the other s i d e . 
Hoesch was l a i d up a f t e r a motor accident, and the memorandum 
was f i n a l l y given t o H e r r i o t by the Counsellor of the German Embassy 
on 9 February, s t i l l under the seal of secrecy. D'Abernon had not 
been t o l d beforehand but Schubert informed him next day (w i t h o u t 
t e l l i n g the Germans): not s u r p r i s i n g l y the Foreign O f f i c e found t h i s 
9 2 . Schubert t o Hoesch, 5 Feb. 1 9 2 5 , V ? 0 9 / E 1 2 ^ 1 0 - 1 3 ; desp. t o 
Hoesch and memorandum t o the French Government, 3 1 2 3 / D 6 4 2 1 7 2 -
8 5 , p r i n t e d i n Locarno-Konferenz, Nos. * f - 5 » 
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m y s t i f i c a t i o n incomprehensible. The existence, and even the 
nature, of the German proposals were now, hov/ever, becoming common 
knowledge i n the press; and once the memorandum had been communicated 
t o the Belgian and I t a l i a n Governments on 21 February there was no 
(9*0 
f u r t h e r pretence of secrecy. The i n i t i a l r e c e p t i o n of the German 
proposal i n P a r i s was cautious but not discouraging. The r e p l y 
given t o Hoesch on 20 February sa i d t h a t the French Government were 
determined not t o neglect anything t h a t could c o n t r i b u t e t o peace, 
but must consult t h e i r a l l i e s . I n conversation w i t h Crewe H e r r i o t 
showed h i m s e l f t o be s t i l l worried about the connexion w i t h the 
evacuation of Cologne, and French o f f i c i a l s showed anx i e t y about the 
wider i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the League of Nations and France's eastern 
a l l i e s / 9 5 ^ 
But t h e " c f u c i a l p o i n t f o r the French, c l e a r l y , was what d e c i s i o n 
on s e c u r i t y would be reached by the B r i t i s h Government, and t h i s was 
s t i l l u n c e r t a i n . Chamberlain expressed h i s view of the German proposal 
93- B e r l i n t e l . 60, 10 Feb. 1925; P a r i s t e l . 61, 12 Feb.; Chamberlain 
t o Crewe, 16 Feb., C 2021, 2085, 2^50A59/l8, FO 371/10727. 
D'Abernon wrote l a t e r t h a t he thought the German a c t i o n had on 
the whole been s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , and he regarded the s|crecy about 
the communication t o the French as no more than a j o k j D'Abernon 
to Chamberlain, 21 Feb., Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/262, FO 800/?.57« 
9^. The Belgian Government were informed of Jhe proposal by the French 
a couple of days before the German Charge d ' A f f a i r e s d e l i v e r e d the 
memorandum: D.D.B., Vol. I I , Nos. 22-4. 
95. French r e p l y i n A.A.E., G r ^ e Bretagne, Vol. 72; Cmd. 2^ 35 of 
1925; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 8. P a r i s t e l . 61, 12 Feb. 1925„« 
C 2085A59/18, FO" 371/10727; P a r i s t e l . 75, 22 Feb.; desp. 686 t o 
P a r i s , 2k Feb., C 2557, 27W21/18, FO 371/10708; Hoesch t e l s . , 
17 and 20 Feb., 4509/012^982-87, E 12^7-51. 
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at length i n a l e t t e r to Crewe on 16 February, He wrote that he was 
now disposed to think that a B r i t i s h guarantee of the eastern 
f r o n t i e r of France and Belgium would be a more p r a c t i c a l proposition 
i f Germany were associated with i t . He regarded a general guarantee 
as unconvincing and useless, and he admitted that public opinion, 
the Labour and Liberal parties, and the League of Nations Union would 
be h o s t i l e to p a r t i a l arrangements. He knew, Chamberlain wrote, what 
he wanted to do but he could not forecast the Cabinet's decision,. 
And he warned Crewe and D'Abernon (to whom he sent a copy of t h i s 
l e t t e r ) not to go farther f o r the present than to l e t the French and 
German Governments know, i f the matter came up, that he attached 
great importance to the German approach and considered that i t would 
be a great mistake f o r the Germans to withdraw i t or the French not 
to take i t seriously J^^' As "the argument withi n the Government 
tended increasingly against an Anglo-French pact, Chamberlain's 
references to the German proposal became warmer. On 26 February he 
t o l d the Belgian Ambassador that he regarded the approach as "an 
incident of the utmost importance which might be of v i t a l consequence 
to the A l l i e s and have a determining influence on the whole question 
of our future security". On 3 March he t o l d the I t a l i a n Ambassador 
that he attached much greater importance to the German memorandum 
than when i t was f i r s t communicated% on the same day he was more 
(97) 
encouraging than h i t h e r t o to Sthamer. But the outcome i n London 
was s t i l l not decidedo 
96„ Chamberlain to Crewe, 16 Feb, 1925, C 2^50/^59/18, FO 371/10727, 
printed i n Petrie, L i f e and Letters, Vol I I , pp. 258-60, 
97» Desp, 260 to Brussels, 26 Feb, 1925, C 285^/^59/18, FO 371/10727; 
D0D0B0, Vol, I I , No, 28; desp. 290 to Rome, 3 Mar., C 3099A59/18, 
FO 371/10728; desp. *fl3 to B e r l i n , 3 Mar., C 31*16/2/18, FO 371/ 
10703; Sthamer t e l . , 3 Mar., 3123/D6*t2^8l-85. 
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Chamberlain and the Cabinet 
The March meeting of the Council of the League of Nations was 
now imminent and Chamberlain, according to h i s l a t e r account, was 
determined to get the Cabinet to agree on a policy before he went 
abroado There was also to be a debate i n the House of Commons on 
5 March, and he hoped to be able to outline a policy then.^"^ 
When the Cabinet met on 2 March Baldwin, instead of asking Curzon 
to expound the proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, gave 
Chamberlain the f i r s t wordo Although as l a t e as 26 February Chamberlain 
had put forward the case for an agreement with France p r i o r to any 
inclusion of Germany, he had now apparently recognised that an 
Anglo-French pact would not be accepted and so argued f o r a four-
(99) _ 
power pact including Germany from"the s t a r t . At t h i s meeting 
the Cabinet agreed that i t was t h e i r policy to allay the state of 
insecurity i n Europe, so that although the Geneva Protocol could not 
be accepted something else must be done. They agreed to consider an 
alternative policy two days later,, During the meeting a formula was 
drafted, representing the general trend of the Cabinet's view, which 
Chamberlain could use with Herriot. This reads "His Majesty'-S 
98o I n a l e t t e r to D'Abernon of 11 Sep. 1930, a propos of the 
publication of An Ambassador of Peace, Chamberlain Papers, AC 
39/ll8o Some discrepancies between t h i s account, w r i t t e n from 
memory, and the record are noted below. Chamberlain to Crewe, 
2 Mar. 1925, AC 52/193, Crewe Papers, C/8. 
99. Chamberlain wrote to D'Abernon i n 1930 (see n. 98) that he had 
hoped to win French confidence f i r s t and conclude a defensive 
allia n c e , and only l a t e r turn i t i n t o a reciprocal arrangement 
with Germany0 He was sure that i f he had not continued to press 
the idea of an alliance on the CoIoDQ he would not have got consent 
to the reciprocal pact. But i n t h i s l e t t e r he was not precise 
about the date of such change as there was i n his own approach. 
Grahame, who was i n England at the end of February and was s t i l l 
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Majesty's Government do not f e e l able to enter in t o a dual pact 
with France with or without Belgium., The question of a quadrilateral 
agreement between France, Germany, Great B r i t a i n , Belgium, and i f 
possible, with the accord of I t a l y , f o r mutual securityjand for 
guaranteeing each other's f r o n t i e r s i n the West of Europej/'' 0^ 
stands on a d i f f e r e n t footing and might become a great assurance to 
the peace of Europe and lead to a rapid reduction of armaments. 
His Majesty's Government have, of course, i n these matters to carry 
with them the assent, or at least the goodwill, of the various s e l f -
governing Dominions of the B r i t i s h Empire. I f the French Government 
share the views of His Majesty's Government and w i l l regulate t h e i r 
action towards Germany accordingly, His Majesty's Government w i l l , 
f o r t h e i r part, begin the necessary discussions with the Dominions, 
_ __( JJCL1)_ 
and i n all t h e i r policy w i l l endeavour to further the common cause". 
Chamberlain l a t e r wrote: " I carried the Cabinet that day for 
the mutual pact". Although i t i s clear from the mention i n the 
minutes of a further meeting to be held on 4 March that the alternative 
policy was not f u l l y s e t t l e d , Chamberlain's l e t t e r to Crewe of 2 
99- (Cont'd) 
opposed to any B r i t i s h commitment, returned to Brussels convinced 
that many people i n the Foreign Office were s t i l l bent on a 
guarantee to France and Belgium: Brussels desps. 141, 144, 
19 Feb. 1925, W 1443, 1459/21/4, FO 371/11041; memorandum by 
Grahame, 25 Feb,, C 3171/459/18, FO 371/10728; Grahame to 
D'Abernon, 4 Mar., D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MS 48928. 
100. Square brackets i n pencil i n the o r i g i n a l , presumably inserted 
on 4 March: see p„3tt7. 
101. C. 12 (25), CAB 23/49c 
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(102) March does show some :oonfidence about the way things were going* 
That evening, however, according to his l a t e r account, Curzon came 
to see him, bringing Balfour, and saying that he thought that the 
Cabinet's decision had been too hasty„ Balfour contributed l i t t l e 
to the ensuing argument except the observation that a mutual 
guarantee involved larger commitments than an alliance with France-
Chamberlain wrote that he ended the conversation by saying that they 
(10' 
must have another Cabinet so that he might be sure where he stoodo 
The Cabinet met i n the morning and the afternoon of k Marcho 
Baldwin was absent and Chamberlain himself took the chair- At the 
outset i t became clear that the formula drafted two days e a r l i e r did 
not commend i t s e l f ? i n p a r t i c u l a r i t was feared that to t a l k of 
guaranteeing f r o n t i e r s - not only France and Belgium against Germany 
_but Germany against France - . was- much-more than the public at-home-
and i n the Dominions would accept- Chamberlain was authorised to 
reject the Protocol, and the draft reply to the League was approved 
with some amendments., Chamberlain's summing up of the discussion was 
approved as the l i n e he was to take with Herrioto This was that the 
Government attached the highest importance to the German proposal, 
which seemed to o f f e r the best chance of security f o r France and 
peace for the world- To reject i t would be to thrust Germany into 
102o Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 11 Sep- 1930, Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 39/118; Chamberlain to Crewe, 2 Mar- 1925, AC 52/193, 
Crewe Papers, C/8-
103- Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 11 Sep- 1930, Chamberlain Papers, AC 
39/118; also Chamberlain to Nicolson, 28 May 193^ AC 4C/123<> 
Writing from memory, Chamberlain v/as uncertain about some of 
the dates, and he put the two Cabinet meetings on successive 
days instead of two days apart- Hankey's diary shows that he 
was active i n lobbying Baldwin, Curzon, and Balfour against 
the mutual pacts R o s k i l l , Hankey, Vol- I I , pp» 396-7= 
3*f8 
the hand^of Russia. The Government would consult the Dominions. 
^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ o u i * us ;1 ±.. 4 C h a m b e r l a i n would explain 
the d i f f i c u l t y about public opinion but would say that he hoped that 
i t could be overcome i f Germany were included i n the proposed 
arrangements i t could not be overcome i f Germany were not included. 
I f B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an arrangement were desired, Chamberlain 
could not agree to any formula nor pledge the Dominions, but his 
colleagues had authorised him to say that they would do t h e i r best 
to see that such a project should not f a i l f or want of B r i t i s h 
(10*0 
concurrence. 
This was an exiguous policy for Chamberlain to take abroad with 
him. I t i s not surprising that his statement i n the foreign a f f a i r s 
debate was vague and struck at least one l i s t e n e r as barren, nor 
that jus t before leaving for Paris he wrote_to h i s wife: _!!My_±ask i s 
(105) 
indeed a d i f f i c u l t one". But he had secured an undertaking 
that the B r i t i s h Government would do t h e i r best to co-operate and 
to convince the Dominions, and he proceeded to act on t h i s under-
taking. 
Chamberlain arrived i n Paris on 6 March and had two long 
conversations with Herriot that evening and the following day. 
I0*f. C 13 and 14 (25), CAB 2 3 A 9 . The reply on the Protocol was 
the statement that Chamberlain made to the Council of the 
League on 12 March; Cmd 2368 of 1925, Statement by the Right 
Hon. Austen Chamberlain? M.P., on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government, to the Council of the League of Nations, respecting 
the Protocol f o r the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
Geneva, March 12, 1925-
105. H0C0 Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 181, cols. 700-16; Harry, Graf 
Kessler, Tagebucher 1918-1937,Frankfurt 1961, pp. ^20-3; 
Chamberlain to Mrs. Chamberlain, 6 Mar. 1925, Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 6/1/600. 
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I n the f i r s t conversation he t o l d Herriot of the Government's 
decision not to sign the Geneva Protocol, nor to attempt to amend 
i t , and then said th a t , to his own regret, the state of public 
opinion would not allow the Government to enter in t o an Anglo-
French or an Anglo-Franco-Belgian pact. But the German proposals 
seemed to o f f e r the hope of a solution i n which B r i t a i n could co-
operate, and he begged Herriot to consider them from the point of 
view of formulating the conditions that would make them acceptable 
to France and a real guarantee f o r French security-
Herriot was not surprised at the B r i t i s h decision on the 
Protocol, but the decision not to pursue an Anglo-French pact v/as a 
severe and apparently unexpected blow- He was clearly doubtful about 
the German proposals, and mentioned four problems i n par t i c u l a r -
F i r s t , did the Germans mean to make —it a condition that the period 
of occupation of the Rhineland should be shortened? Second, the 
d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between the eastern and western f r o n t i e r s ; the 
Poles might sometimes be impetuous but France must be concerned fo r 
the safety of Poland- Third, the lack of mention of the southern 
f r o n t i e r (which was of immense importance to I t a l y ) and of Belgium-
Fourth, although Herriot recognised that the proposals were better 
than anything offered before and were especially important as 
coming from Luther's Government, he wondered whether they were not 
a manoeuvre of domestic p o l i t i c s - He then spoke of Germany's 
recovery and preaching of revenge while France was s t i l l struggling 
with f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , and said; "From my heart I t e l l you I 
look forward with t e r r o r to her making war on us again i n ten years"-
Chamberlain was able to reassure Herriot on the f i r s t point, 
as a result of the enquiry that he had made through D'Abernon-
350 
On the second and t h i r d points he said that the Germans had under-
taken not to go to war i n pursuance of t h e i r aims on the eastern 
f r o n t i e r , and i f Germany were not going to war i n the east or the 
west, he could not believe that she intended to provoke trouble 
" f o r the sake of restoring the Tyrol to Austria". He agreed that 
i t was odd that Belgium was not mentioned, but said that he assumed 
that the guarantee of the French f r o n t i e r would extend to the Belgian 
f r o n t i e r as w e l l . Herriot asked what became of the League and the 
Covenant. Chamberlain replied that B r i t a i n ' s obligations under the 
Covenant remained exactly the same, but Herriot had himself admitted 
that neither the Covenant nor the Protocol gave France the necessary 
security. I t was f o r t h i s reason that he had sought the separate 
pact which Chamberlain had to t e l l him no B r i t i s h Government could 
givev and _iir^a~s~for _thl~s _reason that he asked Herriot to consider 
the German proposals. 
In the conversation on 7 March Herriot asked whether B r i t a i n , 
France, and Belgium could agree among themselves on the terms which 
they might propose to Germany. Chamberlain got the impression 
that Herriot was harking back to the idea of two pacts, one between 
the three A l l i e s and a second between them and Germany. He therefore 
scotched t h i s idea while saying that of course the A l l i e s could 
106. Chamberlain to Crowe, 7 Mar. 1925. C 3367A59/18, FO 371/ 
10728. Chamberlain seems to have convinced himself that 
the o f f e r to conclude a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with Germany's 
Eastern neighbours was an of f e r of an undertaking not to 
go to war. Each time that he mentioned t h i s point his 
language on i t became more categorical, but he would not 
have been so d e f i n i t e i f he had read the text of the 
German-Swiss a r b i t r a t i o n treaty. See also (JY-l&f*^. 
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confer and agree among themselves. Herriot then reverted to the 
subject of Poland. The more the Germans renounced t h e i r hopes i n 
the west, he said, the more certain they were to nourish them i n 
the east; and France could not purchase her own security at the expense 
of her a l l y . Chamberlain replied that the German undertaking to 
avoid recourse to war even i n the east was a new security for Poland 
and - an argument that he was to use often i n the course of the summer -
the general appeasement that would follow an agreement i n the west 
would tend to make the s i t u a t i o n more secure everywhere. 
The f i n a l topic was the evacuation of the Cologne zone, and 
Chamberlain stressed the great importance that the B r i t i s h attached 
to concluding the question quickly and on i t s own. From v/hat 
Herriot said, Chamberlain's e a r l i e r fear that the French might i n s i s t 
~on~ staying "was reinforced, and he therefore warned Herriot "that~~such 
an insistence v/ould have a disastrous effect on B r i t i s h opinion. 
He recalled the guarantees already i n existence and said that he 
could not share French apprehensions for the immediate future. 
Germany could not be held down fo r ever and the object ought to be 
to bring about such a change i n the s i t u a t i o n that by the time that 
Germany could be dangerous again she would no longer wish to gamble 
(107) 
on recovering what she had l o s t . 
107. Chamberlain to Crowe, 7 Mar. 1925, C 3368/4-59/18, FO 371/ 
10728. The two l e t t e r s of 7 March were circulated to the 
Cabinet as CP. l¥f and 14-5(25), CAB 2V172. Fleuriau had 
advocated the idea of two pacts (which Herriot had proposed 
i n h i s note of 11 August 1924) to Crowe on k March. On 9 
March Herriot was s t i l l hoping f o r two-stage negotiations; 
desp. 776 to Paris, C 3170/4-59/18, FO 371/10728; D.D.B., Vol. 
I I , No. 32. 
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From Geneva Chamberlain wrote to Crowe that he did not know 
how f a r Herriot would be able to bring his Government to a f a i r 
consideration of the B r i t i s h o f f e r by the time that he himself 
passed through Paris again on his way home- Meanwhile he was very 
much a f r a i d of the effect that his statement might have on the 
consideration of German disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne-
" I am r e a l l y oppressed", he wrote, "by the danger that the French 
w i l l i n s i s t on remaining i n Colognj'j for reasons which are within 
the terms of the Treaty, but which v / i l l be held as i n s u f f i c i e n t to 
j u s t i f y a prolongation of the occupation by a l l those sections of 
B r i t i s h opinion which are opposed to a pact". On the other hand a 
u n i l a t e r a l B r i t i s h withdrawal would mean the end of any real under-
standing between the A l l i e s ; the question thus raised the gravest 
-issues-- "Am-I—justified-in pressing-upon~Mo Herriot'the p o s s i b i l i t y ~~ 
of our having to take t h i s course, or would the consequences of i t 
be so grave i n other respects that i n the l a s t resort, the Cabinet 
would decide to r e t a i n our troops j u s t as we maintained them through 
a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s brought about by the occupation of the Ruhr?" 
Chamberlain asked Crowe to get, through the Prime Minister, an 
indi c a t i o n of the Cabinet's views on the matter, and an indication 
of how they generally viewed his conversations with H e r r i o t / 
108. Chamberlain to Crowe, 8 Mar„ 1925, C3569A59/18, FO 371/ 
10728: underlining i n the o r i g i n a l - Johnson's wording i n 
summarising t h i s l e t t e r .(University of Birmingham H i s t o r i c a l 
Journal, VTIO961), p. 7^); "he f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n wondering 
whether the Cabinet would not authorise him to go further i n 
his apprs^ch to Herriot", might suggest that Chamberlain 
hoped to be authorised to make a more favourable offer- The 
text of the l e t t e r hardly supports such an inte r p r e t a t i o n -
Crowe certainly used i t as a request f o r greater l a t i t u d e , 
but did so on h i s own initiatives see below-
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On 9 March Chamberlain found Briand much more favourable to 
the proposed B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Briand seemed to have accepted that 
B r i t a i n would not take part i n any other form of arrangement and 
to be anxious to make the best of the s i t u a t i o n . Chamberlain hoped 
th a t , although not i n o f f i c e , Briand would exercise influence on 
(109) 
the French Government and public opinion. 
The evidence on what followed i n London i s largely derived 
from Crowe's l e t t e r s to Chamberlain at Geneva. On receiving 
Chamberlain's l e t t e r of 8 March on the morning of 11th, Crowe sent 
Baldwin a copy but asked to be present at any Cabinet discussion. 
He saw Baldwin a f t e r the Cabinet meeting, to which he was not 
summoned and at which security was not discussed, and said that 
Chamberlain f e l t that he was i n a very d i f f i c u l t position with 
Horriot and feared a breaeh~wrth~France. ~ Crowe~said that "he~did~ not 
favour threatening Herriot with a B r i t i s h v/ithdrawal from the 
Rhineland but did recommend that Chamberlain be authorised to t e l l 
Herriot that the B r i t i s h Government would be ready to contemplate a 
"bundle" of pacts, so long as Germany were included and they a l l 
came int o force simultaneously. He himself had alv/ays held that 
there were advantages i n such a procedure from the B r i t i s h point of 
viev; as well as from the French. 
Baldwin, v/ho said that he thought that the instructions given 
to Chamberlain on 4 March had been too r i g i d , nonetheless f e l t 
109. Record of conversation, 9 Mar. 1925, V/ 2096/9/98, FO 371/ 
11065. Chamberlain also saw Hymanss Chamberlain to Crowe, 
12 Mar., C 3726/459/18, FO 371/10728; D0D0B., Vol. I I , 
Nos. 34-6. 
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unable to authorise a statement of t h i s kind without Cabinet 
approvalo He thought that he could hardly c a l l another Cabinet 
for two or three days, but Crowe considered t h i s delay too long. 
He therefore asked whether Baldwin could himself authorise 
Chamberlain to t e l l Herriot that he was personally impressed with 
the idea of separate pacts and would recommend i t to the Cabinet, 
Baldwin said that he would think t h i s over, but l a t e r i n the a f t e r -
noon he summoned Crowe to an informal meeting of Ministers at the 
House of Commons* Those present, besides Baldwin himself, were 
Churchill, Birkenhead, Hoare, Worthington-Bvans, Bridgeman, Amery, 
(110) 
Salisbury, and Cecil, 
Crowe's account of the meeting was wri t t e n next day. He t o l d 
Chamberlain t h a t , i n v i t e d by Baldwin to explain the s i t u a t i o n , he had 
pointed out that the immediate question on~ whrch Chamberlain asked~ ~ 
for guidance was whether Herriot should be threatened with a 
B r i t i s h withdrawal from the Rhineland, But while t h i s v/as apparently 
the only immediate question, i t was clear to him that the issue was 
much wider and graver, and he hoped that Ministers would review the 
v/hole s i t u a t i o n again. There followed an hour and a half's 
discussion, which Crowe described as "vague and inconclusive"and 
v/as on much the same l i n e s as those i n the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, Churchill developed his theory that there was no need to 
do anything, that France would become increasingly amenable, and 
110, Crowe to Chamberlain, 11 Mar, 1925, C 3569/459 /18, FO 37V 
10728; Crowe to Chamberlain, 12 Mar,, Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 52/240, 
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that there was no r i s k of a breach. (111) Amery once more said that 
i t was impossible to do anything because the Dominions would never 
agree. He admitted that he had agreed to the Cabinet resolution on 
k March but had not r e a l l y meant i t and must now withdraw his consent. 
Birkenhead said that he remained opposed to a pact of any kind and 
denied that the Cabinet had ever agreed to one. He agreed that 
everyone knew that B r i t a i n and the Empire would not allow France and 
Belgium to be invaded, but held that i t was impossible to say so 
formally. Salisbury and Hoare said that the most that they supported 
was a u n i l a t e r a l declaration by B r i t a i n . Only Cecil expressed him-
s e l f i n favour of a genuine pact including Germany, and said that he 
had no doubt that the Empire was ready to f i g h t not only f o r the 
Channel ports but for the i n t e g r i t y of the French eastern f r o n t i e r . 
""Birkenhead^wourid^up" by saying" that there was no d i f f i c u l t y i n replying 
to Chamberlain's request for instructions and guidance. A l l that 
need be said was that Ministers e n t i r e l y approved his statement to 
Herriot. The result was eminently satisfactory? " I t had been made 
quite clear to France that the B r i t i s h Government desired no pact, 
they would i n no case commit themselves to anything, either as 
towards France alone, or to any number of powers, including Germany. 
A l l that was intended was that i f France could come to some agreement 
with Germany, under which pledges were given against aggression, 
then, i n the event of aggression nevertheless taking place, Great 
B r i t a i n might possibly consider the question whether they|"sic~l 
111. Crewe, i n a despatch written especially for Cabinet consumption, 
advised on 9 March that i t would be f a t a l to think that a 
B r i t i s h policy of i s o l a t i o n vrould make France amenable through 
weakness? Paris desp. 60k, C 3380A59/18, FO 371/10728. 
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would give an undertaking to take part i n any consultation as to 
what might then be done"- A l l the other Ministers except Cecil 
( 1 1 2 ) 
agreed- Baldwin had said nothing throughout. 
Crowe was appalled- He f e l t that Chamberlain was being l e t down, 
and even suspected that Birkenhead and Churchill were undermining his 
position deliberately- When at l a s t Baldwin allowed him to speak 
he therefore, as he wrote, expressed himself strongly- He denied 
formally i n the name of the Foreign Office the view that there v/as 
no danger of a breach with France- But what was much more immediately 
serious, i f the Cabinet's inte n t i o n v/as that now stated by Birkenhead and 
apparently approved by the other Ministers, Chamberlain's statement 
to H e r r i o t ^ had been not clear but seriously misleading and l a i d 
the Government open to a charge of bad f a i t h . For Chamberlain had 
clearly conveyed to Herriot that although the B r i t i s h Government could 
not enter in t o a pact with France and Belgium alone, they would 
endeavour to get the country and the Dominions to approve entry into 
112- Crowe did not report any contribution to the discussion by 
Worthington-Evans or Bridgeman- Considering that the former, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , had i n the e a r l i e r discussions been i n favour of 
a pact with France, t h i s i s somewhat odd. Bridgeman recorded 
i n his p o l i t i c a l diary his regret at his colleagues' decision, 
but i n terms that perhaps r e f l e c t the confusion of the meeting-
R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, p- ^37, quotes and summarises Bridgeman's 
note as follows; "to his great regret the Cabinet decided 'to 
continue the policy of refusing any pact with France to j o i n 
her against a u n i l a t e r a l attack, unless a quadrilateral arrange-
ment could also be made to include Germany'- He was e n t i r e l y 
i n favour of including Germany, but could not understand why 
B r i t a i n should 'refuse what we sha l l be bound to concede i f 
Germany attacked France' - namely 'to assist France i n order to 
keep open the Channel p o r t s ' - M Roskill*s own account i n Hankey, 
Vol- I I , pp- 39^-7, i s d i s t i n c t l y confused-
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(113) a pact of which Germany formed part. 
At t h i s point Baldwin asked Crowe to leave the Ministers to 
continue t h e i r discussion alone, and when Crowe wrote to 
Chamberlain next day he did not know the outcome. He hoped that 
(114) 
perhaps Baldwin had supported Chamberlain a f t e r he had l e f t . 
Baldwin did i n fact write a short l e t t e r on 12 March, saying that 
the meeting had f e l t that Chamberlain had represented the Cabinet's 
decision f i r m l y and clearly.. Baldwin expressed his own appreciation 
and sympathy. He said that the question of Cologne would have to be 
considered very c a r e f u l l y , and that i t was impossible to say more now 
(115) 
on the pact question. But i n view of Crowe's report Chamberlain 
f e l t that t h i s l e t t e r gave him no guidance or support. He had already 
made at Geneva the statement approved by the Cabinet, re j e c t i n g the 
Protocol but holding out the'prospect of^special arrangements"to 
(116) 
meet special needs, and he telegraphed back to Crowe informing 
him that he would resign i f the Cabinet went back on t h e i r decision 
and destroyed the whole effect of the conversations that he had had 
H3» I n addition Chamberlain had authorised Herriot to inform the 
A l l i e d Ambassadors i n Paris of the nature of his communication, 
and Crowe had done the same i n London; Geneva t e l . 52 , 8 Mar. 
1925; Crowe to Chamberlain, 11 Mar., C 3327, 3569/459/18, 
FO 371/10728. 
114. Crowe to Chamberlain, 12 Mar. 1925, Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 52/240. 
115. Baldwin to Chamberlain, 12 Mar. 1925, Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 52 /80 . 
116. Cmd 2368 of 1925= V/.No Medlicott, B r i t i s h Policy since 
Versailles,2nd edn., London 1968, p. 59, i s mistaken i n 
saying that i t was t h i s statement that was too much for 
some members of the Cabinet. 
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(117) since leaving London. 
Later, when the trouble was over, Chamberlain thought that 
Crowe might have misunderstood the Ministers on 11 March. 
But Crowe had long years of experience i n recording conversations; 
his account was highly circumstantial; and the opinions that he 
reported were exactly i n l i n e with those that the Ministers i n 
question had e a r l i e r expressed i n the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
I t i s unfortunate th a t , apart from Bridgeman's note, Crowe's i s 
apparently the only record of the meeting; but there seems to be no 
(119) 
good reason to doubt i t s accuracy. I t seems more l i k e l y that 
those Ministers who were opposed to any B r i t i s h contribution to 
security had not changed t h e i r minds, and took the opportunity of 
an informal meeting to say so. Crov/e may indeed have contributed 
117o Chamberlain t e l . to Crov/e, 14 Mar. 1925, Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 52/2^1, printed i n Petrie, L i f e and Letters, Vol. I I , p. 
264. Chamberlain also wrote b i t t e r l y to his wifes AC 6/l/603< 
118. Chamberlain to Mrs. Chamberlain, 25 Mar. 1925, Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 6/1/608. 
119» No secretary v/as present and the meeting was not recorded as 
a Meeting of Ministers. I have not been able to trace any 
account of the meeting i n the Churchill Papers; enquiry of 
the present Earl of Birkenhead has revealed no evidence i n 
his possession; I have not been able to obtain access to 
the Amery Papers but i t seems un l i k e l y that they contain any 
evidence since Middlemas and Barnes, who used these papers 
for t h e i r biography of Baldwin, add nothing to the above 
account. 
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to t h i s r e s u l t by i n v i t i n g them to re-examine the whole problem.^ 2 0^ 
How f a r Ministers r e a l l y meant to go i n repudiating the decision 
of h March i s s t i l l an open question. At least when Crowe, a f t e r 
receiving Chamberlain's telegram, went to see Baldwin at Chequers 
on 15 March, he was reassured. Baldwin t o l d him that there was no 
question of Chamberlain not having h i s f u l l confidence and that 
what individuals had said at the informal meeting did not i n any 
sense constitute a Cabinet decision. Baldwin said that he knew that 
there were d i f f e r e n t views about the form of an eventual pact 
including Germany, and that was why he had warned Chamberlain not to 
say any more i n Paris on his way back. But when he returned the 
Cabinet would again discuss Br i t a i n ' s contribution, and Baldwin by no 
means despaired of bringing Birkenhead, Churchill, and Amery round. 
He assented to Crowe's statement that a promise to consult i n case 
of aggression would not constitute a pact and would not be enough 
(121) 
to s a t i s f y France. 
120. Cecil wrote to Baldwin on 12 March what Crowe described as a "very 
he l p f u l l e t t e r i n favour of a proper pact". But Cecil also said 
that i f the Foreign Office would only get i t in t o t h e i r heads that 
an Anglo-French pact i^as out of the question and concentrate on 
getting the other policy, progress might be made! Cecil to Baldwin, 
12 Mar. 1925, Cecil Papers, BM Add. MS 51080, Baldwin Papers, F.2 
(Vol. 115). 
121. Crowe to Chamberlain, 15 Mar. 1925. Chamberlain Papers, AC 52 /2^ . 
I n informing Baldwin on 1*f March that he had received an important 
telegram from Chamberlain which he wished to deliver as soon as 
possible, Crowe recorded on paper his d i s j q u i e t at the position 
i n which he thought the outcome of the meeting of 11 March had put 
Chamberlain: Crowe to Baldwin, 14 Mar., Baldwin Papers, F„ 2 (Vol. 
115)= Further indications of Amery's a t t i t u d e are two instances 
of h i s apparently amending telegrams to the Dominions i n such a 
way as to make i t appear that the suggestion to Herriot that the 
German proposals be taken up was Chamberlain's alone, not that 
of the Governments Crowe to Chamberlain, 12 and 13 Mar., 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/239 , 2*f2, 2V5, F0 800/257; C.O. 
12836/25, co 532/316. 
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How the objectors were brought round i s not known. There are 
suggestions that Baldwin was personally interested i n the question, 
and that he could not afford to lose Chamberlain from h i s Government. 
I t i s also suggested that Crowe convinced them at the meeting of 
(122) 
11 March. However^ i t was done, Chamberlain had what he 
described as "quite a satisfactory t a l k " with Baldwin and obtained a 
promise of support v/hen he returned to London on 17 March. And 
on 20 March the Cabinet, af t e r another f u l l discussion, congratulated 
Chamberlain on his handling of the s i t u a t i o n and agreed on the l i n e s 
(12*0 
of the statement that he was to make i n Parliament four days l a t e r . 
Thus the German proposals, launched i n d i f f i c u l t circumstances 
and i n a manner that did l i t t l e to ensure a favourable reception, 
turned out to be f r u i t f u l . I f t h e i r fate i s compared with that of 
the ~two e a r l i e r proposal^ both equally "designed to ward o f f a danger 
to Germany from the west, the difference i n outcome i s seen to l i e 
p a r t l y i n the nature of the proposals, but largely i n circumstances 
i n France and B r i t a i n . The Cuno off e r was i l l conceived and badly 
presented; but i t i s hard to suppose that any other last-minute 
122. Sybil Eyre Crowe, "Sir Eyre Crowe and the Locarno Pact", i n 
Engl i sh Hi s j ^ i c a l ^ Re vie w, LXXVII (1972), pp. ^9-7^° 
123« Chamberlain to Mrs. Chamberlain, 19 Mar. 1925> Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 6/1/605. 
12^. C. 17 ( 25 ) , CAB 23/^95 the discussion was not recorded. I n 
his speech i n the House of Commons on 2h March Chamberlain 
s t i l l did not say that B r i t a i n would take part i n a m u l t i l a t -
eral pact a r i s i n g out of the German proposals; but Baldwin, 
winding up the debate, stated that while i t was too early to 
say what form the pact would take or which countries would be 
included, B r i t a i n would be a contracting party; H.Co Deb., 
5th ser., Vol. 182, cols. 307-22, Jf02-08. 
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security o f f e r could have prevented the occupation of the Ruhr. 
The attempt early i n 192^ to secure French concessions i n the Ruhr 
by r a i s i n g the security question was also f r u i t l e s s , because 
reparations were now under examination by the Dawes Committee, because 
p 
Poincare was not interested, and because MacDonald was both determined 
to deal with reparations f i r s t and opposed to p a r t i a l security 
arrangements,, The proposals of 1925, certainly better conceived, 
hardly better presented at f i r s t , but then pursued with f a r greater 
s k i l l and determination by Stresemann, ultimately acheived t h e i r aim 
p a r t l y because the French Governments concerned were more receptive 
but mainly because the B r i t i s h Government v/ere at l a s t inclined to 
do something about v/estern European security and unable to agree on 
any other p i a n o That they did eventually agree on t h i s one must be 
at t r i b u t e d "to Chamberlain's refusaT~"to take no for "an answerT" I t i s " 
quite evident from the discussions among Ministers that the majority 
would have preferred to do nothing and to close t h e i r eyes to the 
problem; and also that, unlike Curzon, Chamberlain refused to allow 
*.u 4. J (125) them to do soo 
But Chamberlain's success v/as limited,. He had no more trouble 
with h i s colleagues, but throughout the negotiations of the next 
seven months he was perpetually conscious of the bounds beyond which 
he could not go. There i s i n fact no evidence that he personally, 
125° Chamberlain's achievement i s discussed by F„G„ Stambrook, 
"The Foreign Secretary and foreign policy: the experiences 
of Austen Chamberlain i n 1925 and 1927", i n International 
Review of History and P o l i t i c a l Science VI (1969), No„ 3, 
P P o 109-2? 0 ' 
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or his chief advisers, wished to involve B r i t a i n farther i n Europe 
than the eastern f r o n t i e r of France and Belgium„ The fact that the 
Government were at l a s t prepared to be involved as f a r as that 
enabled the Rhine pact of Locarno to be negotiated; but t h i s alone 
was not enough to bring security to Europe,, I t may reasonably be 
maintained that there was i n the Foreign Office as well as i n less 
well informed quarters a marked reluctance to think through the 
problem of a r e v i v i f i e d Germany's place i n Europe and that, while 
refusal to plan far ahead has sometimes been a v i r t u e i n the conduct 
of B r i t i s h foreign policy, i n t h i s case i t was to contribute to 
l a t e r uncertainties and f a i l u r e s -
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Chapter 5 
The Negotiation of the Western Security Pact 
By the end of March 1925 the B r i t i s h Government had decided to 
take part i n a m u l t i l a t e r a l pact including France and Germany and 
r e l a t i n g to the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontierso This was 
the v i t a l decision of p r i n c i p l e ; but the form of the pact and i t s wider 
ramifications took several months to negotiate.„^JDhe negotiations may 
conveniently be divided i n t o four stages: from March to the middle of 
May, preliminary exploration of the ground; from the middle of May to 
the middle of June, Anglo-French negotiations about the form of the 
pact; from June to the end of August, exchange of views with the 
German Government and d r a f t i n g of a treaty; and from September to 
October detailed negotiations leading to the conference at Locarno«, 
The p r i n c i p a l problems, which emerged at an early point and remained 
unsettled u n t i l the conference, were Germany's membership of the League 
of Nations, the nature of the guarantees and of the a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s , and the relationship between the tr e a t i e s i n the west and 
i n the east. Behind these problems stood, for the German Government 
at l e a s t , the Soviet Union; and a separate section w i l l be devoted to 
t h i s factor. 
Preliminary discussions 
The a t t i t u d e of the French Government to the German proposals 
remained uncertain for some weeks a f t e r Chamberlain's v i s i t to 
Paris at the beginning of Marcho When Chamberlain returned there 
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from Geneva on 16 March Herriot had come to terms with the B r i t i s h 
refusal to sign a separate Anglo-French or Anglo-Franco-Belgian 
treaty. He said that he had t o l d h i s colleagues, and was prepared 
to maintain before the Chamber, that the German proposals must be 
( 1 ) 
examined seriously. There were a number of questions on which 
more information about the German position was desirable, but some 
of them were only i n d i r e c t l y related to the proposed security pact 
and the French had some d i f f i c u l t y i n framing t h e i r questions about 
them. 
(2) 
While they were doing so and exploring the German position, 
the B r i t i s h too were t r y i n g , not wholly successfully, to form a clear 
picture of the German views and to encourage the Germans to advance. 
The lack of success was p a r t l y due to D'Abernon. Even when he was 
" n o t pursuing"his own" ideas, such as suggesting" th~e~T839 treaty on 
Belgian n e u t r a l i t y as a suitable model and renewing the idea of a 
(3) 
neutralised s t r i p , the Ambassador was frequently i n a hurry, over 
opti m i s t i c , and inclined to blur what Stresemann and Schubert said. 
One curious feature of the negotiations as seen from the German 
1. Record of conversation, 16 Mar. 1925, C 3921/459/18, FO 371/10729; 
A.A.E., Gr^e Bretagne, Vol. 74; Herriot, Jadis, Vol. I I , pp 187-9° 
2. Hoesch t e l . , 11 Mar. 1925, 4509/E125456-57; memorandum by 
Stresemann, 16 Mar., 3123/D642708-11, Verm'achtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 
83-5; memorandum by Schubert, 16 Mar.f 4509/E125366-73; Hoesch 
t e l . 19 Mar., 3123/D642765-67; t e l . to Hoesch, 21 Mar., 4509/ 
E125730-32; A.A.E., Grande Bretagne,Vol. 74, p = g ^ w , 
3. D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 15 Mar. 1925, C 4 l 7 l / 4 5 9 / l 8 , FO 371/ 
10729; memorandum by Schubert, 31 Mar., 4509/E125802-09. 
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archives i s the relationship between D'Abernon and Schuberto The 
Ambassador placed complete confidence i n the State Secretary, often 
giving him his own instructions from London to read and showing him 
draft s of his own reports., Schubert i n turn corrected D'Abernon's 
(k) 
drafts and harangued him on Germany's requirements. I t i s 
evident that he held no high opinion of D'Abernon!s a b i l i t y . The 
Ambassador reported very l i t t l e of t h i s to London, but he sometimes 
carried Schubert's injunctions to discregtion so far as to disguise 
him, i n reports to the Foreign Office, as "a most r e l i a b l e source". 
On the other hand since Sthamer was not regarded i n London as very 
able, Chamberlain r e l i e d on D'Abernon's "influence and discre t i o n " 
(5) 
f o r "keeping things straight at the German end". Whereas i n the 
early months of 1925 Chamberlain's l e t t e r s to Crewe i n Paris were 
-much longer and franker than those to D'Abernon, -as—time went on t h e — 
l a t t e r became more and more confiding. Chamberlain often disagreed 
with D'Abernon about Germany, but he also wrote to him things which, 
had he known that D'Abernon was passing them on to Schubert, he would 
perhaps not have w r i t t e n . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to be certain about 
D'Abernon's standing with the permanent o f f i c i a l s of the Foreign 
Office: he v/as never c r i t i c i s e d d i r e c t l y , but i t i s possible to get 
the impression that throughout h i s period i n Be r l i n they did not think 
very highly of his p o l i t i c a l understanding of Germany. 
k„ According to his own accounts. Among many instances may be cited 
Schubert's memoranda of conversations with D'Abernon on 1 May, 
26 May, 28 July, 31 July and 10 August, k 5 0 9 / E l 2 6 l 1 5 - l 8 , 
E126^97-401, E127^2-^7 , E l27 k 58-62 , E127588-91. 
5. Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 2 Apr. 1925, Chamberlain Papers, AC 
52/266, D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MS ^8928, FO 800/257, Petrie, 
L i f e and Letters, Vol. I I , pp. 271-^. 
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At the beginning of March D'Abernon was recommending the 
German offer as a "broad gesture of re c o n c i l i a t i o n and appeasement"; 
but his description of the Germans' present a t t i t u d e - that they had 
done a l l that could be expected - worried Chamberlain, who had 
instructions sent to Be r l i n that Germany must make further contributions 
especially by jo i n i n g the League, doing something about Austria, and 
making a pledge on the eastern f r o n t i e r as binding as that on the 
Rhine. After malting enquiries D'Abernon replied that the Germans 
were ready to give precision to t h e i r proposals. The main points 
requiring negotiation were entry into the League and the eastern 
f r o n t i e r . On Austria he would l i k e to know what the French had i n 
mind. On the Rhineland Germany would not ask for the occupation to 
be modified but would not abandon her r i g h t s . The Belgian f r o n t i e r 
(7) . 
would be assured i n the same way as the French. 
The position of Poland was an important question from the e a r l i e s t 
moment. From the German point of view the eastern f r o n t i e r had 
nothing to do with the problems i n the west which had led to the pact 
o f f e r . But since they were well aware that for the French the 
problems were connected, the offer of a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with a l l 
Germany's neighbours was made to show that Germany did not intend to 
use security i n the west to f a l l upon Poland i n the east. The Germans 
were not prepared to guarantee the Polish f r o n t i e r i n any way, and 
regarded a declaration that they did not wish to a l t e r i t by force 
6. B e r l i n t e l . 86, 2 Mar. 1925; Geneva t e l . 5^, 9 Mar.; t e l . 5^ 
to B e r l i n , 9 Mar., C 3097 , 3376A59/18, F0 371/10728. 
7. B e r l i n t e l . 3 to Geneva, 12 Mar. 1925, C 366V^59/ l8, F0 371/ 
10728. German assurances that Belgium was meant to be included 
i n a pact were given i n Brussels by the end of February: 
D0D0B., Vol. I I , No. 26; ^509/El2^923-26. 
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as an in d i r e c t guarantee <> On the other hand they did not intend to 
raise the question of f r o n t i e r revision now: they did not regard the 
question as ripe and knew that r a i s i n g i t would wreck the negotiations 
• 4.*, + (8) 
i n the west. 
The nuances of t h i s position were perhaps not easy to convey. 
The Poles automatically regarded the security o f f e r to France as a 
device to enable Germany to attack them, and saw an a r b i t r a t i o n treaty 
as a trap under which the f o n t i e r grievance could be raised i n a new 
way. The Minister for Foreign A f f a i r s , Skrzynski, v i s i t e d Paris as 
well as Geneva i n March; and both Herriot and Chamberlain did t h e i r 
(9) 
best to calm Polish fears, but without much success. D'Abernon 
appears to have assumed that the Germans intended to raise the 
f r o n t i e r question, and started t a l k i n g about c o m p e n s a t i o n . O n 
-the-other hand-unttl—the second week i n March he—seems to have — 
believed that the German Government were ready to give an undertaking 
(11) 
not to attempt to a l t e r the eastern f r o n t i e r by force. 
(12) 
Chamberlain sent warnings to D'Abernon against moving too fa s t ; 
8. Hoesch t e l . , 7 Mar. 1925; t e l . to Hoesch, 10 Mar.; minute by Schubert, 
10 Mar.; Schubert to Dufour, 23 Mar., ^509^125173-7^, E125^95~96, 
E125752-53i E125706-12. 
9. Chamberlain to Crowe, -\k Mar. 1925, C 3753A59/18, FO 371/10728; 
Rauscher desp., 27 Mar., Kl70/K025663-68j Hote by Herriot, 18 Mar., 
A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol. 7^;^France and her Eastern A l l i e s , 
pp. 332-^. ^ D ^ ^ f e s ^ 
10. Memorandum by Schubert, 10 Feb. 1925, ^509/El250^8-5^; B e r l i n desp. 
122, 1*f Feb., C 2390A59/18, F0 371/10727; D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 
20 Mar., 0^91/^59/18, F0 371/10729; memorandum by Schubert, 21 Mar., 
4509/E1257 /10-^; D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, Vol. I l l , p. 153-
1 1 .Berlin t e l . 81, 1 Mar. 1925, C 3009A59/18, FO 371/10727; B e r l i n 
t e l . k to Geneva, 12 Mar., C 3655A59/18, FO 371/107^8; memoranda by 
Luther and Schubert, 10, 11 and 12 Mar., k509/E125^-87, E125V72-83, 
E125^59, £125^31-390 
12. Geneva t e l . 2 to B e r l i n , 15 Mar. 1925, C 3725A59 /18 , FO 371/10728; 
Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 18 Mar., C *f1?l / l f59/l8, FO 371/10729, 
printed i n Petrie, L i f e and Letters, Vol. I I , pp. 267-8. 
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but as noted above he too appears to have believed that the Germans 
v/ere ready to give an undertaking about the f r o n t i e r . The incident 
a r i s i n g out of his speech i n the House of Commons on 2k March did not 
greatly advance understanding. After o u t l i n i n g the German proposals 
Chamberlain said: " I f I understand them r i g h t l y , they amount to t h i s : 
that Germany i s prepared to guarantee v o l u n t a r i l y what hit h e r t o she 
has accepted under the compulsion of the treaty, that i s , the status 
quo i n the West; that she i s prepared to eliminate, not merely from 
the West but from the East, war as an engine by which any a l t e r a t i o n 
i n the Treaty position i s to be obtained. Thus not only i n the West 
but i n the East, she i s prepared absolutely to abandon any recourse 
to war f o r the purpose of changing the treaty boundaries of Europe, 
though she may be unwilling., or unable, to make the same renunciation 
of the hopes and aspirations that-some day, by friendly~arrangement— -
or mutual agreement, a modification may be introduced into the East, 
as she i s prepared to make i n regard to any modification i n the West". 
Sthamer, who with other foreign representatives was l i s t e n i n g to 
the debate, urgently asked to see Chamberlain and t o l d him that the 
reference to the eastern f r o n t i e r s was not wholly accurate. He did 
not clearly explain why, but Chamberlain understood him to mean that 
the German Government had not renounced a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of resort to 
force. Chamberlain said that i f t h i s were so the bottom f e l l out of 
the whole scheme and he must go back and t e l l the House. Sthamer 
protested that the German memorandum was unchanged, and Chamberlain 
said no more; but he at once telegraphed to D'Abernon that the point 
(13) 
was a test of German good f a i t h and must be cleared up at once with Luther. 
13. Tel. 6k to B e r l i n , 25 Mar. 1925, C ^302/^59/18, FO 371/10729; Sthamer 
t e l . , 25 Mar., *f509/El256l6-l8; H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 182, cols. 
317-18. Cf. Petrie, L i f e and Letters, Vol. I I , pp. 270-1. 
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The Germans feared that Chamberlain was t r y i n g to commit them 
to some additional obligation to Poland such as a non-aggression 
pact, but D'Abernon maintained that only a reply to the B r i t i s h 
Government was needed. The f i r s t d r a f t of the reply said that Germany 
had "no intention to bring about by warlike means an a l t e r a t i o n of the 
present German-Polish f r o n t i e r , " and that there was no cause f o r the 
B r i t i s h Government to change t h e i r policy. After much discussion 
D'Abernon got the wording strengthened to; "The German Government 
renounce any idea of bringing about by warlike means an a l t e r a t i o n to 
the present German-Polish f r o n t i e r " , and there was no reason f o r the 
B r i t i s h Government to a l t e r t h e i r views as expressed by Chamberlain 
and Baldwin. 
The incident was a t t r i b u t e d to a misunderstanding on Sthamer's 
part. Olamber^ain-wrote" that he did not think" that he would ever Be 
able to negotiate e f f e c t i v e l y through the Ambassador, whom he suspected 
of not being kept f u l l y informed by Berlin and of not reporting 
accurately. I t i s clear from Sthamer's reports that although not very 
quick he did on the whole report accurately; but i t does seem to be 
the case that he did not always succeed i n conveying points clearly 
to the B r i t i s h . On t h i s occasion he was t r y i n g to point out the fact 
that the German-Swiss a r b i t r a t i o n treaty did not exclude the use of 
force i n a l l cases of disputes he succeeded only i n being blamed for 
14. Memoranda by Schubert and Stresemann, 26, 27 and 28 Mar. 1925« 
4509/E125596-98, E125592-95, E125590-91, E125589, E125583-86, 
E125580-81, E125567-71, E125563-66, E125560-62. I n the f i n a l 
German text the verb "verzichten" was s p e c i f i c a l l y avoided; 
"zuruckwiesen" was used instead. 
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(15) Chamberlain's own confusion-
The position of Czechoslovakia v/as less delicate than that of 
Poland since the Czechoslovak Government were not alarmed by the 
German proposals and there were no major causes of dispute with 
Germany. Benes t o l d Chamberlain at Geneva and Herriot i n Paris that 
he v/as quite w i l l i n g to consider tr e a t i e s of a r b i t r a t i o n and guarantee 
with neighbouring countries. As i n e a r l i e r years he regarded secure 
peace i n the west as the best assurance of peace i n the east, although 
he would have l i k e d a treaty of mutual assistance i n the east as well. 
Benes v/as also anxious that existing t r e a t i e s should not be weakened 
i n any way and that Germany should j o i n the League. To the Germans 
Benes saxd that he v/as w i l l i n g to s t a r t talks on an a r b i t r a t i o n treaty 
and saw no d i f f i c u l t y i n o n e . ^ ^ 
D'Abernon was also exploring the German p o s i t i o n o n the League 
of Nations, having already sent to London two memoranda given to him 
by Schubert i n February on A r t i c l e 16 and on the supervision of German 
(17) 
disarmament. The Secretary-General of the League, Drummond, who 
15- Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 26 Mar. 1925; B e r l i n t e l . 129, 28 Mar, 
C V+91, W19A59/18, FO 371/10729; D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 29 Mar., 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/263, D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MS ^8928, 
FO 800/257; Sthamer t e l . , 25 Mar.; t e l . to Sthamer, 26 Mar.; 
memorandum by Schubert, 27 Mar.; dosp. to Sthamer, 30 Mar.; Schubert 
to Dufour, 30 Mar., ^509/Ei256l6-i8, E125619, E125583-86, E125519-25, 
£12551^-18; Dufour to Schubert, 31 Mar., *f567/El66o85-99; Sthamer 
t e l . , 1 Apr., ^509/El258^8-^9o 
16. Chamberlain to Crowe, 12 Mar. 1925, C3726A59/18, FO 371/10728; Benes 
to Chamberlain, 16 Mar., C 3878A59/18, FO 371/10729; A.A.E. , Grande 
BretagoiL, Vol. 7^; Herriot, Jadis, Vol. I I , pp. 189-90; Wandycz, 
France and her Eastern Allies,pp. 336-7; desp. to Koch (Prague), 10 
Mar.; Koch tel., 2^ Mar.; memorandum by Schubert, 31 Mar., k509/E 
125^99-503, E125675-76, E125800-01; Hoffman (Bern) t e l . , 13 Mar., 
31^7/1165^811-12; desp. to Koch, 31 Mar.; Koch desp., 3 Apr., 3123/ 
D6^2929-32, D6V3012-1*1-. 
17O B e r l i n desp. 156, 27 Feb. 1925, C 3053/109/18, FO 371/10717; memoranda 
by Schubert, 19 and 2k Feb.; Schubert to D'Abernon, 25 Feb., ^509/ 
012^95^-59, £12^903-09 , E12^913-22, £12^883-89; desp. to Sthamer, 
25 Feb., 3123/D642371-78. 
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v i s i t e d B e r l i n at the beginning of March, got the impression that 
the German Government were raising new conditions for entry, but 
D'Abernon considered that i f t h e i r fears of i s o l a t i o n could be over-
come t h e i r a t t i t u d e to A r t i c l e 16 might c h a n g e . D ' A b e r n o n 
hoped for a quick decision on German entry during the March Council 
meeting, and suggested that the Roman Law maxim "Ultra posse nemo 
obligatur" should meet the case on A r t i c l e 16. But Luther, Stresemann, 
and Schubert were i n no hurry to suggest a formula, and l a i d equal 
emphasis on the removal of the p o s s i b i l i t y of supervision over 
Germany's disarmament 0 ^9) On 1^ f March the Council replied to the 
German Government's l e t t e r of the previous December, stating that 
Germany could expect a seat on the Council and a voice i n deciding 
the application of the prin£«ples of the Covenant, but could not refuse 
to take part i n economic measures recommefl^ed. The matter was then 
dropped f o r the time being. 
No more than that of the Polish f r o n t i e r did the German Government 
intend to raise the question of Austria at present; but i t caused 
confusion for some weeks0 Herriot's mention of i t appears to have 
18, Memoranda by Schubert, 2 Mar. 1925, k 5 8 k / E l 7 8 2 7 0 - 7 k ; Drummond 
to D'Abernon, 5 Mar.; D'Abernon to Drummond, 8 Mar., Cecil 
Papers, BM Add. MS 51110. 
19„ Memorandum by Stresemann, 9 Mar. 1925, 3123/06^2576-78; 
memorandum by Luther, 10 Wasf«; memoranda by Schubert, 9» 10 
and 12 Mar., ^ 5 0 9 / E l 2 5 ^ - 8 7 , E l 2 5 1 k 3 - L 7 , El25^72-83, 
E125V51-39o 
20. Instructions to German missions, 17 Mar. 1925, V?8VE178190-
92; memorandum by Schubert, 21 Mar., V509/E1257kO-kk; D'Abernon 
to Drummond, 1 Apr., Cecil Papers, BM Add. MS 51110. 
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arisen from the general fear l e s t new security arrangements i n the 
west might weaken treaty provisions elsewhere, and he perhaps hoped 
that Germany might make some renunciation of the aspiration for an 
Anschlusso The I t a l i a n a t t i t u d e to the western security pact was 
so far non-committal; they would have d i s l i k e d an Anglo-Franco-
Belgian treaty but do not at t h i s stage seem to have considered joining 
( 2 1 ) 
a wider pact. At the end of March the French Government informed 
the I t a l i a n s that t h e i r reply to the German proposal would not 
mention f r o n t i e r s not touched on i n i t ; and on 1 A p r i l Chamberlain 
t o l d the Ambassador i n London that he had not thought i t desirable 
( 2 2 ) 
to raise the Austrian question. But i n Be r l i n D'Abernon appears 
to have been t a l k i n g about Austria and both to have derived the 
impression that I t a l y was not interested and to have given the 
( 2 3 ) 
impression that B r i t a i n would not oppose an Anschluss. -----No -sooner -
had t h i s been cleared up ( i f i t ever was; Mussolini continued to regan 
D'Abernon with suspicion) than the I t a l i a n Ambassador i n Be r l i n 
interpreted some remarks by Stresemann about the strength of popular 
support for an Anschluss and the impossibility of delaying a solution 
to the Austrian problem to mean that the Germans intended to raise i t 
now. There was instant uproar i n Rome, not much soothed by Stresemann 
2 1 . Rome t e l . 6 9 , 1 2 Mar. 1 9 2 5 , C 3 6 2 4 / 4 5 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 2 8 ; 
D.8.I., Vol. I l l , Nos. 74-3 , 7 6 1 , 767 , 781 c 
2 2 . Desp. 446 to Rome, 1 Apr. 1925 , C 4 6 3 8 / 4 5 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 3 0 ; 
D.D.I,, Vol. I l l , Nos. 7 7 7 , 7 7 8 , 7 8 6 . 
2 3 ° Op. c i t . , Nos. 7 7 2 , 7 8 0 , 7 8 3 ; memoranda by Schubert, 2 Apr. 
1925; t e l . to Neurath, 5 Apr., 4 5 0 9 / E 1 2 5 8 5 4 - 5 6 , E 1 2 5 8 6 O - 6 1 , 
E125891-93O 
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hasty denial that the German Government had any such in t e n t i o n . 
I n a speech to the Senate on 20 May Mussolini asserted that the 
Brenner f r o n t i e r must be guaranteed, and i t was f e l t necessary to 
explore the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e again. The Secretary-General of the 
Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , Senator Contarini, t o l d Graham that 
the Germans seemed to think that no one would object to an Anschluss, 
and that Bosdari had reported that D'Abernon was not unfavourable 
and reflected the B r i t i s h Government's views. Minutes on Graham's 
despatch indicate that so f a r as the Central Department of the 
Foreign Office were concerned Bosdari was not far wrong; but 
Chamberlain remarked: " I am d e f i n i t e l y opposed to Anschluss and shall 
say so anywhere and every time that the subject i s raised... Our only 
chance of peace i s to l e t everyone know that we are opposed to any 
"revision o"f the "Treaty settlement ^ f o r ~ a generation11". Chamberlain"_ 
stated h i s view to Torretta and l a t e r repeated i t at Geneva, and i t 
(25) 
was conveyed to D'Abernon. 
The French questions on the German proposals had not been 
formulated before Herriot's ministry f e l l on 10 A p r i l . I n the new 
Government formed by Painleve Briand was Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s 
and Berthelot returned to the Quai d'Orsay as Secretary-General. The 
delay i n the French reply was by now causing Stresemann d i f f i c u l t y 
2ko DoDcI., Volo I I I , Nos. 8*t6; Vol IV, No. 13; memorandum by 
St.resemann, 8 May 1925, k 509/El26l71 -73, Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , 
pp. 96-7; Neurath t e l . , *\k May; t e l . to Neurath, 15 May, 3086/ 
D6TA036-37 , D6l^038-39; memorandum by Schubert, 16 May, ^509/ 
E126289-92; P r i t t w i t z t e l . , 20 May; t e l . to Neurath, 23 May; 
Neurath t e l . , 6 Jun., 3086/D6l*K)56, D6lif065-70, D614084. 
25° Rome desp. Vl^f, 15 May 1925; desp. 1008 to B e r l i n , 2 Jun.; 
Berlin desp. 338, 6 Jun., C 6680, 782V2 k9/3, FO 371/10660; 
desp. 923 to Rome, 23 Jun., C 8^75/^59/18, FO 371/1073^; 
P.P.I-,Vol. IV, Nos. 26, 28, 29. 
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with the Cabinet and the parties i n Germany, and from the middle of 
(26) 
A p r i l he and Schubert expressed increasing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
Fleuriau t o l d Chamberlain that Briand was getting on with the French 
reply but did not l i k e the draft l e f t by Herriot; and Chamberlain 
reassured Sthamer that the B r i t i s h and French Governments were anxious 
(27) 
to press on. But although he was severe that Germany must j o i n 
the League "sans phrase" and t o l d Sthamer that the election of 
Hindenburg as President had made a bad impression, Chamberlain too 
began to show anxiety about French intentions. 
An additional cause of German anxiety was the state of the 
disarmament question, a solution to which with the evacuation of the 
Cologne zone had been a major motive for the security o f f e r . The 
A l l i e d M i l i t a r y Committee at Versailles did not report on the Control 
Commission's report u n t i l the mTddlfTof A p r i l . To begin with 
26. H.A. Turner, Stresemann and the P o l i t i c s of the Weimar Republic, 
Princeton 1963, pp. 188-91; desp. to Sthamer, 13 Apr. 1925; t e l s . 
to Hoesch, 15 and 16 Apr.; Hoesch t e l . , 18 Apr.; memorandum by 
Schubert, 1 May, 4509/E125955-63, E125964-65, E25971, E125987-90, 
E126515-18; B e r l i n t e l . 179, 1 May, C 5906/35/18, FO 371/10713; 
B e r l i n t e l . 185, 3 May, C 5969/459/18, FO 371/10731- Sthamer 
was unable to carry out his instructions to speak to Chamberlain 
or Crowe before Easter since the former was away and the l a t t e r 
was on sick leave. Crowe died on 28 Aprils he was succeeded as 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State by T y r e l l . 
27. Desp. 1502 to Paris, 30 Apr. 1925; desp. 797 to B e r l i n , 30 
Apr., C 5804, 5852/459/18, FO 371/10730. Draft r e p l i e s , dated 
2, 6 and 10 A p r i l , are i n A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol. 75. 
28. Lampson to Addison, 27 Apr. 1925, C 6058/35/18, FO 371/10713; 
desp. 797 to B e r l i n , 30 Apr., C 5852/459/18, FO 371/10730; t e l . 
113 to Paris, 5 May; Crewe to Chamberlain, 5 May, C 5969, 6154/ 
459/18, FO 371/107315 Chamberlain to Crewe, 12 May; Crev/e to 
Chamberlain, 13 May, Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/211, 212, Crewe 
Papers, C/8, FO 800/257. 
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Chamberlain was s t i l l convinced that the note to the Germans about 
i t must include an i n v i t a t i o n to discussions on the method of 
carrying out the A l l i e d requirements, but l a t e r he was prepared to 
agree that the detai l s could be discussed by the Control Commission 
i n B e r l i n provided that the note contained only the essential demands 
( 2 9 ) 
on which the A l l i e s were prepared to i n s i s t . A l l t h i s time the 
Germans had been pressing f o r discussions and f o r early transmission 
of the Control Commission's report, and the B r i t i s h had been preaching 
patience. The r e l a t i v e p r i o r i t y and timing of the two topics of 
security and evacuation was a delicate point. On 16 March Sthamer 
t o l d Crowe that i f there were a prospect of success for the security 
pact he thought that evacuation would take second place; but three 
days l a t e r , on instructions from B e r l i n , he reversed the order and 
told"ehamherlain~that~unless sa11 s f a c t i on" were"~obtained- on "31 sarmamerft" 
and evacuation, public opinion might force the German Government to 
withdraw the security o f f e r . Hoesch on the other hand advised that 
negotiations on disarmament would not succeed u n t i l France was 
convinced that her security requirements would be m e t . ^ ^ By the 
middle of A p r i l the Germans v/ere thinking of sending a formal note 
(31) 
to the A l l i e s demanding information on the disarmament question. 
29. CI.D. Paper 605-B, CAB V l 3 ; Paris desp. 880, 13 Apr. 1925; desp* 
1299 to Paris, 17 Apr.; desp. 1561 to Paris, 5 May, C 5027, k76k, 
5855/21/18, FO 371/10709. 
30. Sthamer t e l . , 16 Mar. 1925; t e l . to Sthamer, 18 Mar.; Sthamer 
t e l . , 19 Mar., ^509/El25325-26, E125322-23, E125767-69; desp. 
51^ to Berlin* 19 Mar., C 4008A59/18, FO 371/10729; Hoesch 
t e l . 19 Mar., Kl885A 1 f7^57 i f-82. 
31. Memorandum by Schubert, 5 Apr. 1925; desp. to Sthamer, 13 Apr., 
4509/E12589^-902, El25955-63<> 
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They continued to express d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the delay, but at the 
beginning of May Schubert was equally aware that i f the disarmament 
note arrived before the reply on security, public discussion on the 
former would make the l a t t e r question more d i f f i c u l t . The solution 
seemed to be to ask for simultaneous di scussion on both, with a 
( 3 2 ) 
conference on the whole complex of questions. 
Anglo-French discussion of the reply to the Gerrnan_proposals 
The French draft reply to the German security proposals f i n a l l y 
reached the Foreign Office on May. I t stated that before 
negotiations could begin, c l a r i f i c a t i o n and agreement on certain points 
were needed. There were two general points and four r e l a t i n g to the 
proposals i n the German~meml5r^Mum,~as~ follows? 
I . The security agreement was only possible i f Germany entered 
the League under the conditions set out i n the Council's l e t t e r of 
13 Marcho 
I I . Nothing i n the agreements concluded must imply a revis i o n 
of the peace t r e a t i e s nor modify the conditions of application of 
certain clauses, and the A l l i e s must have the right to oppose any 
f a i l u r e to observe provisions of the t r e a t i e s even i f they were 
not d i r e c t l y affected., 
I I I . Belgium should be included i n the pact among the powers 
interested i n the Rhine^ the renunciation of war should be unlimited 
i n dixration; the occupation of the Ehineland should not be affected. 
32= Hoesch t e l . , 18 Apr. 1925, ^509/El25987-90; Addison to Lampson, 
20 Apr., C 6 0 5 8 / 3 5 / 1 8 , FO 371/10713; Hoesch t e l . , 27 Apr., 
3123/D6if3116-19; desp„ 797 to B e r l i n , 30 Apr., C 5852/^59/18, 
FO 371/10730; Sthamer t e l . , 1 May; memorandum by Schubert, 1 May-
desp. to Hoesch, h May, *f509/El26l19-2*f, E126115-18 , E 1 2 6 1 3 8 - ^ O / 
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IV „ The ar b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with the parties to the Rhine pact 
should cover a l l c o n f l i c t s and should allow coercive action only i n 
case of f a i l u r e to observe the various agreements envisaged i n the 
note* They should be guaranteed j o i n t l y and individually hy the 
powers taking part i n the t e r r i t o r i a l guarantee i n the Elaine pact* 
V 0 There must be ar b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s between Germany and those 
of her neighbours who, although not parties to the Rhine pact, were 
signatories of the Treaty of Versailles.. The A l l i e s had certain rights 
and obligations under the Covenant and the peace t r e a t i e s , and could 
not renounce them0 These a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s should have the same 
scope as those discussed i n section IV, and should be backed by the 
same guarantees» 
VIo A l l these agreements should form an i n d i v i s i b l e whole, 
^brought^together"in a"general convention^ un"der~~the ^ auspices of "the 
Leagueo ( 3 5^ 
In t h i s note the French Government were envisaging a pact of 
t e r r i t o r i a l guarantee between the powers interested i n the Rhine; 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s between Germany and each of these powers, 
guaranteed by them a l l ; a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s between Germany and her 
other neighbours signatories of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , guaranteed 
i n the same way; German entry into the League; preservation of a l l 
the A l l i e s ' rights under the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and freedom to f u l f i l 
t h e i r obligations under the Covenant., Some of these suggestions 
raised d i f f i c u l t i e s for the B r i t i s h ; but the f i r s t e s s e n t i a l was to 
be clear about what the French meant. When Fle u r i a u delivered a 
copy of the note to Chamberlain on 14 May the l a t t e r put some questions 
to him, and more were put a few days later» 
33. P a r i s desp. 1126, 13 May 1925, C6if93A59/l8, FO 371/10731; Briand 
to F l e u i i a u , 13 May, A „ A o E „ , Grade Bretagne, Vol .75; Cmd, 2^35 of 
1925= t 
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On Germany's entry into the League, Chamberlain asked whether 
i t was understood that i t was an es s e n t i a l condition of agreement 
but should not be a precondition for negotiations. On section I I 
he asked for c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the precise object and the clauses 
referred to. There were no questions about section I I I . On section 
IV, however, there were several questions - whether the term "a r b i -
t r a t i o n " meant j u d i c i a l a r b i t r a t i o n i n a l l cases or included 
c o n c i l i a t i o n by, for example, the League Council; whether the French 
envisaged coercive action without reference to some means for peace-
f u l settlement such as was provided by the Covenant; whether c o n f l i c t s 
over the execution of the peace t r e a t i e s were to be excluded from 
arbitration; and what obligations were involved for the guarantors. 
On section V Chamberlain asked whether Austria was included and what 
Allied"rights"and -obligations were referred -to; and~he questioned-th~e~~ 
v/ording about guarantees. B r i t a i n , he said, was not prepared to 
take on any new obligation on Germany's eastern f r o n t i e r and i f the 
same wording were used about the guarantees for the arbitration 
t r e a t i e s i n the west and i n the east there was a r i s k either of 
ra i s i n g the l a t t e r to the same l e v e l as the former, or of watering 
down the former to the l e v e l that public opinion would accept for 
the l a t t e r . F i n a l l y on. section VI, Chamberlain asked whether placing 
the t r e a t i e s under the auspices of the League would involve any 
obligations for members of the League who were not signatories of 
(3*0 
the agreements. 
Jk. Desp. 1709 to Pa r i s , <\h May 1925, C 6558A59/18, FO 371/107315 
memorandum to the French Ambassador, 19 May, C 7063/^59/18, 
FO 371/10732; Cmd 2^35 of 1925; A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vo£. 75. 
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The French r e p l i e s to these questions showed an appreciation 
of the d i f f i c u l t y of treating B r i t a i n exactly on a l l fours with 
(35) 
the other signatories,. On section I the French agreed that 
German entry into the League was not a precondition for negotiations, 
but suggested that i t might be stated that the pact would not corae 
into force i f Germany had not entered by the time i t was signed* 
The object of section I I was to make i t clear that the new arrangements 
must not i n any way impair the peace t r e a t i e s or the Covenant» The 
reservation of the A l l i e s ' r ights i n respect of clauses not concerning 
them d i r e c t l y was to cover Austria and Sles v i g , and had been worded 
i n t h i s way i n response to the German requests that Austria, Poland, 
e t c should not be mentioned by name. On section IV, on the western 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s , the French answered that " a r b i t r a t i o n " was 
used i n the most general sense and was not meant to exclude recourse 
to the Council,, I t was, however, e s s e n t i a l that the peaceful 
solution be obligatory» F a i l u r e to observe other t r e a t i e s and agreement 
could only give r i s e to coercive action i f such action were provided 
for i n those t r e a t i e s ; f a i l u r e to observe the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s 
would j u s t i f y coercive action appropriate to the nature of the 
violation,, The guarantors must i n princ i p l e act together, but each 
would be bound to act even i f others did not„ There was a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between a t e r r i t o r i a l guarantee and a'guarantee of an arb i t r a t i o n treaty 
The f i r s t necessarily involved resort to force i n defence of the 
territory guaranteed,. The second implied the use of means appropriate 
35« On 18 May Chamberlain found the Belgian Ambassador, too, concerned 
that the obligations to be undertaken i n regard to the a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s i n the east and i n the west were the sames desp„ 563 to 
Brussels, C 6?87A59/l8, FO 371/10731; D°D°B,, Vol. I I , No. 55. 
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to the nature of the v i o l a t i o n and each guarantor would act i n such 
measure as i t could. I f , for example, Germany violated the 
arb i t r a t i o n treaty v/ith Poland B r i t a i n would not be involved farther 
than was appropriate or farther than she was committed by membership 
of the League; but France must not be deemed to vi o l a t e the Rhine 
pact i f she were ca l l e d upon to help Poland. The reference i n 
section V to the A l l i e s ' rights and obligations had a similar purposes 
the Rhine pact must not make i t impossible to give assistance to 
states i n the east i n conformity v/ith the Covenant. On section VT, 
the object of putting the whole under the auspices of the League was 
to enable i t to decide the legitimacy of action taken and i t s 
conformity with the Covenant. No additional obligations for other 
( 3 6 ) 
members of the League were intended. 
When Fleuriau handed over the French reply to the second set "of 
questions Chamberlain said that he could understand France's position 
with regard to her eastern a l l i e s but he was sure that Briand equally 
would understand B r i t a i n ' s position, which was that no fresh duties 
could be undertaken i n the east and that i t was important to distinguish 
c l e a r l y between the guarantees that she might be w i l l i n g to give i n 
36. Informal French memorandum, 18 May 1925, C 6708/^59/18, FO 
371/10731; memorandum from French Ambassador, 22 May, C 7063/ 
if59/l8, FO 371/10732 ; AOA.E., Grande Bretagne, Vols 75-6; Cmd 
2^35 of 1925. On 21'May Phipps wrote that Laroche, the 
P o l i t i c a l Director at the Quai d'Orsay, had been stre s s i n g the 
importance of France retaining the right to go to the help of 
Poland or Czechoslovakia. France wanted B r i t a i n to guarantee 
the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s i n order not that she should 
be bound to help but that she should be bound to protest i f 
Germany attacked Poland. Such a protest would give France the 
moral right to go to Poland's help herselfs Phipps to Lampson, 
21 May C 7296A59/18, FO 371/10732. 
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(37) 
the west and any guarantees that others might undertake elsewhere. 
Chamberlain was also doubtful whether B r i t a i n could take part 
(-zQ\ 
i n a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s of the kind proposed. 
The Cabinet on 20 May decided to set up a committee to help 
draft a reply to the French. Baldwin, Chamberlain, Chu r c h i l l , 
Worthingtdn~Evans, Hoare, Balfour, Amery, Birkenhead and C e c i l , a 
f a i r cross-section of m i n i s t e r i a l opinion on security, met on 
26 and 28 May and approved without d i f f i c u l t y a reply i n the form 
( 3 9 ) 
of a despatch to Crewe. The despatch, with a suggested redraft 
of the note to be sent to the German Government, was sent on 28 
May. Chamberlain told Fleuriau that i t represented the l i m i t to 
which the B r i t i s h Government could go, and he warned that France 
should not r i s k the whole policy by trying to involve B r i t a i n 
( Z J O ) 
farther than public opinion would allow. i n the lengthy 
instructions to Crewe, Chamberlain stated that the basic p r i n c i p l e 
guiding the Government was that "any new obligation which they 
undertake s h a l l be s p e c i f i c and limited to the maintenance of the 
existing t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements on the western frontier of. Germany. 
His Majesty's Government are not prepared to assume fresh 
obligations elsewhere i n addition to those already devolving upon 
them as signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
of the Peace Trea t i e s . At the same time, i t may be well to repeat 
that, i n seeking means to strengthen the position i n the west, 
His Majesty's Government do not themselves question, or give any 
37. Desp. 1841 to P a r i s , 25 May 1925, C 7064/459/18,FO 371/10732. 
38. C P . 245(25), CAB 24/173-
39. C« 26(25), CAB 23/50; Cabinet Committee on Security, CAB 27/275, 
40. Desp. 1905 to P a r i s , 28 May 1925, C 7265/459/18, FO 371/10732. 
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encouragement to others to question, the other provisions of the 
t r e a t i e s which form the basis of the e x i s t i n g public law of Europe". 
The French draft as i t stood did not accurately convey the extent 
and character of the obligations that the B r i t i s h Government were 
ready to assume, and i t was thought desirable to amend i t i n such a 
way as to make i t a statement of policy common to both countries, 
rather than each sending separate notes v/hich might lay undue emphasis 
on differences of view between them* 
The f i r s t three sections of the French draft were not altered* 
Section IV, on the western a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s , now provided for 
such t r e a t i e s between France and Germany and Belgium and Germany, but 
not between B r i t a i n and Germany,, Chamberlain explained that the 
B r i t i s h Empire, as a power with world-wide r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , was in a 
different position from the continental countries and also"that for 
B r i t a i n an ar b i t r a t i o n treaty would not, as i t was for them, be the 
natural complement to the Rhine pacto The provision about the 
guarantee was revised to allow for immediate operation i f the breach 
of the a r b i t r a t i o n treaty were coupled with a resort to h o s t i l i t i e s : 
i n other cases the Council of the League should propose the steps to 
be taken., In section V the reference to guarantees of the eastern 
a r b i t r a t i o n treatiesflwas deleted. A new section was added st a t i n g 
that nothing i n the proposed t r e a t i e s would affec t the rights and 
obligations attaching the membership of the League. I n the French 
section VI the reference to putting a l l the agreements under the 
auspices of the League was removed, but i t was stated that they 
should a l l come into force simultaneously. 
*f1. Desp. 1887 to P a r i s , 28 May 1925, C 717^/^59/18, FO 371/10732; 
Cmd. 2^35 oj- 1925° Copies of the despatch were sent on the same 
day to Rome and Brussels for communication to the I t a l i a n and 
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The B r i t i s h Government were therefore now envisaging a pact 
of t e r r i t o r i a l guarantee regarding the western f r o n t i e r of Germany; 
arb i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s between France and Germany and Belgium and 
Germany, guaranteed by each of them and by B r i t a i n ; a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s between Germany and her other neighbours who were 
signatories of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s but without guarantees; and, 
l i k e the French, German entry into the League and preservation of 
a l l the A l l i e s ' r ights and obligations„ The French, however, 
although accepting the B r i t i s h r e f u s a l to undertake new obligations 
beyond the western frontier of Germany and welcoming an explanation, 
given informally, that the Covenant en t i t l e d France to go to the help 
of Poland or Czechoslovakia i f either were attacked by Germany, 
nevertheless f e l t i t necessary to state c l e a r l y i n the reply to the 
-German Government that she must r e t a i n freedom "to give t h i s assistance 
(^2) 
v/ithout being prevented by the Rhine pact. Their reply of k June, 
therefore, reintroduced the idea of guarantees for the eastern 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s by any signatory of the Rhine pact whOjWished to 
give one, and added to the cases where coercive action would be 
(Cont'd) 
Belgian Governments. On 25 May the Belgian Minister for Foreign 
A f f a i r s told Grahame that h i s country wanted to feike part i n the 
western pact on an equal footing with an e x p l i c i t guarantee of 
her f r o n t i e r , but that he had misgivings about guaranteeing the 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s . A statement of the Belgian view was given 
to Chamberlain on 29 May; Brussels t e l . k7, 25 May; memorandum 
from Belgian Ambassador, 29 May, C 7065, 7263/Vp9/l8, FO 371/ 
10732; D 0 D 0 B 0 , Vol. I I , No. 57= 
k2o On 29 May T y r e l l wrote to Phipps that as regards France's obligations 
to Poland and Czechoslovakia, i t was f e l t i n London that the remedy 
already existed i n the Covenant. I f Germany attacked Poland Art. 
16 would come into play and France v/ould be e n t i t l e d to treat the 
case as an act of war and proceed accordingly. B r i t a i n would be 
in the same position and would be bound to apply sanctions: Phipps 
read the l e t t e r to Laroche. T y r e l l to Phipps, 29 May 1925; Phipps 
to T y r e l l , 31 May, C 7296, 7512A59/18, FO 371/10732. 
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allowed under the Franco-German a r b i t r a t i o n treaty f a i l u r e to observe 
a treaty guaranteed by one or both of the p a r t i e s . A few other 
amendments were made i n the in t e r e s t s of c l a r i t y , and the new 
( 4 3 ) 
B r i t i s h section was amended and put back to section V. After 
considering the French amendments Chamberlain told Baldwin that he 
thought that they could a l l be accepted apart from the change i n 
the statement that nothing i n the proposed t r e a t i e s would affec t the 
rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League. The 
Foreign Office wished to r e t a i n their version because i t was wider 
than the French and would cover Germany as well when she joined the 
League. Baldwin agreed that Chamberlain might so inform Briand at 
(44) 
Geneva, whither both were now going for the June Council meeting. 
At Geneva Chamberlain and Briand rapidly reached agreement, 
Chamberlain being struck by the width of Briand's views and his" 
conviction that i f the pact negotiations succeeded the whole si t u a t i o n 
would be changed so that other problems now causing d i f f i c u l t y could 
be more e a s i l y solved. Briand accepted the B r i t i s h wish to r e t a i n 
t h e i r new section i n the draft note to the German Government. The 
speed of their agreement caused surprise and speculation i n the press, 
which was apparently not aware that very l i t t l e had remained to be 
set t l e d and therefore assumed that one or other (probably Chamberlain) 
43. Briand to Fleuriau, 4 Jun. , 1925^ desp. 1963 to P a r i s , 5 Jun., C 7%% 
7577/459/18, FO 371/10732; A o A o E „ , Grande Bretagne, Vol. 76; Cmd 
2 4 3 5 of 1925. 
44. Minutes by Chamberlain and Baldwin, 5 and 6 Jun. 1925,0 7806/ 
459/18, FO 371/10733= 
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had s a c r i f i c e d something important. (^5) A Havas message reporting 
Chamberlain's and Briand's agreement caused trouble i n Rome because 
i t implied that they had decided on a v i r t u a l Anglo-Franco-Belgian 
a l l i a n c e o Although Mussolini had recently been saying that I t a l y 
might not be interested i n joining a pact unless there was a 
guarantee for the only fr o n t i e r that d i r e c t l y interested her, he and 
the I t a l i a n press only calmed down on being assured by both Chamberlain 
and Briand that the Havas report was inaccurate and that they would 
be very glad i f I t a l y did join, / ^ Briand also suggested that 
there might be another agreement Jaerout Germany's southern f r o n t i e r . 
Chamberlain impressed on S c i a l o j a , the I t a l i a n delegate at Geneva, 
that B r i t a i n ' s decision to guarantee only the Rhine frontier did not 
af f e c t her other obligations under the peace t r e a t i e s and the Covenant; 
and he said that; i f Germany raised the question" of union v7rth~~AustFia-
when she joined the League she would meet decided B r i t i s h opposition. 
While these Anglo-French discussions were taking place the 
Germans were s t i l l professing anxiety about the fate of the pact 
proposals. Among other things they were worried by a report that 
Benes, when on a v i s i t to Warsaw at the end of A p r i l to sign a trade 
^5. Chamberlain to Briaiuj, 8 Jun. 1925, C 77^3A59/l8, FO 371/10732; 
A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol 76; Chamberlain to T y r e l l , 8 Jun. 
1925; Chamberlain to Briand, 8 Jun,; B e r l i n t e l . 10 to Geneva, 
9 Jun.; Geneva t e l . 5 to B e r l i n , 9 Jun.; P a r i s desp. 1331, 11 
Jun., C 7862, 7752, 7785, 788V^59/18, FO 371/10733; Chamberlain 
to T y r e l l , 12 Jun., C 8199A59/18, FO 371/1073^5 D.D.B. , Vol. I I , 
No. 6*+. 
•^6. Brussels t e l . 59, 9 Jun. 1925; Rome t e l s . 1^6, 1V?, 10 Jun. 1925; 
Chamberlain to Graham, 11 Jun.; Rome t e l . 153, 13 Jun., C 775 ,^ 
78if8, 78^9, 8052, 7957A-59/18, f o 371/10733; D°D.I°, Vol. IV, 
Nos. 21, 23, 2k, 27, 29, 32. 
if7. Chamberlain to Graham, 11 Jun. 1925, C 8052A59/18, FO 371/10733; 
A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vols.77-80, pjagsim; D.D.I., Vol. IV, No. 
32. Mussolini remained doubtful about joining the pact; Contarini 
and S c i a l o j a were i n favour: D.D.I., Vol IV, No. 35; Rome desp. 
526, 19 Jun., C 83^5A59/18, FO 371/1073^= 
bio 
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and an arbi t r a t i o n treaty, had made some agreement with the Polish 
Government about preventing frontier revision.. Sthamer asked 
Chamberlain about the reports on 15 May, and said that a new 
encirclement had begun i n the east which would make Germany's entry 
into the League even more d i f f i c u l t . Chamberlain replied that he 
did not know whether the reports were accurate, but i f they were 
i t was due to n a t i o n a l i s t talk i n Germany and the fact that the 
German Government had drawn a d i s t i n c t i o n between the western and 
eastern f r o n t i e r s . He would ce r t a i n l y not encourage Germany to seek 
a change i n the treaty settlement and i t would be f o l l y for her to 
jo i n the League only to appeal to A r t i c l e 19 of the Covenant. 
Germany must joi n the League unconditionally: i f she could not do 
so i t would be better to abandon the security negotiations before 
they went any "farther. 
A month l a t e r Chamberlain sent to D'Abernon and Max Muller a 
considered statement of the Foreign Office position on Poland. The 
pact proposals, he wrote, had paradoxically focused attention on the 
east and had aroused one of the periodic outbursts of c r i t i c i s m i n 
B r i t a i n of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . ^ 9 ) T h e s o l u t i o n reached a t 
the Peace Conference was at l e a s t ethnographically correct and 
represented the most s a t i s f a c t o r y of the courses open at the time. 
48. Memorandum by Schubert, 11 May 1925; desp. to Sthamer, 11 
May; desps. to Koch and Eauscher, 13 May; Sthamer t e l . , 15 May, 
4509/E126187-92, E126195-97, E126215-24, E126279-83; desp. 
902 to Be r l i n , 15 May, C 6652/459/18, FO 371/10731° 
49. Notably a denunciation by Lloyd George i n the Commons debate 
on 24 March! H.C. Deb., 5th ser. , Vol. 182, c o l s . 328-38. 
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Two other solutions had recently been suggested. The f i r s t was 
that Poland should give up the Corridor and get Hemel i n exchange 
for Danzig. The disadvantage of putting Poles back under German rule 
might be outweighed by the advantage of removing a cause of 
constant f r i c t i o n and a possible cause of war; but the solution was 
beyond the bounds of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s because of the Polish-
Lithuanian quarrel and the status of Memel. The second proposal was 
that East Prussia should be neutralised, on the assumption that t h i s 
would reduce the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n due to i t s separation from the rest 
of Germany. This seemed impracticable because there was no reason 
to suppose that the East Prussions would agree to being separated 
from the Reich to an even greater degree. There was a danger, 
Chamberlain went on, of assuming that a change i n the frontier was 
inevitable and that therefore B r i t a i n should promote i t . I t was too 
soon to say that a change was inevitable, and as l i t t l e as possible 
ought to be changed u n t i l change was proved to be necessary. Not 
only would changes bring new problems: the idea that the B r i t i a h 
Government favoured change would increase i n s e c u r i t y . Chamberlain 
was trying to diminish the d i f f i c u l t i e s , t e l l i n g the Polish Minister 
(51) 
that h i s country must not be i r r i t a t i n g , and t e l l i n g the German 
Amabssador that h i s country must not expect a change i n the treaty 
50. By D'Abernon among others. Berthelot was also said to 
favour the f i r s t solutions minute by Gregory, 20 May 1925, 
N 3028A3/55, FO 371/10997° 
51. He did so, for example, on 51 Marchs desp. 268 to Warsaw, 
N 1843/43/55, FO 371/10997; and on 19 May: desp. 39^ to Warsaw, 
C 6850/459/18, FO 371/10731o 
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settlement. " I f the Germans are wise they w i l l l e t the question 
sleep for a generation., I f the Poles are wise they w i l l make i t 
( 5 2 ) 
possible for them to do so". 
When D'Abernon sav; the f i r s t French draft of the reply to 
the German security proposal, he thought i t excellent and recommended 
that i t should be sent before the A l l i e d disarmament note. The 
Foreign Office replied that the security note would s t i l l take some 
( 5 3 ) 
time and they did not want the French to delay the disarmament one. 
D'Abernon then went to the other extreme and told Schubert that he 
was alone i n feeling optimistic about the prospects for negotiations; 
once again Schubert complained of the delay and said that he suspected 
the French of trying to sabotage the security pact. Just before 
Chamberlain and Briand v/ent to Geneva the London press, too,was 
"pessimistic about""the""Anglo-French corfespbndence; and although 
Chamberlain and T y r e l l did their best to reassure Sthamer, and Briand 
did h i s to reassure Hoesch, the Germans remained gloomy and believed 
that the central problem was that of the effect of a Rhine pact on 
( 5 5 ) 
France's obligations to Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
52. Desps. 1099 to B e r l i n , 470 to Warsaw, 16 Jun. 1925, C 8063A59/ 
18, FO 371/10733#O 
53o B e r l i n t e l . 195, 18 May 1925; B e r l i n t e l . 199, 20 May; t e l . 
107 to B e r l i n , 22 May, C 6711, 6852A59/18, FO 371/10731» 
5k. B e r l i n t e l . 20k, 26 May 1925, C 7142A59/18, FO 371/10732; 
memorandum by Schubert, 26 May, 4509/E126397-^01» 
55. Sthamer t e l s . , 26 and 28 May 1925; t e l . to Hoesch, 2 Jun.; 
Hoesch t e l . , k Jun., 4509/El26*K)7, E126437, El26V?8-8*f, 
E126507-10o 
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At t h i s point, on 4 June, the A l l i e d note on the state of 
German disarament was delivered i n B e r l i n . The German Government 
received i t calmly, although i t was evident that the subject could 
ii 
lead to a co n f l i c t of in t e r e s t s betv/een the army and the Auswartiges 
Amt.^^ I n two conversati ons with D'Abernon Stresemann t r i e d f i r s t 
to dispose of the Austrian question and then to suggest that i n view 
of the strong Soviet objections to the security pact and German 
entry into the League, the Western powers would have to give Germany 
something more, such as the return of Eupen and Malmedy, the 
evacuation of the Rhineland, and a colonial mandate, to compensate 
(57) 
for worsened re l a t i o n s with the Soviet Union. 
The Franco-German exchange of notes and drafting the Rhine pact 
The reply to the German proposals for a security pact, i n the 
( ^ 
name of the French Government, was delivered i n B e r l i n on 16 June. 
From the B r i t i s h point of view the next two months saw the development 
of two aspects of the pact policy, on the one hand encouragement of 
the Germans to pursue the negotiations and on the other the drafting 
56. Salev/ski, Entwaffnung und Mil i t a r k o n t r o l l e , pp. 305-07; Otto 
Gessler, Reichsv/ehrpolitik i n der WeimarevZeit, Stuttgart 
1958, pp. 316-17° A shortened version of the Control Commiss-
ion's report was now published, omitting the appendixes i n 
order to protect German sources of information. When Strese-
mann complained of not being given the f u l l text, D'Abernon 
supplied him with a copy; Salev/ski, op. c i t . , p. 305, n. 23-
57. Memoranda by Stresemann, 4 and 10 Jun. 1925, 3123/D6434o4-08, 
D 643483-85, extracts i n Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 99-103; 
D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, Vol. I I , pp. 167-70. For the 
Russian aspect see below, pp. te^y^^o, 
58. P a r i s desp. 1331, 11 Jun. 1925, C 7884/459/18, FO 371/10733; 
A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol 77; Cmd 2435 of 1925; Locarno-
Konferenz, No. 14. 
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of the v/estern security pact i n a form s a t i s f a c t o r y to B r i t a i n . 
The two aspects overlapped at certain points and eventually came 
together i n the j u r i s t s ' meeting i n London at the beginning of 
September. 
Encouraging the Germans to pursue the negotiations was not easy. 
The immediate reaction i n Germany to the French note was unfavourable, 
and the tone of the press was so bad that on 21 June Addison was 
instructed to l e t the Auswa'rtiges Amt know that Chamberlain believed 
that the French note offered Germany a golden opportunity to regain 
a position of f u l l equality in the comity of nations, and that i f 
she now frustrated her own i n i t i a t i v e the worst conclusions would be 
drawn. The German Government should reply promptly, accepting the 
broad p r i n c i p l e s , and save discussion of d e t a i l s for the drafting 
(59) 
stage. Addison replied that-Schubert said that the press comment" " 
must not be taken as representing the views of the Government 
(although he described i t as reasonable), and that he thought that 
the i r answer would not be such as to prevent further negotiation. 
Two days l a t e r Schubert told the French Ambassador, de Margerie, that 
there would have to be a detailed reply to the French note. 
Internal d i f f i c u l t i e s had to be overcome, but he was personally 
anxious to make progress and he suggested a meeting between Briand 
and Stresemann 0 ^ 
5 9 . T e l . 132 to B e r l i n , 21 Jun. 1925, C 8305A59/18, FO 371/10734. 
6 0 . B e r l i n t e l . 24-2, 22 Jun. 1925, C 8418/459/18, FO 371/1073^5 
memorandum by Schubert, 22 Jun., 4509 /E126766-69 . 
6 1 . Memorandum by Schubert, Zk Jun. 1925,- 4509 /E126805-09 . 
The internal d i f f i c u l t i e s were divisions with the German 
Government, a number of whose members either saw no point i n a 
security pact or wished to make the negotiations f a i l . Although 
the Cabinet approved Stresemann's policy on 26 June the arguments 
(62) 
continued, and no doubt at l e a s t partly for t h i s reason 
Stresemann's and Schubert's tone i n conversation remained harsh. 
When towards the end of June D'Abernon returned to B e r l i n from 
leave Chamberlain wrote to urge him to use a l l h i s influence to 
prevent the Germans from destroying t h e i r own works at the same 
time Addison suggested that pressure should be put on Sthamer. 
Chamberlain thought that i t was no good talking to Sthamer, whom he 
described as "a German feather bed", but nevertheless Lampson 
expressed concern to the Ambassador and exhorted him to urge h i s Government to send a speedy and uncontentious reply to the French 
note. After talking to Stresemann and Schubert D'Abernon sent 
pessimistic reports. He believed that Stresemann was s t i l l whole-
heartedly behind the pact negotiations, but the opposition, fanned 
by the Russians, was unexpectedly strong. D'Abernon thought that 
i t was important to get to the conference stage as quickly as 
p o s s i b l e . C h a m b e r l a i n replied that these reports, contrasting 
62. See Turner, Stresemann and the P o l i t i c s of the V/eimar Republic, 
pp. 2 0 4 - 0 7 ; Max von Stockhausen, Sechs Jahre Reichskanzlei, 
Bonn 1954, pp. 165-7; Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt, Frankfurt 
1967, pp. 4-70-7; Stresemann, Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 109-10. 
On 27 June the Land Governments gave the Reich Government a 
free hand to take the next step, and a f t e r a meeting of the 
Reichstag Foreign A f f a i r s Committee Stresemann secured Luther's 
support, which had been i n doubt. 
63- Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 26 Jun. 19251 Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 52/280, FO 800/257; Addison to Lampson, 26 Jun.; desp. 1208 
to B e r l i n , 30 Jun., C 8804, 8805/459/18, FO 371/10735» 
6 4 . B e r l i n t e l . 245, 28 Jun. 1925; B e r l i n t e l . 2 4 4 , 29 Jun., 
C 8699, 8770/459/18, FO 371/10735; memorandum by Schubert, 27 
Jun., 4509/E126878-87; memorandum by Stresemann, 28 Jun., 
3 1 2 3 / D 6 4 3 7 4 8 - 5 4 . 
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w i t h D'Abernon's e a r l i e r optimism about the probable r e c e p t i o n of 
the French note, made him wonder whether he was "being used as a 
dupe i n a n e g o t i a t i o n i n which the German proposals were only put 
forward t o d i v i d e the A l l i e s or get a b e t t e r p r i c e from fiussia.o,.. 
I f Germany refuses or delays acceptance the o p p o r t u n i t y may pass 
f o r ever and the blame w i l l be hers"„ 
The p o i n t s i n the French note t h a t caused the greatest 
o b j e c t i o n s i n Germany were the i n s i s t e n c e on German en t r y i n t o the 
League and the proposal f o r a guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s . Other p o i n t s o f d i f f i c u l t y were the u n l i m i t e d nature 
o f the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s and the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the A l l i e s could 
s t i l l take a c t i o n against Germany under the terms of the Treaty of 
V e r s a i l l e s . The Germans asked f o r explanations on some of these 
p o i n t s and were not s a t i s f i e d w i t h r e p l i e s t h a t d e t a i l s were best 
l e f t f o r subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n s . ^ ^ To discover p r e c i s e l y what 
the German o b j e c t i o n s were, D'Abernon and a member of the Embassy 
s t a f f v/ent through the French note w i t h Schubert and Gaus, and compiled 
a l i s t which he sent t o London.. I n the f i r s t place the proposal f o r 
u n l i m i t e d a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s "presented a problem of e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
65o T e l - 135 t o B e r l i n , 30 Jun„ 1925, C 8?70A59/l8, FO 371/10735= 
66. Memorandum by Stresemann, 18 Jun. 1925, 3123/06^3555-59, 
Vermachtnis, V o l . I I , pp. 103-06; memorandum by Stresemann, 
20 Juno, 3123/D643576-79; t e l . t o Sthamer, 22 Jun.; Sthamer 
t e l . , 23 Juno, ^509/El26781-83, E126800-02; desp. 1175 t o 
B e r l i n , 23 Jun., C 85^8/^59/18, FO 371/1073^° A c i r c u l a r t o 
German missions on the French note asserted t h a t the 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s and the Covenant were not both needed and 
suggested t h a t i f France demanded both she was pursuing not 
her 'own s e c u r i t y but the encirclement of Germany. Hoesch 
disagreed w i t h t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n but Schubert supported i t : 
c i r c u l a r t e l . , 20 Jun.; Hoesch t e l . , 21 Jun.; t e l . t o Hoesch, 
23 Jun„, ^509/^1267^5-^9, E126756-57, E126786-88. 
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d i f f i c u l t y " . The o b j e c t i o n was worded as a t e c h n i c a l one about 
the u n s u i t a b i l i t y of a r b i t r a l t r i b u n a l s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h non-
j u r i d i c a l disputes, and i t was suggested t h a t under t h i s proposal 
an a r b i t r a l t r i b u n a l would be c a l l e d upon not only t o adju d i c a t e on 
the current German-Polish trade dispute but t o f i x German t a r i f f s . 
Gaus and Schubert sa i d t h a t they p r e f e r r e d the dual system of a r b i t r a l 
r 
t l b u n a l s and c o n c i l i a t i o n bodies provided i n the German-Swiss 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y . Secondly the r e t e n t i o n of the r i g h t t o take 
a c t i o n under e x i s i n g t r e a t i e s would, the Germans claimed, leave 
France f r e e t o enter the Ruhr again without o p p o r t u n i t y f o r 
a r b i t r a t i o n , or t o invade Germany i f she decided t h a t A r t i c l e s k2 
and ^3 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s had been v i o l a t e d . T h i r d l y the 
guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s meant t h a t France could 
"act against~Gerraany w i t h o u t " w a i t i n g f o r the League i n the~event,~say, 
o f t r o u b l e caused by the German m i n o r i t y i n Poland. F i n a l l y the 
renewed a f f i r m a t i o n of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s was causing great 
d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and p u b l i c o p i n i o n . 
D'Abernon pooh-poohed Schubert's a s s e r t i o n t h a t the Germans 
were threatened w i t h another d i c t a t e d t r e a t y , and wrote t h a t he 
thought t h a t most of the ob j e c t i o n s were t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r than 
p r a c t i c a l and arose from a misunderstanding of the s p i r i t of the 
French note. He hoped t h a t when the d r a f t i n g stage was reached i t 
would not be d i f f i c u l t t o devise a t e x t meeting most of the o b j e c t i o n s . 
But he admitted t h a t Schubert and Gaus had s a i d t h a t the pact as 
proposed would leave Germany i n a worse p o s i t i o n than i f she simply 
j o i n e d the League, and t h a t the French had t w i s t e d the o r i g i n a l 
39^ 
o f f e r of a short and simple agreement out of a l l r e c o g n i t i o n * 
Although D'Abernon was more hopeful a f t e r the meeting of the 
(f>P>) 
Reichstag Foreign A f f a i r s Committee on 1 J u l y , the Foreign O f f i c e 
decided t o set out t h e i r impression of the German o b j e c t i o n s i n a 
despatch which could be published i f the n e g o t i a t i o n s f a i l e d . The 
despatch s a i d t h a t Chamberlain agreed t h a t the German o b j e c t i o n s 
were j u r i s t i c r a t h e r than p r a c t i c a l and ought not i n themselves t o 
cause great d i f f i c u l t . He would not give d e t a i l e d explanations now, 
f o r i f the explanations were not concerted w i t h the French they 
might subsequently prove not t o represent French views, and i f they 
were so concerted i t would mean f u r t h e r delay and p r o l o n g a t i o n of 
the correspondenceo But two p o i n t s must be made. F i r s t , the s t a t e -
ment t h a t the proposal of u n l i m i t e d a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s presented 
a problem of e x t r a o r d i n a r y d i f f i c u l t y was i t s e l f e x t r a o r d i n a r y , 
since i t was the Germans who had f i r s t suggested comprehensive 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s p r o v i d i n g f o r the peaceful settlement of j u r i d i c a l 
67» B e r l i n desp. 388, 1 J u l . 1925, C 9066A59/18, FO 371/10735; 
memoranda by Schubert and correspondence w i t h D'Abernon, 
30 Jun= and 1 J u l . , ^509/El26932-33, E126988-91, E126992-
127006, E126592-99. 
680 B e r l i n t e l a . 2^8, 2 J u l . 1925; 250, 3 J u l . ; 251, 3 J u l . , 
C 8895, 8938, 8959A59/18, FO 371/10735, 
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and p o l i t i c a l disputes. Secondly the Germans were c r e a t i n g 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the language of the French note. However short 
and simple an agreement the German Government might have contemplated, 
t h e i r proposals were both comprehensive and e l a s t i c and the French 
note was an honest attempt t o carry f a r t h e r t e n t a t i v e German 
suggestions which had been taken as having f o r t h e i r object "the 
p r e s e r v a t i o n of peace, the removal of the p r e v a i l i n g sense of 
i n s e c u r i t y and the c u l t i v a t i o n of more f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between 
the n a t i o n s r e c e n t l y at war.... I f , a t t h i s stage, the German 
Government draw back, the world w i l l q u i c k l y r e v i s e i t s estimate of 
69. The despatch quoted A r t . 1 of the German-Swiss a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t y i n support of t h i s argument, a f a c t which suggests a 
degree of misunderstanding a t l e a s t on the B r i t i s h s i d e . The 
Germans were o s t e n s i b l y o b j e c t i n g t o a t r e a t y under which 
— - -disputes—of— a H - k i n d s would be -submitted to~ a r b i t r a l - t r i b u n a l s ' "' 
which were not s u i t a b l e f o r d e a l i n g w i t h p o l i t i c a l disputes 
whereas, as Chamberlain had ascertained from Briand, the French 
were t h i n k i n g of a r b i t r a t i o n i n the broad sense i n c l u d i n g c o n c i -
l i a t i o n procedures, only s t i p u l a t i n g t h a t the award must be 
bi n d i n g . On the other hand the B r i t i s h seem s t i l l t o have 
been i g n o r i n g the f a c t t h a t under the German-Swiss t r e a t y the 
awards of the c o n c i l i j a t i o n body were not b i n d i n g but merely 
recommendations. But correspondence i n the German archives 
shows t h a t the German d i s l i k e of u n l i m i t e d a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s 
was mainly p o l i t i c a l , and t h a t some o f f i c i a l s saw advantages i n 
the t r e a t i e s being u n l i m i t e d , both because France and Belgium 
would be more completely bound and because more disputes w i t h 
Poland could be raised? 4509/E127720-45, E127880-88; 4562/ 
E15586O-67. See also below,- pp.4*S^«>&. 
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the nature and purpose of t h e i r o r i g i n a l proposals. . . . ^ ^ 1 cannot 
suppose t h a t any responsible statesman, r e a l i s i n g what t h i s would 
mean, w i l l enter upon so disa s t r o u s a course". 
The o r i g i n a l o b j e c t s of the German proposals were i n f a c t a 
good deal narrower than the p r e s e r v a t i o n of peace and the c u l t i v a t i o n 
o f more f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s , but these more l i m i t e d o b j e c t s had i n 
l a r g e measure already been achieved, as Hoesch p o i n t e d out i n a 
despatch u r g i n g the c o n t i n u a t i o n of n e g o t i a t i o n s . The pact proposal, 
he maintained, had had a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the disarmament note, 
i t had separated the question of the evacuation of the Cologne zone 
from t h a t of f u t u r e s u p e r v i s i o n under A r t i c l e 213* and had k i l l e d the 
idea of an A l l i e d s e c u r i t y t r e a t y d i r e c t e d against Germany. Hoesch 
picked out three elements i n the French note f o r s p e c i a l comment : 
"( a) "the" r i g h t t o R e s i s t f a i l u r e s to"6bs"erve the peace t r e a t y "even 
where the Western powers were not d i r e c t l y concerned seemed o b j e c t i o n -
able , as i t appeared t o a l l o w a French veto on the r e t u r n of Eupen 
and Malmedy even i f Belgium agreed, ( b ) U n l i m i t e d a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s were not ob j e c t i o n a b l e so f a r as those i n the west were 
concerned: indeed i t was t o Germany's i n t e r e s t t o get the greatest 
s e c u r i t y against a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n by France and Belgium, and t h e i r 
70. Desp. 1307 t o B e r l i n , 17 J u l . 1925, C 9066A59/18, FO 371/10735; 
Chamberlain wrote t o D'Abernon i n a s i m i l a r sense on 10 J u l y , 
Lampson wrote t o Addison t h a t while i t might not be wise t o go 
on "belabouring" Stresemann, he and "others ought t o be made t o 
r e a l i s e t h a t i f they turned down the French overtures they would 
be regarded as having opted f o r revenge, and t h i s would have a 
fa r - r e a c h i n g e f f e c t on the p o l i c y of other c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y 
B r i t a i n . Lampson spoke on the same l i n e s t o the Counsellor of 
the German Bnabssy, Dufour-Feronce; Lampson t o Addison, 6 J u l . ; 
desp. 1250 t o B e r l i n , 7 J u l . ; Chamberlain t o D'Abernon, 10 J u l . , 
C 880^, 9103, 9066A59/18, FO 371/10735; Dufour desp., 10 J u l . , 
3123/D6^3869-76. 
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e f f o r t s should be d i r e c t e d towards g e t t i n g breaches of e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s 
i n c l u d e d . I t would obviously be very d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d convincing 
reasons f o r concluding d i f f e r e n t t r e a t i e s i n the east, and Hoesch 
thought t h a t Germany might have t o concede t h i s p o i n t , ( c ) Although 
Hoesch thought t h a t a French guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s would not give France a greater r i g h t t o intervene i n a 
German-Polish c o n f l i c t than she already possessed under the Covenant, 
i t would set France up as a k i n d of a r b i t e r of Germany's r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h the eastern c o u n t r i e s and i m p l i e d r e c o g n i t i o n of France's 
a l l i a n c e s . I t ought t h e r e f o r e t o be r e j e c t e d and Hoesch thought t h a t 
r e s i s t a n c e might succeed. I n general he believed t h a t the only 
p o s s i b l e p o l i c y was t o pursue the n e g o t i a t i o n s s e r i o u s l y : i f they 
could get a guarantee pact, even by making a s a c r i f i c e on the 
character -of the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s , Germany's s e c u r i t y — a g a i n s t 
(71) 
French a t t a c k would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased. 
On 3 J u l y Schubert t o l d D'Abernon t h a t i t had been decided t o 
send a note t o the French Government, but t h a t d r a f t i n g i t was very 
(72) 
d i f f i c u l t . D'Abernon had asked Lampson f o r suggestions on over-
coming the d i f f i c u l t y about the guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s . Lampson r e p l i e d t h a t D'Abernon would r e a l i s e "the n i c e t y 
of the question of France's commitments i n the east and the necessity 
of f i n d i n g some way out f o r her". He should be e s p e c i a l l y c a r e f u l t o 
say no t h i n g of t h i s t o the Germans, but he could p o i n t out t h a t France 
71o Hoesch desp., 30 Jun. 1925, A-509/E126960-72. 
72. Memorandum by Schubert, 3 J u l . 1925, ^509/EI26988-91= Six 
d r a f t s of the German r e p l y are preserved i n t h i s f i l e . 
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already had an a l l i a n c e w i t h Poland and the proposed guarantee would 
be of both sides. Even i f the Germans were s c e p t i c a l about t h i s 
aspect, they ought t o r e a l i s e t h a t they would have ample o p p o r t u n i t y 
(73 
du r i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s t o go f u l l y i n t o the terms of the guarantee. 
I g n o r i n g the s p e c i f i c warning, D'Abernon not only t o l d Schubert t h a t 
Germany would be b e t t e r o f f w i t h the guarantee because i t would apply 
t o her as w e l l as t o Poland, but also said t h a t B r i t a i n would support 
the German view and t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p of France t o Poland was 
(?4) 
t h a t of a man who wanted t o p a r t from h i s mistress e l e g a n t l y . 
Nevertheless the French guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s was r e j e c t e d i n the German note which was d e l i v e r e d i n P a r i s 
on 20 J u l y . The note also objected t o ( l ) the statement t h a t the 
peace t r e a t i e s would not be modified by the proposed pact as un-
necessary 'and undesirable. The German Government, i t s a i d , b e l i e v e d 
t h a t conclusion of the pact would have an e f f e c t on the occupation 
of the Ehineland. (2) The proposal f o r u n l i m i t e d a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s 
and the r e t e n t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of coercive a c t i o n i n case of a 
breach of e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s . (3) The guarantee of the a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s l e a v i n g the guarantor t o decide who had been the aggressor. 
(4) The demand f o r German en t r y i n t o the League of Nations. The l a s t 
l e t t e r from the Council, i t was s a i d , had not met the German o b j e c t i o n s 
t o A r t i c l e l6s Germany was disarmed and exposed, and could not be 
regarded as enjoying equal r i g h t s u n t i l her disarmament were f o l l o w e d 
by general disarmament. I n conclusion the German Government expressed 
73„ B e r l i n t e l . 252, 3 J u l . 1925; t e l . 137 t o B e r l i n , 5 J u l . , 
C 8939A59/18, F0 371/10735. 
74. Memorandum by Schubert, 8 J u l . 1925, 4509/E127066-70; B e r l i n 
t e l . 257, 8 J u l . , C 9177/459/18, F0 371/10735. D'Abernon d i d 
not h i m s e l f r e p o r t t h i s statement. 
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the hope t h a t f u r t h e r discussions v/ould l e a d t o a p o s i t i v e r e s u l t , 
(75) 
and t h a t these discussions could be accelerated. 
The German note was not w e l l received i n P a r i s and London. 
Although Briand and Chamberlain made the best of i t t o each other, and 
although Briand convinced Hoesch of h i s good w i l l , both M i n i s t e r s 
•were concerned a t the continued German o b j e c t i o n s t o j o i n i n g the 
(76) 
League and agreed t h a t there would have t o be another note. 
Chamberlain was also annoyed a t the reference t o the occupation, 
which he regarded as near t o a breach of Stresemann's promise t h a t the 
question v/ould not be r a i s e d as a c o n d i t i o n f o r the pact. Chamberlain 
commented t o D'Abernon t h a t he had given due weight t o the f a c t t h a t 
the mote had been d r a f t e d w i t h an eye t o German p u b l i c o p i n i o n , but 
he f e l t bound t o observe t h a t i n pursuing an i n t e r n g a t i o a l settlement 
"i" t " was also necessary~to- s a t i s f y p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n o t h e r - c o u n t r i e s . 
I n t h i s note the German Government appeared no longer " i n the r o l e 
o f a f a r - s e e i n g c o n t r i b u t o r t o the general cause of peace, but 
r a t h e r i n t h a t o f a somewhat u n w i l l i n g p a r t i c i p a n t , who acquiesces 
i n a scheme, not because of i t s i n t r i n s i c m e r i t s , but merely i n the 
(77) 
hope t h a t consent w i l l enable him t o d r i v e a barg a i n i n other d i r e c t i o n s 1 ° 
When D'Abernon r e p o r t e d Schubert's hope t h a t there would not be 
another French note Chamberlain r e t o r t e d t h a t the Germans should have 
75. Note from the German Government, 20 J u l . 1925, C9581A59/18, 
FO 371/10736; 3123/D6if39l8-33; A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, V ol. 79; 
Cmd 2^68 of 1925, Reply of the German Government t o the Note 
handed to Herr Stresemann by the French Ambassador at B e r l i n on 
June 16V "1925 r e s p e c t i n g the proposals f o r a pact of s e c u r i t y ; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 16. 
76. Desp. 2503 t o P a r i s , 22 J u l . 1925; desp. 2539 t o P a r i s , 27 J u l . , 
C 9789A59/18, FO 371/10736; Hoesch t e l s . , 20 and 23 J u l . , ^509/ 
E127279-85, E127363-65<. 
77. Desp. Iif13 t o B e r l i n , 28 J u l . 1925§1 01003^59/18, FO 371/10737; 
Chamberlain t o D'Abernon, 29 J u l . , Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/289, 
D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MS ^8929, FO 800/258. 
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thought of t h a t before p u b l i s h i n g "an e l e c t i o n manifesto"., They 
were now asking the A l l i e d Governments t o show "a patience, f o r -
bearance and statesmanship, not t o say a courage, i n face of p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n , of which i n e f f e c t they avow themselves incapable" 
Although the German r e p l y made a f u r t h e r note i n e v i t a b l e , i t 
also c a l l e d f o r a d e c i s i o n on how the f u t u r e n e g o t i a t i o n s were t o be 
conducted, and how soon the Germans were t o be brought i n t o the 
con s i d e r a t i o n of a t e x t . D r a f t s of a t r e a t y had already been under 
discussion between the B r i t i s h and the Frence f o r a month. Two 
d r a f t s had been produced i n the Foreign O f f i c e as e a r l y as 12 May, 
before the r e c e i p t of the French d r a f t r e p l y t o the German proposals; 
but these were s o l e l y f o r the i n t e r n a l purpose of mind-clearing and 
(79) 
Chamberlain d i d not i n t e n d t o submit a t e x t t o the Cabinet as y e t . 
Once agreement had been reached w i t h the French on the terms of the 
r e p l y t o Germany, the Foreign O f f i c e set sWiously~tb"w6fk w i t h - t h e ~ 
dual object of producing a basis f o r discussion and f o r e s t a l l i n g any 
pos s i b l e French attempt t o re i n t r o d u c e p o i n t s t h a t had already been 
r e j e c t e d . 
A d r a f t o f the mutual s e c u r i t y pact was c i r c u l a t e d t o the Cabinet 
on 27 June. The main p o i n t s were : (1) France and Belgium on the one 
hand and Germany on the other undertook i n no case to r e s o r t t o war 
78. B e r l i n t e l . 283, 28 J u l . 1925; t e l . 153 t o B e r l i n , 30 J u l . , 
C 9992/^59/18, FO 371/10737-
79° One d r a f t contained a mutual guarantee by Belgium, the B r i t i s h 
Empire, France, and Germany, and an undertaking by a l l f o u r t o 
submit disputes l i k e l y t o lead t o h o s t i l i t i e s t o a r b i t r a t i o n or 
j u d i c i a l s ettlement. The other contained a guarantee of the 
f r o n t i e r s between France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany 
on the ot h e r , and no a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n . I n both the p a r t i e s 
undertook t o respect the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Rhineland and 
i n both the oper a t i o n of the guarantee was made subject t o a 
decis i o n by the Council of the League. Neither contained any 
reference t o a guarantee of a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s i n the east, 
but both reserved the r i g h t s and d u t i e s of the p a r t i e s as 
memeber of the League: C 6579, 6580, 6581, 6582, 6583A59/18, 
FO 371/10731o 
except i n resi s t a n c e t o atta c k or when a c t i n g w i t h the a u t h o r i s a t i o n 
of the League. (2) An all e g e d breach of the preceding p r o v i s i o n or 
of A r t i c l e s 42, 43, or 180 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s would be brought 
before the Council of the League. I f the Council e s t a b l i s h e d the 
existence of a v i o l a t i o n i t would n o t i f y the p a r t i e s t o the t r e a t y , 
who would then come immediately t o the assistance of the v i c t i m . 
(3) The p a r t i e s t o the t r e a t y would guarantee the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s 
between France and Germany and Belgium and Germany. An all e g e d 
breach ( r e f u s a l t o submit a dispute t o the machinery provided, or 
r e f u s a l t o comply w i t h an award) would be r e f e r r e d t o the Council of 
the League. I f i t were s a t i s f i e d t h a t there was a breach i t would 
propose steps t o secure compliance. I f the p a r t y committing the 
breach r e s o r t e d t o war against the ot h e r , the guarantors would 
immediately come t o the help of the v i c t i m . (4) The t r e a t y w o u l d -
not prevent one of the p a r t i e s t a k i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n f u l f i l m e n t 
of a guarantee given t o an a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y between one of the 
other p a r t i e s and a t h i r d s t a t e , nor would i t a f f e c t r i g h t s under 
e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s . (5) No o b l i g a t i o n s were imposed on the Dominions 
or on I n d i a unless they chose t o accept t h e m . ^ ^ 
The question of how t o t r e a t the Dominions i n the proposed pact 
had been r a i s e d by the Co l o n i a l O f f i c e on 24 June, and they had been 
t o l d t h a t Chamberlain p r e f e r r e d t o make the o b l i g a t i o n s i n a p p l i c a b l e 
unless they contracted i n . ^ ^ But t h i s was merely the end of a 
80. CP. 311(25), 312(25), CAB 24/174. D r a f t of 17 Jun. 1925, C 8158/ 
459/18, FO 371/10733; notes by Hurst, C 8211/459/18, FO 371/10734. 
81. Harding t o Lampson, 24 Jun. 1925; Lampson t o Harding, 30 Jun., 
C 8530/459/18, FO 371/10734. 
long d i s c u s s i o n . On 2k March the A u s t r a l i a n l i a i s o n o f f i c e r i n 
London, R.G. Casey, sent the Foreign O f f i c e and the Colo n i a l O f f i c e 
some notes on the p o s i t i o n of the Dominions i n r e l a t i o n t o the 
s e c u r i t y pact, and asked f o r a discussion- Casey thought t h a t i t 
would be d i f f i c u l t t o get the Dominions t o discuss the pact, and 
t h a t i t was even l e s s l i k e l y t h a t they would a l l s i g n . I f not a l l 
d i d so the u n i t y of the Empire would be v i s i b l y impaired and even 
the " l o y a l " ones would be more d o u b t f u l . He t h e r e f o r e suggested t h a t 
B r i t a i n should j o i n the pact alone, and should not even include an 
accession clause i n the t r e a t y . Casey was not worr i e d about the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o i n t t h a t i f the United Kingdom were a t war the 
whole Empire would be at war,but|he had overlooked the p o i n t t h a t the 
Empire would be exposed t o b e l l i g e r e n t a c t i o n by the enemy: whether 
(82) _ the Dominions sent troops or not was" "secondary". 
Chamberlain t o l d Casey t h a t even though i t might i n the end 
prove necessary f o r B r i t a i n t o j o i n the pact alone, he hoped t h a t the 
Empire would speak w i t h one voice. The Co l o n i a l O f f i c e p r e f e r r e d a 
clause by which the Dominions could c o n t r a c t out of the o b l i g a t i o n s 
o f the pact i f they wished, and Casey wrote t o t h i s e f f e c t to h i s 
Prime M i n i s t e r a t the beginning of A p r i l . ^ Bruce then wrote t o 
Amery. He thought a pact between B r i t a i n , France and Belgium as 
obj e c t i o n a b l e as the Geneva P r o t o c o l , and considered t h a t a pact 
82. Casey t o Bland, 2k Mar. 1925, C *f257/l70V"l8, FO 371/10752. 
Casey's appointment as l i a i s o n o f f i c e r w i t h the Cabinet O f f i c e , 
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e and Foreign O f f i c e arose out of conversations 
i n 192^ between MacDonald and Bruce: CO. 5^369/2^+, CO 532/271; 
C e c i l Ed.wards, Bruce of Melbourne, London 19&5, PP» 86-87. 
83. Casey t o Bruce, 8 Apr. 1925, C 563QA59/18, FO 371/10730. 
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i n c l u d i n g Germany would be no more e f f e c t i v e than Germany's en t r y 
i n t o the League. I f B r i t a i n j o i n e d such a pact alone a f a t a l blow 
would be s t r u c k at Empire u n i t y ; but i f Germany j o i n e d the League 
the whole s e c u r i t y problem might be t r e a t e d , "as i t r e a l l y i s , as a 
p u r e l y Continental question". Sending Chamberlain and Baldwin copies 
of t h i s l e t t e r , Amery commented t h a t Bruce's views were s i g n i f i c a n t 
because he was l i k e l y t o back B r i t i s h | p ) l i c y more s t r o n g l y than any 
other A u s t r a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r , and c e r t a i n l y more s t r o n g l y than 
any Canadian or South A f r i c a n Prime M i n i s t e r . Amery repeated h i s own 
doubts about B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a pact and sa i d t h a t he had only 
acquiesced so f a r because he thought the commitment so remote t h a t 
B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n was u n l i k e l y ever t o be needed. 
Chamberlain r e p l i e d t h a t he agreed w i t h much of what Bruce wrote; 
but he was sure t h a t no Franco-German agreement was possible without 
B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n and t h a t i f Germany entered the League a t a l l 
she v/ould only do so i f e n t r y were i n s i s t e d upon as a c o n d i t i o n of 
the pact. Moreover the s e c u r i t y question was not a p u r e l y c o n t i n e n t a l 
one. B r i t a i n had a v i t a l i n t e r e s t i n the Channel coast, and could not 
remain untouched by any major European c o n f l i c t . I f B r i t a i n w i t h d r e w 
from Europe there would be no chance of permanent peace, and d i s a s t e r 
would come i n a couple of generations. " I a t any r a t e could not be 
responsible f o r att e m p t i n g t o conduct the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of t h i s 
84. Amery t o Baldwin, 15 Jun. 1925, Baldwin Papers, F.2 (Vol 115); 
Amery t o Chamberlain, 15 Jun., Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/32, 37, 
FO 800/258; both w i t h copies of Bruce t o Amery, 6 May. 
country i n c o n d i t i o n s which t o my mind make war i n e v i t a b l e " . 
The Dominion Governments received by telegram f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n 
on the progress of the n e g o t i a t i o n s . Except f o r the New Zealand 
Government, who s a i d t h a t they would f o l l o w B r i t a i n , none had expressed 
an opinion on the pact by the time of the debate on i t i n the House 
of Commons on ?h June. One of the strongest pleas i n Chamberlain's 
speech was t h a t i s o l a t i o n was impossible f o r B r i t a i n , who was a 
member of the League, had r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s under the Treaty of 
V e r s a i l l e s , and was geographically c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o Europe. 
Most speakers i n the debate, and notably the leaders of the Labour 
and L i b e r a l p a r t i e s , agreed; and although MacDonald s t i l l hankered 
a f t e r some general instrument l i k e the Geneva P r o t o c o l , the p o l i c y 
set out i n the correspondence w i t h the French Government was 
--genera-l-ly- -approved. — -Anxiety- -was-, -however ,—expressed—about—t-he - - - -
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the proposed guarantee and the machinery of the 
(86) 
League. A f t e r the debate Chamberlain wrote t o Crewe t h a t he was 
w e l l s a t i s f i e d and b e l i e v e d t h a t so f a r as B r i t i s h o p i n i o n was 
concerned "we r e a l l y have the pact i n our pocket" - provided t h a t 
the p r i n c i p l e were maintained t h a t except t o r e p e l i n v a s i o n no p a r t y 
should r e s o r t t o war u n t i l the methods of settlement by the League 
had been exhausted. " I f we l e f t a loophole f o r war (except i n the 
one case of self-defence against aggression) w i t h o u t previous 
85. Chamberlain t o Amery, 19 Jun. 1925, Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/ 
38, FO 8OO/258. On 6 August Chamberlain sent another l e t t e r 
t o Amery w i t h a r e p l y t o s i m i l a r c r i t i c i s m s of the pact by 
Smuts; AC 52/51, FO 8OO/258. 
86. H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 185, c o l s . 1555-16?1. 
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submission of the question t o the Council, t h a t would be the p o i n t 
(Pi7) 
on which a l l c r i t i c i s m and a l l o p p o s i t i o n v/ould centre"„ 
At the Cabinet's request the Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence 
considered the d r a f t s e c u r i t y t r e a t y on 1 J u l y . Here too much of 
the discussion was about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the pact and the 
League. Chamberlain explained t h a t B r i t a i n was o b l i g e d t o intervene 
i f the Council f a i l e d t o reach agreement, but t h a t the t r e a t y had been 
so framed as t o prevent any case a r i s i n g i n which the use of f o r c e was 
j u s t i f i a b l e w ithout previous recourse t o a r b i t r a t i o n i n i t s broadest 
sense, except t h a t France, Belgium and Germany might act i n s e l f -
defence against a t t a c k . I f B r i t a i n were t o guarantee the western 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s the terms would have to be s c r u t i n i s e d very 
c a r e f u l l y ; but he was sure t h a t no FrBnch Government v/ould be so 
f o o l i s h as to~~go~~t~o~ war -unless -"th^y~v/eYe"~ceTtain _of" c a r r y i n g " B r i t a i n 
w i t h them. I n f a c t B r i t a i n ' s l i a b i l i t i e s v/ere reduced, because by 
making i t cl e a r t h a t i n the case of one f r o n t i e r she was prepared t o 
make her maximum e f f o r t i t was i m p l i e d t h a t i n the case of the other 
f r o n t i e r she was n o t . The F i r s t Sea Lord and the Chief of the A i r 
S t a f f had no comments. Cavan sai d t h a t the General S t a f f were whole-
h e a r t e d l y i n favour and d i d not t h i n k t h a t the m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n s 
v/ere any greater than those already e x i s t i n g under the peace t r e a t i e s 
and the Covenant. The Committee decided t h a t there should be a 
clause a l l o w i n g the t r e a t y t o be terminated i f the Council of the 
League decided by a m a j o r i t y t h a t the League i t s e l f a f f o r d e d s u f f i c i e n t 
87. Chamberlain t o Crew^ 27 Jun. 1925, Chamberlain Papers, AC 
52/221, Crewe Papers, C/8, FO 8OO/258. 
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p r o t e c t i o n ; and they agreed t o recommend the d r a f t t o the Cabinet 
subject t o fou r minor amendments. On 3 J u l y the Cabinet 
approved the amended d r a f t without questioning i t s p r i n c i p l e s , and 
agreed t o send i t to the Dominions and the French Government. 
Chamberlain was now anxious t o speed up the n e g o t i a t i o n s and 
get t o the stage of conversations w i t h the G e r m a n s , b u t i t 
took another month t o reach agreement w i t h the French on the d r a f t 
o f the t r e a t y . The d i f f i c u l t y was t h a t s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the oper-
a t i o n of the guarantee t o deci s i o n by the Council t o which B r i t i s h 
o p i n i o n was b e l i e v e d t o at t a c h so much importance. The French also 
feared t h a t the B r i t i s h d r a f t weakened the p r o v i s i o n s of the Treaty 
of V e r s a i l l e s r e l a t i n g t o the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Rhineland. 
These p o i n t s were r a i s e d a t once by the French Ambassador when he 
received the d r a f t s and were s p e l l e d out i n i n s t r u c t i o n s sent t o - h i m — 
(91) 
by Briand on 9 J u l y . Chamberlain commented t h a t the p r o v i s i o n s 
i n the d r a f t were the maximum or minimum o b l i g a t i o n s t o France and 
Germany, according t o the p o i n t of view, outside which B r i t a i n 
r e t a i n e d e n t i r e freedom i n c l u d i n g l i b e r t y t o act i f Germany v i o l a t e d 
the f r o n t i e r before the League could take a d e c i s i o n . He r e p l i e d t o 
F l e u r i a u t h a t the d r a f t d i d d i s t i n g u i s h between the dec i s i o n r e q u i r e d 
of the Council i n the case of a t h r e a t of war and t h a t r e q u i r e d i n 
case of an act of war. I t was e s s e n t i a l t o set up some machinery t o 
88. C 32(25), 1 J u l . , CAB 23/50; CP. 309(25), 311(25), CAB 24/174; 
C.I,Do 201st meeting, CAB 2/4. There does not seem t o have been 
any discussion of the m i l i t a r y aspects of the pacts t h i s was the 
only occasion on which i t came before the ^C.I.D. But see also 
Chapter 7i pp. f%§>=-3<> 
89. C. 33(25), CAB 23/50; CP. 381(25), CAB 24/174; desp, 2286 t o 
P a r i s , C 8861/459/18, FO 371/10735= For the t e x t see Appendix. 
90. Desp. 2286 t o P a r i s , 4 J u l . 1925, C 8861A59/18, FO 371/10735; 
Chamberlain t o Crewe, 7 J u l . , CrewjgPapers, C/8. 
91. Minute by Nicolson, 6 J u l . 1925; Briand t o F l e u r i a u , 9 J u l ; desps. 
2362, 2370 t o P a r t s , 10 J u l . , c 9186, 9216, 9223, 9243/459/18, 
FO 371/10736'; A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, V o l . 79. 
decide whether the casus f o e d e r i s had a r i s e n : i t was i n the i n t e r e s t 
o f a l l concerned t h a t the a l l e g a t i o n must be es t a b l i s h e d as c o r r e c t ; 
and as the recent debate had shown i t was h a r d l y too much t o say t h a t 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n would not endorse the guarantees unless i t were 
provided t h a t the question would be decided by the Council. Briand 
had also objected t o the omission of a p r o v i s i o n t h a t a l l the agreements 
envisaged should come i n t o f o r c e a t once. Chamberlain agreed t h a t t h i s 
was d e s i r a b l e , but he said t h a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t to make the 
western settlement depend on a settlement between Germany and her 
(92) 
eastern neighbours. 
The Belgian Ambassador and the M i n i s t e r f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , 
Vandervelde, who had been given a copy of the B r i t i s h d r a f t , also 
expressed a n x i e t y about procedure i n the event of sudden a t t a c k . 
Chamberlain assured Moncheur t h a t ~the~guarantors would not w a i t f o r 
(93) 
the League i n a case of self-defence. I n order t o s o r t out these 
problems i t was agreed t h a t Fromageot, the French l e g a l a dviser, 
should come t o London f o r discussions w i t h Hurst. He a r r i v e d almost 
simultaneously w i t h the German note of 20 J u l y , which included a f i r m 
o b j e c t i o n t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c t i o n by any of the p a r t i e s w i t h o u t 
92. Minute by Chamberlain, 6 J u l . 1925; Chamberlain t o F l e u r i a u , 
11 J u l . , C 9186, 9216A59/18, FO 371/10736; A.A.E. , Grande Bretagne, 
Vol. 79o 
93. Desp. 2^ +05 t o P a r i s ; desp. 831 t o Brussels, *\k J u l . 1925; Brussels 
desp. 538, 17 J u l . , C 9367, 9^11, 9539/^59/18, FO 371/10736; D^D^B., 
Vol. I I , Nos. 76, 78, 79° On 29 J u l y Vandervelde sent a lengthy 
comment on the B r i t i s h d r a f t proposing something a k i n t o a r e t u r n 
to the Geneva P r o t o c o l . The document was sent by post from 
Brussels, a proceeding which caused some astonishment i n the Foreign 
O f f i c e . Briand was annoyed w i t h Vandervelde f o r i n t e r f e r i n g , and on 
6 August sent him a r a t h e r crushing r e p l y : Note from the Belgian 
Government, 29 J u l . ; Phipps t o Lampson, 6 Aug., C 10080, 
10^06/^59/18, FO 371/10737; A.A.E., Grande Bretagne Vols. 80-1; 
D.D.B., V o l . I I , Nos. 86, 92, 93» 
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a carefully regulated procedure. From the discussions with Fromageot 
i t emerged that there were two French anxieties, f i r s t about the 
possible delay i n getting a Council decision, and secondly about the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , since some of the minor powers on the Council might 
not dare to pronounce Germany to be the aggressor and since unanimity 
would be required, there might be no decision and so the guarantee 
(94) 
would never come int o play. 
Chamberlain held a meeting on 22 July to discuss the German note 
and the results of the discussion with Fromageot. The Central 
Department had suggested, as a possible f i n a l compromise, that 
provision might be made for a guarantor to act i n advance of a Council 
decision i n cases where an actual invasion of t e r r i t o r y had taken place. 
Chamberlain said that t h i s must include the demilitarised zone as wells 
i f armies were marching -across i t , i t would be intolerable to have to 
wait u n t i l they crossed the French f r o n t i e r - Hurst said that Fromageot 
was prepared to concede that an allegation that a casus foederis had 
arisen must be referred to the League, but he wanted something that 
would allow B r i t a i n to go to the help of France at her own discretion 
and subject to subsequent endorsement by the League. He accepted that 
B r i t a i n would not be bound so to act, but he refused to accept a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between French t e r r i t o r y and infringement of the demilitarised 
zone. Hurst had therefore drafted some a r t i c l e s v/hich allowed the 
parties to the treaty to act i n case of a "manifest v i o l a t i o n " of the 
undertaking not to go to war or of A r t i c l e s kz, kj, or 180 of the 
94. Minutes, 21 J u l . 1925, on C 9581, 9693A59/18, FO 371/10736. 
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Treaty of Versailles, i f they v/ere agreed that the v i o l a t i o n was 
an "unprovoked movement of aggression and that by means of the out-
break or the imminence of h o s t i l i t i e s " immediate action was necessary, 
or i f a breach of the a r b i t r a t i o n treaty were accompanied by h o s t i l i t i e s . . 
Hurst said that he believed that Fromageot v/ould accept these 
a r t i c l e s , but he had pointed out that , apart from the at t i t u d e of 
B r i t i s h public opinion, the Germans were very un l i k e l y to accept 
provisions which l e f t i t to the judgment of one of the parties whether 
to take actiono At the meeting Lampson agreed that the Germans would 
reasonably refuse to accept any such provision and B r i t i s h opinion 
v/ould agree with them. Chamberlain said that he would j u s t i f y the 
a r t i c l e s to Parliament on the ground that they preserved B r i t i s h freedom 
of action and that i f events were happening which showed that a 
pa r t i c u l a r country was deliberately taking aggressive action, the 
B r i t i s h Government clearl y ought not to be prevented from taking 
appropriate steps. He thought that the German objections might be 
met by showing that the proposal v/ould operate as much to Germany's 
advantage as to that of France. Sterndale Bennett pointed out that 
the new provisions also l e f t l i b e r t y to France, and i t seemed equally 
necessary to guarei against French action i n bad f a i t h . Hurst said 
that he had discussed t h i s point with Fromageot, who had replied that 
i t was ruled out by the fact that France v/ould not be strong enough. 
However, said Larnpson, the German fear of France was genuine. He 
thought that the French request should be rejected and that the French 
would presumably acquiesce rather than have no tre a t y . 
Chamberlain remarked that he and the Department seemed to be 
proceeding from d i f f e r e n t standpoints. They appeared to be saying: 
"Here are the French asking for something. Ought we to give i t ? " 
whereas he wanted to give i t because he wanted i t too. He wished 
to ensure that i f war broke out i t should be on a f r o n t i e r as far as 
possible from B r i t a i n * He did not wish to give Germany the advantage 
that she would have i f B r i t a i n found herself blocked from acting by 
delay i n the Council or a f a i l u r e of the Council to reach a decision 
owing to obstruction organised by Germany. Sterndale Bennett replied 
that they a l l agreed that the B r i t i s h Government ought to have a 
certain l i b e r t y of actions the only question was whether i t should 
be stated i n the treaty, since stating the r i g h t to act i n flagrant 
and urgent cases contained dangerous p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
The discussion then turned to procedure, Lampson saying that he 
was a f r a i d of getting to the position where there was an unalterable 
Anglo-French draft before the Germans came on to the scene. Chamberlain 
said""that h i s idea was that~~~the "draft should~be put forward as a 
B r i t i s h one that committed no one. He was doubtful how long i t s 
existence could be kept secret, but Hurst should warn Fromageot to put 
forward as few changes as possible at t h i s stage. As for the guarantee, 
Hurst should t r y to get Fromageot's consent to an a r t i c l e so worded 
as to make i t clear that the guarantor would only act i n advance of 
a decision by the Council i n cases where h o s t i l i t i e s had actually 
broken out or when the armed forces of either side had indubitably 
entered the demilitarized zone. I f Fromageot accepted he should be 
t o l d that Chamberlain was prepared to submit such a text to the Cabinet, 
(95) 
but that Hurst doubted whether the Cabinet would agree. 
95 . Record of meeting, 22 J u l . 1925, C 978V^59/l8, FO 371/10736„ 
D'Abernon revealed the existence of the d r a f t , and the fact that 
Fromageot was going to London to discuss i t , to Schubert on 23 
July. A copy of the d r a f t as approved by the Cabinet and sent 
to the Dominions was given to the German Consulate-General i n 
Dublin by an I r i s h informant on or before 2 Augusts ^509/ 
E127388-90, E128723-26. 
411 
This was the inception of the idea of a flagrant v i o l a t i o n of 
the demilitarised t e r r i t o r y . After t a l k i n g to Fromageot again Hurst 
minuted that for the French the de m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Ehineland 
was more than a screen f o r the French f r o n t i e r ; i t was a protection 
against another war having to be fought on French s o i l . Chamberlain 
noted that he agreed, and that the General Staff said that i t was 
important for B r i t a i n a l s o . ^ " ^ Chamberlain t o l d Fleuriau and 
Fromageot that he thought that i t was nov; i n the Government's power 
to give with general national approval a guarantee that would operate 
e f f e c t i v e l y i n case of a serious threat from Germany, but he wished 
to v/arn them against two dangers. The f i r s t was that popular acceptance 
of the obligation depended on the guarantee being clearly l i m i t e d to 
the case against which i t was intended to provide. He was worried l e s t 
attempts to f i l l every gap migh-t- so confuse and alarm public ^ opinion -' 
that the real guarantee might s l i p through France's grasp. The second 
danger lay i n the eastern arrangements, about which he had said very 
l i t t l e since B r i t a i n did not intend to take part. I t was on these 
arrangements that i t was l i k e l y to be most d i f f i c u l t to reach agreement 
960 Minutes, 23 and 2k J u l . 1925, C 9801A59/18, FO 371/10736. On 
20 July D'Abernon raised the question whether a guarantee of the 
Channel ought not to be included i n the treaty. Lampson replied 
that there were three objections f i r s t , i t was desirable from 
the point of view of public opinion that B r i t a i n should have the 
moral advantage of not seeking any material benefit for herself; 
second, i f B r i t a i n sought similar r i g h t s she would have to accept 
the same obligations, v i z . unlimited a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s ; t h i r d , 
a guarantee was unnecessary because securing the Rhine f r o n t i e r 
ensured ample protection f o r the Channel; D'Abernon to Lampson, 
20 J u l . ; Lampson to D'Abernon, 7 Aug., C 9886/459/18, FO 371/ 
10737; D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, Vol. I l l , pp. 177-9° 
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with Germany, but he trusted that the western pact v/ould not be 
allowed to founder on them, for i f i t did there v/ould be no B r i t i s h 
guarantee at a l l o ^ ^ 
When D'Abernon t o l d Schubert of the existence of a draft treaty 
and the fact that Hurst and Fromageot were discussing i t , Schubert 
expressed alarm l e s t i t should reach a f i n a l form before the Germans 
had had a say. But he was ho s t i l e to the idea that Gaus should j o i n 
i n discussions with the other two legal advisers, and v/as not impressed 
by D'Abernon's suggestion that Gaus was the best p o l i t i c i a n of the 
three and v/ould have the advantage. The Germans evidently feared that 
Gaus might be led into making what were essentially p o l i t i c a l decisions 
and v/anted ministers to meet and agree on principles before the 
dr a f t i n g was done, whereas the B r i t i s h idea was that the j u r i s t s could 
"establish" "the areas of agreement more easily i n conversation than by 
continued correspondence; leaving the ministers to come i n and take 
(98) 
the f i n a l p o l i t i c a l decisions. There were obvious objections to 
a m i n i s t e r i a l meeting before success v/as reasonably assured, and the 
French d i s l i k e of conferences had to be borne i n mind. But although 
Chamberlain and Lampson encouraged Sthamer to recommend the idea of 
an experts*meeting a f t e r the next French note v/as sent, the German 
objections continued although now directed more against Gaus being 
97» Desp. 2515 to Paris, 23 J u l . 1925, C 9802/459/18, FO 371/10736; 
A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol. 80. 
98. B e r l i n t e l . 278, 24 J u l . 1925, C 9857/459/18, FO 371/10737; 
D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 25 J u l . ; Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 
29 J u l . , Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/288, 289, D'Abernon Papers, 
BM Add. MS 48929, FO 8OO/258; memoranda by Schubert, 23, 24, 
and 28 J u l . , 4509/E127388-90, E127412-14, E12744:2-47. 
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being expected to discuss a draft which he would ostensibly not have 
(99) 
seen m advance. 
Meanwhile Briajid suggested that he should v i s i t London. He was 
more disposed than Berthelot to consider a meeting with Stresemann, 
but was anxious to reach agreement with the B r i t i s h f i r s t . Discussing 
the German note with Phipps he agreed that every encouragement should 
be given to the German Government to re s i s t the Russian pressure 
against j o i n i n g the League. On the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s Briand said 
that his main object was to close the door to any p o s s i b i l i t y of 
future c o n f l i c t , but he was also anxious to avoid the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
France being prevented from taking j u s t i f i e d measures against German 
aggression by the dissentient vote of one member of the Council. He 
would subscribe to any provision that could be found to overcome t h i s 
d i f f i c u l t y / 1 0 0 ^ " 
Briand's v i s i t was fixed for 10-12 August. Hoesch had come 
to the conclusion that further Anglo-French conversations were to 
Germany's advantage so long as the B r i t i s h did not f a l l i n with French 
views, and he was impressed with Briand's a t t i t u d e on the eve of his 
99«Desp. 1446 to B e r l i n , 31 J u l . 1925, C 10255/459/18, FO 371/10737; 
desp. 1475 to B e r l i n , 6 Aug., C 10531/459/18, FO 371/10738; 
Sthamer t e l s . , 28 J u l . , 1 and 6 Aug.; memorandum by Schubert, 31 
J u l . , 4509/E127844, E127479-80, E127525-27, E127458-62; memorandum 
by Stresemann, 3 Aug., 3123/D644145-48, Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 
163-6; t e l s , t o Sthamer and Hoesch, 4 Aug., 3123/D644155-56, 
D644149-50; D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 7 Aug., Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 52/290, BM Add. MS 48929, FO 800/258. Gaus had i n fact seen 
the B r i t i s h d r a f t by 5 August. 
100. Paris t e l . 259, 27 J u l . 1925; Paris t e l . 2 6 1 , 28 J u l . , C 9984, 
9994/459/18, FO 371/10737= 
departure for London. T y r e l l was encouraging Dufour, saying that 
i f Germany joined the League B r i t i s h opinion would move i n her 
favour. He also said that Briand was anxious to li q u i d a t e France's 
obligations to Poland, but could only secure Polish consent i f 
France guaranteed the German-Polish a r b i t r a t i o n treaty. When Dufour 
said that he did not think that his Government could agree, T y r e l l 
r e p l i e d that he thought that i t was a?.matter of finding a formula by 
(101) 
which the real guarantor would be the League. 
Despite a l l t h i s encouragement, the completion of the evacuation 
of the Ruhr, and the announcement that the three "sanctions towns1' 
fa? 
occupied i n 1921^ere to be evacuated at the same time, the Germany 
position was s t i l l s t i f f . D'Abernon asked Schubert for a l i s t of 
points that he could send to London, and reported them (as coming 
from "an exceptionally r e l i a b l e secret source 1 1) as follows : (1) 
The German Government would i n s i s t that f o r c i b l e intervention could 
only take place a f t e r an impartial decision. (2) The a r b i t r a t i o n 
procedure must cover differences on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Treaty 
of Versailles. (3) A French guarantee of the German-Polish 
a r b i t r a t i o n treaty was unacceptable i f i t gave France a r i g h t to 
decide on the application of the guarantee, and useless i f i t added 
nothing to A r t i c l e 16. (4) Objections to j o i n i n g the League seemed 
to be receding. I t was beginning to be recognised that the danger 
of the French sending troops through Germany was rather t h e o r e t i c a l . 
101. Hoesch t e l s . , 5 and 6 Aug. 1925; Dufour t e l . , 7 Aug.; Dufour 
desp. 9 Aug., ^509/E1275$f-06, E1275*fO-Vf, E127551-56, 
E 127633-^7. 
^15 
Point (^f) was D'Abernon's own idea and did not altogether f i t the 
„ , (102) facts. 
In advance of his v i s i t Briand sent to London drafts of the 
proposed reply to the German note of 20 July and a new dr a f t of the 
security treaty. The chief differences between i t and the B r i t i s h 
d r a f t were that (a) the undertaking not to resort to war v/as not to 
apply to resistance to "hostile acts" as well as to invasion or 
attack; (b) provision was made for action i n case of "manifest 
v i o l a t i o n " of the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Rhineland; ( c ) the 
provision i n the B r i t i s h d r a f t for termination of the treaty v/as 
deleted. ^ ^-^ The f i r s t meeting at midday on 11 August v/as taken up 
with discussing the reply to the German Government. The B r i t i s h 
proposed only minor amendments, which were settled either on the spot 
'or "later i n the" day by Hurst~ahd Fromageot. Chamberlain suggested 
that i n the l a s t paragraph the i n v i t a t i o n to verbal negotiations 
should be made more d e f i n i t e , and put forward the idea of i n v i t i n g 
Gaus to meet Hurst and Fromageot, and perhaps VarQder^Velde's chef de 
cabinet Rolin Jaecquemins, to exchange ideas and explanations. Gaus 
could then inform Stresemann and the l a t t e r would then v i s i t Briand 
102. Berlin t e l . 297, 10 Aug. 1925, C 1055AA59/18, FO 371/10738; 
memoranda by Schubert, 8, 9, and 10 Aug., ^509/El27563-71, 
El2757^-76, E127588-91. On t h i s l a s t point Phipps had mentioned 
to Berthelot a suggestion by Chamberlain that some reassurance 
might be given to the Germans about Art . 16: f o r example i t might 
be pointed out that i t would be impossible f o r France to send 
troops across Germany v/ithout being assured beforehand of German 
approval: Phipps to T y r e l l , 17 J u l . , C 9552A59/18, FO 371/10736. 
103. Note from the French Ambassador, 31 J u l . 1925, C 101^6/^59/18, 
FO 371/10737; d r a f t s of note to the German Government, C 10308/ 
^59/18, FO 371/10737; C io*fl8, 10529A59/1&, FO 371/10738; A . A . E . , 
Grande Bretagne, Vol 81. A translation of^French draft treaty 
i s i n the Appendix. 
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and himself, at Geneva or elsewhere- Briand, who was anxious to 
avoid giving the impression that the French and B r i t i s h Governments 
had arranged everything before the play started but was also averse 
(104) 
to a formal conference, agreed that t h i s was the best way out. 
The discussion the same afternoon on the French redraft of 
the treaty was less simple although equally f r i e n d l y . The addition 
of "hostile acts" v/as the f i r s t problem. Chamberlain asked that the 
expression® be omitted, and said that he wished to avoid the reproach 
that he was promising armed assistance to France and Belgium i n 
cases where i t was not called f o r . Fromageot pointed out that the 
expression was that of the Treaty of Versailles and r e a l l y covered 
two categories of act. Minor breaches such as the discovery i n the 
demilitarised zone of a railway siding overlooked by the Control 
CornmissionT"clearly could not be regarded as h o s t i l e acts, but positive 
actions such as the assembly of armed na t i o n a l i s t associations v/ould 
enable France to act without waiting for the League. Chamberlain 
explained that i n the B r i t i s h view, although the Treaty of Versailles 
created a r i g h t for the A l l i e s to respond to a v i o l a t i o n of the 
demilitarised zone by h o s t i l i t i e s , they were bound by the Covenant 
104. Notes of conversation, 11 Aug. 1925, C 10609/459/18, FO 371/10738. 
The idea of a meeting at Geneva appears to have been f i r s t 
mentioned by Briand to Phipps on 28 July. The Germans had 
natural objections to Geneva but suggested somewhere else i n 
Switzerland; the French were inclined to suggest Paris. 
Chamberlain minuted that he was not disposed to accept Paris: 
i f i t were to be an A l l i e d capital i t must be London. He saw 
the objections to Geneva, but "why not go to some nice place i n 
the neighbourhood?" Paris t e l . 261, 28 J u l . ; desp 1446 to B e r l i n , 
31 J u l . ; desp. 2675 to Paris, 6 Aug., C 9994, 10255, 10417/459/18, 
FO 371/10737; Sthamer t e l . , 1 Aug.; Hoesch t e l . , 6 Aug., 4509/ 
E127479-80, E 127540-44. 
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not to resort to h o s t i l i t i e s i n any case u n t i l they had exhausted 
the procedure for peaceful settlement. I t might thus happen that 
although Germany committed a ho s t i l e act, the f i r s t breakers of the 
peace would be the A l l i e s . Fromageot objected that t h i s interpre-
t a t i o n seemed to offend the maxim that texts must be interpreted 
according to common sense; but Chamberlain went on to say that j u s t 
because the term "hostile acts" might include minor cases, i t was 
important that i t should not be used. As a general r u l e , he f e l t , 
the Council should be called i n to decide whether the alleged v i o l a t i o n 
was important or not, and he wished to reserve the immediate operatiion 
of the guarantee for cases where urgent action was clearly necessary. 
Briand suggested that provision might be made for consultation 
between the parties to decide whether the alleged h o s t i l e act was a 
menace of'war ; but~Fromageot ob jected that t h i s would mean "a'doublfe. 
r e s t r i c t i o n ^ o n independent action and on immediate action i n case of 
a v i o l a t i o n of A r t i c l e s k2 and k~5 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Chamberlain asked what France would r e a l l y lose. Everyone appeared 
to agree that A r t i c l e s h2-hk gave the A l l i e s r i g h t s which they would 
not dream of using i n practice; but i f they t r i e d to reserve such 
r i g h t s something v i t a l might be l o s t . Briand said that he for one 
would not dream of losing the substance for the shadow; no one could 
possibly hesitate i f the choice lay between a defensive war against 
Germany with Great B r i t a i n acting on the side of France, and an 
independent war by France, unsupported by Great B r i t a i n , f o r reasons 
of minor importance. Chamberlain said that when there was time every 
method of c o n c i l i a t i o n must be exhausted before action were taken. 
But provision must be made for immediate action when there was not 
time for the concilation machinery to operate without prejudicing 
4 i 8 
the position of the country against which the h o s t i l e act was directed« 
The French agreed that i t should be possible to draw up an a r t i c l e 
giving effect to Chamberlain's definition,, 
After some lesser points had been disposed of or referred for 
discussion betv/een Hurst and Fromageot, the discussion came to the 
question of termination. Her<^Chamberlain said that the passage i n 
the B r i t i s h d r a f t , which the French had deleted, was intended to 
avoid the necessity of a time l i m i t . A treaty of unlimited duration 
would arouse c r i t i c i s m . The French agreed that a time l i m i t was 
undeosirable, but objected to the B r i t i s h text because under i t a 
majority decision of the Council could cause the lapse not only of the 
guarantees but of the obligation not to resort to war and the a r b i t r a t i o n 
obligation. I t was agreed to consider another version.^^^) 
OnT the following morning" the dr a f t reply to the German note 
was approved, and the various amendments worked out fo r the dra f t 
treaty. Chamberlain pointed out that the text was s t i l l subject to 
approval by the Cabinet, and Briand said that he was i n the same 
position. The main changes were that (a) the undertaking not to resort 
to war was now not to apply ( i n addition to the case of resistance to 
invasion or attack) to a case of "a flagrant v i o l a t i o n of A r t i c l e s 
42 , 43 or 180 of the Treaty of Versailles, i f such v i o l a t i o n 
constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the 
assembly of armed forces i n the demilitarised zone, immediate action 
i s necessary"; (b) the guarantors would act immediately i n t h i s case; 
105. Notes of conversation, 11 Aug. 1925, C 10610/459/18, FO 371/ 
10738. 
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(c) for the treaty to be terminated at least two of the parties would 
have to ask the Council of the League to decide that the League 
ensured s u f f i c i e n t protection. 
The Cabinet approved the new t e x t , and the reply to the German 
note of 20 July, on 13 August. I n the discussion i t v/as emphasised 
that the B r i t i s h guarantee would not operate automatically i f Germany 
attacked Poland, France i n consequence attacked Germany, her troops 
(107) 
were driven back, and Germany invaded France. Two days e a r l i e r 
Amery had w r i t t e n to the Dominion Prime Ministers i n connexion with 
a study by the Chiefs of Staff of the problem of d i v e r t i n g shipping 
from the Channel i n time of war. Amery wrote that he regarded the 
security pact not as an entanglemt of B r i t a i n i n Europe for the sake 
of peace i n the abstract, but as a disentanglement from undue concern about sectors other than that where BFiTairT's ov/n interests demanded 
s t a b i l i t y . The s l i g h t extension inland from the t r a d i t i o n a l area of 
interest of the Channel coast was due to the new range of warfare 
brought about by the aeroplane. The fact that the guarantee was 
given to both sides would prevent m i l i t a r y intimacy. 
106. Notes of conversation, 12 Aug. 1925, C 106ll/459/l8, FO 
371/10738. The revised text of the treaty i s i n the 
Appendix. 
107. C 45(25), CAB 23/50. 
108. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 13 Aug. 1925; explanations 
of the pact were given by the Foreign Office to Casey and the 
South African High Commissioner: C 10678, 10846/459/18, FO 
371/10738. For the study of shipping see pp. &(y@>-j. 
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At the end of the f i r s t meeting with Briand on 11 August 
Chamberlain wrote o f f to t e l l D'Abernon how well things were going, 
how admirable was the attitud.e of the French, and how i t was Briand 
who had insisted that they must prepare for a r e a l discussion with 
the Germans, The object of the i n v i t a t i o n to Gaus was to give him a 
copy of the Jorm i n t o which the B r i t i s h and French had put t h e i r ideas, 
and a l l necessary explanations of t h e i r real intentions. Gausf would 
not be asked to commit himself to anything; he would go home and 
discuss the plan with Stresemann and a f t e r that Stresemann and any 
other German representative could meet Briand, Vandervelde and 
Chamberlain for conversations. After the second meeting had gone well 
Chamberlain added to h i s l e t t e r ah outline of the pact and the 
guarantee, stressing that i t v/as B r i t a i n who would have to be s a t i s f i e d 
that a" "flagrant""act had -taken place and that there was immediate 
danger. Germany ought not to f i n d anything to object to i n such a 
treaty. As to the eastern guarantee, "don't the Germans see that 
t h i s i s the way and the only way of r e w r i t i n g the Franco-Polish 
Alliance? I t i s a l l i n the German in t e r e s t , and ours". Chamberlain 
warned D'Abernon to be careful what he said, except i n the most 
(1' 
general terms, and p a r t i c u l a r l y to avoid using the word "conference«" 
D'Abernon, who quoted t h i s l e t t e r to Schubert on August, was 
anxious that the ministers should meet before the League Assembly so 
that Germany's entry i n t o the League could be se t t l e d at once. But 
109.Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 11 Aug. 1925, FO 8OO/258, D'Abernon 
Papers, BM Add. MS 48929, Petrie, L i f e and Letters, Vol. I I , 
pp. 281-3= 
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Schubert said that t h i s would hardly be possible since, apart from 
the necessity of reaching an understanding on A r t i c l e 16, the 
Cologne zone had not been evacuated and the new French note would 
have to be considered. When the note did not arrive at once (because 
Briand was taking a short holiday and did not want i t to go i n his 
absence) Schubert's suspicions were aroused again, and he continued 
(110) 
to r e s i s t D'Abernon's pleas for speed i n sending Gaus to London. 
While awaiting the French reply the Germans had been considering 
the fundamental questions which remained to be decided. I n a 
memorandum completed i n August Gaus wrote that the f i r s t was the 
operation of the guarantee i n the west. I t was a nice question whether 
Germany had a greater interest i n a promise of immediate B r i t i s h 
assistance against France, or i n protection against a French assertion 
that" peace was endangered by a German v i o l a t i o n of the demilitarised 
zone. Gaus considered that the best solution would be that the 
guarantee should only operate automatically i n the event of French 
forces crossing the f r o n t i e r or German forces entering the demilitarised 
zone. I n a l l other cases the operation of the guarantee should depend 
on a decision by the Council. The second question was the form of 
the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s . Here there were three p o s s i b i l i t i e s : 
standing by the previous German system; widening i t by including the 
categories of dispute referred to i n A r t i c l e 13 of the Covenant as 
being suitable for a r b i t r a t i o n ; or acceptance of unlimited a r b i t r a t i o n ; 
110. Dufour was also being given encouragement i n London: Dufour 
desp. , 11 Aug. 1925, 3123/D6H252-55; Dufour t e l s . , 13 and 
15 Aug.; memorandum by Schubert, *\k Aug.; Hoesch teL, 21 
Aug.; memoranda by Schubert, 22 and 2k Aug., ^509/El27657-58, 
E127659-60, E1276^8-53, £12775^-55, E127772-7^, E127777-79= 
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on the model of recent t r e a t i e s concluded by Switzerland. Gaus 
considered that there was l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l difference between the 
second and t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; but he regarded i t as dangerous for 
a government to abandon the f i n a l decision on a question of major 
national interest to a court whose decision could not be p r e d i c t e d 
because the legal norms were not clear. He suggested that the f i n a l 
decision would depend on whether the advantage, to Germany of having 
unlimited t r e a t i e s with France and Belgium were thought to outweigh 
that of retaining some freedom vis-a-via the eastern countries. 
The t h i r d point was the French guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s . This was p o l i t i c a l l y undersirable but of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l 
significance i f the r i g h t of u n i l a t e r a l decision by the guarantor 
were removed. F i n a l l y , there was the problem of A r t i c l e 16. I n 
p r a c t i c a l terms t h i s was a matter of Germany, as a member of the League, 
being able to keep out of c o n f l i c t s involving her neighbours. She 
need not ask f o r release from a l l the stipulations i n every case, and 
a formal amendment to the a r t i c l e was neither practicable nor desirable. 
The most important problem was that of a Russo-Polish war, and Gaus 
discussed at length the procedure under A r t i c l e 17 of the Covenant for 
dealing with a c o n f l i c t between a member of the League and a non-member 
and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to Germany so long as Russian aggression 
were not glaring. I n case of a c o n f l i c t between two members, e.g. 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Gaus said that Germany i^ould only be able 
to avoid acting i f i t were not clear which was the aggressor. The 
essential point was to secure Germany's r i g h t to decide on p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n j o i n t League action while avoiding accusations of d i s l o y a l t y . 
The a r t i c l e of the Geneva Protocol r e f e r r i n g to a country's geographical 
position and m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n might serve as a s t a r t i n g point, but 
i t v/as inadequate because i t would not allow Germany to refuse to 
take part i n economic sanctions or allow passage of troopes. 
When Hoesch received a copy of an early version of t h i s paper 
he wrote to Schubert that he had thought a l l along that Germany 
would have to accept unlimited a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s . He agreed that 
the French claim to guarantee the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s v/as 
an u n j u s t i f i e d pretension; i t would have to be decided whether i n the 
l a s t resort i t was worth wrecking the whole pact on t h i s point. 
Hoesch thought that a formal release from A r t i c l e 16 was impossible. 
The v/hole point f o r the V/est was to remove not only the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of j o i n t German-Russian m i l i t a r y action against Poland but also to 
remove that of Germany, despite membership of the League, becoming a 
bulwark for Russia against the League- and ensuring by benevolent 
n e u t r a l i t y a Russian destruction of Poland. But some of Gaus's 
fear.s seemed unfounded; Russia v/as not l i k e l y simply to invade one 
of the border states and i n more doubtful cases German membership of 
the League could help her. The example of a Hungarian-Czechoslovak 
c o n f l i c t , hov/ever, raised i n Hoesch's view the question whether 
Germany ought to j o i n the League. I f she did, she would have to 
come to terms with i t s basic purpose and give up ideas of promoting 
, . „ . . (112) os 3helping Hungarian aggression. 
111. Memorandum by Gaus, f i n a l version, 21 Aug. 1925, 4509/E127720-V?; 
an e a r l i e r version i s i n 6698/H1083^7-7^O 
112. Hoesch to Schubert, 8 Aug. 1925; Schubert to Hoesch, 11 Aug., 
^509/2127579-87, E127601-05. I n his reply Schubert discussed 
the p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Germany, but was himself less 
doubtful about the chances of finding a formula on Art . 16. 
A memorandum of k A p r i l on the effect of a German-Czechoslovak 
a r b i t r a t i o n treaty on German-Hungarian r e l a t i o n s , arguing that 
although such a treaty would make i t more d i f f i c u l t for Germany 
to help Hungary her overall policy must not be held up by 
Hungarian considerations, i s i n 4582/E175^52-59= 
The French note was delivered i n Berl i n on 2k August* Comments 
on the German note of 20 July were confined to three points, and the 
German Government were i n v i t e d to enter i n t o negotiations. The 
German reply of 27 August was a short acceptance of the i n v i t a t i o n 
to a meeting of the legal experts- The Belgian Minister i n Berl i n 
joined D'Abernon and de Margerie i n giving the i n v i t a t i o n , and 
Mussolini now decided to send a representative too with a view to 
. . . . . (113) j o i n i n g i n the pacto 
The j u r i s t s ' meeting and the approach to Locarno 
The meeting of the legal advisers to the B r i t i s h , French, German, 
Belgian and I t a l i a n Foreign Ministers was held i n London from 1 to 
k September. The basis of discussion was the Anglo-French draft of 
12 August. The j u r i s t s agreed on a number of amendments regarding the 
western t r e a t i e s , being clear, however, that these were for submission 
to the Governments and were not binding. The most important amendments 
related to the western a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s and to the t e r r i t o r i a l 
guarantee. On the f i r s t , there was a discussion on the meaning of 
the word "dispute" and on the question whether a state could be obliged 
to accept the recommendation of a t r i b u n a l or commission on matters 
i n which i t v/as acting with i n i t s r i g h t s but i n c o n f l i c t with the 
interests of another state. The agreed new version of the a r t i c l e 
113. Locarno-Konferenz, Noj, 17-18. Tel. 160 to B e r l i n , 20 Aug. 1925, 
C10822/^59/18, F0 371/10738; Paris t e l . 30^, 25 Aug.; Paris t e l . 
310, 26 Aug.; Paris t e l . 312, 27 Aug.; t e l . 2^5 to Paris, 28 Aug.; 
desp. 1289 to Rome, 28 Aug.; Rome t e l . 206. 28 Aug.; t e l . 250 
to Rome, 29 Aug., C 11069, 11101, 11158, 1120^, 11215, 11220/ 
^59/18, FO 371/10739; D.DcIo, Vol. IV, Nos. 95 , 102, 112, 11^f. 
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i n the security treaty r e f e r r i n g to the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s now 
provided for j u d i c i a l a r b i t r a t i o n for questions with regard which 
the parties were i n c o n f l i c t as to t h e i r respective r i g h t s , with 
binding awards; a c o n c i l i a t i o n commission for other disputes; and 
i f the recommendations of t h i s commission were not accepted by both 
parties, submission of the question to the League of Nations» Gaus 
regarded t h i s r e d r a f t i n g as a return to the German system of 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s i n which the con c i l i a t i o n procedure had no binding 
forceo The provision f o r submission of the dispute to the Council 
did not, he believed, involve any fresh obligation for Germany„ 
As for the guarantee, Gaus claimed that the provision for 
action i n advance of a Council decision would operate one-sidedly, 
since i t required a l l the parties other than the attacker and the 
vi c t i m to-agree" "and Belgium was unlikely to pronounce against France.. 
The other j u r i s t s f i r s t described t h i s objection as u n j u s t i f i e d but 
next day, to Gaus's surprise, accepted that each guarantor should act 
alone i f i t agreed that a flagrant v i o l a t i o n had taken place,, Hurst's 
report on the conference suggests that the reason for the change was 
the new p o s s i b i l i t y that I t a l y would take part i n the pact, which 
made i t desirable that B r i t a i n should be able to act without needing 
I t a l i a n agreement« Gaus nov; regarded the placing of the re s p o n s i b i l i t y 
on the individual guarantor as preferable to a search f o r some 
objective test of the conditions for the operation of the guarantee„ 
No agreement, however, was reached on the clause about the 
guarantees for the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n treaties« Gaus set out the 
German objections and said that he did not think that any German 
Government could sign an agreement \-/hich recognised such a guarantee, 
Fromageot explained that a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with the eastern 
neighbours were part of the o r i g i n a l German proposals, and he did not 
think i t would be possible to induce Poland to sign such a treaty 
with Germany unless i t were guaranteed by France<• I t was as much i n 
Germany's interest as i n France's that disputes with Poland should 
be set t l e d amicably,, Hurst explained that he believed that 
Chamberlain had accepted the idea of a French guarantee because the 
Franco-Polish alliance existed and France was bound to f u l f i l her 
obligations to Poland., There was always a r i s k that Poland, feeling 
that France was bound to support her, might take some unwise action 
and precipitate a c o n f l i c t with Germany<> I f Poland attacked Germany, 
France would be i n a d i f f i c u l t position i f the alliance obliged her 
to support Poland while her membership of the League obliged her to 
support Germany. The proposed guarantee would not merely diminish the 
r i s k of armed c o n f l i c t but would bring the existing treaty arrangements 
more int o harmony with~the League and would enable France to exercise 
a moderating influence on Poland. Gaus, however, continued to maintain 
that either the guarantee added nothing to the Covenant, i n which case 
i t was superfluous, or i t gave France a special r i g h t i n r e l a t i o n to 
Germany, i n which case i t was impossible„ When Hurst asked whether 
Germany might prefer to sign an express renunciation of warlike 
measures i n respect of Poland too, Gaus replied that Germany saw no 
reason to go beyond the a r b i t r a t i o n treaty and the provisions of 
the Covenant* 
Hurst at the end of the meeting thought i t u n l i k e l y , despite his 
and Fromageot's explanations, that the German Government would accept 
the mention of a French guarantee; but he p r i v a t e l y considered that 
another scheme might s a t i s f y Poland and achieve the French object* 
This was that France should by herself give Poland a guarantee of 
the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y , i n a separate instrument which would be 
k27 
communicated to the League. France would then be able to take action 
against Germany i f she attacked Poland i n breach of the a r b i t r a t i o n 
treaty, because such an attack would bring A r t i c l e 16 into play and 
(114) 
hence France would not be v i o l a t i n g the security pacto 
At Geneva on 9 September Chamberlain discussed the results of 
the j u r i s t s ' meeting with Briand, Vandervelde, and Scialoja, and they 
agreed that i t was generally satisfactory. I t was decided to ask 
Mussolini v/here i n Switzerland he would go, and then to ask the 
Germans to a meetingo I t was recognised that the eastern f r o n t i e r s 
of Germany formed the great obstacle. Briand said that the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of war i n the east must be excluded, but a way out might 
be found by putting the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s under the 
guarantee of the League, with France i n some way acting as i t s agent. 
He said~~that Skfzynski had not been altogether unfavourable to the 
idea, and Vandervelde said that Benes would certainly agree. The 
question of how Poland and Czechoslovakia were to be brought in t o the 
meeting was then discussed. 'Shamberlain suggested that i t should 
1 1 ^ . Report by Hurst on the j u r i s t s ' meeting, h Sep. 1925; note by 
Hurst, 5 Sep., C 11^25, 11^55A59/l8, FO 371/10739= The terms 
of the report were agreed between the participants and copies 
of i t (but not of Hurst's note) were given to them for 
communication to t h e i r Governments. Hurst's explanation of 
Chamberlain's views on the guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s was warmly welcomed by Fromageot, but i t was deleted 
from the report because Fromageot did not want i t to appear i n 
a j o i n t document to be communicated to the Belgian and I t a l i a n 
Governments. The other j u r i s t s were of course free to report 
Hurst's words, and Gaus and Rolin at a l l events did so. Gaus's 
report (4509/E128045-67) i s printed i n Locarno-Konferenzg, No. 
20; Rolin's i n ^ D.D.B., Vol. I I , No. 1C4. The text of the 
treaty as amended i s i n the Appendix. 
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s t a r t with the western pact and that then the Polish and 
Czechoslovak representatives could be i n v i t e d to j o i n them, Briand 
C1 1 5) 
and Vandervelde agreed,, 
Chamberlain also saw Skrzynski and Benes at Geneva, Both were 
concerned that the western pact should not be concluded before the 
eastern questions were settled- Bemes emphasised the differences 
between the positions of Poland and Czechoslovakia and the very-
l i m i t e d extent to which he would do anything to help the Poles» 
Skrzynski said that he would be s a t i s f i e d i f German conversations 
v/ith Poland began at the same time and i n the same place as the conver-
(116) 
sations with the Western powers. Before leaving for Geneva 
Skrzynki had t o l d the B r i t i s h Minister i n V/arsaw that Poland would 
not stand i n the way of the western pact, but i t must not contain any-
-t-hing that could be—interpreted as weakening Poland's r i g h t ~ t o her 
present t e r r i t o r y . He was gloomy about the prospects for an 
a r b i t r a t i o n treaty with Germany, and said that he r e a l l y believed that 
Germany had a fixed anti-Polish policy whereas Poland was anxious to 
l i v e on correct terms. Max Muller asked what the B r i t i s h could do, 
and Skrzynski replied that nothing would contribute more than a 
categorical statement i n Berlin that i n the present negotiations the 
1 «5» Memorandum by Chamberlain, 9 Sep, 1925, C H 6 7 0 A 5 9 / 1 8, FO 3 7 V 
10739» Benes t o l d the German Consul-General at Geneva on 19 
September that he would agree to any formula on the guarantee 
that v/ould make i t supportable f o r Germany so long as i t s 
content were not destroyed? V509/E128079-81„ 
116, Memoranda by Chamberlain, 11 and 12 Sep, 1925, C 11813, 1 l 8 l V 
459/18, FO 371/107^0= 
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B r i t i s h Government did not contemplate the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
modification of Poland's f r o n t i e r s . Replying to Max Muller's report 
the Foreign Office said that i t would not be possible to state that 
the B r i t i s h Government did not contemplate the p o s s i b i l i t y of f r o n t i e r 
revision even by peaceful means, although they thought that a German 
appeal to A r t i c l e 19 of the Covenant would be unwise and they had 
(117) 
done t h e i r best to discourage the idea. 
The i n v i t a t i o n s to the German Government to take part i n a 
(118) 
meeting of ministers were delivered i n Berli n on 15 September. 
Before the conference met there were two agitations. The f i r s t was 
over the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s ; at a press conference on 18 
4 ® , 
September Stresemann said that neither Poland nor Czechoslovak^had 
approached Germany about a treaty, a statement which so far as 
Czechoslovakia was concerned was untrue. Benes promptly instructed 
the Czechoslovak Minister i n Berli n to inform the German Government 
on Sunday, 20 September, that his Government were ready to open 
negotiations. Benes did not inform the Poles; they were upset; and 
Skrzynski t o l d Max Muller that he would take no steps i n Berli n u n t i l 
he heard from the Western Governments. He v/as again taken aback 
when Max Muller t o l d him that the Foreign Office did not at a l l wish 
to deter him from taking similar action. Skrzynski said that his 
117. Warsaw t e l . 82 , 26 Aug. 1925; Warsaw desp. 398, 26 Aug.; desp. 
709 to Warsaw, 12 Sep., C 11103, 1 1 2 1 0 A 5 9 / l 8 , F0 371/10739-
118. Tels. 180, 181 to Be r l i n , 12 Sep. 1925, C 11673A59/18 , FO 3 7 1 / 
10739; B e r l i n t e l . 335, 15 Sep., C 1 1 8 W ^ 5 9 / 1 8, FO 371/107^0; 
memorandum by Stresemann, 15 Sep.; memorandum by Schubert, 17 
Sep., 3123/1)6^503-04, D6H520-21 . 
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idea had been that i t would be for the French at the conference to 
suggest to the Germans the a d v i s a b i l i t y of getting i n t o touch with 
(119) 
him. The Germans were ready to take up the Czechoslovak 
approach i n order to prevent Polish and Czechoslovak p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n the conference - an aim i n which D'Abernon was ready to encourage 
them - or at least to separate the two countfc&es. But although 
Benes was w i l l i n g and indeed perhaps anxious to get better terms for 
his country than, he knew, Germany would be w i l l i n g to give Poland, 
he certainly did not wish to negotiate with Germany en t i r e l y on his 
own. So apart from an inconclusive discussion with the German 
Minister i n Prague about possible terms nothing happened before the 
+ • X T ( 1 2 ° ) meeting at Locarno. 
The second upset was over the decision of the German Government, 
on~th"e"insistence of Hindenburg and the Nationalist ministers, to 
accompany t h e i r acceptance of the i n v i t a t i o n to the conference by a 
statement on war g u i l t and the evacuation of the Cologne zone. 
Forecasts that conditions would be attached to the acceptance appeared 
i n the press on 22 September and provoked an enquiry from the 
(121) 
Foreign Office to D'Abernon. D'Abernon had already t o l d 
119. B e r l i n t e l . 337, 21 Sep. 1925; Warsaw t e l . 93 , 23 Sep.; t e l . 
57 to Warsaw, 25 Sep.; Warsaw t e l . 100, 28 Sep., C 12063, 
12148, 12339/459/18, FO 371/10740; memorandum by Schubert, 20 
Sep., 4509/E128090-94; Wandycz, France and her Eastern A l l i e s , 
f>p. SJ4=t, 
120. Memorandum by Schubert, 21 Sep. 1925, 4509/E128100-07; memor-
andum by Stresemann, 25 Sep., 3123/D644658-61; memoranda by 
Schubert, 30 Sep. and 1 Oct.; Koch desp., 2 Oct, 4509/E128413-
15, E128422-24, E128443-45; memorandum by Hoetzfch, 8 Oct., 
4582/E176486-90; Warsaw t e l . 101, 30 Sep., C 12427/459/18, 
FO 371/10741; t e l 18 to Prague; Prague t e l 34, 3 Oct., FO 8 4 0/l / 2 , 
During the summer Benes had t r i e d to arrange a meeting with 
Stresemann, but without success: L417/L120587-89, L120610; 3086/ 
D617810-11, D617813-15; 4509/E127107-08. 
121 . Tel. 185 to B e r l i n , 22 Sep. 1925, C 11950/459/18, FO 371/10740. 
Stresemann that the only sensible answer to the i n v i t a t i o n was an 
unconditional acceptance. His report of the conversation, although 
more optimistic than was r e a l l y warranted, said that Stresemann hoped 
to be able to get authority for an unconditional acceptance accompanied 
by a verbal statement. There was thought to be i n s u f f i c i e n t time 
for an attempt to prevent t h i s proposal from being carried out; but 
D'Abernon was t o l d to leave Stresemann i n no doubt that i t was 
(122) 
considered i l l timed and most unfortunate. 
The German declaration was delivered, with the acceptance of 
the i n v i t a t i o n to the meeting, i n London, Paris, Brussels and Rome on 
26 September. I t stated that the eventual entry of Germany into the 
League v/as not to be understood as a recognition of the allegation of 
res p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the war made i n the Treaty of Versailles; and that 
the object of the pact would not be achieved i f the Cologne zone were 
not evacuated before the conclusion of the pact and Germany's entry 
int o the L e a g u e . G e r m a n s hoped that the A l l i e s would 
122. B e r l i n t e l s . 338, 339, 340, 23 Sep. 1925; t e l . 18? to Be r l i n , 
24 Sep.; Nicolson to D'Abernon, 25 Sep., C 12109, 12110, 
12111/459/18, FO 371/10740; memorandum by D'Abernon, 22 Sep., 
D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MS 48929; memorandum by Stresemann, 
22 Sep., 3123/D644614-15, Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 177-8; 
minutes by Schubert, 25 Sep., 4509/E128193-97• For the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s with the D.N.V.P. and the German Cabinefi decision 
see Stresemann, Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 178-8O; Stockhausen, 
Sechs Jahre Reichskanzlei, pp. 175-6; notes of Cabinet meeting, 
24 Sep., 3242/07138^5^977 
123. Desp. 1726 to Be r l i n , 26 Sep. 1925; German note, 26 Sep.; 
German declaration, 26 Sep., C 12224, 12225, 12226/459/18, 
FO 371/10740; 3123/D644624-29, D644635-41, D644642-43; 
Locarno-Konferenz, Nos. 21-2: D.D.B., Vol. I I , No. 107. 
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r e f r a i n from answering the declaration or at most would issue an 
innocuous communique. But although Briand and Chamberlain were 
agreed that the episode should not be allowed to upset the meeting 
they f e l t bound to reply; and since the Germans f e l t bound to 
{124) 
publish t h e i r declaration the A l l i e d replies were published as well-
The B r i t i s h answer was cold„ I t noted with pleasure that the 
acceptance of the i n v i t a t i o n was unconditional, but said that the 
questions raised i n the declaration were new and had nothing to do 
with the security pact* The B r i t i s h Government were obliged to observe 
that the pact could not a l t e r the Treaty of Versailles nor t h e i r 
judgment of the past; and the evacuation of the Cologne' zone depended 
e n t i r e l y on Germany f u l f i l l i n g her disarmament obligations. The 
French reply was similar but shorter; the Belgian Government referred 
to Bethmann-Hollweg's declaration i n the Reichstag on 4 August 1914; 
( 123) 
the I t a l i a n reply made no comment„ The incident was of the kind 
that Mas most apt to annoy Chamberlain, and he wrote angrily to 
D'Abernons "Your Germans - I use the possessive pronoun as one says 
to one's wife: your housemaid - are very nearly intolerable. From 
f i r s t to l a s t very nearly every obstacle to the Pact negotiations 
has come from them, Briand has almost taken my breath away by 
124. Desp, 3212 to Paris, 26 Sep, 1923; Paris t e l s . 327, 329, 28 Sep,; 
minutes by Wellesley, 28 and 29 Sep.; note from French Embassy, 
29 Sep,; C11227, 12299, 12300, 12335, 12343, 12344/459/18, FO 3 7 1 / 
10740; German documents, 3123/D644656-57, D644717-19, D644742-
44; 4509/E128244-54, E128256-57, E128326-28, E128332-33, 
E128353-59, E128374-75, E128381-830 
125o Paris t e l . 330; t e l . 269 to Paris, 29 Sep, 1925, C 12345/459/ 
18, FO 371/10740; German documents, 4509/E128378-79, 
E128387, E128389, E128393', D,D°B. , Vol. I I , No. 108. 
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his l i b e r a l i t y , his conciliatoriness, his strong and manifest desire 
to promote peace. The German a t t i t u d e has been j u s t the contrary -
niggling, provocative, crooked.,.. I have chosen my path within the 
l i m i t s set to me by forces beyond my control. God forgive me i f I 
have allowed myself to be duped by the Germans, but either Stresemann 
i s crooked and a coward, or the value of any Pact which may be made 
i s for the present singularly discounted by the opposition which he 
meets". ( l 2 6 ) 
By the eve of his departure for Locarno Chamberlain's wrath 
had subsided. He now thought that the incident might even have done 
some good as i t had demonstrated A l l i e d s o l i d a r i t y and had cut l i t t l e 
ice i n Germany. Chamberlain had suggested to Baldwin that another 
Minister should accompany him to the meeting, but the Prime Minister 
said' that t h i s was unnecessary as the Cabinet had f u l l confidence i n 
him. Chamberlain therefore set out his views i n a memorandum for the 
Cabinet. He approached the conference, he wrote, i n a s p i r i t of sober 
hopefulness. The French would do a l l that they could to make the 
negotiations succeed. The Belgians too would be l i b e r a l ; and the 
j u r i s t s ' conversations had shown that the western pact was not l i k e l y 
to be d i f f i c u l t although the Germans might cause unexpected d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The eastern f r o n t i e r was much more d i f f i c u l t , and even with good w i l l 
i t might not be easy to f i n d a solution. Briand's at t i t u d e was a l l 
that could be desired: he was bound to respect France's obligations 
to Poland and Czechoslovakia, but ever since the j u r i s t s ' meeting he 
126. Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 30 Sep. 1925, Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 52/297, D'Abernon Papers, BM Add. MS 48929= 
k3h 
had been seeking a solution that Germany might accept, including a 
guarantee by the League and putting the French army as i t were at the 
disposal of the League to support i t . The case of Czechoslovakia was 
hot expected to be d i f f i c u l t but that of Poland v/as very d i f f e r e n t , 
and there were signs that the Germans were t r y i n g to escape from 
t h e i r assurance that they did not wish to a l t e r the f r o n t i e r by force<> 
Chamberlain wrote that he might not be involved i n the eastern 
negotiations at a l l , and that he would s t r i c t l y maintain the B r i t i s h 
refusal to undertake new obligations i n respect of the eastern 
frontiers o But i t would be a mistake to suppose that B r i t a i n v/as 
i n d i f f e r e n t to what went on there. Her one great interest was peace; 
and although the western pact would greatly strengthen the prospects 
of peace i n Europe, f u l l security could not be obtained without 
corresponding arrangements—for the-easr. - " I t i s not r i g h t that we 
should accept any obligations i n advance i n respect of a war 
orig i n a t i n g i n Eastern Europe, but i t does not follov; that we ought 
to be or can be i n d i f f e r e n t to the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of such a c o n f l i c t , 
for i t might easily raise issues and assume dimensions which would 
compel the Government of the day, free though i t were from treaty 
obligations, to take part". Chamberlain therefore thought that he must 
take an in t e r e s t i n the eastern negotiations and perhaps use his 
influence to ensure t h e i r success. Furthermore i t would be a mistake 
to go too f a r with the western negotiations u n t i l the eastern 
si t u a t i o n had developed, l e s t a firm bargain with Germany i n the west 
(127) 
reduce the chances of an eastern settlement. 
127. Memorandum by Chamberlain, 2 Oct. 1925, C12491A59/18, 
FO 371/107^1. 
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The position of the German Government on the eve of the 
conference was not such as to encourage unsober hopefulness. 
Guidelines l a i d down for the delegates stated t h a t t h e basis of the 
Government's policy remained the note of 20 July; the wording of the 
v/estern pact must not imply any renunciation of German t e r r i t o r y ; a 
French guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s must be refused; 
the objections to A r t i c l e 16 must be met; before Germany could enter 
the League the problem of general disarmament must be tackled seriously; 
and before the pact was concluded the Cologne zone must be evacuated 
and the question of disarmament (including the r i g h t of investigation 
and the a i r question) must be cleared upf and the occupation regime 
i n the Rhineland revised; and e f f o r t s must be made to secure a 
(128) 
curtailment of the occupation of the second and t h i r d zones. I n 
accordance with t h i s policy the Chancellor, who was going to the 
meeting as well as Stresemann, held f o r t h to D'Abernon on the questions 
that would need to be settled i n Germany's favour i f the Reichstag 
were to approve- the pact, and on h i s doubts whether the pact would 
improve the position s u f f i c i e n t l y to bring about the removal of 
Germany's grievances. D'Abernon was l e f t with the impression that 
Luther would be more d i f f i c u l t at Locarno than the representatives of " (129) the Auswartiges^ Arnt. 
128. Undated memorandum, 3123/0645128-29; Locarno-Konferenz, 
No. 24. 
129. Berlin t e l . 357, 2 Oct. 1925, C 12490/459/18, FO 371/10741. 
The Russian Factor 
I t i s not the inte n t i o n to examine i n t h i s section the whole 
question of German-Soviet relations i n 1924-25 i n connexion with 
Germany's entry in t o the League of Nations and the western security 
pact. To do so i n d e t a i l would be to move too f a r from the central 
theme of B r i t i s h policy. The object rather i s to consider the 
importance of the Soviet Union i n the B r i t i s h policy leading towards 
the western pact, with only a summary account of German-Soviet negoti-
ations. ^ ^ 0 ) 
In December 1924 the Russians raised with the German Emietessy 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an agreement on Poland, and an agreement that 
the two countries would not enter with t h i r d parties into any 
understanding or alliance directed against the other and would concert 
t h e i r action on—joining the League. Although the then State Secretary, 
Maltzan, was ready to take up discussion of an agreement on Poland 
and wrote to Brockdorff-Rantzau, the Amabssador i n Moscow, about 
forcing Poland back to her ethnic f r o n t i e r s , the German a t t i t u d e to 
the larger proposal was cautious and no answer on i t had been given by 
( 1 
the time that the security proposals were made to the Western powers. 
1J0. The l i t e r a t u r e on German-Soviet relations i n the 1920's i s large, 
and the most important works are l i s t e d i n the bibliography. The 
specific problem of the in t e r a c t i o n f o r Germany between eastern 
and western policy i s dealt with by ELeonore Breuning i n her 
unpublished Oxford D.Phil, thesis, "Germany's policy between East 
and West", 1965; also by Spenz, Die diplomatische Vorgeschichte 
des B e i t r i t t s Deutschlands zum Vcflkerbund ,and Martin Vfelsdorff 
Westorientierung und O s t p o l i t i k , Stresemanns Russlandpolitik i n 
der Locarno-Ara, Bremen 1971° 
131 . Correspondence with Rantzau, 3-29 Dec. 1924, 4562/El54862-65, 
E154874-76, E154921-30, E124907-09. On 29 September 1925 (see 
436 
The Soviet desire f o r a new p o l i t i c a l agreement with Germany appears 
to have been prompted by the prospect of improved German relations 
with the V/est af t e r the London Conference of August 1924 and especially 
by the prospect of Germany's entry i n t o the League which became 
(132) 
actual from September 1924. A further cause for Soviet concern 
was the f a i l u r e of the treaty negotiations with B r i t a i n with the f a l l 
of the Labour Government i n October, At the same time there was, 
with the French defore recognition of the Soviet Union, a prospect 
of a Franco-Soviet rapprochement and even some chance of improved 
(133) 
relations with Poland. 
The news of the security proposals for the west caused alarm 
both to the Russians and to Brockdorff-Rantzau who, although sceptical 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of close collaboration and opposed to any f a r -
-reaching -treaty commitment to"the Soviet Union, was also v i o l e n t l y 
1 3 1 ° § ? ^ E s . d s -
jysgy Stresemann professed to Chicherin ignorance of Rantzau's 
remarks about Poland. Although the State Secretaries, f i r s t 
Maltzan and then Schubert, were i n charge of the correspondence 
with Moscow Stresemann would hardly have f a i l e d to consult i t 
before sending instructions to Rantzau on the security propos-
als i n March. I t seems rather that although the question of 
Poland was raised by a Soviet o f f i c i a l , Kopp, i t was readily 
taken up by Maltzan: but that his instructions resulted i n 
Rantzau making statements to Chicherin which did not f i t the 
policy which Streseraann was t r y i n g to develop. G. Freund i s 
wrong i n stating (Unholy Alliance,p. 218) that the i n i t i a t i v e 
f o r the alliance proposal came from the German sides he i s 
corrected on t h i s point by l a t e r writers. 
132. Correspondence with Moscow Embassy, 13 Sep. - 19 Nov. 1924, 
K281A096775-79; L1837/L531420-22, L331437; 2860/D554498-500, 
D554551-52. 
133. Dokurnenty Vneshnei P o l i t i k i S.S.S.R., Vol. V I I , No. 287. 
Rantzau was par t i c u l a r y worried about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
Franco-Soviet understanding: 2860/D554551-52, D554724-26; 
4556/E148639-42, E148535-37. 
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opposed to any commitment to the west since he believed that i t 
would subject Germany to V/estern hegemony. Brockdorff-Rantzau was 
not convinced by Stresemann's arguments that the negotiations with 
the V/estern powers need not prevent the development of German-
Soviet relations since Germany had no intention of guaranteeing or 
recognising her f r o n t i e r with Poland, and since entry into the League, 
i f accepted at a l l , would only take place on conditions that would 
allow Germany to rearnin neutral i n a c o n f l i c t between the League and 
(134) 
the Soviet Union and would enable her to f r u s t r a t e League action. 
Enjoying as he did a position of unusual independence of the 
Auswartiges Amt, Brockdorff-Rantzau v i r t u a l l y declined to pursue with 
the Soviet Government the discussions, which Stresemann wanted, of 
the effects of German entry into the League, and he returned to Berlin 
i n the middle of A p r i l . ^ 5 5 - ) - Here he" remained u n t i l the end of June 
warning, as Addison reported to the Foreign Office, against sub-
servience to the west but unable to suggest any alternative policy 
that would secure Stresemann's aims.^""^ 
Negotiations with the Russians continued, however, i n Be r l i n . 
After another attempt to convince them that the conclusion of a 
134. Rantzau to Schubert, 25 Feb. and 8 Mar. 1925, 4562/E155004-09, 
E155020-28; Stresemann to Rantzau, 6 Mar., 2860/D554907-10; memo-
randum by Stresemann, 10 Mar., 2860/D554919-21, extract i n 
Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 512-13; Rantzau t e l s . , 11 and 13 Mar., 
3123/D642617-19, D642639-42; Stresemann to Rantzau, 19 Mar., 
3123/D642742-62, Locarno-Konferenz, No. 9. 
135. Correspondence, 25 Mar.-9 Apr. 1925, 4509/E125656-61; 2860/ 
D555002-05, D555070-73, D555047-50, D555057-59, D555077; 3123/ 
D642935-41. 
136. Memoranda by Rantzau, 13 Apr. and 8 Jun. 1925, 2860/D555109-
13; 4562/E155343-48; Addison to Lampson, 26 Jun., C 8804/459/18, 
FO 371/10735-
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security pact would not lead to a reorientation of German policy, 
that Germany would not enter the League unconditionally, and that the 
chances of her being compelled, as a member of the League, to act 
offe r a preamble to be attached to the trade treaty then under 
negotiation i n Moscow. This would pledge the two Governments to 
fr i e n d l y p o l i t i c a l and economic collaboration i n the s p i r i t of 
Rapallo, and would be supplemented by a verbal declaration that even 
i f Germany did not secure formal release from the obligations of 
A r t i c l e 16 she would maintain her standpoint on i t and would conduct 
herself on those l i n e s as a member of the League. Brockdorff-Rantzau 
took the preamable back to Moscow, and he was accompained by 
DIfksen"of the Easterh~Department •eeB^n^S^^^s^^pp^si^^k of the 
Auswartiges Amt.^^^ Although the Russians did not accept the 
preamble and repeated t h e i r own previous suggestions, the German 
offe r seems to have served the purpose of preventing a real c r i s i s 
137. Memorandum by Stresemann, 15 Apr. 1925, 3123/D645992-97, 
extract i n Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 513-14; Gaus-Bulow memo-
randaum on A r t . 16, 17 Apr., 6698/H108117-26; memorandum by 
Schubert, 25 Apr,-, 4562/E155223-48; memorandum by Stresemann, 
25 Apr., 2860/D555130-36, extracts i n Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 
514-15; t e l . to Hey (Moscow), 23 May, 286O/D555196-200; Hey t e l . , 
29 May, 2860/D555233-35; memorandum by Schubert, 2 Jun. , -4562/ 
E155328-42; memorandum by Stresemann, 13 Jun., 2860/D555257-67, 
extracts i n Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 516-18; memorandum by 
Schubert, 13 Jun. , 4562/E155369-73<> 
138. Correspondence and memoranda, 23 May-26 Jun. 1925, 6698/ 
H108183-85; 4562/E155360-65, E155413-20; 2860/D555303-O8, 
D555311-14, D555339; Cabinet meetings, 24 and 25 Jun., 3242/ 
D713846-49; 2860/D555332-38. 
against the Soviet Union were remote, produced merely a r e p e t i t i o n 
(137) 
of the Soviet viewpoint, the German Government decided to 
Jun 
^39 
of confidenceo At the end of August i t was agreed not t o hold up 
the trade t r e a t y f o r the p o l i t i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , and the Deputy 
Commissar f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , L i t v i n o v , s t a t e d t h a t the Soviet 
Government were w i l l i n g t o continue the l a t t e r even i f Germany had 
(139) 
t o j o i n the League» 
The Foreign O f f i c e and the French were v/ell aware t h a t anxiety 
about r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union was a major ground of the German 
obj e c t i o n s t o j o i n i n g the League; but they d i d not know of the German-
Soviet n e g o t i a t i o n s and appear not t o have f u l l y understood the way 
i n which the problem presented i t s e l f t o the Germans. Schubert 
mentioned a n x i e t y about the Soviet Union i n h i s memorandum f o r D'Abernon 
at the end of February, and Luther, Stresemann, and Schubert a l l 
stressed i t t o D'Abernon i n the f i r s t ten days of March, ' Some 
a"tTempts-were made" to" counter the-argument„ On 15 May Chamberlain, 
w h i l e acknowledging t h a t Germany must have regard t o her r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h the Soviet Union, maintained t o Sthamer t h a t Soviet o p p o s i t i o n 
t o German entry i n t o the League was intended t o keep Germany weak. 
139» Negotiations were h e l d up by Soviet attempts t o i m p l i c a t e a 
member of the German Embassy s t a f f i n the t r i a l f o r espionage 
of t*B5 two German students i n J u l y , but there was no breach. 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t Stresemann on the one hand was anxious not 
to l e t the Russians go and on the other hand d i d not want t o 
sign a p o l i t i c a l agreement before the conclusion of the western 
pact. Correspondence and memoranda, 29 Jun . - 2 9 Aug* 1925, 
2860/D555357-60, D555393-95, 0555^15-19, D555^6i-65, D 5 5 5 ^ - 8 5 , 
D 5 5 5 ^ - 9 7 , D555656-62, D555683-89, D555699-703, 05557^3-^8; 
^562/Ei55522-25, E155573-75, E155723-27, E155839; ^556/Eiif9230-
38, E1^9239-^3° 
1^0= See above, (pp, '&v© =d„ 
He also said t h a t he was not f o l l o w i n g an a n t i - S o v i e t p o l i c y and even 
i f he were i t would be a mistake t o t r y t o use the League/ f o r the 
purpose; but he d i d not t h i n k t h a t Germany had anything t o gain from 
(1V1) 
the Soviet Union, Stresemann's suggestions t o D'Abernon t h a t 
i f her r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union were to be upset by entry i n t o 
the League Germany must be given something e x t r a , were contested by 
Addison, who t o l d Schubert t h a t the Russians g e n e r a l l y b l u f f e d and 
the Germans should not be taken i n . Schubert r e p l i e d t h a t an 
Englishman could say t h i s , but f o r Germany i n her " c a t a s t r o p h i c 
(142) 
geographical p o s i t i o n " the danger was much g r e a t e r . To Schubert 
and Stresemann at the end of June D'Abernon described Soviet Assertions 
t h a t B r i t a i n was t r y i n g t o get Germany i n t o an an t i - B o l s h e v i k c o a l i t i o n 
as nonsense; but he agreed t h a t Germany could not r i s k Soviet h o s t i l i t y a n d he rep o r t e d t o the Foreign O f f i c e t h a t many German 
p o l i t i c i a n s were wondering v/hether i t was wise f o r t h e i r country to 
(143) 
break the Russian connexion. 
Under the new Conservative Government Anglo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s 
1^1. Desp. 902 t o B e r l i n , 15 May 1925, C 6652A59/18, FO 371/10731; 
Sthamer t e l . , 15 May,^509/8126279-83. E a r l y i n A p r i l , when 
the question of the League and r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union 
was acute, Schubert asked Hoesch and Sthamer f o r t h e i r opinion 
on the whole problemo^Stharner advised t h a t i f i t came t o a 
choice, g i v i n g up r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia would be more harmful 
than l o s i n g the western n e g o t i a t i o n s . Hoesch on the contrary 
b e l i e v e d t h a t securing the p r a c t i c a l aims i n the west was more 
important than the remote prospect of using a Russo-Polish 
c o n f l i c t t o achieve German aims i n the east, and t h a t on general 
grounds Germany would gain by j o i n i n g the League: 4562/E155163-
66; 3123/D645960-68, D645979-86. 
14-2. See above, p. . »memorandum by Schubert, 18 Jun., 1925, 4509/ 
E126720-21. L 
1*f3. B e r l i n t e l s . 244, 245, 28 and 29 Jun. 1925, C 8699, 8770/459/lS, 
FO 371/10735; memorandum by Schubert, 27 Jun., 4509/E126878-87; 
memorandum by Stresemann, 28 Jun., 3123/D643748-54. 
d e t e r i o r a t e d . Although there was, and i s , no evidence t h a t they 
intended t o pursue an a n t i - S o v i e t p o l i c y t o the extent of orga n i s i n g 
a new crusade, the f e a r of the Soviet leaders t h a t they would do so 
seems t o have been genuine, at l e a s t i n i t i a l l y . L ater i n 1925 the 
fear of a t t a c k diminished t o a fear of i s o l a t i o n or b o y c o t t , but 
uneasiness was kept a l i v e by the frequent a n t i - S o v i e t utterances of 
c e r t a i n members of the Government, n o t a b l y Birkenhead and Joynson-
Hicks, and by the p u b l i c a t i o n i n some American newspapers of 
Nicolson's memorandum of 19 February., On 19 March Chicherin 
gave Brockdorff-Eantzau a copy of a memorandum p u r p o r t i n g t o be one 
addressed by Chamberlain t o the French Government on 7 March, 
advocating p o l i t i c a l t r e a t i e s b i n d i n g a number of s t a t e s t o mutual 
defence, non-aggression and prevention of r e v o l u t i o n , and i n c l u d i n g 
-Germany~to~~forestall a German-SavielTairiance; and^prbmising p r e c i s e 
proposals i n the near f u t u r e . The document i s obviously a 
f a b r i c a t i o n , and i s an extremely amateurish p r o d u c t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n 
t o the inhere n t i m p l a u s i b i l i t y of c r e d i t i n g the B r i t i s h Government 
w i t h plans f o r a la r g e - s c a l e a l l a i n c e a t the moment when they were 
about t o r e j e c t the Geneva P r o t o c o l , the memorandum does not even 
mention the Protoc o l as a genuine document of t h i s date obviously 
would have done; and some of the terminology ( f o r example " n a t i o n a l 
c h a u v i n i s t s " ) would never have been used by B r i t i s h c i v i l servants 
or p o l i t i c i a n s . The Auswa«tiges Amt regarded the document as 
spurious on i n t e r n a l evidence alone.^ ^ 5 ) 
l¥f. See p. ZM y a. §3. 
1^5. Brockdorff-Rantzau desp., 21 Mar. 1925, V562/E1551O6-13. 
A. Anderle, Die deutsche R a p a l l o - P o l i t i k , |last] B a l i n 1962, 
pp. 118-120, t r e a t s the memorandum as genuine. 
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The Russians were also worried by Chamberlain's r e f u s a l t o 
contemplate new Anglo-Soviet negotiations,, On 6 January the Soviet 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n London, Eakovsky, asked Chamberlain t o e x p l a i n a 
comment which he had made i n the House of Commons, t h a t normal 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h any government r e q u i r e d t h a t i t should observe the 
normal r u l e s of f r i e n d l y conduct,, Chamberlain r e p l i e d t h a t he d i d 
not i n t e n d t o argue about the Zinoviev l e t t e r , which the Government 
were convinced was genuine: what he meant was t h a t normal r e l a t i o n s 
were not possible i f one of the c o u n t r i e s concerned, by i t s own 
organs or by means of a body such as the Comintern, i n t e r f e r e d i n the 
domestic a f f a i r s o f the other or campaigned against i t s i n t e r e s t s i n 
d 4 6 ) 
t h i r d countries,, I n A p r i l and again i n J u l y Eakovsky suggested 
general discussions t o explore what agreements could be s u b s t i t u t e d 
f o r the abandoned t r e a t i e s of-1924." On both occasions Chamberlain, 
although c a r e f u l l y p o l i t e , was unforthcomings he said t h a t he saw 
l i t t l e use i n discussions so long as the p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s i n the 
(147) 
trade agreement of 1921 were not being f u l f i l l e d . 
However, Chamberlain had no desire t o break o f f r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
the Soviet Union and he had no great d i f f i c u l t y f o r the present i n 
persuading the Cabinet t o h i s view. When at the end of February the 
B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Moscow, R.M. Hodgson, re p o r t e d t h a t Chicherin 
was unable t o shake o f f the idea t h a t Chamberlain was i n s t i g a t i n g an 
a n t i - S o v i e t c o a l i t i o n , Chamberlain r e p l i e d t h a t the Government had 
146. Desp. 17 t o Moscow, 6 Jan. 1925, N 102/102/38, FO 371/11015-. 
147. Desp., 249 t o Moscow, 1 Apr. 1925, N 1852/IO2/38, FO 371/11015; 
desp. 690 t o Moscow, 13 J u l . , N 4021/102/38, FO 371/HO16. 
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not departed from an a t t i t u d e of s t r i c t correctness; they had n e i t h e r 
undertaken nor l e n t countenance t o any such combination, nor d i d they 
(148) 
i n t e n d t o do so. On 20 May Chicherm t o l d another member of the 
B r i t i s h mission t h a t he wanted to conclude an' arrangement which would 
lead t o a di m i n u t i o n of B r i t i s h u n f r i e n d l i n e s s t o the Soviet Union 
a l l over the world. Peters commented t o the Foreign O f f i c e t h a t the 
de s i r e f o r an arrangement seemed t o be genuine, and was due t o 
pressure of circumstances, disappointment over t r a d e , and above a l l a 
(149) 
d i s l i k e of being ignored. A f t e r the League Council meeting i n 
June Chamberlain c i r c u l a t e d a record of a conversation w i t h the 
Estonian General Laidoner, who had said t h a t the Russians were a f r a i d 
o f everyone, but c h i e f l y of B r i t a i n because she was doing without 
them. Chamberlain commented t h a t t h i s confirmed h i s b e l i e f t h a t i t would be a mistake t o provoke a controversy w i t h the Soviet Government 
or denounce t h e i r behaviour: i t was much b e t t e r t o ignore them. The 
Cabinet on 8 J u l y approved the p o l i c y of m a i n t a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s , and 
Chamberlain appealed t o h i s colleagues t o remember t h i s when making 
t h e i r speeches.^ 
148. Moscow desp. 123, 26 Feb. 1925; desp. 229 t o Moscow, 30 Mar., 
N 13lVl02/38, FO 371/11015. 
149. Moscow desp. 347, 22 May 1925, N 3153/102/38, FO 371/HOI6. 
Reports reaching the German Government i n May of Anglo-Franco-
American discussion of a plan of i n t e r v e n t i o n against the 
Soviet Union l e d Schubert t o make en q u i r i e s of the German 
Embassies i n London, P a r i s and Washington. A l l three dismissed 
the r e p o r t s as i n v e n t i o n : one p a r t i c u l a r l y improbable f e a t u r e , 
as Hoesch pointed out, was the suggestion t h a t the United States 
Government, who were s a i d t o be the moving s p i r i t s of the p l a n , 
had o f f e r e d t o take over the Russian debt t o France and cancel 
the French debt t o the United States: 4562/E155288-89, 
E155297-98, E155306; 2860/D555211. 
150O Memorandum by Chamberlain, 10 Jun. 1925, N 3432/102/38, FO 371/ 
11016; C. 36(25), CAB 23/50o 
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Later i n J u l y Chamberlain e v i d e n t l y f e l t i t necessary t o spread 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s advice t o the Cabinet. He wrote t o 
Baldwin t h a t the constant flow of i n f o r m a t i o n about h o s t i l e Soviet 
a c t i v i t y , e s p e c i a l l y i n the east, made i t d i f f i c u l t t o maintain the 
a t t i t u d e t h a t he had recommended. His reasons f o r not wishing t o 
push t h i n g s t o a breach were the p o s s i b l e repercussions i n China, 
where a breach would help the Russians t o pose as the champions of 
the Chinese against the West, the r e a c t i o n s i n Germany, where 
opponents of the s e c u r i t y pact described i t as a B r i t i s h p l o t t o 
cause a -^breach between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the l i k e l y 
r e a c t i o n s a t home. Chamberlain s t i l l thought these reasons s u f f i c i e n t , 
but he asked Baldwin t o appoint a Cabinet committee t o look a t the 
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t was too secret t o be c i r c u l a t e d . B a l f o u r and C e c i l 
met Chamberlain f o r the purpose on 30 J u l y , and they agreed t h a t the 
e x i s t i n g p o l i c y should be continued. A week l a t e r the Cabinet 
confirmed t h a t there was no occasion a t present t o change t h e i r 
(151) 
p o l i c y towards the Soviet Union. 
One area of pos s i b l e a n t i - S o v i e t c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h other c o u n t r i e s , 
the exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n about Communist a c t i v i t i e s , was d e l i b e r a t e l y 
avoided i n 1925= The Soviet press claimed t h a t Chamberlain's v i s i t s 
to P a r i s and Rome i n December 192^ had the object of s t a r t i n g a 
campaign against the Soviet Union. I n f a c t the subject of the Soviet 
Union was barely mentioned between Chamberlain and H e r r i o t , and not 
at a l l i n Rome. But the two M i n i s t e r s contemplated exchanging 
i n f o r m a t i o n , although not con c e r t i n g a c t i o n about Communist a c t i v i t e s l ^ 2 - ) 
151. Chamberlain t o Baldwin, 2l\ J u l . 1925; note by Chamberlain, 30 
J u l . , Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/l8; C. ^3(25), CAB 23/50. 
152. Note by H e r r i o t , 5 Dec. 192^, A.A.E., Grande Bretagne, Vol. 71; 
note by Laroche, 13 Dec, Vol. 57, minute by T y r e l l , 18 Dec. 192^, 
N937/108/38, F0 371/10^80. See pp. t o=A «a*y. 
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Nothing appears t o have been done, however, and when i n the summer 
the Portuguese Government suggested co-operation i n combating 
Communism the Foreign O f f i c e and the Home O f f i c e agreed t h a t , w h i l e 
t h e r e was no o b j e c t i o n t o ord i n a r y p o l i c e c o l l a b o r a t i o n over known 
c r i m i n a l s , i t was p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a b l e a t present, i n view of the 
a l l e g a t i o n t h a t B r i t a i n was engageiin c r e a t i n g an a n t i - S o v i e t b l o c , 
not t o depart from the p r a c t i c e o f deprecating arrangements w i t h 
f o r e i g n Governments about Communist a c t i v i t i e s . Again a t the end of 
the year, when a s i m i l a r enquiry came from the Swiss Government, the 
Foreign O f f i c e r e p l i e d : "We are anxious t o avoid being involved i n 
anything which could be regarded as a concerted a n t i - B o l s h e v i k movement 
or as tending t o the o r g a n i s a t i o n of or p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an ant&~ 
Bolshevik b l o c " / 1 5 3 ^ 
Although - the Foreign O f f i c e r e j e c t e d ^ - s u g g e s t i o n from Hodgson 
t h a t they should issue a formal d e n i a l of the s t o r y of an a n t i - S o v i e t 
c o a l i t i o n , on the ground t h a t a d e n i a l would not convince the Russians 
and would only l e n d importance t o the s t o r y , Max Mu l l e r was i n s t r u c t e d 
i n August t o give a d e n i a l t o Skrzynski since the Poles appeared t o 
(154) 
b e l i e v e the t a l e . Skrzynski s a i d t h a t while he had never b e l i e v e d i n 
153= N3600, 4225/29/^8, FO 371/11010; N 5536, 6173, 6282, 6390, 7081 / 
29/38, FO 371/11011. 
154. Moscow t e l . 291= 7 Aug. 1925; t e l . 244 t o Moscow, 12 Aug.; 
Chamberlain t o Max M u l l e r , 12 Aug., N 4519, 5059/102/38, 
FO 371/11016. At the same time, i n answer t o another enquiry 
from B e r l i n , Dufour reported h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the B r i t i s h 
Government d i d not want a war w i t h the Soviet Union, and t h a t 
even i f they d i d they would be unable t o conduct one f o r 
reasons of finance and of p u b l i c o p i n i o n : 4562/E155742-44. 
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the bloc s t o r y he thought t h a t the Russians had r e a l l y done so u n t i l 
r e c e n t l y . But he found i t hard to b e l i e v e t h a t the B r i t i s h Government 
v/ould not t h i n k i t i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t t o detach Germany from the 
Soviet Union. ^^5) 
How l a r g e a f a c t o r i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y on the s e c u r i t y pact a 
desire t o detach Germany from the Soviet Union may be sa i d t o have 
been i s not easy to determine. A good deal depends on the degree of 
detachment envisaged. One con s i d e r a t i o n i n t a k i n g up a p o l i c y of 
mutual s e c u r i t y i n western Europe was c e r t a i n l y a desire t o convince 
Germany t h a t she had more t o gain from f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the 
west than from a commitment to the Soviet Union. I t i s much l e s s 
c e r t a i n whether i t was thought t h a t Germany would have t o choose 
between east and west, or whether i t was expected t h a t she would continue 
t o t r e a d the narrow path between the two. On the one hand one has 
assurances t o the Germans t h a t B r i t a i n understood the necessity f o r 
Germany to have regard t o her r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union and d i d 
not wish t o promote a breach. On the other hand one has words l i k e 
those of Chamberlain t o the P o l i s h M i n i s t e r i n London about "the 
European Powers on the one hand and the Soviet Government on the other 
f i g h t i n g f o r the soul of theg, German people". ^ ^ 6 ) p e r n a p S the best 
answer i s t h a t provided Germany were not thrown i n t o the arms of 
Russia the question i n B r i t i s h eyes d i d not present i t s e l f as one 
155» Max M u l l e r t o Chamberlain, 25 Aug. 1925, N 5059/102/38, 
FO 371/11016. 
156. Desp. 5^0 t o Warsaw, 7 J u l . 1925, C 9132/^59/18, FO 371/ 
10735« An argument addressed to the Poles on such a subject 
was, however, always a sp e c i a l one. 
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o f a hard and f a s t choice. I t was probably assumed and hoped t h a t 
f o r Germany b e t t e r p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the west and r e t u r n t o 
the European p o l i t i c a l community would lead t o a weakening of 
p o l i t i c a l t i e s w i t h the east. The importance t o Germany of economic 
t i e s w i t h the Soviet Union was c e r t a i n l y acknov/ledged and there 
was no suggestion t h a t they should be cut o f f ; but despite the 
d i s a p p o i n t i n g experience of Anglo-Soviet trade since 1921 the i n t i m a t e 
connexion, i n Soviet and German eyes, between economic and p o l i t i c a l 
(157 ) 
r e l a t i o n s was probably not appreciated i n B r i t a i n . 
The French too may be said t o have wished t o detach Germany from 
the Soviet Union t o some extent; but i n French p o l i c y there was a 
second element not p a r a l l e l e d on the B r i t i s h s i d e , t h a t of detaching 
the Soviet Union from Germany. I n t h i s respect there was not much 
diff e r e n c e " between H e r r i o t and -Briahd." When "Chamberlain v i s i t e d Paris 
i n December 1924 H e r r i o t t o l d him t h a t one of h i s reasons f o r 
re c o g n i s i n g the Soviet Government a couple of months e a r l i e r and 
sending an ambassador t o Moscow was the fear l e s t , l e f t t o h e r s e l f , 
the Soviet Union should combine w i t h Germany.^^8) g r ; j _ a n ( j c o u i c [ t a l k 
157= A discussion of the very d i f f e r e n t p a r t s played by economic 
p o l i c y i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of B r i t a i n and of Germany f a l l s 
outside the scope of t h i s study. As f a r as German-Soviet 
r e l a t i o n s are concerned, the economic aspect i s discussed much 
more f u l l y by Dr. Breuning than by Spenz or Walsdorff. As 
regards German-Polish r e l a t i o n s , see Harald von Riekhoff, 
German-Polish Relations 1918-1933, Baltimore 1971, Chs I I I , 
VT, V I I , and below, pp. 
158. Record of conversation, 5 Dec. 1924, N 9223/44/58, FO 371/ 
10747. 
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t o Phipps about detaching Germany from Russia as a very worthy o b j e c t , 
(159) 
and t o Hoesch about the p e r i l s of Bolshevism; but at the same time 
he could suggest p o l i t i c a l consultations t o the Russians. The motive 
here v/as, as the French Ambassador s a i d t o Chicherin, t h a t "the 
French Government were g r e a t l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the establishment of 
l a s t i n g peaceful r e l a t i o n s between £the Soviet Union~|and Poland", 
and as he wrote t o H e r r i o t , " i l n'y a pas de s a l u t pour nous que s i 
nous a r r i v o n s a. e n t r e t e n i r , avec l a Russie q u i r e n a i t actuellement, 
des r e l a t i o n s q ui excluront une co-operation russo-allemande contre 
l a France e t contre l e s amis de l a France".^^®} 
Chicherin's v i s i t s t o Warsaw and B e r l i n on the eve of the 
Locarno meeting caused l i t t l e concern t o the B r i t i s h and French. 
They d i d not s e r i o u s l y f e a r t h a t h i s f i n a l e f f o r t s t o deter Germany 
"from~tHe "western pact would succeed, and they used, the occasion f o r 
some e x h o r t a t i o n t o the Poles and f o r some contact w i t h Chicherin 
h i m s e l f . Skrzynski t o l d Max M u l l e r t h a t he found Chicherin a b s o l u t e l y 
convinced t h a t the B r i t i s h Government were working t o create a 
common f r o n t against the Soviet Union. Max Mu l l e r t h e r e f o r e , meeting 
Chicherin a t a re c e p t i o n i n Warsaw, t o l d him t h a t the common f r o n t 
v/as pure i n v e n t i o n , and t h a t even i f the B r i t i s h Government wanted 
t o embark on so hazardous a venture they had too many other pre-
occupations t o do so. Chicherin asked why then Chamberlain had twice 
159O P a r i s t e l . 261, 28 J u l . 1925, C 999V^59 / l8 , FO 371/10737; 
Hoesch t e l . , 6 Aug., ^509/El2?5^0-kk„ 
160 Dokumenty Vneshnei P o l i t i k i S.S.S.R., Vol. V I I I , n. 128 and 
No. 272; H e r r i o t , J a d i s , Vol. I I , pp. 240-1. 
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turned down overtures f o r conversations. Max M u l l e r r e p l i e d t h a t 
so soon a f t e r the f a i l u r e of the l a s t n e g o t i a t i o n s he thought t h a t 
i t was p o i n t l e s s t o expect a new t r e a t y on the same l i n e s , and t h a t 
no n e g o t i a t i o n s were p r e f e r a b l e t o another breakdown. He also s a i d 
t h a t he hoped the improvement i n Polish-Soviet r e l a t i o n s would be 
, (161) permanent. 
Further i n f o r m a t i o n about Chicherin's v i s i t t o Warsaw came 
from Briand and Skrzynski a t Locarno. Briand t o l d Chamberlain^the 
Poles had consulted him about the v i s i t and t h a t he had encouraged 
i t , saying t h a t Poland had every i n t e r e s t i n being on good terms 
w i t h the Soviet Unions her r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany could only be 
be t t e r e d and the prospects f o r the western n e g o t i a t i o n s improved i f 
the Germans f e l t t h a t there was "no l i k e l i h o o d of Russia making t r o u b l e 
"f^or^Tolahd^ i n the r e a r " . Indeed i f Poland had n o t h i n g t o fear from 
the Soviet Union i t might help t o d i s p e l the German nightmare of a 
French army marching across Germany t o help her, "an idea which 
Briand observed no Frenchman c o n t e m p l a t e d " . C h a m b e r l a i n t o l d 
both Briand and Skrzynski t h a t i t was no p a r t of B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y t o 
embroil Poland w i t h e i t h e r o^ her neighbours; on the con t r a r y he 
would be glad t o see r e l a t i o n s improve. Skrzynski sa i d t h a t 
Chicherin's v i s i t marked a welcome detente. He had t o l d Chicherin 
t h a t he was ready t o si g n a non-aggression pact a t any time w i t h any 
161. Warsaw t e l . 98, 28 Sep. 1925; Warsaw desp. 467, 29 Sept., 
N 5491, 5575/102/38, FO 371/11016. 
162. Chamberlain t o T y r e l l , 4 Oct. 1925, N 5714/710/38, FO 371/ 
11022. 
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country, but t h a t P o l i s h agreement w i t h the Soviet Union must not 
endanger or ignore the B a l t i c States or Roumaniao ^ ^-^ 
Despite Chamberlain's words t o Skrzynski, i t seemed t h a t the 
Poles were anxious about the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e t o a poss i b l e 
rapprochement w i t h the Soviet Union. At a l l events such an an x i e t y 
was thought t o be the reason why Skraynski's p r i v a t e secretary t o l d 
a member of the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n t h a t h i s M i n i s t e r would probably 
r e t u r n Chicherin's v i s i t . Chamberlain minuted t h a t he f e l t no 
jealousy of conversations between Warsaw and Moscow, although not 
(l64) 
a l l B r i t i s h o pinion would f e e l the same. But a t the end of 
the conference the Foreign O f f i c e thought i t w e l l t o i n s t r u c t Max 
Mu l l e r to make i t c l e a r t o Skrzynski t h a t they would welcome b e t t e r 
(1(55) 
P o l i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany as w e l l as w i t h the Soviet Union. ~ As f o r Chicherin's v i s i t t o - B e r l i n , Schubert a t h i s f i r s t 
encounter w i t h Lampson was a t pains t o d i s p e l any idea t h a t i t had 
a l t e r e d the German Government's p o l i c y towards the western pact. 
163. Locarno desp. 17, 9 Oct. 1925, C 128l3A59/l8, FO 371/107^2; 
Warsaw desp. ^58, 29 Sep., N 5570/1805/55, FO 371/11005„ 
Chicherin's own account of h i s v i s i t t o Warsaw, Dokumenty 
Vheshnei P o l i t i k i S.S.S.R., Vol. V I I I , No. 323, describes 
h i s t a l k s as concerned w i t h the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a Franco-
Soviet rapprochement, the p o s s i b l e r e c o g n i t i o n of the P o l i s h 
f r o n t i e r , and a non-aggression pact. The German Embassy i n 
Moscow be l i e v e d t h a t the Poles had f i r s t suggested the v i s i t 
i n the s p r i n g when the western pact n e g o t i a t i o n s became known; 
^509/El28433-8^5 I n May Skrzynski dismissed as nonsense suggestions 
(which worried Chamberlain) t h a t Poland might seek p r o t e c t i o n 
against Germany i n clo s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union; 
Warsaw desp. 256, 13 May, N 2818/1805/55, FO 371/11005. See 
also J . Korbel, Poland between East and West, Princeton 19&3, 
pp. 162-6. 
l6*f„ Minute by V. Cavendish-Bentinck, 11 Oct. 1925, FO 8WV7-
165. Deep. 818 to Warsaw, 16 Oct. 1925, N 5803/1805/55, FO 371/11005. 
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Schubert s a i d t h a t Chicherin had come u n i n v i t e d and unwanted and t h a t 
the t a l k s w i t h him had merely been the conclusion of discussions 
which had been proceeding " f o r a good two years, d e a l i n g w i t h a 
v a r i e t y of t e c h n i c a l matters between the two countfa&es"</ 
On 7 October Stresemann gave Chamberlain a lo n g and o s t e n s i b l y f r a n k 
account of h i s conversations w i t h Chicherin. He said t h a t Chicherin 
had r e v e r t e d t o the a l l e g e d B r i t i s h i n v i t a t i o n t o other c o u n t r i e s to 
j o i n i n an a n t i - S o v i e t b l o c , and asked v/hether Chamberlain could t e l l 
him whether such a document e x i s t e d . Chamberlain said t h a t there 
was no word of t r u t h i n the s t o r y , and expounded B r i t i s h p o l i c y f o r 
Stresemann's b e n e f i t . There were enough grounds, he s a i d , f o r a 
breach w i t h the Soviet Union but he d i d not want one i f i t could be 
avoided. He had a t no time made any proposal t o any government f o r 
concerted a c t i o n against the Soviet Union, but on the contrary had 
always encouraged her neighbours t o get on t o the best possible 
terms w i t h her. He welcomed the recent conversations between Chicherin 
arid Skrzynski, f o r the l e s s danger there was of a qu a r r e l between the 
Soviet Union and Poland the easier would be t h e i r work at Locarno. 
For B r i t a i n he saw no advantage i n making a new agreement w i t h the 
Soviet Union so lon g as the terms of the trade agreement were being 
broken: r a t h e r i t was B r i t i s h p o l i c y t o leave the Soviet Union alone 
u n t i l she discovered t h a t she needed Europe more than Europe needed 
her. 
l66.Minute by Lampson, 4 Oct. 1925, C 12660/459/18, FO 371/10741. 
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Stresemann said t h a t he had never believed the s t o r y of the 
B r i t i s h memorandum. Chicherin's argument, so f a r as Germany v/as 
concerned, had been t h a t t o conclude the pact, and s t i l l more t o 
enter the League, was t o make Germany p a r t y t o an a n t i - S o v i e t 
combination and subordinate her p o l i c y t o t h a t of B r i t a i n . D'Abernon 
would become d i c t a t o r of Germany and the Reichswehr B r i t i s h mercenaries. 
Stresemann s a i d t h a t he had t r i e d to show Chicherin t h a t these 
suspicions were unfounded, and t h a t he had asked what evidence Chicherin 
had f o r a B r i t i s h p l o t . He had f i n a l l y e x t r a c t e d the statement t h a t 
a B r i t i s h bank (not the Bank of England) had advised a German bank to 
stop g i v i n g c r e d i t s to the Soviet Union. Stresemann commented t o 
Chamberlain on the pro-Russian a t t i t u d e of the German conservatives, 
saying t h a t i t was a compound of the Bismarckian t r a d i t i o n t h a t a l l 
was w e l l f o r Germany when Russia was her f r i e n d w i t h a nev; sympathy 
f o r Communist a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . But he thought t h a t Chicherin's 
p u b l i c propaganda had probably been a mistake. 
Chicherin had also t r i e d t o f r i g h t e n him, sai d Stresemann, w i t h 
a suggestion t h a t a Russo-Franco-Polish understanding was i n process 
of formation; but he had r e p l i e d t h a t Chicherin must make up h i s 
mind which s t o r y he wanted t o have b e l i e v e d . A Franco-Polish under-
standing w i t h Germany could not be intended as an a t t a c k on Germany; 
i f a French agreement w i t h Germany were a danger t o Russia, there 
could not a t the same time be a Franco-Russian rapprochement. 
Stresemann then explained the agreement w i t h the Soviet Union t h a t 
was about t o be signed. The n e g o t i a t i o n s , he s a i d , had been going 
on f o r a long time, about such matters as how trade r e l a t i o n s could 
be conducted between a country w i t h an ord i n a r y economy and one 
w i t h a Governemnt monopoly of f o r e i g n t r a d e , about t a r i f f s and so on. 
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He had not wanted t o postpone the whole question u n t i l a f t e r the 
Locarno meeting because any c o n d i t i o n s t h a t the German side might 
make afterwards would then be blamed on the pact. But the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s d i d not i n any way a f f e c t the German a t t i t u d e towards 
the conference or circumscribe h i s freedom of a c t i o n . Chamberlain 
assured Stresemann t h a t he was p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f i e d . Soviet p o l i c y 
seemed t o be t o approach each country i n t u r n w i t h o f f e r s , which were 
always contingent upon a lo a n . He d i d not t h i n k t h a t much would come 
of them a t present, but he would not be jealous of a recovery of 
German trade w i t h Russia. Whenever a l a r g e trade w i t h Russia became 
po s s i b l e again, Germany would n a t u r a l l y have the l a r g e s t share as she 
h% done i n the past. B r i t a i n would have a smaller shares the gain t o 
her would be the general r e s t o r a t i o n of trade and increased German 
capacity t o buy Empire products. " I had, I repeated, never sought t o 
i n t e r f e r e w i t h the establishment of good r e l a t i o n s between Russia 
and any other country. When the P o l i s h M i n i s t e r i n London, 
summarising something I had sai d t o him, had spoken of my desire t o 
'detach' Germany from Russia, I had s a i d t h a t the word d i d not 
c o r r e c t l y represent my idea. I had no desire t o detach Germany from 
Russia, but I had a very r e a l d e s i r e not t o throw Germany i n t o the 
arms of Russia by c l o s i n g t o her every other o p p o r t u n i t y of f r i e n d s h i p 
n , . „ (167) or even normal r e l a t i o n s " . 
"l67o Locarno desp. 1*f, 8 Oct. 1925, FO 8^0/1/5° The top copy i n 
N 5959/265/58 has been weeded! p r i n t i n FO ^18/6^. Stresemann's 
record of h i s conversations w i t h Chicherin on 29 September and 
2 October, 2860/D555899-910, D555911-17, short e x t r a c t s i n 
Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 523-7; h i s record of h i s conversation 
w i t h Chamberlain, 3l47/D655659-6l. Stresemann d i d n o t , 
n a t u r a l l y , t e l l Chamberlain of h i s wrangle w i t h Chicherin 
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While i n B e r l i n Chicherin saw the French Ambassador, t o 
whom he repeated the s t o r y of B r i t a i n ' s a n t i - S o v i e t p o l i c y and said 
t h a t he would p r e f e r an agreement w i t h France t o an a l l i a n c e w i t h 
Germany. De Margerie r e p l i e d t h a t the a n t i - S o v i e t bloc s t o r y was 
rub b i s h , and i n any case Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s were of the best and 
he would not l i s t e n t o such t a l k . Chamberlain, a f t e r hearing t h i s 
from Briand, then took another o p p o r t u n i t y to t e l l Schubert t h a t 
C hicherin was f a l l i n g i n t o the f a t a l mistake of supposing t h a t the 
establishment of good r e l a t i o n s between any two co u n t r i e s was a 
menace t o h i s own. I n s t r e s s i n g the complete confidence e x i s t i n g 
between B r i t a i n and France, Chamberlain i n d i r e c t l y warned Schubert not 
t o t r y t o play one o f f against the o t h e r . S u m m i n g up Chicherin's 
v i s i t t o B e r l i n , D'Abernon wrote t h a t h i s main object had been a great 
campaign"against B r i t a i n . But he had found"the German Government not " 
prepared t o abandon the pact p o l i c y , and France also u n w i l l i n g t o be 
separated from B r i t a i n . ^  
167. Cont'd. 
about the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the suggestion i n December 1924 of 
a German-Soviet agreement on Poland, nor of t h e i r d iscussion 
on the League of Nations and the proposed preamble, the l a s t 
paragraph of which meant, Stresemann s a i d , t h a t Germany as a 
member of the League would so deal w i t h A r t . 16 t h a t a war 
against the Soviet Union was excluded. The German-Soviet 
trade agreement was signed i n Moscow on 12 October. Chicherin's 
press i n t e r v i e w s i n B e r l i n are p r i n t e d i n J. Degras, Soviet 
Documents on Foreign P o l i c y , V ol. I I , London 1952, pp 57-9 , 
168. Locarno desp. 33, 13 Oct. 1925, N 5812/IO2/38, FO 371/HO16; 
minute by Chamberlain, 13 Oct., FO 84o/l / 8 . 




The Conference at Locarno and the Signature of the Treaties 
The meeting at Locarno i n October 1925 of the Foreign Ministers 
of Great B r i t a i n , France, Germany, Belgium and I t a l y , and the attendance 
of the Foreign Ministers of Poland and Czechoslovakia, was the 
culmination o f months of negotiation. The discussions o f the legal 
advisers i n London at the beginning of September had resulted i n 
substantial agreement on the a r t i c l e s o f the draft treaty of mutual 
guarantee for the f r o n t i e r s between France and Belgium and Germany; but 
none of the Governments were committed to the precise terms of the text 
of k September, and one important provision remained the subject of 
disagreement - the mention i n the treaty, and therewith the acknowledgment 
by Germany, of a French guarantee for the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s to be 
concluded between Germany and her eastern and south-eastern neighbours. 
A l l the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s , both i n the west and i n the east, had 
yet to be negotiated although the system on which the western ones 
would be based had been agreed. Germany's entry into the League of 
Nations had been accepted i n pr i n c i p l e but her obligations under 
A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant had not yet been discussed. And outside the 
tr e a t i e s , the German Government intended to raise desiderata about 
disarmament and the occupation of the Rhineland. The meeting was 
therefore one for p o l i t i c a l negotiations, not merely to set the seal on 
agreements already reached. 
The negotiations were completed on 16 October. A protocol, eight 
tr e a t i e s or conventions, and one coll e c t i v e note were i n i t i a l l e d , and 
were to be signed i n London on 1 December. While there was l i t t l e 
doubt that the results would be accepted i n the other countries, the 
5^6 
outcome i n Germany was less certain despite the fact that Germany was 
probably the greatest beneficiary from the settlement. During the 
i n t e r v a l between the conference and the signature, therefore, attention 
centred mainly on the domestic position of the German Government and 
the extent to which they might s a t i s f y t h e i r c r i t i c s by the attainment 
of additional advantages or by in t e r p r e t i n g away v/hat they had under-
taken. The events of these weeks did not only answer t h i s question: 
they raised others about the consequences o f the settlement. A l l 
concerned were aware that Locarno was a beginning as well as an end: 
not a l l viewed the future with the same eyes. 
The conference 
Between 5 and 16 October there were nine meetings of the delegates 
of the five western countries, two of which were also attanded by the 
Polish and Czechoslovak representatives, and a number of informal 
meetings. No o f f i c i a l record was made, but the secretary to each 
delegation compared his notes of the conference meetings with those of 
the other secretaries. A l l the r e s u l t i n g sets of notes can therefore 
(1) 
be regarded as s e m i - o f f i c i a l l y agreed even though not au t h o r i t a t i v e . 
1. Lokarnskaya Konferentsiya, Moscow 1959 > contains a Russian tr a n s l a t i o n 
of a l l the secretaries' notes; the German notes are printed i n 
Locarno-Konferenz; the French notes are i n A.A.E., Grande Bretagnf, 
Vol. 85, and a copy i s i n the German Foreign Ministry archives, 
^509/E12906l-7if7, passim. I have r e l i e d mainly on the B r i t i s h 
record, which i s the f u l l e s t , and on B r i t i s h and German accounts of 
informal meetings. D.D.B., Vol. I I contains some l e t t e r s from 
Va^ervelde to his Prime Minister about the progress o f the conference. 
D.D.I., Vol. IV contains only a few short telegrams from Scialoja to 
Mussolini. Stresemann's journal of the conference i s printed i n 
Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 185-203. Later accounts by participants 
include H. Luther, P o l i t i k e r ohne Partei, Stuttgart 1960, pp. 368-85, 
and Schmidt, S t a t i s t auf diplomatischer Buhne, pp. 76-91• Suarez, 
Briand, Vol. VI, pp. 10^-32, gives an account o f the atmosphere 
rather than of the proceedings. 
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A l l the unsettled points were mentioned as soon as the delegations 
arrived at Locarno. On the afternoon of k October Schubert t o l d Lampson 
"emphatically" that i t would be absolutely impossible for Germany to 
agree to the French guarantee of the German-Polish a r b i t r a t i o n treaty. 
I n the evening Scialoja, the chief I t a l i a n delegate unless or u n t i l 
Mussolini should decide to attend, repeated to Chamberlain various 
statements that the Germans were said to have been making since t h e i r 
a r r i v a l : A r t i c l e 16 was an insuperable obstacle; Cologne must be 
evacuated. I t was rumoured that the Germans would demand mandates over 
some of the former colonies. Scialoja himself thought that agreement 
over the eastern f r o n t i e r would be very d i f f i c u l t . Chamberlain, with 
deliberate optimism, replied that he did not think that the d i f f i c u l t y 
would be insurmountable i f the Germans adhered to t h e i r o r i g i n a l 
assurance that they were ready to exclude the use of force i n the east, 
and would put i t i n w r i t i n g . As for A r t i c l e 16, there was no probabil-
i t y that the Assembly would change the Covenant, but he thought that 
the Germans were frightening themselves with a problem which would 
. (2) never arxse. 
The conference got under way on the morning of 5 October with a 
welcome by the Mayor of Locarno, a f t e r which Chamberlain proposed that 
(3) 
they should do without a chairman. ^ At the f i r s t meeting various 
2. Locarno desps. 1 and 3, 5 Oct. 1925, C 12660, 12662/^59/18, 
FO 371/107^1. 
3. This had been Chamberlain's idea before he l e f t London, but he found 
that Briand favoured B r i t i s h chairmanship. The Germans, however, to 
stress equality, objected to any one delegation providing the 
chairman throughout, so i t was agreed to have none: Locarno desps. 
2 and 3, 5 Oct. 1925, C 12661, 12662/459/18, FO 371/107^1; Chamberlain 
to T y r e l l , k Oct., N 571^/710/38, FO 371/11022. 
amendments to the draft treaty were proposed and were remitted to the 
j u r i s t s . The most important were, f i r s t , that the Germans wished, i n 
the provision about flagrant v i o l a t i o n s of the demilitarised zone, to 
specify "German, French or Belgian" forces i n order to emphasis the 
mutual character o f the guarantee and f o r e s t a l l possible B r i t i s h 
excuses for not helping Germany= The German desire was eventually 
p a r t l y met by specifying the crossing of the f r o n t i e r (as well as the 
outbreak o f h o s t i l i t i e s or the assembly of armed forces i n the 
demilitarised zone) as a case which might make immediate action 
(4) 
necessary. The second important amendment proposed by the Germans 
was that only one of the parties need approach the League for a 
decision that the treaty had become superfluous. Stresemann explained 
that the present a r t i c l e smacked of inequality, since the A l l i e s were 
a group i n which i t would be easy to f i n d a seconder whereas Germany 
was on her own. The German desire was eventually met, but i t was 
provided at the same time that a two-thirds majority of the Council 
(5) 
would have to approve before the treaty could be terminated. 
The question of the French guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s was tackled on 6 October. Stresemann asked for an explanation 
o f the proposal, especially on the questions o f how the a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s were to be concluded and how a state could guarantee a treaty 
to which an a l l y was a party. Briand said that the French position 
k. Notes of F i r s t Meeting, 5 Oct. 1925, C 12792/459/18, FO 371/10742; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25; Locarno desps. 5 and 6, 6 Oct., C 12711, 
12712/459/18, FO 371/107^1. 
5o Notes of F i r s t Meeting, 5 Oct. 1925; Third Meeting, 7 Oct., C 12792, 
12943/459/18, FO 371/107^2; F i f t h Meeting, 10 Oct., 013241/459/18, 
FO 371/107^3; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25. 
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had been f u l l y explained. France had tr e a t i e s with certain states, 
which were binding upon her. I n her anxiety about her own f r o n t i e r s 
she could not forget nor diminish her obligations to others. I f i t 
were a question of form, of doing the same thing i n a d i f f e r e n t way, 
agreement ought to be possible; but i f the objection were fundamental 
and France were asked to abandon altogether the idea of giving a 
guarantee, i t would be impossible to conclude the pact. There ought 
to be no d i f f i c u l t y i f the question were approached i n the s p i r i t of 
the Covenant. I t was not a matter of an old-style alliance directed 
against another country, but rather o f mutual protection. There were 
to be a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s i n the west and the east; i f i t were agreed 
that these t r e a t i e s ruled out resort to force i n a l l cases, Briand 
could not see why the German Government should object to the obligations 
just"assumed~being guaranteed. Of course public opinion had to be 
taken into account, but on both sides. The guarantee was already 
implied: i f the impossible happened, no one would be surprised i f some 
countries interpreted the obligation o f A r t i c l e 16 as involving for them 
the obligation to use armed force. F i n a l l y Briand begged the Germans 
to consider what a change had already taken place i n the way of looking 
at the western guarantee. The 1919 t r e a t i e s had provided for a 
guarantee of one side only; now they envisaged a mutual one. I t had 
taken a l o t of work to get French public opinion to accept the change: 
he must ask that similar work be done on the German side, for there was 
no reason why the same principles should not be applied to the other 
f r o n t i e r . 
Stresemann replied that German public opinion had moved too since 
the Cuno o f f e r . The necessity of taking into account France's r e l a t i o n -
ship with Poland had been accepted, and was the reason why the idea o f 
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a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s had been included i n the pact proposals- France 
had gone farther and demanded that Germany should guarantee peace i n 
the east and enter the League,, Despite hard c o n f l i c t at home the 
German Government had agreed to the l a t t e r demand i n order not to 
jeopardise the security pact, and her entry would give the A l l i e s 
additional guarantees. He would l i k e to be clear on two points: how 
the French guarantee would be effective under A r t i c l e 16, and why i t 
was necessary i f i t f e l l under the provisions of the Covenant. 
Briand observed that the l a t t e r question might apply equally to 
the guarantee for the Rhine f r o n t i e r . As to the former, the answer 
was that the terms of A r t i c l e 16 were not as clear as those o f the 
pact and i t did not f u l l y safeguard security. I t was natural and 
l o g i c a l to give a special guarantee to the execution of the a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s . Moreover France already had binding agreements with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia and her own security was involved. Stresemann 
night say that there was no danger on the eastern f r o n t i e r , and Briand 
did not doubt the present German Government's desire for peace. But 
there would be another Government one day; there might be some public 
outcry, and when public opinion became heated who knew what might happen. 
I t was necessary to take precautions even i f the eventualities were 
never l i k e l y to arise. Briand repeated that i f the d i f f i c u l t y were one 
of form he was absolutely ready to seek the wording that approached 
most nearly to the Covenant. 
Luther said that the question at issue seemed to be whether the 
d i f f i c u l t y was one of form or of substance. The German Government had 
not discussed a formula, but perhaps the French would be able to suggest 
one. Briand replied that the a r t i c l e i n question had been drafted with 
a desire to meet the Germans and to l i n k the idea o f the pact with that 
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of the Covenanto I f German public opinion would not accept t h i s d r a f t , 
he was sure that both sides would t r y to f i n d another solution. He 
would point out that the pact provided for i t s own demise when the 
League Council should decide that the Covenant provided s u f f i c i e n t 
security. I n accepting t h i s provision the German Government showed 
that they recognised the necessity of some special provision now. So 
long as the gap remained i t was l o g i c a l to consider how to f i l l i t . 
Chamberlain said that he would l i k e to explain the B r i t i s h 
positiono I t was understood that the B r i t i s h Government could not 
undertake any new obligation i n the east, but they were not uninterested 
i n the s i t u a t i o n there. B r i t a i n ' s greatest in t e r e s t , l i k e that o f a l l 
the world, was peace; and no one could say where a war, once started, 
would end. Moreover B r i t a i n was a member of the League and had 
undertaken a l l ^ t h e obligations ~d f ~thlT~C6v^nant, ^including those o f 
A r t i c l e 16. These obligations were not exactly defined and might be 
interpreted d i f f e r e n t l y according to the circumstances of a given case. 
The e f f o r t which B r i t a i n would make, for example, i n a South American 
c o n f l i c t would obviously not be the same as that which she would make 
i n a western European one. The B r i t i s h Government were i n effec t 
prepared to put a l l t h e i r forces at the disposal of the League for the 
support of Germany or France i f the other committed the act of flagrant 
aggression defined i n the pact. This was more de f i n i t e than A r t i c l e 
16. I n the same way i t seemed necessary that A r t i c l e 16 should be 
supplemented by a special guarantee i n the case of Germany's eastern 
f r o n t i e r . 
6. Notes of Second Meeting, 6 Oct. 1925, C 1294-2/459/18, FO 371/10742; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25. 
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The discussion was then adjourned u n t i l the following afternoon. 
After the meeting Chamberlain had a conversation with Luther, who said 
that the German Government honestly desired the conclusion of the pact 
but the guarantee of the eastern t r e a t i e s was an almost insuperable 
d i f f i c u l t y . Chamberlain reminded him of France's existing obligations 
and said that the guarantee would l i m i t them by defining and l i m i t i n g 
the occasions on which assistance could be asked for or given. Luther 
said that he saw the force of t h i s argument, but no German Government 
could accept the idea. He asked whether Chamberlain knew what 
alternative proposal Briand might have. Chamberlain replied that he 
knew only that Briand was genuinely ready to consider any form more 
acceptable to the Germans that would s t i l l f u l f i l the fundamental 
French condition. The French and German delegates must discuss the 
problem between themselves i n the f i r s t place, and the sooner the 
b e t t e r . ^ 
On the same evening the B r i t i s h delegation discussed possible 
alternatives i f the French and Germans could not s e t t l e the issue 
between themselves. Three suggestions were drawn up. The f i r s t was 
that there should not be a new French guarantee but that the Polish 
Government should address a note to the French Government asking how 
the security pact affected the Franco-Polish alliance, and receive a 
reply that i f Poland were attacked i n breach of the German-Polish 
a r b i t r a t i o n treaty the casus foederis would apply. The second suggestion 
was that France should place i t on record that i n the event of a 
Polish-German dispute going to the League Council her forces would be 
available to the Council, and that i f i t f a i l e d to agree the s i t u a t i o n 
7. Locarno desp. 8, 7 Oct. 1925, C 127^6/^59/18, FO 371/107^1. 
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would be that of A r t i c l e 15(7) of the Covenant, i . e . members had the 
r i g h t to act as they thought necessary. The t h i r d suggestion was that 
there should be d e f i n i t e agreements between Germany and Poland and 
Germany and Czechoslovakia, not only that they would submit a l l 
disputes to peaceful settlement but also that they would not resort to 
war. Then a l l that would be needed would be a French declaration that 
i f Germany or Poland (or Czechoslovakia) did resort to war and bring 
A r t i c l e 16 into play, France's forces would be at the disposal o f the 
League to uphold the Covenant. 
On the morning o f 7 October Luther met Briand at Ascona, and 
among other topics discussed the guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s . On t h i s occasion Luther made i t clear that whatever the 
modalities and however much i t were based on League procedure, the 
' whole idea of a~French~guarantee was unacceptable. Briand said that 
he would t r y to f i n d a new proposal, but he had already gone a long 
(9) 
way and did not know whether more would be possible. At the 
afternoon conference meeting the a r t i c l e about the guarantee was not 
discussed further but was referred to the j u r i s t s . After Hurst had 
reported on certain amendments Vandervelde proposed an amendment to 
the a r t i c l e dealing with the western a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s , the effec t 
of which was apparently to reintroduce unlimited a r b i t r a t i o n . ^ 
8. Locarno desps. 10 and 11, 7 Oct. 1925, C 12748, 12749/459/18, 
FO 371/10741. 
9. Memoranda by Luther, 7 Oct. 1925, 3123/D645137-48. Luther and 
Briand also discussed the League and the additional German 
desiderata, and Luther also spoke to Vandervelde. 
10. Notes o f Third Meeting, 7 Oct, 1925, C 12943/459/18, FO 371/10742; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25° 
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The problem of the eastern guarantee was not s e t t l e d for another 
six days. Meanwhile at the conference meeting on 10 October Vandervelde 
explained the purpose of the Belgian amendment to A r t i c l e 3. Besides 
adopting the wording of the Covenant for defining disputes of a legal 
nature, the object was indeed to extend a r b i t r a t i o n to a l l differences. 
Vandervelde was concerned l e s t a c o n f l i c t might arise for which no 
solution could be found. Disputes o f a p o l i t i c a l nature were to be 
submitted to c o n c i l i a t i o n commissions, and i f t h e i r recommendations 
were not accepted the dispute would go to the Council of the League. 
But i f the Council f a i l e d to agree there would be an impasse, and the 
Belgian Government proposed that i n such a s i t u a t i o n the dispute should 
be referred for f i n a l decision to some other form o f a r b i t r a t i o n . 
This return to the Geneva Protocol and to an argument of the summer 
must "have been disconcerting to the other delegates; but Briand was 
the f i r s t to attempt to dispose o f i t by pointing out that France and 
Belgium and Germany were undertaking i n no case to attack each other or 
resort to war, so that the gap of which Vandervelde spoke did not 
r e a l l y e x i s t . I f when they came to discuss the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s 
i t appeared that war had not been e f f e c t i v e l y ruled out, they could 
look at the amendment again. Chamberlain supported Briand, saying that 
i f war were excluded and fo r c i b l e measures put outside the bounds of 
p o s s i b i l i t y , a case where a settlement could not be reached would be 
very improbable. Although not a l l the parties to the pact were 
prepared to submit a l l disputes to compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , they were 
not prevented from having recourse to a r b i t r a t i o n when i t was not 
obligatory. The B r i t i s h Government had not been able to consent to 
the pr i n c i p l e of universal compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , but they had 
actually practised a r b i t r a t i o n as much as any country i n the world. 
hG5 
The Germans said nothing except to associate themselves with Chamberlain 
and Vandervelde agreed to postpone his amendment u n t i l the a r b i t r a t i o n 
(11) 
t r e a t i e s came up for discussion. 
After the meeting o f 7 October Hurst suggested a solution of the 
d i f f i c u l t y over the guarantee of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s i n 
the form o f an amendment to A r t i c l e 2 of the pact (under which France 
and Belgium and Germany undertook not to go to war except i n resistance 
to attack or flagrant v i o l a t i o n of the demilitarised zone or with the 
authority of the League). Gaus said that the German delegation might 
accept the amendment, and i t was presumably t h i s that allowed 
Chamberlain to report home that the j u r i s t s were thought to have 
(12) 
nearly reached a solution. But next day Gaus again said that any 
guarantee o f the eastern t r e a t i e s was unacceptable, and i n addition 
Hurst found that the Germans wanted protection against i n d i v i d u a l 
action by France i n a case when, the League Council having f a i l e d to 
agree, members recovered t h e i r freedom of action under A r t i c l e 15(7) 
o f the Covenant. The Germans professed to fear that i n such a case 
France would say that Germany had attacked Poland when i t was not she 
who had started the c o n f l i c t , and they wanted provision made for an 
impa r t i a l examination o f the question of who had made the f i r s t 
a t t a c k / V ^ 
11. Notes of F i f t h Meeting, 10 Oct. 1925, C 13241/459/18, FO 371/10743; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25. 
12. Locarno t e l „ 1 3 ; Locarno desp. 13, 8 Oct. 1925, C 12780, 1279V 
^59/18, FO 371/107^1. 
13. Minute by Hurst, 8 Oct. 1925, FO 840/1/6; German del. t e l . to 
Berlin, 9 Oct., 4509/E128590-92= 
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The B r i t i s h delegation discussed the nev; German demand on 
9 October. Chamberlain said that he did not think that the French 
could meet i t ; but he wondered whether a demilitarised zone on the 
German-Polish f r o n t i e r might be practicable. I t was pointed out, 
however, that such a zone would cover the whole o f the Polish Corridor 
near the sea and would include the fortresses o f Grudziadz, Torun and 
Bydgoszcz, so that the Poles would not accept i t ; and the idea was 
dropped at once. Chamberlain then said that Skrzynski had suggested 
to him a t r i p a r t i t e pact o f guarantee between France, Poland and 
Germany, to take the place of the Franco-Polish alliance. He had 
advised Skrzynski to discuss the idea with Briand, because he did not 
wish to intervene i n the eastern negotiations unless i t became clear 
(14) 
that the parties could not solve the problem. 
The German demand for a r e s t r i c t i o n of France's l i b e r t y of 
action under the Covenant was discussed by the p r i n c i p a l delegates on 
t h e i r lake t r i p on 10 October, but s t i l l without r e s u l t . Chamberlain 
and Hurst, however, pointed out to the Germans that they could not at 
the same time refuse to l i m i t t h e i r own country's l i b e r t y of action by 
undertaking i n no case to go to war with Poland and demand that France's 
l i b e r t y o f action under the Covenant should be l i m i t e d . As a res u l t 
(15) 
Gaus agreed to t r y to induce his ministers to drop the l a t t e r demand. 
14. B r i t i s h delegation meeting, 9 Oct. 1925, FO 840 /1/6; Locarno desp. 
17, 9 Oct., C 12818/459/18, FO 37V10742. Skrzynski had been 
suggesting a t r i p a r t i t e or quadripartite pact of guarantee i n the 
east to the French since June; but he had apparently made no attempt 
to consider whether the Germans would agree: Panafieu (Warsaw) to 
Berthelot, 27 Jun.; note by Laroche, 4 J u l . ; note by Laroche, 13 Aug. 
Panafieu to Berthelot, 21 Aug.; not^by Laroche, 4 Sep.; aide-moJ'moitae 
by Skrzynski, 6 Sep., A.A.E., Grande Bretagna, Vols. 76,78,79,81,82. 
15. Minutes by Hurst, 11 and 12 Oct. 1925, FO 840/1/7; Locarno t e l . 
22, 12 Oct., C 12899/459/18, FO 371/10742. 
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This he evidently succeeded i n doing, for at the conference meeting on 
13 October Hurst was able to produce an agreed f i n a l version of A r t i c l e 
2 of the pact giving France the r i g h t to act against Germany, i n 
addition to the cases already included, i n pursuance of A r t i c l e 16 of 
the Covenant or a decision by the Council or Assembly or i n pursuance 
o f A r t i c l e 15(7) of the Covenant provided that Germany had been the 
f i r s t to attack. The j u r i s t s believed, Hurst said, that France's 
r i g h t to help Poland and Czechoslovakia i n case of need was completely 
safeguarded and the reference i n A r t i c l e 6 of the pact to a guarantee 
of the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s could be dropped. Briand s t i l l 
had to consult the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives, but they 
(1 
gave t h e i r consent and the text of the pact was agreed on 14 October. 
I n the discussion of the second major obstacle to the pact, the 
questiori~of Germany's entry into the League, the German delegates 
continued to base t h e i r objections to assuming any obligations under 
A r t i c l e 16 not on a desire to help the Soviet Union attack i t s 
neighbours with impunity, but on the disarmed state o f t h e i r country, 
and they made ingenious use of the question o f general disarmament. 
Luther t o l d Briand at Ascona on 7 October that i t was not j u s t a 
question of m i l i t a r y action: economic measures too involved the r i s k 
16. Notes of Seventh and Eight^h Meetings, 13 and 14 Oct. 1925, 
C 13053, 13095/459/18, FO 371/10742; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25. 
A solution o f t h i s kind, with a treaty o f guarantee between 
France and Czechoslovakia, i s mentioned i n a l e t t e r from Benes 
to Berthelot o f 20 September: A.A.E., Grande Bretagng,, Vol. 83. 
I t was therefore presumably one of the alternatives considered 
by Briand before going to Locarno. 
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of war, and there were dangers i n allowing the passage of troops. 
Next morning Stresemann said much the same to Chamberlain, and asked 
how the B r i t i s h interpreted A r t i c l e 16. Chamberlain said that i t was 
not easy to i n t e r p r e t . He supposed that when the Covenant was drafted 
i t s framers, expecting the United States to be a founding member of 
the League and Germany to be admitted shortly, had f e l t that the moral 
force o f a unanimous Council decision would be so great that no state 
would be l i k e l y to defy i t . Furthermore the economic pressure on a 
re c a l c i t r a n t state would be so overwhelming that i t would be convinced 
that resistance would be hopeless. I t must therefore have seemed most 
improbable that i t would ever be necessary to resort to m i l i t a r y 
measures. But the force of economic sanctions had been greatly 
weakened by the abstention of the United States, and the B r i t i s h 
Government had had to consider what the position would be i f they had 
to be enforced by sea and the Empire came into c o n f l i c t with the United 
States. However, Chamberlain said, he thought i t impossible to define 
A r t i c l e 16 more precisely than the Council had done i n i t s l e t t e r to 
the German Government i n the preceding March. As regards m i l i t a r y 
sanctions the Council would make recommendations but Germany would 
decide whether and how much she could contribute. As regards economic 
sanctions members were to some extent free to decide the extent and 
even the timing of t h e i r co-operation, but a member obviously could 
not decide not to co-operate at a l l . Stresemann asked whether there 
could be an in t e r p r e t a t i o n applicable not only to Germany but to other 
disarmed countries. He suggested, as he did l a t e r i n the day, an 
17° Memorandum by Luther, 7 Oct. 1925, 3123/D645137-43; Locarno 
t e l . 12, 7 Oct., C 12720/459/18, FO 371/10741. 
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exchange of l e t t e r s between the German Government and the League 
secretariat, and proposed that i t should be supplemented by a private 
correspondence between Germany and the p r i n c i p a l A l l i e s , i n which the 
l a t t e r would explain that the special consideration which the public 
correspondence acknowledged to be necessary would i n t h e i r opinion 
make i t unreasonable to expect any German p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n measures 
(18) 
taken i n the event o f aggression by the Soviet Union. 
At the meeting of the conference i n the afternoon of 8 October 
Stresemann began by o u t l i n i n g the history o f Germany's att i t u d e to 
the League. He referred to the German note of September 1924 with i t s 
questions on representation on the Council and the secretariat, the 
claim i n p r i n c i p l e to colonial ma^ates, the problem whether recognition 
of in t e r n a t i o n a l obligations implied a fresh acknowledgement of moral 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the"war7 and~the" application of A r t i c l e 16. The 
replies from the members of the Council had been satisfactory on 
representation, but on other points s a t i s f a c t i o n had not been given. 
The question o f A r t i c l e 16, for instance, remained open. The German 
Government had sought further explanations but the reply o f the A l l i e s , 
that once Germany was a member she could vote against decisions, was 
not satisfactory. I n cases where there was no doubt as to the i d e n t i t y 
o f the aggressor Germany would isolate herself by voting against a 
decision. Not only, however, could Germany not take part i n m i l i t a r y 
measures, i t was impossible to imagine her taking i n d i r e c t m i l i t a r y 
action such as allowing the passage o f foreign troops. Nor was 
co-operation i n an economic boycott possible. He would take the 
18. Locarno desp. 15, 8 Oct. 1925, C 12881/459/18, ID 371/10742. 
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example of a war between Poland and Russia - but not because there was 
any secret agreement between Germany and Russia: there were no agreements 
other than the Treaty of Rapalloo Without doubt Moscow would answer a 
German boycott with a declaration of war. I n 1920 Germany had only 
been saved from serious d i f f i c u l t i e s by the breaking o f the Russian 
advance i n Poland, I f the Russians advanced again Germany v/as 
defenceless: they would have to reckon on Bolshevism up to the Elbe. 
Germany was i n a special position: she asked not for privileges but for 
special treatment i n a t r a n s i t i o n a l period. I f greater progress had 
been made with general disarmament there would be no d i f f i c u l t y ; but 
so long as there were unarmed and armed countries each must be able to 
decide on i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n action under A r t i c l e 16. I n the Geneva 
Protocol regard had been paid to the m i l i t a r y and geographical 
s i t u a t i o n of a country i n considering active measures against an 
aggressor, but t h i s was not enough: the same regard must be paid i n 
considering economic measures and the t r a n s i t of forces. The question 
of German p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n action under A r t i c l e 16 must be deferred 
u n t i l general disarmament was complete. There would have to be a 
further exchange of notes on the question. I f Germany were assured 
that i t was for her alone to decide on the extent o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
then she would be w i l l i n g to promise co-operation to the utmost of 
her power. 
Briand said that he believed t h i s to be the central point of the 
negotiations. The whole pact turned on the League, and i f that pivot 
were broken or put out of j o i n t a l l t h e i r combinations became impossible 
or inoperative. The League was a r e a l i t y , an association for mutual 
assurance against war, and was t r y i n g to bring i n a system based on 
that equality which seemed to dominate the Germans' minds. But equality 
must apply a l l round: one could not choose what was pleasant and 
r e j e c t what was unpleasant. A r t i c l e 16 did not provide enough organised 
force and therefore an attempt had been made i n the Geneva Protocol to 
provide a more comprehensive system of sanctions,. Security was not 
yet organised: only when i t was could disarmament be contemplated. 
I f countries could withdraw t h e i r support i t was a motive for the 
better armed not to reduce t h e i r forces. Germany was not m i l i t a r i l y 
negligible: i f she s a i d that she could not help, the League could not 
ask other countries to disarm. But Germany was going farther and 
saying that she could not associate h e r s e l f with economic measures. 
She was economically strong: i f she could not give anything even i n 
t h i s way the League would be p o s i t i v e l y weakened. I f Russia were the 
aggressor, the League would be at war with her. Ib refuse help to 
the League wouIcTbe" equivalent to giving economic support to the 
aggressor. Nothing was being done against Russia: the agreements 
were directed not against her but against war, and the League was open 
to her. I f Russia had no aggressive intentions there would be no 
problem; but i f Russia had aggressive intentions the very danger i n 
which Germany would be placed should remove her hesitations. Germany 
would be much safer i n the League, and she would be i n a stronger 
position to discuss A r t i c l e 16 on a footing of equality i n order to 
get general disarmament. But i f she started on a footing of w i l f u l 
inequality her voice would be greatly weakened. I n any case these 
questions were outside the competence of the delegations at Locarno: 
the Great Powers could not do what they l i k e d at Geneva and could not 
bind the League. Briand begged the Germans to think again. 
Vandervelde supported Briand and said that he was disappointed 
at the German objections. He had thought that the question was s e t t l e d . 
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Chamberlain said that the reason why B r i t i s h opinion, which had at 
f i r s t been doubtful, now supported the pact was that i t meant that 
Germany would j o i n the League. He understood the German anxieties, 
and he supposed that i n any case of war the League would have to 
consider the s i t u a t i o n of each country upon which i t made demands.. 
But for a nation to say that i t would j o i n the League and enjoy a l l 
the privileges and guarantees that i t afforded, and at the same time 
to refuse i n advance a l l help to the League and other members i n 
c e r t a i n cases, was to take up an impossible position. I f the League 
agreed, a l l the countries which had disarmed voluntarily, as well as 
those which had been disarmed, could demand the right to be neutral. 
Chamberlain also supported Briand's statement that the Great Powers 
did not control the Council; and he was sure that S c i a l o j a would 
confirm how jealous also the Assembly was of the Council. He too hoped 
that the Germans would think again. F i n a l l y he would state c l e a r l y 
and categorically that i t had never entered the B r i t i s h Government's 
head to make any kind of a l l i a n c e or bloc against the Soviet Union, 
through the League or through the pact. 
S c i a l o j a supported Chamberlain and then Luther took up the debate. 
He emphasised again that there were no bonds with the Soviet Union, but 
s a i d that Germany could not change her geographical position and her 
disarmament made i t worse. The dangers i n A r t i c l e 16 did not e x i s t 
for B r i t a i n and France. When Briand and Chamberlain at once contested 
t h i s assertion Luther maintained that a l l the same A r t i c l e 16 affected 
Germany i n a p a r t i c u l a r way and a formula must be found that would 
give her a feeling of safety. 
Briand replied that i f war broke out i n the east the countries 
separating Germany from the war zone would be fighting for her as well 
as for themselves. Germany was bound to be affected i n any case, but 
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f a i l u r e to act would i n cer t a i n circumstances help the common enemy. 
Luther said that a l l that Germany asked was that during the t r a n s i t i o n a l 
s i t u a t i o n before universal disarmament came about she should be 
sheltered from bearing the general dangers of the League. Stresemann 
sa i d that i f there were a blockade or boycott Germany would not be 
able to help Russia. She was not asking for a change i n the Covenant: 
she would be s a t i s f i e d by a declaration on the l i n e s of the provision 
i n the Geneva Protocol, but applying to economic measures as well. 
Chamberlain wound up by saying that supposing Germany did 
participate i n a c o n f l i c t that originated with an act of aggression 
by the Soviet Union, she would become a l l i e d with every other country 
i n the League and they would be bound to support her. "Her strength 
would become t h e i r strength. Her weakness would be t h e i r weakness. 
Honour and t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s would compel a l l the other nations to 
aid Germany and equip her, and those who had disarmed her would be 
the f i r s t then to rearm her". Briand agreed that t h i s was self-evident, 
and Chamberlain suggested that they should now r e f l e c t on the matter 
(19) 
and t r y to find a solution. 
The B r i t i s h delegation discussed the problem the same evening. 
The idea of a secret exchange of notes was dismissed at once by 
Chamberlain, but no conclusions were reached as to what might be said 
publicly about A r t i c l e 16. Hurst said that the provisions" for protecting 
19. Notes of Fourth Meeting, 8 Oct. 1925, C 13094/459/18, ID 371/10742; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25. Schmidt, the German interpreter, thought 
that the fact that Stresemann's remark about war g u i l t was passed 
over i n silence meant that the A l l i e s accepted the German t h e s i s . 
The German Nationalist Party were p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s i s t e n t on 
s a t i s f a c t i o n on t h i s point as a condition for approving the pacts 
B e r l i n desp. 562, 8 Oct.; B e r l i n desp. 567, 9 Oct., C 12807, 
12925/459/18, K> 371/10742; Schmidt, S t a t i s t auf diplomatischer 
Buhne, p. 86. 
a country which allowed the passage of troops were inadequate, and that 
he gathered that the Germans feared i n t e r n a l disorder and might apply 
for the m i l i t a r y clauses to be relaxed to allow extra police. 
Chamberlain said that such t a l k was premature, and that the Germans 
could be to l d that t h e i r country would c e r t a i n l y not be used as a 
l i n e of communication i f they could not keep order. But any appearance 
of a Holy Alliance directed against Bolshevism must be avoided. Lampson 
drew attention to the Assembly resolution of 1921 and the proposed 
addition to A r t i c l e 16, which he thought might s a t i s f y the Germans. 
There was no conference meeting on 9 October but a number of 
private conversations took place, between Briand and Stresemann, Briand 
and Vandervelde, Vandervelde and Schubert, and Chamberlain and Luther. 
Chamberlain s a i d that he thought i t impossible to accept the proposal 
that Germany should be allowed to remain neutral, and that the idea of 
(21) 
a secret exchange of l e t t e r s was unacceptable. And Hurst had a 
long discussion with Fromageot and Gaus, as a r e s u l t of which a draft 
was produced of a note which the powers represented at the conference 
might address to the German Government stating that they interpreted 
A r t i c l e 16 as "obliging each Member of the League to co-operate l o y a l l y 
and a f f e c t i v e l y i n support of the Covenant and i n resistance to any act 
of aggression to the extent which i t s geographical position and i t s 
(22) 
m i l i t a r y and economic situation permit". 
20. B r i t i s h delegation meeting, 8 Oct. 1925, ID 840/1/6. For the 
Assembly resolution of 1921 see p. 2<§>§, ^>m. 
21. Locarno desp. 23, 10 Oct. 1925, C 12882/^59/18, K> 371/107^2; 
D.D.B., Vol. I I , No. 115; memorandum by Schubert, 9 Oct., 
4509/E129175-82. 
22. Minute by Hurst, 9 Oct. 1925, PO 8^0/1/6. 
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The whole question was discussed again on the t r i p on Lake Maggiore 
which the B r i t i s h , French and German delegates took i n the boat Fior 
d'Arancio on Saturday afternoon, 10 October. No one made a record of 
(23) 
the conversation, and few even p a r t i a l accounts e x i s t . I t 
resulted i n a draft c o l l e c t i v e note on the interpretation of A r t i c l e 
16, known as the "texte du bateau", the operative paragraph of which 
read: " l e s obligations resultant dudit a r t i c l e pour l e s membres de l a 
Societe doivent etre entendues en ce sens que chacun des E t a t s membres 
de l a Societe est tenu de collaborer loyalement et efficacement pour 
fa i r e respecter l e Pacte et pour s'opposer a tout acte d'agression, 
dans une mesure qui n<£ so i t pas hors de proportion avec sa situation 
m i l i t a i r e , et qui tienne compte de sa position geographique". 
During the discussion on the boat Chamberlain t r i e d to explain to 
Luther that the German position on A r t i c l e 16 was not so exceptional as 
he thought, and spoke of the B r i t i s h fears of possible c o n f l i c t with 
the United States. Once i n the League, he said, Germany would be able 
to discuss the application of the a r t i c l e ; and since there seemed to be 
a certain community of i n t e r e s t between B r i t a i n and Germany on the 
matter, they might find themselves working together and carrying more 
weight than either could do separately. "Voila", said Briand, "une 
a l l i a n c e qui se forme contre moi". To Chamberlain's alarm Luther 
seemed to take t h i s j e s t l i t e r a l l y and spoke of Chamberlain's having, 
23. Stresemann, Verma'chtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 192-3, records some 
conversation on disarmament. See also below, p. $ M , 
2k. Notes of Sixth Meeting, 12 Oct. 1925, C 13637/^59/18, FO 371/107^. 
At that meeting Stresemann asked for a drafting amendment to remove, 
he said ^ double negative which was awkward i n German but which also 
had the effect of s l i g h t l y strengthening the l a s t phrase. I t now 
read: "dans une mesure qui s o i t compatible avec sa s i t u a t i o n 
m i l i t a i r e , et qui tienne compte de sa position geographique". 
This was the f i n a l text. The German translation i n Locarno-
Konferenz, No. 25 i s that of the text as amended. 
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as i t were, suggested an a l l i a n c e . Chamberlain therefore had to say 
that he had not: a l l that he had done was to c a l l Luther's attention 
to the fact that others besides Germany were worried about the 
consequences of A r t i c l e 16, so that they might find themselves working 
(25) 
together i f the matter came before the Assembly again. 
The "texte du bateau" was given to the Belgian and I t a l i a n 
delegations a f t e r the boat t r i p , and the discussion was resumed i n the 
conference on 12 October. Despite the fact that the note gave the 
Germans a l l that they had publicly asked for, although not i n the form 
of a note from the League, Stresemann s a i d that i t s t i l l entailed a 
very serious si t u a t i o n for Germany, and he proceeded to develop the 
theme of disarmament. One of the f i r s t questions that the delegation 
would be asked at home, he said, was whether the League was r e a l l y 
going to take p r a c t i c a l steps i n t h i s direction. The German Government 
could only be s a t i s f i e d with the proposed note i f they were convinced 
that the League's next great accomplishment would be disarmament and 
that the intention of the powers represented at the conference were 
serious. 
Briand replied that there was no doubt that the League was 
(pfi^ 
taking disarmament seriously, and that the idea corresponded to 
the general sentiments of France. One of the e s s e n t i a l s , however, was 
that each member of the League should contribute to the forces needed 
to apply sanctions. I f , say, twenty of the fifty-two members said 
that they could not participate and t h e i r number included some of the 
25. Locarno desp. 35, 1^  Oct. 1925, C 13053A59/18, PO 371/107^2. 
26. On 25 September the Assembly adopted a resolution asking the 
Council to make a preparatory study with a view to c a l l i n g a 
disarmament^) ^ see p. §3^. see p 
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most important, the others would have to make up the difference and 
disarmament would be more difficult,, France had already done a good 
deal, but she must also be constantly anxious about her security. The 
German Government were not alone i n having d i f f i c u l t i e s at home. 
Stresemann said that Briand seemed to be j u s t i f y i n g the 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n of inequality i n armaments, and suggesting that because 
Germany was disarmed others must arm more to replace the effort which 
she could not make. The Reichstag would ce r t a i n l y not concur i n such 
an argument: the German princip l e was an equality of armaments s u f f i c i e n t 
for each country. Briand replied that Stresemann had misunderstood him. 
He had not s a i d that some countries would have to make a greater 
eff o r t as a r e s u l t of others' f a i l u r e to co-operate i n action by the 
League. He had said that i f the League accepted the non possumus 
formula put forward by the Germans at an e a r l i e r meeting, such a state 
of a f f a i r s would a r i s e . This was not what he wanted, but what would 
happen. Chamberlain s a i d that the Council had started work. His view 
had been that without security there could be no disarmament. The 
moment there was a sense of security the A l l i e s were bound to work to 
the utmost for general disarmament. 
Vandervelde said that the "texte du bateau" went a good deal 
farther than the Geneva Protocol i n allowing account to be taken of an 
individual country's position. The Belgian Government would support i t , 
but he r e a l l y d i s l i k e d the exclusion of economic sanctions. Chamberlain 
replied that there must be no misunderstanding. He could not t e l l 
Parliament that the proposed solution gave Germany a right to n e u t r a l i t y 
i n regard to A r t i c l e 16. As far as he understood, the Germans did not 
demand neut r a l i t y , but asked that i n a given case Germany's present 
si t u a t i o n i n the present European sit u a t i o n might be taken into 
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account. No country could be asked to contribute beyond i t s capacity. 
Germany could not be asked to send troops which she did not possess, 
or which were needed to preserve order at home. As for economic 
sanctions, he interpreted them i n the sense of the Assembly resolution 
of 1921. 
Luther agreed that Germany had never said that she wished to 
remain inactive i n a l l cases. Now she wanted a new eff o r t towards 
disarmamento She wished a l l members of the League to be i n a state of 
armament which should be as small as possible but proportionate. He 
asked whether the conference could make some statement. The other 
delegates s a i d that they would consider a declaration c a l l i n g attention 
to the importance of what had been done and the effect that i t ought to 
have from the point of view of disarmament. But they s a i d that i t was 
not pos^ible~t6™discuss general disarmament at Locarno, and Chamberiain 
refused to consider the word "proportionate". The question of Germany's 
(27) 
entry into the League was thus concluded. 
The negotiation of the various a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s i s not well 
documented. Since B r i t a i n was not d i r e c t l y involved, the lack of a 
f u l l account i n the B r i t i s h records i s not surprising; but the 
meagreness of the information from the German side i s rather strange: 
the French archives give more information about preliminary intentions. 
Vandervelde evidently abandoned h i s attempt to reintroduce a r b i t r a t i o n 
as the f i n a l stage i f the Council of the League f a i l e d to agree, so 
27. Notes of Sixth Meeting, 12 Oct. 1925, C 13637/459/18, FO 371/10744; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25. Chamberlain was so much impressed by 
the German insistence on general disarmament that he telegraphed 
home that the Western powers ought to give a definite assurance 
that they meant business and that disarmament was no longer a 
mere pious aspiration: Locarno t e l . 22, 12 Oct., C 12899/459/18, 
FO 37V10742. 
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that the Franco-German and Belgian-German conventions followed the 
l i n e agreed at the j u r i s t s ' meeting,, Disputes over respective rights 
were to be submitted to an a r b i t r a l tribunal or to the Permanent Court 
of International J u s t i c e but might f i r s t be referred to a permanent 
c o n c i l i a t i o n commission.. Other disputes were to be submitted to the 
con c i l i a t i o n commission and then, i f i t s recommendations were not 
accepted, to the Council of the League under A r t i c l e 15« 
The path towards the arb i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s between Germany and 
Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia was l e s s smooth. On the eve of 
the conference the Germans had hoped to keep the negotiation of these 
t r e a t i e s as far as possible d i s t i n c t from the negotiations with the 
Western powers. Benes had announced h i s willingness to s t a r t 
negotiations but had not revealed to the Germans h i s ideas about 
/pQ\ 
terms. The Poles had taken no i n i t i a t i v e . When Skrzynski arrived 
at Locarno Chamberlain advised him to consult Briand as to whether he 
ought now to t e l l Stresemann that he was ready to s t a r t discussing the (29) «> arb i t r a t i o n treaty. Up to the middle of September Benes appears 
to have envisaged a treaty much more l i k e recent t r e a t i e s signed by 
the Swiss Government or the Czechoslovak-Polish treaty of A p r i l 1925 
than the German model, that i s a treaty providing for a permanent 
c o n c i l i a t i o n commission i n the f i r s t instance for a l l disputes, 
followed by binding a r b i t r a t i o n i f the commission's recommendations 
were not accepted; and he wished to include a provision whereby the 
part i e s repudiated a l l idea of war and undertook to respect the 
28. Koch desp., 2 Oct. 1925, 4509/E128443-4-4. 
29. Locarno desp. 17, 9 Oct. 1925, C 12818/459/18, FO 371/10742. 
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t e r r i t o r i a l status quo between them. While at Geneva i n September 
Benes accepted a French suggestion that the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n 
t r e a t i e s should be on the same pattern as the western ones, but he 
s t i l l wanted a non-aggression clause. I t was presumably t h i s that 
caused Stresemann l a t e r to describe the draft produced by Benes when 
the negotiations began as a guarantee pact, which Gaus rejected with a 
declaration that Germany would not discuss recognition of fro n t i e r s or 
renunciation of w a r . ^ ^ 
At the conference meeting on 13 October Hurst reported that a l l 
the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s were l i k e l y to be ready on the same day as the 
treaty of mutual guarantee; but Fromageot said that while the western 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s would almost c e r t a i n l y be ready on the following 
day, the eastern ones required further discussion because they must 
( 3 l t contain provisions of principle analogous to those of the Rhine pact. 
Chamberlain offered h i s own services and those of Hurst i f they could 
be of help. He wrote to T y r e l l that there were two main d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
I n the f i r s t place Skrzynski was determined that frontier questions 
30. Benes to Bethelot, n.d. |c.27 July 1925] : Benes to Berthelot, *\k 
and 20 Sept.; Briand to de Marge*ie, 22 Sep.; Benes to Berthelot, 
5 Oct., A.A.E. Grande Bretagne, Vols. 80, 83, Sk. Stresemann gave 
b r i e f accounts of the negotiations, emphasising German success, i n 
speechogto the central executive of h i s party on 22 November and to 
the Arbeitsgemainschaft deutscher Landmannschaften on 14 December: 
V i e r t e l j a h r s h e f t e f u i r Zeitgeschichte, XVO967), pp. V15-36; Akten 
zur deutschen auswaSrtigen P o l i t i k , Series B, hereafter c i t e d as 
A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, Gffttingen 1966, pp. 727-53, edited version i n 
Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 231-Mf. A f u l l account of the conversations 
between German and Czechoslovak representatives at Locarno, including 
the topic of the German-speaking minority i n Czechoslovakia but not 
including any more information about the a r b i t r a t i o n treaty, i s 
given by Manfred Alexander, Per deutsch-tschechoslowakischg, 
Schiedsvertrag von 1925 im Rahmen der Locarno-Vertrsfge, Munich and 
Vienna 1970, Ch. XI. 
31. Notes of Seventh Meeting, 13 Oct. 1925, C 13053A59/18, FO 371/107^2; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25• 
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should not be made subject to ar b i t r a t i o n . Since Stresemann was also 
anxious to avoid any mention of frontiers, t h i s might seem to make 
things easier, but i n fact i t introduced an element of danger which 
worried the French and made Chamberlain anxious l e s t so many causes of 
quarrel might be l e f t open that the position would look insecure. The 
other d i f f i c u l t y was that the Germans refused to declare that they 
renounced war as a means of ultimately changing the eastern frontier. 
Chamberlain took a grave view of t h i s and had instructed Hurst to work 
to secure that war should i n fact be made impossible except i n the 
conditions allowed i n the wast and that i t should be stated that the 
purpose of the treaty was the avoidance of war. I f the Germans 
objected Hurst was to remind them of t h e i r assurance to him i n the 
(32) 
spring and to say that they owed i t to him to confirm i t . 
Partly at l e a s t at Chamberlain's instance Benes and Skrzynski 
attended the conference meeting on 15 October to hear the discussion 
of the western a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s . Fromageot explained the i r scope 
and Chamberlain then asked what was the position about the eastern 
t r e a t i e s . Benes replied that i t had been decided that the a r t i c l e s of 
the German^Czechoslovak treaty would be i d e n t i c a l v/ith the Franco-
German convention. The preamble would have to be different and there 
was s t i l l one p o l i t i c a l question to be discussed, but he hoped that the 
treaty would be ready for the next meeting. Skrzynski said that he was 
(33) 
i n the same position. 
32o Chamberlain to T y r e l l , 14 Oct. 1925, FO 840/1/6. To judge from a 
conversation between Luther and Skrzynski on 14 October the Poles 
were s t i l l uncertain about mentioning the frontier i n the treaty: 
3123/06^5200-01. 
33. Memorandum by Selby, 14 Oct. 1925, FO 841/1/8; notes of Eighth 
Meeting, 15 Oct., C 13095/459/18, FO 371/10742; Locarno-Konferenz, 
No. 25. 
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The two t r e a t i e s were indeed ready for the f i n a l meeting next 
day. I n addition to the a r t i c l e s i d e n t i c a l with those of the Franco-
German arb i t r a t i o n convention there was one, analogous to A r t i c l e 7 
of the treaty of mutual guarantee, reserving the rights and obligations 
of the p a r t i e s as members of the League and the position of the League 
i t s e l f . The preambles mentioned neither frontiers nor the renunciation 
of war but spoke of maintenance of peace and settlement of disputes 
without recourse to force. They also referred to respect for r i g h t s 
established by treaty. Stresemann l a t e r described them as a c o l l e c t i o n 
(34) 
of platitudes. 
From the German point of view, as the guidelines l a i d down for 
the delegation show, the questions of the occupation and t h e i r own 
disarmament were almost as important as those of the pact and the other 
t r e a t i e s . The method chosen for r a i s i n g them was to indicate at an 
( 3 5 ) 
early stage that discussion was desired, then to wait to see how 
the main negotiations went, and f i n a l l y to press them hard at the end 
when the pact was assured. 
On the boat t r i p on 10 October i t was evidently agreed that the 
French, B r i t i s h and German delegates should meet to discuss German 
disarmament. At t h i s meeting, on the afternoon of 12 October^Stresemann 
started by asking whether a date could be fixed for the evacuation of 
the Cologne zone, and set out the points on which the German Government 
wanted concessions. These were (a) the General Staff, the training of 
3 4 . Notes of Ninth Meeting, 16 Oct. 1925, C 1 3 6 3 8 / 4 5 9 / 1 8 , FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 7 4 4 ; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 2 5 ; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1 . 1 , p. 741. 
35« Memorandum by Luther, 7 Oct. 1925, 3123/D645137-43; Locarno desp. 
15 , 8 Oct., C 12881/459/18, FO 371/10742; Chamberlain to Luther, 
8 Oct., FO 8 4 0 / V 5 ; memorandum by Schubert, 9 Oct., 4509/E129175-82. 
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troops and the numbers of the Schutzpolizei; (b) reduction of the 
occupation forces i n the Rhineland; and ( c ) the nature of the occupation 
regime. There were also a couple of questions about l e g a l cases a r i s i n g 
out of the Ruhr occupation; and there were the questions of c i v i l 
a viation and League of Nations supervision af t e r the withdrawal of 
the Control Commission. 
Briand replied that i t was certain that i f the pact went through 
there would be an immediate detente and changes would be made. But 
i n the f i r s t place he had no mandate to deal v/ith these questions here 
and i n the second place the evacuation of Cologne depended on the 
execution of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . His information about progress 
on disarmament was not as hopeful as Stresemann seemed to think, but 
once a serious beginning was made on completing the outstanding points 
he~would be disposed to believe that they would be ca r r i e d out and 
therefore to accelerate the evacuation. But he could not make 
promises outside the subject of the pact and before i t came into force. 
Could not the German Government enlarge to public opinion on the 
ef f e c t s that the general reaction resulting from the pact would 
produce? Chamberlain agreed that once security had been attained 
other things would follow naturally. But he was not i n a position to 
go into d e t a i l s now and would not make binding promises i n advance or 
as a condition of the pact. 
Luther said that he was going to be asked at home what concrete 
r e s u l t s he had brought back. Could they not find some formula which 
Briand and Chamberlain could carry i n th e i r own countries and would 
enable him to meet the charge that he had come home empty-handed? 
Briand replied that he understood that the Germans could not be 
s a t i s f i e d with espressions of hope. He could envisage going so far as 
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to say i n the Chamber that the occupation system must be reviewed i n 
the l i g h t of the pact and that c e r t a i n changes would follow i t s 
r a t i f i c a t i o n . But as for going homcempty-handed, the German delegates 
should look at t h e i r hands and see what they had gained - the return of 
Germany to a footing of complete equality among the nations and i n the 
League. Surely the German public could understand t h i s ? He was going 
to be reproached with weakening the position of France, and Luther's 
position might be stronger than h i s own. 
Stresemann s a i d that the points outstanding on disarmament were 
quite small, and the only thing the German people were thinking about 
was the improvement of conditions i n the Ehineland. Chamberlain 
observed that the scheme of League control had been deliberately 
postponed so that i t should be discussed a f t e r the pact was concluded 
"andl^ith Germany i n the Council. As to Cologne, evacuation depended 
solely on s a t i s f a c t i o n of the Control Commission's requirements. He 
did think i t important to hasten the evacuation and was very anxious to 
avoid any obstacles. After some further discussion about the occupation 
regime and the number of forces, the conversation ended on that n o t e . ^ ^ 
Next day Stresemann told Chamberlain that i t was e s s e n t i a l to 
come to an agreement on the evacuation i f the d i f f i c u l t i e s on the pact 
were to be overcome. Chamberlain said that he desired nothing more 
than the e a r l i e s t possible evacuation of the Cologne zone, but the 
Germans must meet the wishes of the A l l i e d Governments so far as lay i n 
(37) 
t h e i r power. Both Chamberlain, and Lampson explained to Schubert 
36. Locarno desp. 31, 13 Oct. 1925, C 13004/459/18, FO 371/10742; 
memorandum by Schubert, 12 Oct., 3123/D645168-80. The question of 
League supervision under A r t i c l e 213t having been adjourned at the 
March Council meeting (see p.33^ ) , was withdrawn from the agenda 
of the June meeting and did not appear on that for the September 
meeting. 
37. Memorandum by Selby, 14 Oct. 1925, FO 840/1/8. 
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that i n the view of the B r i t i s h l e g a l authorities A r t i c l e 213 did not 
allow for permanent organs anywhere i n Germany, and that the supervision 
scheme was s t i l l i n abeyance; but Schubert told Lampson that Germany 
could not enter the League without showing d e f i n i t e l y that she did not 
admit the right of the Council to set up the scheme, which i n her 
view was not covered by the Treaty. Lampson retorted that Chamberlain 
had made i t c l e a r that unless Germany joined the League the pact would 
not go through. Schubert was delivering two long memoranda on the 
occupation regime and the League's right of investigation. He s a i d 
that obviously the technical d e t a i l s about the occupation could not be 
dealt with at Locarno, but i t would ease the position of the German 
delegation i f the f i n a l protocol could contain a reference to 
a l l e v i a t i o n s i n the Ehineland. He did not want to harp on public 
opinion, but i t was very desirable that the Nationalists should be 
induced to endorse the delegation's policy for they were the best 
elements of the country and even of the Government. Lampson replied 
that he could say that s p e c i f i c complaints about the Ehineland would of 
course be gone into, but he did not think that i t would be easy to 
mention these matters i n the f i n a l protocol partly because I t a l y was 
not an occupying power and partly because such a mention would introduce 
that element of bargaining which Chamberlain and Briand had said was 
(~z<R} 
inadmissible. 
I t was the discussion on the evening of 15 October that produced 
the f i r s t r e a l l y discordant note. Briand repeated a promise already 
380 Minute by Chamberlain, 14 Oct. 1925, *0 840 / 1 / 8 ; Locarno desp. 39 i 
14 Oct., C 13093 /459 /18 , FO 371/10742; memoranda by Schubert 14 
and 15 Oct., 4509 /E129612-21 , E I 2 9 6 5 6 - 5 9 , E129660-64. Schubert 
also gave the memoranda to Vandervelde and Berthelot. 
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given to Luther, that he would press on h i s colleagues to the point of 
resignation the necessity for new conditions i n the Rhineland. But 
the Germans battled hard, f i r s t to get a date fixed for the evacuation 
of the Cologne zone and then to get a favourable interpretation of 
A r t i c l e 213 before Germany joined the League. They asserted that most 
of the conditions i n the A l l i e d disarmament note of June had been met, 
that the disarmament of Germany was complete, and that the German 
people considered the non-evacuation of Cologne u n j u s t i f i e d . Chamberlain 
sa i d that he would be delighted to leave Cologne next day, but the 
points outstanding were not as small as Schubert maintained. I f they 
were so small that i n the German view i t was s i l l y of the A l l i e s to 
i n s i s t on them, i t was even more stupid of the Germans not to carry 
them out and so make evacuation possible. Luther said that he would 
not be able to carry the pact i n the Reichstag u n t i l evacuation had 
taken place. The three A l l i e d Ministers r e p l i e d that they had no 
mandate to s e t t l e the question at Locarno. The German Government 
should undertake to s e t t l e the remaining points and begin to do so, and 
they would then support a solution favourable to Germany. They refused 
to mention the Rhineland i n the f i n a l protocol. 
Then Luther r a i s e d the question of League control and s a i d that 
Germanyacould not j o i n the League u n t i l i t was s e t t l e d . The three 
western Ministers replied that they had no power to discuss i t : i t was 
a question for the Council; they had gone a long way to meet the Germans 
and the l a t t e r must not go on producing new demands. After a rather 
tense silenc e , followed by some argument over whether t h i s was or was 
(39) 
not a new demand, Luther abandoned the point. The Germans did, 
39. Locarno t e l . 41, 16 Oct. 1925, C 13091/4-59/18, F0 371/10742; 
Locarno desp. 44, 17 Oct., C 13133/13120/18, FO 371/10759; 
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however, get i n a f i n a l word. Before leaving Locarno Schubert t o l d 
Chamberlain's private secretary, Selby, that German public opinion 
expected the whole occupied t e r r i t o r y to be evacuated. Selby replied 
that i f the German Government were so fo o l i s h as to raise t h i s 
(40) 
question they would v/reck the pact. 
This f i n a l discussion on the German associated demands took 
place on the eve of the l a s t conference meeting, at which Mussolini 
appeared. He had probably made up his mind, as soon as i t was clear 
that the pact was going to come o f f , that he could not af f o r d to be 
absent; but his a t t i t u d e gave ri s e to some suspicion and rumour and 
his attendance was not certain u n t i l the l a s t moment. 
At the l a s t meeting of the conference on the afternoon of 16 
October, Chamberlain's sixty-second birthday, i t was agreed that 
signature o f the t r e a t i e s would take place i n London on 1 December, 
the f i n a l protocol and the various instruments were i n i t i a l l e d , and the 
delegates made t h e i r f i n a l speeches. Vandervelde, the only man present 
who had signed the Treaty of Versailles, contrasted with that occasion 
(Zf2) 
the feeling of shared happiness with which they concluded the pact. 
39= (Cont). 
Chamberlain to T y r e l l , 16 Oct., K> 84X)/1/9; memorandum by Schubert, 
15 Oct., 4509/E129696-712; memoranda by Luther, 15 Oct., 5123/ 
D645228-29; 4509/E129721-28. 
40. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 7. 
41. Locarno desp. 3, 5 Oct. 1925; Locarno t e l . 13, 8 Oct., C 12662, 
12780A59/18, ID 371/10741; Locarno desp. 15, 8 Oct., C 12881/ 
459/18, ID 371/10742; Eome desp. 877, 15 Oct.; Locarno desp. 43, 
17 Oct., C 13174, 13128/459/18, 10 371/10743; P r i t t w i t z desp., 
8 Oct., 3123/D644895-99; D.D.I., Vol. IV, Nos. 102, 142, 146; 
Alan Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy,. Princeton 1970, pp. 278-9, 
42. Notes of Ninth Meeting, 16 Oct. 1925, C 13638/459/18, ID 371/10744; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25° 
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The complex of tr e a t i e s and agreements consisted o f nine 
instruments: the f i n a l protocol with si2j, annexes, the Treaty of 
Mutual Guarantee, the a r b i t r a t i o n conventions between Germany and 
France and Germany and Belgium, the a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s between 
Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia, the l e t t e r to the 
German Government regarding A r t i c l e 16; and tr e a t i e s between France and 
Poland and France and Czechoslovakia. 
The protocol stated that the purpose of the conference had been 
to seek by common agreement means for preserving the nations concerned 
from the scourge of war and for providing for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes of every kind that might arise between them. The delegates 
were convinced that the entry into force of the tr e a t i e s would contribute 
to a moral relaxation o f tension between nations, would help towards 
the solution of many p o l i t i c a l or economic problems, and, i n strengthening 
peace and security i n Europe, would hasten the disarmament provided for 
i n A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant. 
The f i n a l text o f the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee did not d i f f e r 
greatly from that of k September except for the removal of the reference 
to a French guarantee o f the eastern a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s , and the 
consequential amendment to A r t i c l e 2. The a r b i t r a t i o n conventions 
between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium were i d e n t i c a l . As 
noted above, a clear d i s t i n c t i o n was drawn between j u d i c i a l a r b i t r a t i o n 
and c o n c i l i a t i o n . The machinery was l a i d down i n d e t a i l i n nineteen 
kj. A l l are printed i n Crnd 2525 of 1925, Final Protocol of the 
Locarno Conference, 1925 (and Annexes), together with Treaties 
Locarno, October 16, 1925, and i n B.F.S.P., Vol. CXXI, pp. 
923-6; Vol. CXXII, pp. 12^-8, 287-8, 288-9. The f i n a l text of 
the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee i s i n the Appendix. 
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a r t i c l e s o The a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s between Germany and Poland and 
Germany and Czechoslovakia were i d e n t i c a l and, as noted above, t h e i r 
substantive a r t i c l e s were almost i d e n t i c a l with those of the western 
a r b i t r a t i o n conventions. The coll e c t i v e note to the German Government 
about A r t i c l e 16 was that o f the "texte du bateau", modified at the 
meeting of 12 October. 
The t r e a t i e s between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia 
did not form part o f the Locarno settlement, but they were referred to 
i n the f i n a l protocol and to that extent the German Government 
acknowledged t h e i r existence. The terms of the two were i d e n t i c a l . 
The preamble stated that the parties, desirous of seeing Europe spared 
from war by a sincere observance of the undertakings arrived at &t 
Locarno, guaranteed to each other the benefit o f these undertakings 
w i t h i n the framework of the Covenant and of the tre a t i e s already i n 
force between them. The main provision of the t r e a t i e s was that i n 
the event of either party suffering from a f a i l u r e to observe the 
undertakings arrived at with Germany the other, acting i n application 
o f A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant, would immediately lend aid and assistance 
i f such f a i l u r e were accompanied by a recourse to arms. I f the Council 
o f the League were unable to have i t s report on such a question 
accepted, and i f either Poland |czechoslovakiaJ or France were attacked 
without provocation, the other party, applying A r t i c l e 1507) of the 
Covenant, would immediately lend a i d and assistance. Compared with 
the previous French t r e a t i e s with Poland and Czechoslovakia, the 
obligations i n these t r e a t i e s were r e s t r i c t e d and t i e d closely to the 
machinery of the League. 
Despite the often serious arguments the atmosphere of the 
conference was constructive. I t was i n p a r t i c u l a r the contrast with 
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other meetings with German representatives i n the years since the war 
that made a deep impression on the B r i t i s h participants and that 
probably contributed more than any of the concrete results to the 
almost l y r i c a l manner i n which they were inclined for a time to t a l k 
of Locarnoo The f i r s t short report to London of the meeting of 5 
October remarked that the most s t r i k i n g atmosphere of help f u l good 
w i l l prevailed,. After a few days Lampson wrote home that the absence 
of chicanery was amazing: two days l a t e r Chamberlain wrote o f the 
"extraordinary" atmosphere. Only b r i e f l y towards the end, over the 
question of control of German disarmament, did the Germans' persistent 
demands for additional concessions cloud the sky and cause Chamberlain 
to compare them to a nagging o l d woman. But that cloud soon passed, 
and at the end Chamberlain was able not only to write of his thankfulness 
at the success attained but also to regard a l l the months of negotiation 
as "so simple, so natural, so easy"o The Germans were less 
enthusiastic: about 12 October they were considering the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
f a i l u r e ; but afterwards Schubert too could write o f an "agreeable" 
atmosphere and of the "frank and straightforward" tone of the 
conversations.'^ 
44. Locarno t e l . 4, 5 Oct. 1925, C 12598/459/18, K> 371/10741; 
Lampson to T y r e l l , 9 Oct., C 12984/459/18, ID 371/10742; 
Chamberlain to T y r e l l , 11 Oct., SO 840/1/7; Chamberlain to 
T y r e l l , 18 Oct., Chamberlain Papers, AC 6/1/623, printed i n 
Petrie, L i f e and Letters, Vol. I I , pp. 287-90. 
45. Hoesch t e l . , 13 Oct. 1925; Schubert to Neurath, 23 Oct., 4509/ 
E129975-79, E130032-39. 
4 91 
From i n i t i a l l i n g to signature 
During the s i x weeks between the conclusion of the t r e a t i e s and 
t h e i r signature i n London attention centred less on the t r e a t i e s 
themselves than on the immediate additional benefits that Germany might 
gain. Luther and Stresemann were exposed c h i e f l y to attacks from the 
Right i n Germany; they therefore found themselves compelled to defend 
t h e i r work not as a gain for Germany i n i t s e l f but as one that did not 
involve any renunciation, and to press for additional concessions 
before signature, to the point of wearying the B r i t i s h and French 
Governments with t h e i r importunity and c a l l i n g down upon Briand 
attacks from the Right i n France. How far t h i s l i n e corresponded to 
t h e i r r e a l views i t i s hard to say precisely. Stresemann, i t i s clear, 
returned to B e r l i n well s a t i s f i e d with the achievement of Locarno and 
regarded i t as a considerable step forward i n the process of Germany 
recovering her position and freedom as a Great Power. The three major 
estimates that he gave of the Locarno policy and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
that i t opened up for the future - his l e t t e r to the ex-Crown Prince 
and his speeches of 22 November and 14 December - d i f f e r i n emphasis 
according to the audience, but i n a l l o f them he stressed the security 
actually achieved i n the west and the p o s s i b i l i t y of future gains i n 
the e a s t . ^ ^ As for renunciation Stresemann emphasised i n both 
speeches that i n renouncing war for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine 
46. Letter to the ex-Crown Prince, 7 Sep. 1925» Stresemann Nachlass, 
7138/H159871-75, incomplete i n Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 553-5; 
speech of 22 Nov., Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, XV 
(1967), pp. 415-36; speech of 14 Dec , A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, 
App. I I , incomplete i n Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 231-44. Cf« 
also his statement i n a l e t t e r of 27 Nov. (op. c i t . , p. 246): 
•'Ich sehe i n Lokarno die Erhaltung des Rheinlandes und die 
Mo'glichkeit der Wiedergewinnung deutschen Landes im Osten". 
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Germany was not undertaking any moral or p o l i t i c a l obligation but was 
simply abandoning something that she was not i n a position to use; but 
he also admitted that he saw no prospect of recovering Alsace-Lorraine 
by peaceful means. Also i n both speeches Stresemann rather played down 
the importance of the "Ruckwirkungen" i n the Rhineland; but for the 
purpose of securing Reichstag approval of the t r e a t i e s he was well 
(47) 
aware of the importance of having immediate progress to show. 
Luther, although supporting the pact policy a f t e r his i n i t i a l 
hesitations, was less personally committed than was Stresemann, and 
f e l t no need to be gracious about i t . ^ ^ He carried a greater 
re s p o n s i b i l i t y than Stresemann for keeping the Government together, and 
was more inclined to make concessions to the Nationalist ministers. 
Equally he resented t h e i r resignation on 23 October as much as or more 
than Stresemann. But t h i s event did not free Luther and Stresemann 
from the need to pursue a "national" l i n e on the t r e a t i e s . They had 
both been very anxious to get the Nationalists into the Government i n 
the f i r s t place and hoped that they would j o i n another: a breach was 
therefore to be avoided. Thus they were more rather than less impelled 
to defend themselves against right-wing attacks by.repeating that 
Germany had renounced nothing and was e n t i t l e d to immediate benefits 
from the pact, even some that Stresemann had e a r l i e r denied any 
(49) 
i n t e n t i o n o f seeking. The drawback of t h i s l i n e was not only that 
47. Circular t e l . , 20 Oct. 1925, 3123/D644936-38. 
48 . For his a t t i t u d e at Locarno and i n London see his P o l i t i k e r 
ohhe Partei, pp. 398-401. 
49. For the p o l i t i c a l struggles i n Germany a f t e r Locarno see Turner, 
Stresemann and the P o l i t i c s of the Weimar Republic, pp. 213-17; 
Luther, P o l i t i k e r ohne Partei, pp. 586-94; Stresemann, Vermachtnis^ 
Vol. I I , pp 203-07; Stockhausen, Sechs Jahre Reichskanzlei, 
pp. 181-5. 
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i t was defensive and apologetic and obscured recognition of the gains 
actually made, to Stresemann's eventual p o l i t i c a l detriment: i t also 
carried the r i s k that unless a l l the benefits were forthcoming quickly, 
which was hardly to be expected, public opinion i n Germany would 
become soured while confidence abroad i n German policy, necessary for 
the achievement of further gains, would be i n no way strengthened. 
The concrete urgent task was to secure a date for the beginning 
of the evacuation of the Cologne zone. The A l l i e d Ministers had said 
at Locarno that the German Government should send a note to the 
Ambassadors' Conference undertaking to s e t t l e the remaining points on 
disarmament and give instructions for carrying them out, and for t h e i r 
part they would support an early decision on evacuation. The note 
from the German Government was delivered i n Paris on 23 October. I t 
stated that the great majority of the demands set out i n the A l l i e d 
note o f k June had been met or were we l l on the way to completion. 
Only on a very small number had decisive progress not been made, but 
the German Government hoped that a satisfactory solution could be found 
i f the A l l i e s took account of German i n t e r e s t s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y the 
points causing d i f f i c u l t y - the organisation o f the Schutzpolizei, the 
status o f the Chef der Heeresleitung, p r o h i b i t i o n o f army t r a i n i n g 
with certain weapons, the a r t i l l e r y o f the fortress of Kohigsberg, 
and the "paiSdotic" associations - included some of great importance. 
I n addition l i t t l e progress had been made i n producing l e g i s l a t i o n on 
30. Cmd 2527 o f 19251 Correspondence between the Ambassadors' 
Conference and the German Ambassador at Paris respecting German 
disarmament, evacuation of Cologne Zone and modification i n the 
Bhineland regime, Paris, October-November 1925; D.D.B., Vol. 
I I , No. 12^ (without annexes). For the progress made on disarm-
ament i n the summer and early autumn see Salewski, Entwaffnung 
und M i l i t a r k o n t r o l l e , pp. 313-1j^ 
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(51) the manufacture of and trade i n war material.. 
While the A l l i e d M i l i t a r y Committee at Versailles were considering 
the d e t a i l s of the German note the Governments v/ere preparing for an 
essentially p o l i t i c a l decision to accept the German assurances and f i x 
a date for the evacuation to begin. They did not r e a l l y need the 
German demarches stressing that the Reichstag's approval of the 
(52) 
t r e a t i e s depended on the A l l i e s carrying out t h e i r assurances. 
But at the same time some of the outstanding points were regarded as 
important. On 3 November Chamberlain instructed Crewe to t e l l the 
French Government that the B r i t i s h wished to confine themselves to 
those points which, i f not liquidated, might constitute a re a l danger 
to peace. Locarno had introduced a wholly new s p i r i t into r e l a t i o n s 
with Germany, which i n t h i s instance led to the conclusion that peace 
would be better guaranteed by mutual c o n c i l i a t i o n than by insistence on 
the f u l f i l m e n t of a l l the demands i n the note of k June. Provided that 
the Germans completed the destruction of the remaining unauthorised 
plant and showed a reasonable s p i r i t of compromise on the matters of 
d i f f i c u l t y , Chamberlain saw no reason why evacuation should not begin 
at an early date. He suggested that a reply should be sent promising 
that i t would begin on 1 December provided that agreement were reached 
51. See the B r i t i s h General Staff's comments i n D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, 
Vol. I , No. 28, n . 3 . 
52. Tel^. to Sthamer, 22 Oct. 1925; Hoesch t e l . , 23 Oct.; t e l s . to 
Stghamer and Hoesch, 27 Oct.; Hoesch t e l . , 28 Oct.; Sthamer t e l . , 
28 Oct., 3123/D644971-74, D645285-92, D645316-21, D645348-49, 
D645353-59; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 36. 
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on the points o f d i f f i c u l t y and the German Government gave an under-
(53) 
taking to carry t h i s agreement out. 
Briand v/as doubtful both about the date of 1 December and about 
the wisdom® of making specific demands on the points of d i f f i c u l t y , 
p a r t l y because i t would seem l i k e the bargaining which he had made i t 
p l a i n at Locarno that he would not allow, and p a r t l y because incomplete 
German acceptance would cause further trouble. I t seemed to him better 
to ask the Germans to put forward proposals for s e t t l i n g the points. 
Chamberlain accepted the l a t t e r suggestion but argued strongly for 
1 December as the date of the signature of the t r e a t i e s ; and Briand 
deferred to his wishes. The reply to Hoesen was accepted by the 
Ambassadors' Conference on 6 November. I t took note with s a t i s f a c t i o n 
o f the progress made and asked the German Government to make immediate 
proposals for s e t t l i n g the points of d i f f i c u l t y . The proposals should 
be such as to deprive the police of any m i l i t a r y character, to prevent 
associations from concerning themselves with m i l i t a r y matters or having 
connexions with any m i l i t a r y authority, and to prevent the constitution 
o f a command organisation larger than that for an army corps. The 
A l l i e d Governments, the note said, would be happy i f the German answer 
enabled them to f i x the date for beginning the evacuation of the 
(54) 
Cologne zone as 1 December. 
Relaxations i n the occupation regime of the second and t h i r d zones 
53. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , ^ a a a k , No. 50. The B r i t i s h were 
prepared to waive the demand about the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of Kohigsberg 
The Belgian Ambassador understood t h i s to mean that they did not 
wish to weaken Germany vix-a-vis the Soviet Union: minute by 
Lampson, 3 Nov. 1925, C 14087/21/18, FO 371/10710. 
54. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 59, 63, 70, 715 Cmd 2527 of 1925-
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such as a reduction i n the number of ordinances, and the appointment of 
a Reich Commissioner, v/ere being discussed at the same time. But 
German demands mounted too and became increasingly embarrassing. On 
26 October Chamberlain instructed D'Abernon to t e l l Luther and 
Stresemann that he knew that the treaty would be accepted, for no 
nation could a f f o r d to r e j e c t " t h i s great act o f o b l i v i o n and 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n " ; but that he was worried by the a t t i t u d e of the 
Nationalists who were doing t h e i r best to prove to the B r i t i s h and 
French public that the Germany that mattered (a reference to Schubert's 
assertion at Locarno that they represented the best i n Germany) did not 
want peace. Chamberlain repeated the warning next day af t e r a r r i v i n g 
i n Paris for a League Council meeting, saying that Briand's d i f f i c u l t i e s 
were being greatly increased and he himself was receiving "most 
(55) 
unfortunate reactions". Hoesch and Sthamer duly conveyed assurances 
that the German Government were determined to carry through the pact, 
but withi n a few days Hoesch was again being instructed to press Briand 
on the a l l e v i a t i o n s and the evacuation and Stresemann was saying that 
he hoped that Briand would say something about shortening the period of 
the occupation of the second and t h i r d zones. 
This l a s t request produced a f a i r l y sharp reaction i n London and 
Paris. Chamberlain telegraphed to D'Abemon that he did not understand 
Stresemann's request for "action" under A r t i c l e 431 of the Treaty of 
Versailles. Throughout the negotiations of the spring and summer i t 
had been made perfectly clear that the pact would not involve any 
55. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 26, 27, 32. 
56- D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , ggs^igg^ Nos. 28, 31, 36, 43; 3123/ 
D645316-21, D645348-49, D645353-59, D646381-82; K1886A475467-70. 
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modification i n the occupation clauses of the Treaty, and at the very 
outset the German Government had disclaimed any int e n t i o n of asking 
for such a modification. Great steps were being taken to grant 
a l l e v i a t i o n s , but there was a l i m i t and i f the Germans t r i e d to push 
the A l l i e s too far they were defeating t h e i r ov/n object. " I n short 
they are i n grave danger of f a l l i n g into t h e i r usual error of opening 
t h e i r mouths too wide. Time i s on t h e i r side i f they play t h e i r cards 
(57) 
even moderately w e l l . Can you not make them realise this"? And 
Briand instructed de Margerie to t e l l Stresemann that the French 
Government had decided o f t h e i r own accord to hasten the evacuation and 
reduce the burden o f the occupation. But they would not abandon the 
disarmament questions s t i l l unsettled, nor would they allow Germany to 
raise the question of shortening the occupation, which had played no 
part i n the pact negotiations, which constituted a guarantee of the 
execution of the peace treaty, and which was s t i l l bound up with the 
( R?0 
question o f reparations. Stresemann and Hoesch s t i l l hoped that 
something could be said about future p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; but Berthelot 
refused and Hoesch thought that the l i m i t of demands was being reached. 
58. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 56. Laroche t o l d R.F. Wigram of 
the B r i t i s h Embassy i n Paris that Locarno marked a change i n French 
policy from one of "magnificence" to one of "consolidation". But 
that did not mean that Germany could f l o u t the peace treaty. The 
occupation was bound up with reparations: i f Germany would pay a 
large lump sum France would be ready to leave the Ehineland tomorrow; 
otherwise she would stay t i l l the treaty date, or beyond i t i f 
Germany were not at that time showing good f a i t h : op. c i t . , No. 66. 
59- D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , •Qpg^sfe^, No. 68; memorandum by Stresemann, 
8 Nov. 1925, 3125/D646451-56, Verm&chtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 223-7; 
Hoesch t e l s . , 5 and 6 Nov., 3123/D646419-22, D645400-03. 
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Other matters that caused concern i n London and Paris were 
interpretations of the Treaty o f Mutual Guarantee i t s e l f . On 3"1 
October Stresemann made a speech at Dresden i n which he was reported as 
saying that Chamberlain had assured him that the entire B r i t i s h navy 
and army were at Germany's disposal i f the French crossed the f r o n t i e r . 
On learning of t h i s report Chamberlain t o l d D'Abernon to warn Stresemann 
to be careful about what he said, and Stresemann replied that he had 
been misquoted. The same point came up i n a broadcast by Stresemann, 
as well as a statement that Germany had not renounced Alsace-Lorraine 
but retained the p o s s i b i l i t y of recovering i t by peaceful means. 
Stresemann was p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious that Briand and Chamberlain should 
not themselves refe r to Alsace-Lorraine i n speeches because i t was a 
central point of the argument with the Nationalists; but his own 
- — _ . (61V 
statements on the subject earned Hoesch a rebuke from Briand. 
I n the f i r s t few days of November the Germans were pressing for 
an early announcement o f the al l e v i a t i o n s which the occupying powers 
were going to introduce i n the Rhineland, without which, Stresemann 
maintained, the Government could not be reconstructed. Chamberlain 
60. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. k8, 3h\ t e l to Sthamer, *f Nov. 1925, 
3123/D6if5379« 
6 1 . Tel. to Hoesch, k Nov. 1925; Hoesch t e l s . , 5 and 6 Nov.; t e l . to 
Hoesch, 7 Nov., 3123/D64538if, D6^5395-96, D646400-03; memorandum by 
Schubert, 7 Nov., *f509/E130227-28; memorandum by Stresemann, 8 Nov., 
3123/1)6^51-56, Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 223-7; D.B.F.P., Ser.IA, 
Vol. I , No. 69, n .2„ The f i r s t drafts of the preamble to the Treaty 
of Mutual Guarantee contained a reference to the necessity o f 
s t a b i l i s i n g the t e r r i t o r i a l status quo. The German delegation at 
Locarno secured the substitution o f a reference to the need to 
secure peace: Notes o f Third Meeting, 7 Oct., C 129^3/^59/18, FO 
371/107^2; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25. 
62. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. ^9, 6*f, 69; Stresemann t e l . , *f Nov. 
1925; Sthamer t e l . , 5 Nov.; Hoesch t e l . , 5 Nov., 3123/D645380-81, 
£646407-09, DGk6k19-22. 
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too was anxious for early decisions, despite his annoyance at the German 
appearance of bargaining or even threatening and his anxiety at the 
understandable reactions i n France. The tr e a t i e s were to be debated 
i n Parliament on 17 November and he needed to be able to state the 
decisions and i n p a r t i c u l a r to name the date for the beginning of the 
evacuation of Cologne. 
The German reply on disarmament was sent to Paris on 9 November. 
There followed a week of intensive negotiation over some points of 
the note, over the date of announcing the beginning of evacuation, and 
over including a terminal date. On 14 November the Ambassadors' 
Conference sent Hoesch a note on the a l l e v i a t i o n s i n the occupation 
regime. I t stated that the occupying powers were prepared to grant 
measures of amnesty subject to the German Government doing the same, 
and were ready to introduce reforms f a c i l i t a t i n g the exercise of 
German administration, revising the ordinances, and reducing the number 
of troops - "se rapprochant des c h i f f r e s normaux".^^ At the same 
time Hoesch was given a verbal declaration that the evacuation of the 
Cologne zone would begin on 1 December: the reason f o r t h i s was that 
the Ambassadors' Conference reply on disarmament could not be ready for 
the meetings o f the Centre Party and the D.N.V.P. on 15 November. The 
note i t s e l f , which followed on 16 November, stated that agreement had 
been reached on the completion of the points of disarmament s t i l l 
outstanding, and that the evacuation would begin on 1 December and 
63. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 73, 75. 
64. Cmd 2527 of 1925; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1 .1, No. 1, n . 3 . Hoesch asked 
for an undertaking that the member would be reduced to the pre-
war figure. The French put i n "normaux" as deliberately vague but 
indicating a "normal" s i t u a t i o n : D.B.F.P. Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 192, 
n .2 , 203. 
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would i f possible be completed i n January. The Control Commission 
would be withdrawn as soon as i t had completed the tasks s t i l l 
remaining. The l i s t o f al l e v i a t i o n s to be introduced i n the occupied 
t e r r i t o r y was published on 18 November. 
The German Cabinet met with the President on 16 and 18 November 
to discuss the outcome of the negotiations. Not a l l the ministers 
were thoroughly s a t i s f i e d , but most of them agreed that Locarno was a 
major breach i n the Treaty of Versailles and opened the way to further 
dismantling. Gessler, the Reichswehr Minister, said that he would have 
preferred to wait to decide on the tr e a t i e s u n t i l disarmament had been 
f i n a l l y wound up, but he did not think that Germany had renounced 
anything. I n renouncing war i n the west she was abandoning something 
that she did not have the power to undertake: i t was l i k e a man who had 
l o s t both legs saying that he had decided not to go dancing. Hindenburg 
grumbled that Germany's position was s t i l l quite unequal and that Poland 
was s t i l l guaranteed by France. The Government, he said, must not 
forget the Soviet Union and must make sure that Germany's freedom of 
action was recognised. The Cabinet decided to recommend, to the 
Reichstag acceptance o f the Locarno t r e a t i e s . 
The land Governments accepted the t r e a t i e s on 19 November: the 
65. Cmd 2527 of 1925. For the f i n a l negotiations see D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, 
Vol. I , Nos. 85-112, passim; Salewski, Entwaffnung und M i l i t a r k o n t r o l l e , 
pp. 321-5. 
66. Notes of Cabinet meetings, 16 and 18 Nov. 1925, 3243/D713972-99. 
For the at t i t u d e o f Hindenburg and of Seeckt, the head of the 
Reichswehr, see Andreas Dorpalen, Hixidenburg and the Weimar 
Republic, Princeton 1964, pp. 94-8; General Friedrich von Rabenau, 
Seeckt, aus seinem Leben, Leipzig 1941, pp. 420-1, 430; Meier-
Weicker, Seeckt, pp. 45T-2, 494-5; Gessler, Reichswehrpolitik i n 
der Weimarer Zeit; F.L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and P o l i t i c s 1918-
1933, -tefegd 1966, pp. 206-08. 
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Reichstag approved them on 27 November by 292 votes to 17^ and entry 
int o the League by 272 to 183» The opposition consisted of the 
Communists and the D.N.V.P., and two small parties. I n addition to 
the Government parties (D.V.P., Centre, Bavarian People's Party, and 
D.D.P.) the Social Democrates voted i n favour. 
The House of Commons debated the t r e a t i e s on 18 November. I n 
his opening speech Chamberlain stressed that, valuable as the agreements 
i n i t i a l l e d were, Locarno was even more important for the s p i r i t which 
produced them, which informed them, and was already at work. Locarno 
was not the end of the work of appeasement and rec o n c i l i a t i o n but i t s 
beginning. I n describing the conference Chamberlain emphasised the 
perfect equality, confidence and friendliness o f the delegations. The 
greatest d i f f i c u l t y had been that of Germany's entry into the League, 
but the l e t t e r on A r t i c l e 16 contained no more than what had been 
declared by the Assembly and was the common sense of the Covenant. I n 
describing the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee Chamberlain l a i d stress on 
the importance of the demilitarised zone, but made i t clear that for 
B r i t a i n to take action i n advance of the Council the breach must be so 
serious as to give r i s e to danger i f she delayed. He went on to say 
that without a detente on Germany's eastern f r o n t i e r s the work of 
Locarno would have been only h a l f done; but there too security had 
been strengthened and war rendered more remote, and Locarno had already 
borne f r u i t i n the Polish decision not to expel those who had opted for 
German citizenship. Now the A l l i e s had decided to begin the evacuation 
of the Cologne zone and to introduce far-reaching modifications i n the 
' • (67) occupatxon regime. 
67. H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 188, cols. 4l9-32 0 I n conversation with 
Skrzynski at Locarno Chamberlain had p a r t i c u l a r l y asked that the 
Polish Government might show magnanimity over the expulsion of 
optants who under a German-Polish convention were due to leave 
Poland by 1 November or 1 July 1926. See D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , 
Nos. 6, 2k, 57, and, for the whole question, Riekhoff, German-
Polish Relations, pp. 57-70. 
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Labour and Liberal speakers i n the debate agreed that Locarno 
marked a great advance and directed t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s mainly at what 
had not been done, c a l l i n g variously for general disarmament, more 
a r b i t r a t i o n , Russian entry into the League, and settlements i n south-
east Europe. I n answer to MacDonald Chamberlain declared that Locarno 
had not been engineered for the purpose of u n i t i n g the West against the 
Soviet Union nor of detaching Germany from co-operation with her. I n 
his winding-up speech Chamberlain said again that there was no foundation 
for any suspicion that the Government had at any time since taking 
o f f i c e endeavoured to engage any nation or nations i n a league against 
the Soviet Union. I n reply to charges of f a i l u r e to consult the 
Dominions Chamberlain said that the Government had done t h e i r best to 
have a conference but the Dominions had been unable to send representatives 
to London. He could not go to meeting a f t e r meeting of the League and 
say that B r i t a i n had no policy because a l l the Governments of the 
Empire had not been able to meet. The Dominions had been f u l l y 
informed at every stage, t h e i r freedom had been safeguarded i n the 
treaty, and i t was hoped to discuss the matter f u l l y at the next 
(68} 
Imperial Conference. The motion approving r a t i f i c a t i o n of the 
treaty was adopted by 375 votes to 13. 
68. H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 188, cols. 441-2, 519-29° None of the 
Dominions acceded to the Rhine pact. The New Zealand Government 
were prepared to do so, probably also the Australian Government. 
The Canadian Government refused, and the South African Government 
would probably have done so i f asked to declare themselves. 
Discussion was postponed u n t i l the Imperial Conference i n the 
autumn of 1926: i t was then agreed that since not a l l were w i l l i n g 
to adhere i t was better that none should. CP. 473(25), CAB 24/175; 
c. 53(25), CAB 23/51; c 15936/459/18, FO 371/10747; c 16390/459/18, 
FO 371/10748; C 696, 4881/1/18, FO 371/11247; CO. 57668/25, 
00 532/311; D. 632/26, DO 35/1; D. 7259/26, DO 35A; E.(I.R . 26 ) , 
7th meeting; E.129, CAB 32/56. 
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I n France and Belgium there were no parliamentary debates on 
the t r e a t i e s between the conference and the date o f signature: the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n debates took place latere I n Czechoslovakia the Permanent 
Parliamentary Committee approved signature of the tr e a t i e s i n advance 
and so, with misgivings, did the Polish parliamentary Commission on 
Foreign A f f a i r s . 
The Germans were not alone i n considering the p o s s i b i l i t y that 
Locarno might open the way to revision o f the f r o n t i e r with Poland,. 
Just before the conference met i t was reported from the Vatican that 
Poland might under gradual Anglo-French pressure be w i l l i n g to give up 
the Corridor and that Germany might be w i l l i n g to neutralise the 
waterways and railways. Asked to comment on t h i s information, 
the B r i t i s h Legation i n Warsaw repli e d that the Polish Ambassador to 
the Holy See must be e n t i r e l y out of touch with opinion at ifeme to 
make such a forecast; and they proposed not to comment further since 
Chamberlain had said that i t would be most imprudent to raise the 
(71) 
f r o n t i e r question at present. D'Abernon, a f t e r consulting Schubert, 
re p l i e d that whereas neutralisation of East Prussia would arouse strong 
opposition i n Germany, neutrali s a t i o n o f the Corridor would be l i k e l y 
(72) 
to be more acceptable. 
D'Abernon discussed German-Polish relations again with Schubert 
69. The Polish Diet approved r a t i f i c a t i o n , by a large majority, on 
2 March 1 9 2 6 ; the Belgian Chamber of Deputies did so on 21 January; 
the French Chamber of Deputies on 3 March and the Senate on k June. 
7 0 . Vatican desp. 1 2 8 , 3 0 Sep. 1 9 2 5 , N 563VW55, ID 3 7 1 / 1 0 9 9 7 . 
7 1 . Warsaw Chancery l e t t e r , 19 Oct. 1 9 2 5 , N 597VW55, 10 3 7 1 / 1 0 9 9 7 ; 
D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 3 4 , n. k. 
7 2 . D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , - e g ^ e ^ ^ No. 3 4 . Schubert's version of 
the conversation i s less o p t i m i s t i c : 4 5 6 9 / E 1 6 8 3 9 0 - 9 1> also 
4 5 6 9/E16 8 3 9 2 - 9 4 . 
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on 2 0 November, and suggested that an improvement i n them would be a 
natural consequence of Locarno. Schubert replied that the f r o n t i e r 
presented an almost insuperable obstacle, but D'Abernon retorted that 
i t was surely the better policy to i n i t i a t e an improvement i n the hope 
that when i t was better appreciated on both sides some arrangement 
( 7 3 ) 
about the f r o n t i e r might become possible., D'Abernon thought that 
he had persuaded Schubert and that some e f f o r t might be made on the 
German side; but he was mistaken. Stresemann, i n his speeches of 
2 2 November and 1 4 December, looked forward to obtaining Germany's 
p o l i t i c a l demands i n the east as a price for co-operating i n fin a n c i a l 
help to Poland; and by the end of the year the Auswartiges Amt were 
( 7 4 ) 
working out exactly what those demands would be., 
The d e s i r a b i l i t y , voiced by Opposition speakers i n the Commons 
debate, of further settlements i n central and south-east Europe, was 
very much present i n Chamberlain's mind. He had w r i t t e n and spoken 
e a r l i e r i n the year of his hope that although B r i t a i n could not 
undertake dire c t obligations beyond the Rhine f r o n t i e r , the p a c i f i c a t i o n 
which was expected to result from the western pact would spread to 
other sensitive parts of Europe. The chief obstacle to such settlements 
was the fact, pointed out by Nicolson i n his January memorandum, that 
the lesser peace tr e a t i e s were secured by a preponderance of manpower 
on the side of the v i c t o r s . They therefore had no incentive to o f f e r 
concessions and the smaller defeated countries, being unable to create 
serious disturbance by themselves, had nothing to o f f e r d i r e c t l y i n 
return for a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s , non-aggression pacts or mutual 
7 3 « D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 1 1 8 . 
7 4 . See pp. SHW^, 
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guarantees, but possibly had much to gain from fomenting causes o f 
insecurity such as minority grievances and from seeking outside 
patronage. Much therefore depended on the a t t i t u d e of the major 
powers- Germany was not at present i n a position to o f f e r patronage 
for r e v i s i o n i s t aims; B r i t a i n was unwilling to take any re s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
I t a l i a n policy i n the Balkans and the Danubian area, and I t a l i a n 
(75) 
relations with France, were the most important factors. 
At Geneva i n June Chamberlain and Briand agreed that something 
ought to be done about the recurrent troubles i n the Balkans, and 
that I t a l i a n co-operation should be enlisted. They addressed a telegram 
to Mussolini saying that they believed that the Great Powers ought to 
be v i g i l a n t . They were not thinking of collective action, but 
proposed more frequent exchanges of views and hoped that Mussolini 
would lend his personal support. The telegram was given to Scialoja 
for transmission to Mussolini, but for some reason never explained i t 
was said never to have reached him. Chamberlain gave a copy to 
Torretta i n August, but Mussolini was s t i l l i n no hurry to answer. 
Chamberlain referred to the telegram i n his one conversation with 
Mussolini at Locarno and again suggested that France, B r i t a i n and 
I t a l y should exchange views i f they thought that a dangerous s i t u a t i o n 
was a r i s i n g or that united action might be salutary. Mussolini was 
non-committal and i n discussing the f r i c t i o n s between the various 
Balkan countries was, Chamberlain noticed, almost s i l e n t about Albania. 
75° See D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 84. I t a l i a n policy at t h i s 
time i s discussed by Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, 
pp. 321-2, 338-H. 
76. Memorandum by Nicolson, k Jun. 1925; Geneva t e l . 237, 10 Jun.; 
Chamberlain to Torretta, 12 Aug., C 8327, 7815, 7915/251/62, 
ID 371/10695; A.A.E., Grande Bretagng,, Vol. 76(9 Jun.). 
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Mussolini's answer to the June telegram, delivered i n London i n the 
l a s t week of October, was equally non-committal; but Torretta t o l d 
the Foreign Office that h i s Government were anxious to co-operate over 
the serious Greek-Bulgarian f r o n t i e r incident on 19 October, which 
(77) 
involved the Council o f the League of Nations. 
I n his conversation with Mussolini Chamberlain also suggested 
that a pact of mutual guarantee might be more possible i n central 
Europe than i n the Balkans, and he recommended Benes.to consider such 
a pact between the L i t t l e Entente countries and Austria and Hungary; 
but here too the I t a l i a n a t t i t u d e seemed l i k e l y to be doubtful. 
Chamberlain, however, while agreeing about the d i f f i c u l t i e s , was 
anxious that a l l concerned should at least be made aware that the 
B r i t i s h Government would welcome and support any proposal aiming to extend to central Europe the principle o f agreements between former 
v i c t o r s and former enemies. He caused to be sent to the B r i t i s h 
representatives i n the central Europeans capitals, and i n Rome, a 
despatch setting out his views. The Great Powers, he stated, could 
not impose settlements without the consent of the countries concerned; 
t h e i r governments i n turn could not go far ahead of public opinion. 
But even i f concrete proposals for a pact were premature the governments 
(79) 
ought to work towards c o n c i l i a t i o n . 
77. Locarno desp. 43, V Oct. 1925, C 13128/459/18, FO 371/10743; 
message from Mussolini, 7 Oct.; minute by Lampson, 24 Oct., 
C 13838, 13711/251/62, FO 371/10695; D.D.I., Vol. IV, No. 166. 
78. Kennard (Belgrade) to Nicolson, 19 Jun. 1925, C 8497/251/62, 
10 371/10695; Locarno desp. 49, 17 Oct.; Belgrade t e l s . 134, 135, 
136, 22 Oct., C 13131, 13384, 13385, 13386/13131/62, FO 371/10701; 
D.D.I., Vol. IV, No. 164. 
79= D.BoF.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 39. 
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The i n i t i a l reactions were not encouraging. Mussolini was again 
non-committal. The Hungarians said that Hungary's grievances must be 
met before relations with her neighbours could improve, but the 
Foreign Minister, Count Bethlen, indicated at Geneva i n December that 
he might not be unwilli n g to discuss an a r b i t r a t i o n treaty with 
Czechoslovakia. The B r i t i s h Minister i n Vienna thought that Austria 
would not be interested i n a security pact because i t might prejudice 
union with Germany, and on account of the South Tyrol. The Roumanian 
Minister for Foreign A f f a i r s was reported as being rather more 
hopeful about the Balkans than about central Europe; but the proposal 
for a Balkan pact without Bulgaria, which was being talked about i n 
November, was generally d i s l i k e d and came to nothing. 
Graham was convinced that Mussolini did not have aggressive 
designs, but across the Adriatic Kennard i n Belgrade was inclined to 
take Yugoslav anxieties about I t a l i a n policy seriously. Early i n 1926, 
however, Kennard thought that i t might be possible to get a pact i n 
/ Q - i \ 
the Balkans committing the countries to a p a c i f i c policy. On 
22 January instructions were sent to Crewe and Graham to consult the 
French and I t a l i a n Governments on the p o s s i b i l i t y of encouraging a 
80. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , ^ £ ^ v , Nos. 119, 137; Rome desp. 936, 
6 Nov. 1925; Budapest desp. 233, 6 Nov.; Bucharest desp. 501, 7 Nov.; 
minute by Lampson, 11 Nov.; desp. 370 to Budapest, 3 Dec; minute 
by Lampson, 7 Dec; Lampson to Howard Smith, 12 Dec.; minute by 
Lampson, 13 Dec, C 14262, 14270, 14474, 14615, 15697, 15814, 15962, 
16057/13131/62, FO 371/10701. 
81 . D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 166; Belgrade desp. 467, 16 Dec 
1925; Kennard to Howard Smith, 17 Dec; Belgrade desp. 474, 23 
Dec; Lampson to Graham, 30 Dec, C 16338, 16372, 16607/276/92, 
FO 371/10794; minute by Lampson, 22 Dec, C 16521/251/62, FO 3 7 V 
10695; Kennard to Lampson, 4 Dec, C 16693/13131/62, FO 371/10701; 
Kennard to Lampson, 7 Jan. 1926, C 420/308/62, FO 371/11239. 
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system of comprehensive a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s between the countries of 
central and south-east Europe. The f i r s t concrete subject to be 
feckled, i t was suggested, was the Yugoslav-Greek dispute over the 
administration of the dtevgeli-Salonika railway. But when news came 
that the two countries were about to reach agreement on the railway 
the instructions were withdrawn; and the next stage of Balkan 
negotiations involved France more than B r i t a i n . 
Meanwhile nearer home the German Government continued to announce 
expectation of more concessions even a f t e r the Ambassadors' Conference 
notes of 14 and 16 November. At a dinner on 20 November Dufour Feronce 
t o l d Chamberlain that his Government recognised that the promises made 
at Locarno had been f u l f i l l e d but that there s t i l l remained many hopes 
and wishes, especially shortening the period of occupation, reduction 
of occupation forces, and relaxation of r e s t r i c t i o n s on a i r t r a f f i c . 
Chamberlain replied, smilingly but with serious i n t e n t , that the 
trouble about negotiating with Germans was that as soon as they got 
something they appeared to forget i t . There r e a l l y could not be more 
concessions now. He and Briand would be w i l l i n g to t a l k , but i f 
questions of t h i s kind were raised o f f i c i a l l y , the answer would be no. 
Then some passages i n Luther's Reichstag speech on 23 November, as 
reported i n the B r i t i s h press, caused representations to be made to 
Dufour. Luther was reported to have said that negotiations on a i r 
t r a f f i c had begun: t h i s was not true, nor had the A l l i e s made any 
promises about the existing r e s t r i c t i o n s . He was also reported to have 
82. Desps. 238 to Paris, 112 to Rome, 22 Jan. 1926; Paris t e l . 42, 
28 Jan.; Rome t e l . 17, 29 Jan., C 840, 1114, 1170/308/62, 
FO 371/11239. For the next stage see pp. £«U°3, 
83. Dufour desp., 21 Nov., 1925, 3123/D646558-63. 
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said that an assurance had been received at Locarno not only that 
Germany had an equal r i g h t to colonial mandates but that the r i g h t 
would be given p r a c t i c a l effect,, Luther was i n fact misreported on 
t h i s point: what he said was that Germany's r i g h t to mandates had been 
acknowledged and that i t was expected that her claim would receive 
p r a c t i c a l recognition. Even so there was reason to warn Dufour again 
that the Western Governments must not be faced with demands which 
could not be met at present. 
The death of Queen Alexandra and a change of government i n 
France reduced the opportunities for f e s t i v i t i e s and for long 
discussions at the time of the signature of the treaties i n London on 
1 December. But the reported size of the German delegation suggested 
that they thought they were coming for serious negotiations. Chamberlain 
telegraphed to B e r l i n that t h i s would not be possible, and that i t 
was not the moment for the Germans to ask for more; and Schubert 
assured Addison that new demands and contentious questions would not 
( RR^ 
be raised. 
However a f t e r the signature of the t r e a t i e s and agreements on 
the morning of 1 December Stresemann at once raised the question o f 
reducing the number of troops i n the occupied t e r r i t o r y . Apart from 
such problems as the req u i s i t i o n i n g of b i l l e t s , which i t was hoped 
84. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 116. 
85. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , fgyjeifa^ No. 120 and n. 4. A similar 
warning was sent to B e r l i n by Briand on 29 November, a f t e r 
Stresemann had expounded to the French Charge" d'Affaires his 
diplomatic programme for the next two years. This consisted o f 
the e a r l i e s t possible evacuation of the second and t h i r d Rhineland 
zones, the recovery of European and MalmsEdy, the acquisition o f 
mandates over New Guinea, Samoa, Togo and the Cameroons; and i n 
the longer term revision of the Polish f r o n t i e r : A.A.E., Grande 
Bretagng, Vol. 87. 
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could be dealt with l o c a l l y , the Germans were above a l l anxious to get 
the occupying powers to undertake to reduce the number of troops i n 
the second and t h i r d zones to what they regarded as the " c h i f f r e s 
normaux" referred to i n the Ambassadors' Conference note of Ik November, 
namely the number of German troops garrisoned i n the same area before 
the war - 4-3,000„ Briand said that his Government were working from 
that point of view, but he had pointed out at Locarno that there 
were m i l i t a r y problems and the position was not s t r i c t l y comparable 
with that before 1914 when the German army had a larger garrison 
farther west i n Alsace-Lorraine<> Vandervelde said that the Belgian 
Government intended to reduce the number of t h e i r troops by about 
two-thirds- Chamberlain said that the B r i t i s h forces were being 
reduced as well as being moved from the Cologne zone to Wiesbaden, 
but since the B r i t i s h contingent was the smallest of the three the 
reduction would be proportionately less than the French or Belgian. 
Luther then turned to disarmament and complained that the Control 
Commission were not following the principles agreed i n the negotiations 
i n Paris. Briand promised to look into the matter, and Chamberlain 
begged the Germans to do a l l on t h e i r side to s e t t l e the outstanding 
points and not always to be asking for new concessions. Schubert then 
said that the German side had put forward proposals i n Paris about a i r 
control and he hoped that the B r i t i s h representatives would be sent 
in s t r u c t i o n s . 
F i n a l l y Chamberlain raised the question of Luther's reference to 
mandates and said that to avoid misunderstanding he must make i t clear 
that the idea of B r i t a i n or any of the Dominions giving up a mandate 
was out of the question. Luther rep l i e d that the German Government 
would not raise the matter now, but he could not say that i t would 
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never be raised i n the future. Chamberlain answered that a request on 
mandates would certainly be refused, so that i t had better not be put. 
Briand added that the I t a l i a n s were disturbed by the German claim: they 
f e l t that i f any new country were going to have mandates t h e i r s had 
f i r s t claim. 
While i n London Schubert discussed the questions of a i r control 
and the size of the occupation forces further with T y r e l l and Lampson. 
Ty r e l l repeated advice which Chamberlain had already given to Dufour, 
that i n future the Germans should sound out the ground before asking 
for further a l i e v i a t i o n s , to minimise the r i s k of refusals. Lampson 
recommended that the German application for entry into the League 
should be sent soon: otherwise the impression would be created that 
more concessions were awaited, and t h i s would cause great d i f f i c u l t i e s 
for Briand. Schubert said that the Government would have to wait for 
a favourable moment i n r e l a t i o n to domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s ; but he 
denied that there was any int e n t i o n of postponing the application i n 
the hope of further concessions.^^ 
The s i t u a t i o n i n Germany a f t e r the signature o f the Locarno 
t r e a t i e s and the outlook for the future were discussed by the B r i t i s h 
Charge' d*Affaires i n B e r l i n i n a despatch of 10 December. Addison 
believed that the great majority of the German people approved Locarno, 
86. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 122; A.D.A.P., Vol 1 .1 , No. 1. After 
Luther's speech the I t a l i a n Ambassadors i n Paris and London protested 
against any possible grant of a mandate to Germany unless I t a l y got 
one too: D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 121 and n. 3; D.D.I., 
Vol. IV, No. 186, n. 2. 
87. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 123; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1 .1 , Nos. 3-5-
See also op. c i t . , No. 9 for a note by Stresemann of a conversation 
with Chamberlain on 3 December. Stresemann's journal of the v i s i t 
to London and his speech at the signature ceremony are printed i n 
Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 248-54. 
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and p a r t i c u l a r l y a majority of those with influence i n the p o l i t i c a l , 
o f f i c i a l , business and organised labour f i e l d s . The fact that there 
was opposition was less surprising than i t s small size. For the 
future, however, the success of the policy which went under the name 
of Locarno depended on the manner i n which the German Government and 
people vrould conform to i t s s p i r i t and carry out i t s underlying 
pri n c i p l e s . I t was not to be expected that the desire to l i v e i n 
peace and amity with neighbouring countries should suddenly become 
universal i n Germany, especially since a majority of the people 
believed that Germany had not been responsible for the war, that she 
had l o s t i t largely as a r e s u l t of treachery at home, and that the 
Treaty of Versailles imposed on her iniquitous conditions without 
precedent i n history. Whether Germany would now enter whole-heartedly 
on the path which had been opened up was a question which Addison 
confessed himself unable to answer; but his examination of certain 
German attitudes and ways of thought, and of some of the problems 
standing i n the way, revealed doubts. 
The predominant feature of the German character, Addison wrote, 
which struck any foreign observer, was ungraciousness, an absence of a 
sense of compromise, a suspicious and i r r i t a b l e concern for dignity. 
This went with a tendency to form an imaginary conception of the world 
and other peoples and a lack of respect for weakness, and the whole led 
to a preference for pressure rather than negotiation to get what was 
wanted. These characteristics, Addison suggested, had a bearing on the 
future i n so far as i t was to be expected that i n t h e i r relations with 
t h e i r former enemies and t h e i r behaviour i n the League of Nations, the 
Germans would continue to think and behave i n the same way as i n the 
past. I t would be a task for diplomacy to counter German opposition 
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and engage German co-operation. Addison believed that one of the 
chief assets i n the conversion of Germany to a new mentality was the 
absence of compulsory m i l i t a r y service, and that therefore one of the 
chief tasks of the western powers would be to prevent a r e v i v a l of 
the m i l i t a r i s t s p i r i t . This would admittedly be most d i f f i c u t l : the 
only thing that seemed possible was to watch closely the main 
associations, to take steps against a c t i v i t i e s assuming the character 
or organised m i l i t a r y e f f o r t , and to t r u s t that such measures,combined 
with the absence of conscription, would ensure peace for a long period 
o f time, i f possible through a change of heart but at any rate because 
i t would be impossible to wage war. 
The problems l i k e l y to stand i n the way of whole-hearted German 
entry into the path of peace were those which to the Germans were 
hardships not to be supported for any great length of time. Questions 
such as a i r development, the occupation of the Rhineland and the status 
of the Saar would probably be solved i n Germany's favour i n a f a i r l y 
short time. The three problems which, whatever the facts of the cases 
or the j u s t i c e of the decisions taken, were regarded i n Germany as 
insupportable were Danzig and the Corridor, Upper S i l i s i a , and Austria. 
Addison considered that a l l three were l i k e l y to come alive when 
Germany entered the League. Fortunately for him, i t was beyond his 
province to suggest how they might be solved i n a manner conducive to 
the peace of Europe/ 8 8' 
88. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 141. 
Chapter 7 
Defence Policy 1922°1926 
5±k 
During the years 1922 to 1926 some changes were made i n B r i t i s h 
defence organisation and others were proposed but rejected. After the 
Washington Conference, as before, defence policy and planning were 
dominated by naval problems; hence the closest connexion between defence 
policy and foreign policy continued to be seen i n r e l a t i o n to Japan and 
to a l e s s e r extent i n r e l a t i o n to the United S t a t e s 0 Changes i n the 
European s i t u a t i o n affected defence planning l i t t l e : i n 1923, when 
relations with France were strained by the occupation of the Ruhr, the 
programme of home a i r defence was enlarged; at the end of 1925, af t e r the 
conclusion of the Locarno t r e a t i e s , the programme was slowed down0 As 
has already been indicated i n Chapter 5, no detailed consideration was 
given to the mili t a r y implications of the western security treaty, but 
some studies conducted at the time when the treaty was being negotiated 
reinforced the p o l i t i c a l arguments for B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The question 
of further limitation of naval armaments was discussed from time to time 
but no further conference was c a l l e d before the League of Nations embarked 
in 1926 on the preparations for a general disarmament conference,, Most 
of the discussion for and i n the Preparatory Commission for the Disarma-
ment Conference f a l l s outside the scope of t h i s study; but some early 
features w i l l be discussed i n t h i s and i n the following chapter,, At the 
same time, however, the Chiefs of Staff were concluding i n the f i r s t of 
t h e i r annual reviews of defence policy that the s i z e of the armed forces 
maintained by Great B r i t a i n i n peacetime was not and could not be 
determined by the requirements of foreign policy„ 
Naval and a i r policy 1922-23 
Since the navy took the largest of the three services' share of 
defence expenditure i t was invariably the main target for proposals for 
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economy„ The outcome of the Washington Conference was s a t i s f a c t o r y from 
t h i s point of view, but i n the climate of 1922 i t was considered necessary 
to search for further reductions,, The end of the conference almost 
coincided with the publication of the f i r s t reports of the Geddes Commit" 
tee on National Expenditure, which had been set up i n August 1921 to 
examine the provisional estimates for the following year and which 
recommended savings of £46§ mi l l i o n on the s e r v i c e s 0 The Admiralty 
objected at once, and a Cabinet committee was set up under Churchill's 
chairmanship to examine the defence spending part of the r e p o r t T h i s 
committee recommended maintenance of the one<=power naval standard and 
W 
cautions continuation of the development of Singapore and of o i l fuel 
(2) 
reserves, subject to an examination by the Committee of Imperial Defence,, 
The decision i n p r i n c i p l e to construct a base at Singapore was not 
i n fact re-examined by the Coalition Government, but the programme of 
building up o i l fuel reserves was curtailed,, The Admiralty offered a cut 
i n the t o t a l reserves suggested i n the previous year, and proposed to 
concentrate on the route to the east. At a meeting of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence on 28 July 1922 Churchill said that there seemed to be 
no reason why the fuel reserve should be established by 1929 or 1931 (the 
alternative dates suggested by the Admiralty), His experience at 
Washington had made Balfour s c e p t i c a l about Japanese expansionist aims, 
and he argued also that i f Japan did decide to secure control of the 
P a c i f i c the United States would necessarily be involved as well as Britain,, 
Lee and Beatty explained that as a r e s u l t of the Washington Conference the 
United States could no longer defend her in t e r e s t s i n the western P a c i f i c , 
but that B r i t a i n would have to t r y to defend them since she could not 
1, Cmd 1581 of 1922, F i r s t Interim Report of Committee on National 
Expenditure; Cmd 1587 of 1922, Remarks of the Admiralty on the Interim 
Report of the Committee on National Expenditure; C 0"ll("22), J CAB 23/29„ 
2„ Proceedings and memoranda, CAB 27/164; reports i n C,P, 3692, 3692A, 
CAB 24/132; C oP o3706, CAB 24/133, See also R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, 
pp. 336-40, 
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afford to l e t Japan seize the Philippines, This could only be prevented 
by the f l e e t ; but at present there was no base east of Malta that could 
take the f l e e t and although under the present fuel programme i t would 
be able to go to Singapore i n 1925 i t would not be able to operate fr e e l y 
when i t got there, Balfour asked for further figures about Japanese 
strength and o i l reserves, but said that meanwhile the naval estimates 
(3) 
should be based on completing the fuel reserve by 1931„ 
In due course the Admiralty provided such figures as they could 
obtain of Japanese o i l reserves and tanker strength, which, although 
admittedly not a good guide to future developments, suggested that Japan 
already had a larger storage capacity than B r i t a i n was contemplating for 
the route to the east. The Admiralty said that they would view with 
apprehension any proposal to postpone the date by which the f l e e t could 
(4) 
have freedom of action i n the Far East, The question was not discussed 
again before the end of the Coalition Government, At the next following 
meeting, on 14 December, the Committee of Imperial Defence agreed to 
recommend that the Cabinet should reaffirm the decision to develop the 
base at Singapore on the understanding that no considerable expenditure 
would be involved for the next, two years. They also recommended that 
completion of the fuel reserve on the route to the east could not prudently 
be delayed beyond 1931. A Treasury representative, S i r George Barstow, 
questioned the argument against a l a t e r date, saying that he could not 
understand why the Admiralty were content to be weak i n the P a c i f i c up 
to 1931 but considered that i t would be dangerous thereafter, Crowgreplied 
that the question was being put i n the wrong way, i t was possible to say 
with confidence that there was no danger of war i n the P a c i f i c i n 1925, 
3, C„ICD„ Paper 175~C, CAB 5/4; C.I.D, 161st meeting, CAB 2/3, 
4, C oI,D 0 Paper 180-C, CAB 5/4, 
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or perhaps i n 1931„ But the farther ahead one attempted to forecast that 
there would not be a war the more d i f f i c u l t i t became„ Some date must 
be fixed for completing the o i l reserve, beyond which i t would be rash to 
assume that there would be no p o s s i b i l i t y of attack. The Cabinet approved 
( 5 ) 
the Committee's recommendations on 21 February 1923, 
Meanwhile the Admiralty resuscitated the problem of Empire naval 
policy and co-operation, which the Imperial Conference of 1921 had decided 
to shelve u n t i l a f t e r the Washington Conference,, In the summer of 1922 
they produced a draft paper for the Dominions, pointing out that the 
Washington t r e a t i e s affected c a p i t a l ships only and while reducing the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of sudden war had worsened the position i n the western P a c i f i c 
Co-operation by the Dominions and colonies was s t i l l neded, and they should 
be urged to build up a nucleus of sea=»going vessels, p a r t i c u l a r l y l i g h t 
c r u i s e r s and submarines, to help provide o i l supplies, and, most urgently, 
to help i n developing Singapore,, This question also was not discussed 
u n t i l a f t e r the change of government. On 30 November Beatty warned new 
Ministers attending the Committee of Imperial Defence about the r i s k s being 
run i n the P a c i f i c , and used the recent Chanak c r i s i s to point h is case D 
(6) 
The Committee agreed to send the paper on co<=operation to the Dominions. 
The fact that the decision to develop Singapore was reaffirmed before 
the next Imperial Conference, due l a t e r i n 1923, did not please Smuts, 
who wanted a discussion on Empire foreign and naval policy i n the l i g h t of 
(7) 
the s i t u a t i o n created by the Washington naval treaties,, The t r e a t i e s 
themselves had not been f u l l y r a t i f i e d over a year a f t e r t h e i r signature, 
a fact which began to cause concern both i n London and i n Tokyo. In the 
middle of June 1923 the Admiralty asked the Foreign Office whether pressure 
5„ C 0 I o D o 168th meeting, CAB 2/3; C„ 11(23), CAB 23/45 0 
6„ C.I.D, Paper 176=C, CAB 5/4; C.I.D. 165th meeting, CAB 2/3. 
7. C o0. 21865/23, CO 532/238; C 0 I 0 D 0 Papers 189-C, 192-C, CAB 5/5. 
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could be put on the French Government„ They pointed out that whereas 
they had already taken action on the treaty and had rendered unserviceable 
a l l but one of the ships due for scrapping, the United States and Japan 
had done no more than hold up t h e i r construction programmes,, A couple 
of months e a r l i e r there had been a considerable fuss i n Washington when 
the Navy Department asked Congress for funds to modify the main armament 
of ships on the ground that B r i t a i n had already done so. This was not 
the case; the Admiralty had told the United States Embassy i n London so 
o f f i c i a l l y ; and Geddes believed that a considerable number of American 
naval o f f i c e r s , regretting the limitations of the naval treaty, were 
determined to pursue expansion i n directions that were s t i l l open e 
The Japanese Government, however, were anxious to see the naval 
treaty come into force, and early i n July they proposed j o i n t representa-
tions to the French and hinted that the three major naval powers should 
agree to apply i t as between themselves independently of France and I t a l y , 
The United States Embassy i n Paris were pressing the French Government to 
complete r a t i f i c a t i o n , but the Foreign Office were inclined to hold back 
in view of the other matters of disagreement with the French at that time.^ 
The naval treaty and the P a c i f i c treaty received the approval of the 
French Senate and Chamber of Deputies during July and a l l the r a t i f i c a t i o n s 
were f i n a l l y deposited i n Washington on 17 August„ At the same time the 
Japanese press was showing in t e r e s t i n Singapore and was suggesting that 
i t s development was directed against Japan,, Much of the material for the 
8 C Admiralty to Foreign Office, 16 June 1923, A^3554/24/45, FO 371/8482. 
9. Washington desp„ 325, 17 Mar. 1923, A 1890/24/45, FO 371/8481Q There 
was another press campaign i n May, again based on f a l s e information 
and again originating i n the Navy Department: Washington desp„ 607, 
11 May, A 2995/24/45, FO 371/8482. 
10. Paris t e l . 609, 24 Jun„ 1923; Tokyo t e l s . 103, 104, 2 J u l . ; Paris 
t e l . 643, 4 J u l D ; desp„ 271 to Tokyo, 11 J u l . , A 3713, 3950, 3993, 
4023/24/45, FO 371/8482. 
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discussion i n fact came from B r i t a i n , and the Embassy i n Tokyo reported 
that without the stimulus of a r t i c l e s or speeches i n B r i t a i n j u s t i f y i n g 
Singapore on grounds of the present and possible future state of Anglo*" 
Japanese relations very l i t t l e interest would be taken,,^ 1^ 
Singapore was the subject of a paper produced by the Admiralty i n 
the summer of 1923 i n preparation f o r the Imperial Conference to be held 
i n October, along with one on naval policy i n the post-Washington s i t u a -
t i o n and recommendations on the type of naval forces considered most suitable 
for the individual Dominions0 The papers f o r Australia and New Zealand 
stressed that as a result of the Washington Conference the United States 
Navy could not operate e f f e c t i v e l y i n the western Pacific, and that the 
B r i t i s h superiority over Japan i n ca p i t a l ships was of f s e t by the great 
distance from homec Fleet mobility was therefore essential, and the 
development of Singapore as a repair and f u e l l i n g base was the keystone of 
preparations to enable the f l e e t to be concentrated i n the Far East, An 
enemy would aim to seize Singapore i n the i n t e r v a l before the main f l e e t 
could a r r i v e , and so the task of the Empire's naval forces already i n the 
Pacific would be to delay and harass such an expedition. The Australian 
and New Zeafend Governments were therefore advised to concentrate on 
cruisers and submarines „ 
The Imperial Conference did not devote much time to defence,, As i n 
1921 the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers were conscious of 
naval problems and expressed willingness to co-operate<, Smuts was doubt-
f u l about the usefulness and d e f e n s i b i l i t y of Singapore 0 Mackenzie King, 
who was representing Canada f o r the f i r s t time, was c h i e f l y concerned to 
11„ Tokyo t e l 0 104; Tokyo desp, 378, 2 Jul„ 1923; Tokyo desp, 416, 1 Aug„; 
Tokyo tel„ 239, 5 Dec, F 1998, 2364, 2632, 3491/1889/61, F0 371/ 
9225; Tokyo desp„ 582, 24 Dec., F 279/123/61, F0 371/10299. 
12. CI„D. Papers, 194-C, 195-C, 196~C, 201-C, 202-C, 204-C, CAB 5/5„ 
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emphasise the independence of the Dominions, At the end the conference 
adopted some f a i r l y platitudinous resolutions on defence, committing none 
of the governments and stressing the responsibility of the individual 
Parliaments for deciding the nature and extent of t h e i r countries' defence 
e f f o r t . Subject to t h i s proviso the resolution suggested that each part 
of the Empire should be responsible f o r i t s local defence, that provision 
be made to safeguard maritime communications and trade, that f a c i l i t i e s 
be provided to ensure f l e e t mobility, and that naval strength equal to 
that of any other power should be maintained i n accordance with the 
Washington naval treaty, The conference noted the interest of Australia, 
New Zealand and India i n the development of Singapore and the necessity 
of maintaining a safe passage to the east, and recorded an earnest desire 
(13) 
for the further l i m i t a t i o n of armaments0 
The Imperial Conference also took note of the necessity f o r B r i t a i n 
to maintain a home defence a i r force strong enough to give protection 
against attack by the strongest a i r force w i t h i n s t r i k i n g distance, and 
(14) 
were duly alarmed by Hoare's statement on the French a i r force, A 
decision to bui l d up the home defence a i r force to 600 a i r c r a f t instead 
of the 500 projected i n 1922 was one outcome of the enquiry carried out by 
the Salisbury Sub~Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
An enquiry into naval and a i r co-operation had been decided upon i n 
March 1922, but the decision was not implemented u n t i l a year l a t e r when 
13, E„ 9th, 10th, 15th meetings, CAB 32/9; Cmd 1987 of 1923, Imperial 
Conference, 1923, Summary of Proceedings; Cmd 1988 of 192TT,' ' " 
Imperial Conference, 1923, Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings, 
Mackenzie King's position i s discussed i n R, MacGregor Dawson, 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, a P o l i t i c a l Biography, Vol, I , Toronto 
1958, pp, 455=80? Ramsay Cook, "J, W„ Dafoe at the Imperial 
Conference, 1923," i n Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review, XLI (1960), pp„19~40. 
Canadian naval policy i n t h i s period i s discussed i n Gilbert Norman 
Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Ottawa 1952, Vol, I , pp. 304-32; 
James G, Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol, I , Toronto 1964, pp„ 149= 
84, 
14, E, 10th and 11th meetings, CAB 32/9, 
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a committee under Lord Salisbury was appointed to examine the co-operation 
and correlation of the three Services from the point of view of national 
(15) 
and imperial defence. In addition to examining, i n a further sub-
committee, the controversy between the Admiralty and the A i r Staff over 
naval aviation, the Salisbury Sub-Committee considered the assumptions on 
which defence planning should be based and the machinery required. At 
t h e i r f i r s t meeting on 15 March 1923 the following preliminary assumptions 
were adopted: (a) home defence should be considered i n r e l a t i o n to 
imperial defence; (b) i n the oceans the primary res p o n s i b i l i t y rested on 
the navy; (c) i n the narrow seas, however, the navy was no longer solely 
responsible; (d) while war with a Great Power was a remote contingency 
an adequate a i r force was essential to supportBritish diplomacy. Three 
alternative hypotheses f o r war were to be considered: war with an enemy 
i n western Europe, war with a transoceanic enemy, and war with an enemy 
(16} ~ — 
i n the"Near and Middle East. 
In reply to questionnaires sent to the Service Departments the A i r 
Staff produced an alarming and exaggerated estimate of French a i r strength 
and of the weight of bombs that could be dropped on England. France was 
credited with a metropolitan a i r force of 946 a i r c r a f t , of which 600 were 
said to be capable of delivering 160 tons of bombs every twenty-four 
hours. In fact France had a first«*line bomber strenth of 320, and approxi-
mately the same number of f i g h t e r s , the remainder being observation machines 
which the French did not regard as combat a i r c r a f t ; and the calculation of 
the weight of bombs was based on an assumption that each a i r c r a f t could 
make two sorties i n twenty-four hours, that a l l reached t h e i r objectives, 
(17) 
and that none was l o s t . In addition, as the General Staff were quick 
l 5» H C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 161, c o l . 35. See Chapter 2, p. »f H . 
16. C.I.D. Sub-Committee on Defence, 1923, 1st meeting, CAB 21/260. 
17. N.D. 4, N.D.10, CAB 21/260; R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, Vol. I , p. 383, 
n, gives figures from the Service Hist~orique "de I'Arraee de l * A i r . 
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to point out, the Air Staff ignored such considerations as French pre<= 
(18) 
occupation with Germany,, The c i v i l i a n Ministers on the sub-committee 
were, however, impressed by the Air Staff's figures and agreed to 
recommend that the home defence a i r force should be b u i l t up to 600 first<= 
l i n e a i r c r a f t . Inevitably the fact that the French a i r force was being 
used as the yardstick became publicly known, and before the decision on 
numbers was taken the Cabinet agreed that Salisbury should state i n the 
House of Lords that t a l k of attack by France was deprecated and the 
Government could not conceive of anything worse than competition with 
her; but that they would make whatever provision f o r defence was necessary 
(19) 
and the strength of the R„A„F„ would probably be increased. 
The sub-committee on relations between the navy and the R„A,F, 
proposed a compromise on naval aviation by which the Fleet A i r Arm was 
to remain under naval control while at sea but was to be manned and trained 
by the R„A„F. The compromise was accepted by the Cabinet at the end of 
July, but the question continued to cause d i f f i c u l t y and i l l f e e l i n g 
(23) 
between the two Services for some time. On the question of the machinery 
f o r defence planning, the Salisbury Sub=Committee decided against the 
creation of a Ministry of Defence but also against the a b o l i t i o n of the 
A i r Ministry, Instead they recommended strengthening the Committee of 
Imperial Defence and making the Chiefs of Staff c o l l e c t i v e l y responsible 
f o r tendering j o i n t advice on defence. The Chiefs of Staff did not f i n d 
18, N.Do 31, CAB 21/261, 
19, C.25(23), CAB 23/45; HaL, Deb,, 5th ser 0, Vol, 54, cols, 83-8; Sub-
Committee on Defence, 10th and 11th meetings, CAB 21/262; C.32(23), 
CAB 23/46; Cmd 2029 of 1924, Report of the Subcommittee of the 
Committee of imperial Defence on National and Imperial Defence, 
The A i r Staff continued to use France as the hypothetical enemy f o r 
the home defence a i r force, 
20, C,P, 349(23), CAB 24/161; C, 42(23), 43(23), CAB 23/46; Cmd 1938 of 
1923, Recommendations of the National and Imperial Defence Committee 
on Relations of the Navy and Air Force, 
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t h i s easy at f i r s t , or indeed always l a t e r 0 The d i f f i c u l t y was pa r t l y 
due to the differences between the bases on which the three services 
calculated t h e i r requirements, as well as to i n i t i a l lack of f a m i l i a r i t y 
with each other's problems and lack of the habit of working together. 
Nevertheless the inauguration of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was a 
(21) 
considerable step forward i n providing f o r defence planning. 
Singapore and the Navy 1924»»25 
Soon af t e r taking o f f i c e the Labour Government decided to recon>= 
sider the base at Singapore, A committee under Clynes, the Lord Privy 
Seal, accepted the strategic case f o r the base but recommended that i t s 
construction should be abandoned i n the interests of the Government's 
(22) 
policy of international understanding and disarmament. When the 
Dominions were consulted Smuts applauded the Labour Government's intention 
but the Governments of Australia and New Zealand (both of which had agreed 
to contribute to the cost) and of Newfoundland expressed disapproval: the 
Canadian Government declined to comment, MacDonald announced the decision 
(23) 
i n the House of Commons on 18 March, 
The news that Singapore was being reconsidered was welcomed i n Japan, 
and a f t e r the decision was announced E l i o t wrote to MacDonald that i t had 
21, Cmd 2029 of 1924; C, 35(23), CAB 23/46; C,P, 346(23), CAB 24/161, On 
the Salisbury Sub-Committee i n general see Franklin B, Johnson, 
Defence by Committee, London 1960, pp 0 193-8; Andrew Boyle, Trenchard, 
London 1962, pp, 467=91; R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, pp„ 372-82; R o s k i l l , 
Hankey, Vol. I I / , pp, 336-41„ 
22,, C, 14(24), C„ 15(24), CAB 23/47; R„S,(24), 1st and 2nd meetings, CAB 
27/236, The committee was also meant to examine the question of ship 
replacements but did not do so thoroughly. The Committee of Imperial 
Defence on 11 February agreed that the o i l f u e l reserve should be 
treated as a whole, i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n being a matter f o r the Admiralty^ 
and that the 12 months reserve should be completed by 1937; C,I0D, 
Papers 476-B, 477=B, 479-B, CAB 4/10; C„I,D, 180th and 181st meetings, 
CAB 2/4, 
23, C. 21(24), CAB 23/47; H,C, Deb., 5th ser,, Vol, 171, cols, 317-25, 
The correspondence with the Dominion and Indian Governments was 
published i n Cmd 2083 of 1924, Singapore Naval Base, Correspondence 
with the Self«°Goveming Dominions and India regarding the Development 
of Singapore Naval Base, 
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had an excellent effect on Japanese feelings Well-informed Japanese, 
he wrote, had not regarded Singapore as a threat but they had been hurt 
that t h e i r former a l l y had taken the f i r s t opportunity to create f o r t i = 
f i c a t i o n s as near to Japan as the Washington treaty allowed, and had 
been angry at B r i t i s h statements that the base was needed on account of 
possible Japanese a c t i v i t y i n the P a c i f i c E l i o t could see no sign of 
an aggressive Japanese policy to the south: even on the mainland 
Japanese intentions were, he thought, l i m i t e d . The Japanese wanted a 
special position i n north China and were anxious to extend t h e i r influence 
i n Manchuria, but without quarrelling with Russia. In China proper they 
were c h i e f l y interested i n a prefere n t i a l commercial position: they would 
prefer China to remain weak, but not so weak as to f a l l a prey to foreign 
powers. E l i o t believed that i n general the Japanese would f o r some time 
to come make considerable concessions rather than break away from the 
(24) 
other powers. 
B r i t i s h naval opinion was not uniformly h o s t i l e to the decision to 
abandon the development of Singapore. Admiral Richmond wrote from the 
East Indies Station to Haldane that although he agreed that the base was 
needed, he thought that the Services had not begun to work out how i t 
would be used nor what form a war with Japan would take. Haldane replied 
that he had never denied the d e s i r a b i l i t y and usefulness of the base, but 
at present strengthening the R.A.F. must have higher p r i o r i t y . A i r 
weakness hampered the Government's diplomacy i n Europe where i t s most 
urgent tasks lay, and he was not s a t i s f i e d with the state of co-ordination 
(25 ) 
of the individual Services' proposals. Haldane i n fact devoted some 
part of his short tenure of the chairmanship of the Committee of Imperial 
24. Tokyo t e l . 59, 4 Mar„ 1924, F 664/123/61, FO 371/10299; E l i o t 
to MacDonald, 3 May, FO 800/219. 
25. Richmond to Haldane, 16 Apr. and 24 Jun. 1924, National Library of 
Scotland, Haldane Papers, 5916; Maurice, Haldane, Vol. I I , pp. 158-60. 
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Defence to encouraging c o o r d i n a t i o n of defence thinking. At a meeting 
of the Committee i n the summer he pointed out that the d i f f e r e n t 
Departments were working on d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l assumptions as the bases 
for t h e i r preparations, and suggested that they should be re-examined„ 
No new basis was arrived at before the Labour Government f e l l , but 
Haldane's interest was welcomed by Hankey, who wrote to him that previous 
Governments had neglected the Services,, As regards Britain's commitments 
Hankey thought that the s i t u a t i o n i n the Near and Middle East and i n 
India was now f a i r l y clear, but the s i t u a t i o n i n Europe was s t i l l obscure 
and would remain so u n t i l the League of Nations had cleared up the 
(27) 
position i n respect of security and disarmament„ 
The decision on Singapore also had some effect on the Admiralty's 
a t t i t u d e to the question of further l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments, a 
subject raised from time to time during 1924 i n the United States 0 Early 
i n t h i s election year there was t a l k i n Congress and~T."n" the press of c a l l i n g 
a new conference. In March Senator Borah introduced i n the Senate a 
resolution c a l l i n g f o r another disarmament conference and an economic 
conference, and the naval appropriations b i l l s passed by the House of 
Representatives included a request to the President that he should summon 
another conference. Again i n A p r i l Senator Pepper introduced a resolution 
c a l l i n g for a world conference on disarmament and on a world court. But 
the Administration were extremely cautious 0 Hughes l e t i t be known that 
he did not think the idea of a conference practicable, and t o l d Howard 
that the Administration had had nothing to do with Senator Pepper's reso« 
l u t i o n . Both Hughes and President Coolidge indicated i n speeches i n A p r i l 
26. C.I.D. 187th meeting, CAB 2/4. 
27. Hankey to Haldane, 9 Sep. 1924, Haldane Papers, 5916. 
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(OB) 
that the present moment was not thought propitious f o r a conference. 
The Admiralty were discussing the lines which further l i m i t a t i o n 
of naval armaments might take, and were disposed to have i t suggested to 
the Japanese Government that since Singapore had been abandoned they 
should give up t h e i r b a t t l e f l e e t . This suggestion can hardly have been 
intended to be taken seriously, and sounds more l i k e a h i t at MacDonald 
( 29 ) 
and Clynes, MacDonald was not inclined to favour another conference 
at present as he was concentrating on the reparation question; but since 
at the end of May the American press was again saying that the President 
intended to c a l l a conference on disarmament at an early date an enquiry 
(30) 
was sent to Washington, Howard replied that i t was now very unlikely 
that Coolidge would c a l l a conference before the spring. I t was said that 
he would do so i f he were re-elected i n November, but a l l that he had 
stated publicly was that he would do so when conditions i n Europe warranted 
(31) 
i t . The matter rested there u n t i l the end of the year. 
During the summer of 1924 Japanese—American relations were strained 
by the new United States immigration b i l l , and the Japanese became, i n 
Eli o t ' s view, more assertive and more suspicious about reports of Anglo" 
American consultation over China. No such consultation had taken place and 
the Foreign Office t r i e d to soothe the Japanese suspicions; but they 28, Letter from Hughes to Hamilton Fish, Th  Time , 20 Feb, 1924; 
Washington t e l , 100, 24 Mar,, A 1947/435/45,' F0 371/9616; Washington 
desp. 584, 8 Apr„, A 2464/435/45, F0 371/9617; Washington desp, 654, 
18 Apr,, A 2648/218/45, F0 371/9610; Washington t e l , 133, 22 Apr,, 
A 2525/435/45, FO 371/9617, 
29, Minutes on A 2681, 3517/435/45, FO 371/9617: see also R o s k i l l , 
Naval Policy, pp. 423«=5, 428=9„ The Clynes Committee did not meet 
between 11 A p r i l (when Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, urged 
economy i n replacements and an attempt to reach agreement with Japan) 
and 24 June, and did not meet again thereafter: CAB 27/236, 
30. Washington t e l , 173, 26 May 1924; desp. 959 to Washington, 14 Jun,, 
A 3214, 3512/435/45, FO 371/9617, 
31, Washington cesp. 1182, 18 Ju l . 1924; minute by Sir A. W i l l e r t , 15 Aug,, 
A 4541, 4951/435/18, FO 371/9618. See R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, pp. 431, 
433-4. " 
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acknowledged that co-operation with Japan, d i f f i c u l t f o r a long time, had 
become very d i f f i c u l t owing to the wide divergence between the two countries' 
(32) 
interests i n China, I t was suggested that MacDonald should speak to 
the Japanese Ambassador, but Parliament was dissolved before an opportunity 
arose. On entering o f f i c e Chamberlain took up the suggestion and also 
proposed to speak to the United States Ambassador,, He did so on 14 November 
and l a t e r wrote to Howard that consultations about China were needed and 
i t would be much better i f the i n i t i a t i v e would come from Washington,, He 
feared that Japan might be drawn into an agreement with the Soviet Union 
and that the days of spheres of influence might return unless the United 
(33) 
States and B r i t a i n gave Japan a lead i n p r a c t i c a l consultation. The 
State Department were not indisposed f o r discussions, but i n fact l i t t l e 
was done u n t i l the s i t u a t i o n i n China became more threatening again i n the 
(34) 
summer of 1925, 
Chamberlain also t o l d the Japanese Ambassador that he desired close 
co-operation with Japan i n Chinese a f f a i r s and wou}.d welcome Japanese views 
on a constructive policy i n China, The Ambassador asked about the new 
Government's intentions on Singapore and said that there would be anxiety 
i n Japan i f the project were taken up again 0 Chamberlain replied that 
Singapore had not yet been discussed, but i f i t were decided to resume 
construction the Japanese must not think that i t was with any unfriendly 
intention, Singapore was an essential l i n k i n the communications between 
32, Tokyo t e l , 224, 12 Sep, 1924, F 3099/19/10, FO 371/10244; E l i o t to 
MacDonald, 19 Sep., FO 800/219; desp, 424 to Tokyo, 22 Sep,; minute 
by Wellesley, 26 Sep,; Tokyo t e l , 235, 28 Sep,, F 3099, 3281, 
3245/19/10, FO 371/10244; Tokyo desp, 376, 3 Oct,; Tokyo t e l , 258, 
30 Oct., F 3582, 3638/19/10, FO 371/10245, 
33, Desp, 1737 to Washington, 14 Nov. 1924, F 3871/19/10, FO 371/10246; 
Chamberlain to Howard, 19 Nov,, F 3701/19/10, FO 371/10245; desp, 
1774 to Washington, 25 Nov,, F 3945/19/10, FO 371/10247, 
34 Desp, 1813 to Washington, 2 Dec. 1923; Washington t e l , unnum,, 
3 Dec., F 3983, 4085/19/10, FO 371/10247, 
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B r i t a i n and Australia and New Zealand, and no B r i t i s h Government of any 
party could ever plan a deliberate attack on another country. E l i o t ' s 
f i r s t l e t t e r to Chamberlain also referred to Japanese anxiety about 
Singapore, and repeated his conviction that the present Japanese Government 
( 35 ) 
regarded a l l ideas of expansion i n the south as chimerical. 
The new Government i n fact decided at an early date to resume con-
struction of the Singapore base. The Admiralty urged that the l a t e 
Government's statement that construction was only suspended u n t i l i t was 
seen whether a disarmament agreement were possible took no account of t h e i r 
repeated representations that reduction of armaments made the base more 
rather than less necessary. The decision was announced i n Parliament on 
(36) 
9 December. 
However the naval programme came under attack from the new Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Churchill, w i t h i n a few days of the Government taking 
o f f i c e . He proposed that the Committee of Imperial Defence should be asked 
to make a fresh appraisal of the dangers to which the Empire was exposed, 
to consider whether the Ten—Year Rule ought to be extended or renewed, and 
to review the Admiralty's building programme for cruisers. He wrote to 
Baldwin and Chamberlain that the naval programme was based on the idea of 
war with Japan, of which he saw riot the s l i g h t e s t chance " i n our l i f e t i m e " 
Chamberlain, he considered, should be asked to advise the Cabinet and the 
Committee of Imperial Defence whether war with Japan was a reasonable 
p o s s i b i l i t y , and i f he advised that i t was not the Admiralty should be t o l d 
not to prepare for i t . "They should be made to recast a l l t h e i r plans and 
scales and standards on the basis that no naval war against a f i r s t - c l a s s 
35. Desp. 494 to Tokyo, 14 Nov. 1924; t e l . 176 to Tokyo, 21 Nov., F 3852, 
3833/19/10, F0 371/10246; E l i o t to Chamberlain, 14 Nov., Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 51/110, F0 800/256. 
36. CP. 502(24); C.P. 534(24), CAB 24/169; C. 67(24), CAB 23/49; C„I0D. 
191st meeting, CAB 2/4; H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 179, col„ 49. 
529 
Navy i s l i k e l y to take place i n the next twenty years," 
For the Committee of Imperial Defence's re-examination of Singapore 
and the concurrent discussion of the naval programme the Foreign Office 
produced two memoranda. On Singapore Wellesley argued that i t was bound 
up with the problem of Japanese policy i n China. I t could not be denied^ 
he wrote, that t h i s policy was to keep China weak and to diminish the 
prestige and influence of other powers. B r i t i s h and United States 
influence was the chief r e s t r a i n t on Japan, and i t ought to be made 
ef f e c t i v e . But one of the results of the Washington Conference had been 
to eliminate American naval power from the western Pacific and to strengthen 
the Japanese position. I f Singapore were abandoned China would be l e f t 
e n t i r e l y at Japan's mercy. The Japanese did not l i k e the idea of the 
Singapore base, but recognised that B r i t a i n had a r i g h t to build i t . 
There was therefore a good deal to be said f o r undertaking the construction 
now when i t did not represent a threat to Japan rather than l a t e r then the 
p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n might not be so good. On the other hand Wellesley 
regarded the chance of war i n the Pacific as remote, Japan did not want 
to be p o l i t i c a l l y isolated and at present had no alternative to some degree 
of co-operation with B r i t a i n and the United States; a combination with 
Russia and Germany was not inconceivable but was not at present even on the 
horizon, Japan was not now i n a position to make war on B r i t a i n , and i t 
seemed almost inconceivable that she should wish to do so. The two 
countries' interests did c o n f l i c t i n China, but r i v a l r y of that kind was 
unlikely to lead to war. I t would be unreasonable to regard Japan as an 
active enemy and to s t a r t building against her, but i t was important to 
B r i t i s h interests that Japan should not be the only power with armed strength 
37, Churchill to Baldwin, 15 Dec, 1924, Baldwin Papers, D,I,3, Navy 2 
(Vol. 2); Churchill to Chamberlain, 15 Dec,, Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 51/66; R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, p, 445, Churchill also sent to 
the C.I.D, a memorandum on the economic power of Japan, which he 
regarded as l i m i t e d ; C0I,D, Paper 553~B, CAB 4/12, 
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i n the Pacific. 
Early i n the l i f e of the new Government Hankey mentioned to Chamberlain 
the question raised by Haldane i n the summer, of the assumptions as to the 
possible enemy on which the Service Departments were making t h e i r calcula-
tions. He suggested that Japan and France provided the best yardsticks 
for naval and a i r measures. Chamberlain did not disagree but said that 
the less the Foreign Secretary knew about such assumptions the better. He 
did not think that the Committee of Imperial Defence need discuss the 
question, but suggested that Hankey should consult Curzon, the new chairman. 
Curzon agreed with Hankey's view but suggested that Germany should be added 
(39) 
to the l i s t because she could become formidable again. Now at 
Churchill's instance the p o s s i b i l i t y of war with Japan had to be discussed 
i n the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
The meeting took place on 5 January 1925. Chamberlain opened i t by 
stating that he regarded the prospect of war i n the Far East as very remote. 
Japan was restless; she had ambitions i n China; she was unhappy about the 
ending of the alliance with B r i t a i n and sore about the recent American 
l e g i s l a t i o n on immigration. But there was no danger of war unless fchowc 
were a p o l i t i c a l s h i f t i n Japan towards a purely eastern policy; and both 
of these trends would take a long time to mature. Chamberlain said that 
he would strongly deprecate anything that could be regarded as competitive 
naval building or anything that would make the Japanese more nervous. On 
the other hand he welcomed the decision to proceed with Singapore as a 
necessary l i n k i n imperial communications and as something of a guarantee 
for peace - which was never assured by leaving large t e r r i t o r i e s without 
defence, 
38. Memoranda by Wellesley, 1 Jan. 1925, F 26, 27/9/61, F0 371/10958. 
39. Note by Hankey, 20 Nov. 1924, annexed to C.I.D. 187th meeting, 
CAB 2/4. 
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Churchill said that the Services had a r i g h t to expect from the 
Government of the day a statement of the dangers against which they were 
to prepare; i t was then t h e i r duty to work out the best means of meeting 
those dangers, He regarded the present position as i n no way comparable 
to that which existed i n regard to Germany i n the years before 1914, 
There were now three great naval powers, but they were f a r apart and none 
had the means to meet either of the others i n i t s home central decisive 
theatre. The whole question of defence preparations ought to be considered 
i n an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t atmosphere from that prevailing before 1914„ 
He approved of Singapore as a l i n k i n imperial communications but not at 
a l l as a base from which to attack Japan, He was very anxious not to 
wound Japanese feelings, and he suggested that the development of Singapore 
might be followed by a reduction i n the m i l i t a r y status of Hong Kong, 
which was indefensible anyway. 
The F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, Bridgeman, did not disagree about 
the improbability of war with Japan, but he d i s l i k e d the proposition that 
i t was for the Government to decide when there was going to be another war 
and then f o r the Services to prepare f o r i t . Governments, he said, had 
not been very successful i n forecasting wars i n the past and i t was much 
better to approach the question from the point of view of insuring against 
reasonable r i s k s , Beatty welcomed Chamberlain's statement as giving a 
breathing space i n which to get out of an intolerable s i t u a t i o n of defence-
lessness i n the Far East, Unlike Churchill, he regarded the present naval 
s i t u a t i o n as much more d i f f i c u l t than that of 1914, 
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lord Cavan, rather welcomed 
the idea that the Cabinet should define the dangers which the s t a f f s were 
to examine, but said that the l a t t e r must be able to raise other questions, 
Hoare had l i t t l e to say from the a i r point of view. He favoured going on 
with Singapore but was doubtful about public opinion at home and abroad. 
Chamberlain then came back to the question of Japanese uneasiness and t o l d 
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the Committee about recent conversations i n which Baron Shidehara, the 
Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , had t o l d E l i o t that to ordinary Japanese 
i t seemed that B r i t a i n was combining with the United States against JapanG 
E l i o t had asked what, without giving up Singapore, B r i t a i n could do to counter 
t h i s impression, Shidehara suggested statements i n Parliament that the 
base was not directed against Japan and that the two countries were s t i l l 
friends, and perhaps some special f a c i l i t i e s with the Royal Navy for 
(4} 
Japanese o f f i c e r s 0 Chamberlain said that the Foreign Office recommended 
that the base should be developed without undue haste, that statements 
coupling Singapore with reflections on Japan should be avoided, that a 
statement should be made on the lines suggested by Shidehara, and that 
i t should be supplemented by a special message to the Japanese Government, 
Curzon agreed that Japanese public opinion ought to be considered, 
but he thought that the agitation was mainly a matter of domestic p o l i t i c s 
and he was therefore not inclined to take i t too seriously 0 He was also 
nervous of any suggestion of making a gesture such as dismantling Hong 
Kong, Gestures of t h i s kind never brought any benefit: no other country 
ever made them; those made by B r i t a i n were always interpreted as signs of 
weakness; and they were always regretted afterwards. Also weakening Hong 
Kong would weaken Britain's position i n China and hence i n the whole of 
the Far East. 
The Committee then decided to re-examine the proposed sites f o r the 
naval base at Singapore and to consider the programme of construction and 
(41) 
the defences of the base. On 2 March the Cabinet approved the f i r s t 
report of the subcommittee concerned, recommending expenditure of 
40, These conversations were reported i n Tokyo tel„ 311, 30 Dec, 1924, 
F 4441/123/61, FO 371/10299, and Tokyo desp, 6, 12 Jan, 1925, 
F 603/9/61, FO 371/10958, Bridgeman had already made a speech of 
the kind suggested; The Times, 17 Decc 1924„ 
41, C.I0D, 193rd meeting, CAB 2/4, 
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£787,000 over the next three years on preparations f o r the f l o a t i n g deck. 
Since no work had actually been done as yet, despite the decision i n 
p r i n c i p l e of 1921 i n favour of the base, t h i s was authority f o r s t a r t i n g 
construction„ At the same time Chamberlain set out i n despatches to E l i o t 
the Government's policy on Singapore and towards Japan0 I t was, he wrote, 
necessary that the f l e e t should be able to go to the East, and f o r t h i s 
purpose there must be a repair base there„ Singapore was at the centre of 
a vast area of B r i t i s h possessions and B r i t i s h trade, and i t was 2,300 miles 
from Japan, Chamberlain desired to continue close friendship and co«= 
operation with Japan, and the d i f f i c u l t y over Singapore was the more 
regrettable because i t was accidental 0 To the Japanese the decision to 
construct the base seemed to be connected with the end of the alliance; to 
the B r i t i s h i t was connected with the l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments. 
Chamberlain could not believe that Shidehara r e a l l y meant that friendship 
with Japan must mean the disarmament of B r i t i s h naval power from Suez 
eastwards, and he thought that what r e a l l y rankled with the Japanese might 
be the waning of a dream of hegemony i n the western Pacif i c , He hoped that 
the feeling would pass; he would do anything that he could to give expres-
(43) 
sion to a sense of special fr i e n d l i n e s s , 
Churchill's campaign against the naval building programme was, however, 
only just s t a r t i n g . As has been remarked, i t was strongly reminiscent of 
Lloyd George's attack on the naval estimates i n 1913, In a memorandum of 
29 January Churchill asserted again that there was no ground f o r anxiety 
42, C,P, 124(25), CAB 24/171; C 12(25), CAB 23/49, 
43, Desp, 88 to Tokyo, 27 Feb, 1925; desp, 96 to Tokyo, 5 Mar,, F 652, 
595/9/61, F0 371/10958, Baldwin spoke of "special bonds of an 
h i s t o r i c and valued friendship" between B r i t a i n and Japan i n the 
House of Commons on 23 February; Bridgeman, i n two speeches on the 
naval estimates on 19 and 23 March, spoke of Japan's valued 
friendship and stressed that Singapore was not a provocation or 
offence to any country: H.C, Deb,, 5th ser,, Vol, 180, c o l , 1590; 
Vol, 181, cols, 2525-9; Vol'.' '182, c o l , 136, 
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about Japan, The real problem f o r the Admiralty was to keep i n being 
a navy which over a long period of profound peace would, taken as a whole, 
not be i n f e r i o r to those of Japan or the United States, The present 
e f f o r t was being kept at a higher p i t c h than had been thought possible 
i n 1914; t h i s was both unreasonable and injurious to the main interests 
of the country, Bridgeman replied a week l a t e r that the f l e e t was weaker 
than i n 1914 and the programme was to cover a period of ten years. After 
a further reply by Churchill, maintaining that short of mortal p e r i l the 
most important consideration was economy, naval estimates were presented 
to Parliament on 9 March containing nothing f o r new construction: t h i s 
(44) 
was to be examined by another Cabinet committee. 
In order to provide the basis f o r i t s work the Committee of Imperial 
Defence again considered naval policy with especial reference to the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of war with Japan and the rate at which the Singapore base 
should be developed. The Foreign Office again advised that aggressive 
action by Japan such as might involve B r i t a i n i n war i n the Pacific was 
not seriously to be apprehended i n the next ten years. The problem of 
a regular review of the s i t u a t i o n was more d i f f i c u l t , Churchill proposed 
that i t should be made every three years, with the ten—year period being 
automatically renewed so that i t always dated from the last review,, 
Beatty wanted the position reviewed every year, and said that the Admiralty 
thought i t neither wise nor p o l i t i c to lay i t down d e f i n i t e l y now that 
there was no need to make, f o r the next ten years, preparations involving 
additional expenditure. The docking and f u e l f a c i l i t i e s , which had already 
been agreed, were a l l that the Admiralty were asking f o r now, but circum-
stances might arise i n which i t would become necessary to develop the base 
44 0 C,P, 39, 67, 71(25), CAB 24/171; R o s k i l l , Naval Policy, pp, 445-9, 
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more q u i c k l y 0 Chamberlain observed t h a t i n g i v i n g t h e i r a d v i c e the 
Fo r e i g n O f f i c e were t a k i n g a great r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . He wished to make 
i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the a d v i c e was confined to the q u e s t i o n of whether 
t h e r e was a danger of war i n the next t e n y e a r s : they were not s a y i n g 
t h a t t h e r e was no need to make i n the next t e n y e a r s any p r e p a r a t i o n s 
f o r war l a t e r 0 He hoped t h a t he would be a b l e to repeat the same a d v i c e 
i n t h r e e y e a r s ' time, but he might then have to say t h a t i t would be 
a d v i s a b l e to be ready f o r war a t the end of ten years„ 
F i n a l l y the Committee agreed to the f o l l o w i n g recommendations to 
the Cabinet: ( 1 ) The p o l i c y of l e a v i n g to the Admiralty the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r the n a v a l defence of the Empire on the b a s i s of the one«=power standard 
should not be r e v e r s e d o r modified. To meet t h i s standard i t was s u f f i c i e n t 
i f the f l e e t , wherever s i t u a t e d , were equal to the f l e e t of any other n a t i o n , 
wherever s i t u a t e d , provided t h a t arrangements were made f o r l o c a l f o r c e s 
to maintain the s i t u a t i o n a g a i n s t v i t a l damage u n t i l the main f l e e t 
a r r i v e d and to g i v e i t s u f f i c i e n t m o b i l i t y on a r r i v a l , ( 2 ) Aggressive 
a c t i o n by Japan a g a i n s t the B r i t i s h Empire i n t h e next t e n y e a r s was not 
s e r i o u s l y to be apprehended. The Forei g n O f f i c e should be r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r g i v i n g warning of any change i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i n the 
F a r E a s t which would make a f r e s h review n e c e s s a r y , ( 3 ) P r e l i m i n a r y 
arrangements to e s t a b l i s h docking f a c i l i t i e s a t Singapore f o r the l a r g e s t 
s h i p s and to develop g r a d u a l l y the ne c e s s a r y o i l f u e l i n s t a l l a t i o n s on the 
route to the e a s t should proceed, but t h e r e was no need to make p r e p a r a t i o n s 
i n v o l v i n g a d d i t i o n a l expenditure f o r p l a c i n g a t Singapore a B r i t i s h b a t t l e 
f l e e t s u p e r i o r or a t l e a s t equal to the Japanese sea-going navy. T h i s 
d e c i s i o n should be reviewed a u t o m a t i c a l l y each y e a r i n the l i g h t of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , and enquiry should be made as to the p r e p a r a t i o n s 
t h a t would be ne c e s s a r y i f i t had to be r e v e r s e d , ( 4 ) Meanwhile the 
Admiralty should c o n s i d e r what f a c i l i t i e s c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e should war 
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occur before Singapore was a b l e to s u s t a i n a b a t t l e f l e e t Q 
The Cabinet approved t h e s e recommendations on 6 M a y D ^ ^ Thus so 
f a r as the navy was concerned the ten=year r u l e , a t C h u r c h i l l ' s i n s i s t e n c e , 
was not only extended from i t s o r i g i n a l t e r m i n a l date of 1929 but was 
transformed i n t o a r o l l i n g r u l e under which i t would a t any time be 
neces s a r y to p r e d i c t war a t l e a s t t e n y e a r s ahead. The r u l e was maintained 
u n t i l March 1932, when the Shanghai i n c i d e n t had proved t h a t a c t i o n to 
defend B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n the F a r E a s t was i m p o s s i b l e without i n c u r r i n g 
a r i s k of war which the country could not f a c e e When the r u l e was 
abandoned, the d e p r e s s i o n and the approach of the Disarmament Conference 
together prevented any i n c r e a s e i n defence expenditure,, But although the 
f o r e c a s t of 1925 proved over o p t i m i s t i c , the e s t i m a t e of Japanese p o l i c y 
was not wrong f o r i t s d a t e D 
The Cabinet committee on the n a v a l programme, under Birkenhead, 
met from March to June 1925, most of the meetings being taken up by a d i n g -
dong argument between C h u r c h i l l and B e a t t y 0 T h e i r views could not be 
r e c o n c i l e d , so the committee's r e p o r t was signed only by the othe r members 0 
When i t was presented to the Cabinet Chamberlain was ag a i n asked whether 
he h e l d t h a t war w i t h Japan was u n l i k e l y i n the next t e n y e a r s . He r e p l i e d 
t h a t he did, but co u l d g i v e no guarantee, A f i n a l attempt by Baldwin to 
get C h u r c h i l l and the Admiralty to agree f a i l e d , and the Cabinet then 
accepted the committee's r e p o r t w i t h minor amendments,, The outcome was a 
b u i l d i n g programme f o r f i v e y e a r s , c o n s i s t i n g of seven c r u i s e r s , t h r e e 
f l o t i l l a s of d e s t r o y e r s , and eighteen submarines„ The appointment of a 
45, C„I,D, 198th meeting, 30 Mar, 1925; 199th meeting, 2 Apr*-, CAB 2/4j 
C,I,D, Paper 244~C, CAB 5/5; C,I,D, Paper 599<=B, CAB 4/12, 
46, C„ 2 4 ( 2 5 ) , CAB 23/50; C„I,D, Paper 246-C, CAB 5/5; C,I,D„ 200th 
meeting, CAB 2/4, 
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T r e a s u r y committee on economies i n the f i g h t i n g S e r v i c e s was announced 
(47 ) 
a t the same t i m e 0 
Disarmament and the b a s i s of defence p o l i c y , 1925»26 
^-J ' • • •» • ' •' • " ' • > -> * U » • •_» II I. . II- J l _ J • U..II t . - l l I I, - I I U I I • J » I | J J 
D i s c u s s i o n of the f u r t h e r l i m i t a t i o n of n a v a l armaments was resumed 
i n the w i n t e r of 1924=25„ I n November and December t h e r e was another 
p r e s s campaign i n the United S t a t e s , fomented by the navy lobby, i n which 
other s i g n a t o r i e s of the Washington t r e a t y were accused of not having 
c a r r i e d out i t s provisions„ Howard found Hughes r e l u c t a n t to deny the 
charges i n p u b l i c , but Coolidge d i d so s e m i ^ p u b l i c l y and B r i t i s h newspapers 
(48 ) 
reported t h a t the a g i t a t i o n was d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t Japan e 
S h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s Howard re p o r t e d t h a t Hughes was anxious to see n a v a l 
expenditure reduced and might c a l l f o r a new conference soon. One of the 
c h i e f d i f f i c u l t i e s was the present temper i n Japan D C e c i l v i s i t e d the 
United S t a t e s a t about the same time, and re p o r t e d s i m i l a r language from 
(49 ) 
Coolidge and Hughes; but Hughes a l s o foresaw d i f f i c u l t y w i t h F r a n c e 0 
Informal American e n q u i r i e s i n Tokyo r e v e a l e d a c e r t a i n s c e p t i c i s m on the 
Japanese p a r t as to whether views on s m a l l e r v e s s e l s had changed s i n c e the 
Washington Conference „ The B r i t i s h Government were ready to welcome 
a new conference i n the hope t h a t i t might l e a d to f u r t h e r economy, and 
on 18 February the Cabinet approved, s u b j e c t to Dominion concurrence, a 
(51) 
despatch to Howard i n s t r u c t i n g him so to inform Hughes 0 
47 e N„P 0(25), proceedings, CAB 27/273; r e p o r t , C P . 342, 357(25), CAB 24/ 
174; C 3 7 ( 2 5 ) , 15 Jul„; C 38( 2 5 ) , 16 J u l . ; C.39(25), 22 J u l , , 
CAB 23/50; H.C.Deb,,, 5th s e r 0 , V o l , 186, cols„ 2421=3; Cmd 2476 of 
1925, Navy 0^rogramme of New C o n s t r u c t i o n , See R o s k i l l , Naval P o l i c y 
pp. 450~3„ 
48„ Washington desp. 1749, 24 Nov, 1924, A 6781/435/45, FO 371/9619; 
The Times, 11 and 17 Dec. 1924 0 
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49„ Howard to Chamberlain, 22 Dec 0 1924 c A 77/49/45, FO 371/10636; 
C P . 1 4 ( 2 5 ) , CAB 24/171 0 
50. Tokyo t e l . 25, 3 Feb„ 1925, A 589/49/45, FO 371/10636 o 
51 D C.P. 87, 9 6 ( 2 5 ) , CAB 24/171; C. 9 ( 2 5 ) , CAB 23/49; A 895, 1023, 1189, 
1362/49/45, FO 3 7 l A 0 6 3 6 0 
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However by the time the Dominion r e p l i e s ( g e n e r a l l y welcoming the 
i d e a of a co n f e r e n c e ) were r e c e i v e d the steam appeared to have gone out 
of the p r o j e c t i n Washington and the French had r e v e a l e d d i s l i k e of it„ 
The United S t a t e s Ambassador, who was r e t u r n i n g to Washington to become 
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , remarked to Chamberlain t h a t he saw no prospect of 
s u c c e s s i n another conference: he was p a r t i c u l a r l y doubtful about the 
French a t t i t u d e , but Chamberlain was a t t h i s stage o p t i m i s t i c , , Chamberlain 
soon found th a t he had been mistaken, f o r when he met H e r r i o t i n P a r i s on 
16 March he l e a r n e d t h a t the French Government would f i n d the prospect 
(52 ) 
of another conference o u t s i d e the League of Nations very d i s t a s t e f u l . 
He wrote to Howard t h a t i n view of t h i s , and of the f a c t t h a t i t was now 
being s a i d i n Washington t h a t the P r e s i d e n t was not t h i n k i n g of a conference, 
i t was doubtful whether the despatch would be s e n t . I n c a s e , however, 
Kellogg r a i s e d the matter the Government's view was t h a t they would be 
ready to d i s c u s s the s i z e and armament of c r u i s e r s and d e s t r o y e r s , the 
armament of a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , and the number, s i z e and armament of sub«= 
marines; and they thought agreement p o s s i b l e . I f the Americans made an 
(53) 
approach the B r i t i s h r e p l y would c e r t a i n l y be f a v o u r a b l e , K e l l o g g was 
a l s o aware of the French alarm and found the I t a l i a n Government nervous too, 
so the whole q u e s t i o n was dropped. There were o c c a s i o n a l r e f e r e n c e s to i t 
i n Washington i n the summer and autumn of 1925, but i t then became swallowed 
up f o r the time being i n the p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r the League of Nations Prepa« 
(54) 
r a t o r y Commission on the Disarmament Conference. 
52. Desp. 268 to Washington, 17 Feb. 1925, A 885/49/45, FO 371/10636; 
memorandum by Chamberlain, 16 Mar., C 3921/459/18, FO 371/10729. 
53. Chamberlain to Howard, 18 Mar. 1925, A 1478/49/45, FO 371/10637; 
Chamberlain to Howard, 30 Mar., A 1462/49/45, FO 371/10636. 
54. Washington desp. 549, 2 Apr. 1925; Washington desp. 1252, 29 Jul„; 
Washington t e l . 278, 21 Oct.; Washington desp. 1836, 3 Dec., 
A 1920, 4067, 5284, 6292/49/45, FO 371/10637. 
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The e a r l y p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r the disarmament conference which was to 
have been h e l d under A r t i c l e 17 of the Geneva P r o t o c o l were dropped when 
i t became c l e a r t h a t the B r i t i s h Government were not l i k e l y to accept 
the P r o t o c o l . But the d e s i r e f o r general disarmament was by no means 
s t i f l e d , and i n the summer of 1925 i t was evident t h a t the q u e s t i o n would 
be r a i s e d again at the next meeting of the League Assembly,, Although 
Chamberlain agreed w i t h Briand's view t h a t disarmament should not be 
t r e a t e d independently of the q u e s t i o n of s e c u r i t y , the Cabinet decided 
to begin an enquiry i n t o the whole problem of the g e n e r a l l i m i t a t i o n of 
(55) 
armaments. The enquiry had not a c t u a l l y s t a r t e d before the S i x t h 
Assembly, on 25 September, adopted a r e s o l u t i o n a s k i n g the C o u n c i l to 
make a p r e l i m i n a r y study w i t h a view to a conference f o r the r e d u c t i o n 
and l i m i t a t i o n of armaments to be convened as soon as s a t i s f a c t o r y con°= 
d i t i o n s had been a s s u r e d from the point of view of g e n e r a l security,, The 
December meeting of the C o u n c i l adopted proposals f o r a Preparatory 
Commission to meet i n February 1926, and a l i s t of q u e s t i o n s to be s t u d i e d . 
The views of the S e r v i c e Departments - a l l somewhat s c e p t i c a l - were 
sent to the Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence i n October and e a r l y November, 
I t was then decided to s e t up a sub=committee under C e c i l to c o n s i d e r the 
approach to the C o u n c i l ' s q u e s t i o n s and l a t e r to draw up i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r 
( 57 ) 
the B r i t i s h members of the Preparatory Commission, The i n s t r u c t i o n s 
e v e n t u a l l y drawn up i n the s p r i n g of 1926 ( t h e f i r s t meeting of the Prepara 
t o r y Commission having been postponed u n t i l May) s e t out the a t t i t u d e of 
55. B r i a n d to Chamberlain, 13 J u l . 1925; Chamberlain to Briand, 24 J u l . , 
W 6867/9/98, FO 371/11066; C.P. 365(25), CAB 24/174; C. 4 1 ( 2 5 ) , 
29 J u l . , CAB 23/50. 
56. League of Nations, R e s o l u t i o n s adopted by the Assembly during i t s 
S i x t h S e s s i o n , Geneva" 192~&~ p.19; Monthly Summary, Dec. 1925',' pp." 
308-11; D.B.F.P., Ser, IA, Vol.1, Nos. 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 
135, 138, 139, 148. 
57. C.I.D. Papers 628-B, 634-B, 641-B, 644-B, 647-B, CAB 4/13; C.P. 
454(25), CAB 24/175; C. 52(25), CAB 23/51; C.I.D. 205th meeting, 
CAB 2/4. 
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the Government and d e s c r i b e d the s t a t e of B r i t i s h armaments. The navy 
had been reduced as a r e s u l t of the Washington t r e a t i e s ; f u r t h e r e f f o r t s 
to r e s t r i c t submarines were d e s i r a b l e ; but i n view of the l e n g t h and 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y of B r i t a i n ' s t r a d e routes i t was c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the 
B r i t i s h Empire must have s p e c i a l treatment w i t h regard to numbers of 
c r u i s e r s . The B r i t i s h army was n o t o r i o u s l y s m a l l both i n regard to i t s 
commitments and i n comparison w i t h those of many othe r c o u n t r i e s : i t 
d i d not seem capable of r e d u c t i o n . The a i r f o r c e had been reduced to 
almost nothing immediately a f t e r the war. I t was now being b u i l t up 
again w i t h the aim of r e a c h i n g c o m p a r a b i l i t y w i t h t h a t of the n e a r e s t 
neighbour by 1935 0 The Government would welcome any scheme which would 
g i v e e q u a l i t y w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , and were ready to c o n s i d e r s p e c i f i c 
agreements w i t h one or more European powers 0 On the questions to be 
d i s c u s s e d by the Preparatory Commission the Government thought t h a t 
d i f f e r e n t kinds of armament should be c o n s i d e r e d s e p a r a t e l y , t h a t armaments 
should be d e f i n e d as f o r c e s and m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e on the outbreak of war 
and no attempt should be made to l i m i t u l t i m a t e war s t r e n g t h , and t h a t 
(58 
permament or compulsory s u p e r v i s i o n was n e i t h e r p r a c t i c a b l e nor d e s i r a b l e . 
I n the summer of 1925 v a r i o u s s t u d i e s , o r i g i n a l l y s e t i n motion by the 
S a l i s b u r y Subcommittee i n the w i n t e r of 1923, l e d the C h i e f s of S t a f f and 
the Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence to some important c o n c l u s i o n s on defence 
and f o r e i g n p o l i c y a t the same time as the western s e c u r i t y pact was under 
d i s c u s s i o n . Examination of the problems of d i v e r t i n g s h i p p i n g from the 
Channel and the Mediterranean i n time of war showed t h a t d i v e r s i o n would 
a f f e c t the t r a d e and communications of the whole Empire and t h a t p r e p a r a t i o n s 
f o r i t would be c o s t l y . The C h i e f s of S t a f f concluded t h a t the n e c e s s i t y 
58, C.I.D, Paper 682-B, CAB 4/14; C,I,D, 212th meeting, CAB 2/4; 
C. 1 9 ( 2 6 ) , CAB 23/52, See D.B.F.P., S e r , IA, V o l , I I , No, 2, n,2„ 
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would only a r i s e i n case of war w i t h France, and t h i s was so u n l i k e l y 
to happen suddenly t h a t expenditure on p r e p a r a t i o n s would not be j u s t i f i e d 
(59) 
now. When the Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence d i s c u s s e d t h e i r paper 
on 22 June Chamberlain s a i d t h a t he agreed t h a t war w i t h France was 
i n c o n c e i v a b l e . I t was h i s c o n s i d e r e d o p i n i o n t h a t France would never 
r i s k war w i t h B r i t a i n , or a t any r a t e not u n t i l her population was as 
great as Germany's. France needed a s t r o n g f r i e n d on one s i d e or the 
other, and B r i t a i n was r e a l l y her sheet anchor notwithstanding her con° 
t i n e n t a l a l l i a n c e s . Hankey pointed out t h a t the shipping problem might 
a l s o a r i s e i n c a s e of war w i t h Germany, and t h a t i t would take about f i v e 
y e a r s to o r g a n i s e B r i t a i n ' s defences a g a i n s t e i t h e r France or Germany,, 
Chamberlain s a i d t h a t he thought t h a t the moral of the r e p o r t was t h a t 
any f u t u r e war should be kept as f a r from the Channel as possible,, There 
had been much i l l = i n f o r m e d c r i t i c i s m of t h e proposed s e c u r i t y p act, but 
i t was aimed at e n s u r i n g as f a r as p o s s i b l e t h a t d i s a s t e r d i d not o c c u r . 
The C h i e f s of S t a f f were then asked to prepare another paper s u i t a b l e f o r 
the Dominions, showing the importance to the Empire of keeping war away 
(60) 
from the Channel. 
T h i s second study took i n t o account the problem of a i r a t t a c k as 
w e l l as t h a t of s h i p p i n g . I n the event of war w i t h a n a t i o n occupying 
the c o n t i n e n t a l c o a s t s of the Channel, i t s t a t e d , B r i t a i n would be exposed 
to a t t a c k s on her s e a communications and to s e r i o u s danger from the a i r c 
I f France were the enemy, or an enemy power had c o n t r o l of France, s h i p p i n g 
might have to be d i v e r t e d from the Mediterranean as well„ The immediate 
e f f e c t s would be borne by the B r i t i s h people but the i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s would 
spread to every p a r t of the Empire. Provided t h a t the armed f o r c e s were 
59. C.I.D. Paper 610-B, CAB 4/13. 
60. C.I.D. 200th meeting, CAB 2/4 
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maintained a t proper s t r e n g t h , the C h i e f s of S t a f f had no doubt t h a t the 
n a t i o n would come through the o r d e a l s u c c e s s f u l l y , but the l o s s would be 
i n c a l c u l a b l e . Even i n the l a t e war the e f f e c t s of a i r a t t a c k on London 
had not been n e g l i g i b l e ; a f u t u r e a t t a c k by a power i n p o s s e s s i o n of 
the Channel c o a s t would c e r t a i n l y be very formidable. From the defence 
point of view, t h e r e f o r e , the C h i e f s of S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d t h a t f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y should be d i r e c t e d towards a v e r t i n g t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , i t was agreed 
t h a t the contingency of war w i t h France was remote: the danger might, 
however, a r i s e , 
" i f Germany ( e i t h e r w i t h or without the support of R u s s i a o r 
other n a t i o n s ) were to g a i n s u c c e s s e s commensurate w i t h those 
obtained a t the o u t s e t of the l a t e war, and, as a r e s u l t , occupy 
the c o a s t s of North France, Belgium or Holland 0 0 . 0 An advance 
which d i d not b r i n g Germany so f a r as the c o a s t l i n e would be 
l e s s dangerous s i n c e , i n t h a t event, whatever n a v a l menace 
Germany might a t t h a t time be able to e x e r t would not be ac c e n -
tua t e d and, so f a r as the a e r i a l menace i s concerned, the 
a t t a c k i n g a i r c r a f t would have to run the g a u n t l e t of our own and 
our a l l i e s ' a i r f o r c e and defences before approaching t h i s 
c o u n t r y 0 . . . 
From the point of view of defence, t h e r e f o r e , i t i s impor-
t a n t t h a t our f o r e i g n p o l i c y should provide, i n t e r a l i a , f i r s t , 
f o r c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h France and Belgium, and, second, t h a t 
war s h a l l be kept as f a r as p o s s i b l e from the E n g l i s h Channel, 
the S t r a i t s of Dover, and the southern shores of the North Sea. 
The above remarks a r e not d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y to the proposed 
Quadruple Pact, which, we a r e w e l l aware, i s based on c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n s of wider p o l i c y than those w i t h which we are d e a l i n g i n the 
present Memorandum,, I n so much, however, as the proposed Pact 
f u l f i l s t he requirements of a sound n a t i o n a l defence mentioned i n 
5^3 
the preceding paragraph, we welcome i t from th e point of view 
of defence p o l i c y . We do so, however, on the g e n e r a l under-
stan d i n g t h a t the c o n c l u s i o n of agreements of t h i s k i n d w i l l 
not be regarded as j u s t i f y i n g e i t h e r a r e d u c t i o n of our defence 
f o r c e s below the l e v e l e s s e n t i a l f o r the Empire's s e c u r i t y or 
the relinquishment of the continuous study of the problems of 
I m p e r i a l Defence," 
D e s p i t e the warning i n the l a s t sentence of t h i s paper the f i r s t 
r e s u l t f o r defence p o l i c y of the Locarno t r e a t i e s was a slowing down i n 
the expansion of the home defence a i r f o r c e . The A i r M i n i s t r y themselves 
suggested a r e e x a m i n a t i o n of the programme i n the l i g h t of the s e c u r i t y 
pact and of the work of the T r e a s u r y F i g h t i n g S e r v i c e s Economy Committee, 
A Cabinet committee under Birkenhead recommended t h a t completion of the 
programme could be postponed from 1928=9 to 1935-=6, and the Cabinet 
( 6 2 ) 
approved t h e p r o p o s a l . 
S t u d i e s of defence problems prepared i n May 1926 f o r the I m p e r i a l 
Conference due to be h e l d i n the autumn were a l l on matters of o r g a n i s a t i o n 
and co-operation r a t h e r than p o l i c y . The A i r S t a f f ' s paper simply gave 
the present s t r e n g t h of the R,A,F. and noted the postponement of t h e t a r g e t 
date f o r completing the programme f o r home defence. The Admiralty's paper 
expressed the i n t e n t i o n of a s k i n g the Dominions to c o n s i d e r what more they 
could do to b u i l d up t h e i r n a v a l f o r c e s . The General S t a f f i n v i t e d the 
Dominions to c o n s i d e r the maximum e f f o r t which they could make i n a major 
war. A f t e r noting t h a t the B r i t i s h Empire had never maintained i n peace-
time the land f o r c e s r e q u i r e d to meet a l l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , and t h a t the 
61, C.I.D. Paper 625-B, CAB 4/13; see a l s o C.I.D, Paper 135-A, CAB 3/4, 
on a i r r a i d p r e c a u t i o n s . The C.I.D, decided on 27 J u l y t h a t the 
paper should be sent to the Dominions; 202nd meeting, CAB 2/4, 
62, C„P. 421(25), 498(25), CAB 24/175; C, 5 2 ( 2 5 ) , 11 Nov,; C. 57(25), 
3 Dec., CAB 23/51; C,I.D. Paper 145=A, CAB 3/4. 
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s t r e n g t h of the e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e maintained i n B r i t a i n bore no 
r e l a t i o n to any commitment, the General S t a f f d e f i n e d the t h r e e most 
ffcu 
l i k e l y kinds of war as ( a ) one t h a t could be d e a l t w i t h by^expeditionary 
f o r c e alone; ( b ) one r e q u i r i n g i n a d d i t i o n p a r t or a l l of the T e r r i t o r i a l 
Army; and ( c ) a war of n a t i o n a l e f f o r t i n v o l v i n g the expansion of the 
T e r r i t o r i a l Army and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of c o n s c r i p t i o n . For c a s e ( a ) 
t h e r e now e x i s t e d a f i r s t contingent of one c a v a l r y and t h r e e i n f a n t r y 
d i v i s i o n s w i t h a p r o p o r t i o n of n o n - d i v i s i o n a l u n i t s capable of being 
m o b i l i s e d i n two weeks (compared w i t h one c a v a l r y and s i x i n f a n t r y 
d i v i s i o n s i n 1914), and a second contingent of two d i v i s i o n s a b l e to 
f o l l o w i n four months. Case (b) was more complex. I n the c a s e of Great 
B r i t a i n i t would be a number of months before more than the e x p e d i t i o n a r y 
f o r c e would be a v a i l a b l e . Some of the T e r r i t o r i a l Army might be s e n t 
overseas t h r e e to f o u r months a f t e r the outbreak of war, but a steady 
flow-of f u l l y equipped d i v i s i o n s could not be despatched before s i x months 
from the date of m o b i l i s a t i o n ; and i t would not be p o s s i b l e to m a i n t a i n 
a f o r c e of twenty d i v i s i o n s u n t i l much l a t e r . I n c a s e ( c ) c o n s c r i p t i o n 
would have to be introduced before the T e r r i t o r i a l Army were expanded. 
I n terms of manpower the g r e a t e s t e f f o r t t h a t B r i t a i n could make would 
produce a f o r c e of 136 d i v i s i o n s , which could not be i n the f i e l d u n t i l 
f i f t e e n months a f t e r the outbreak of war. The c o n c l u s i o n was t h a t any 
help t h a t the Dominions could g i v e would be the more v a l u a b l e i f i t were 
( 6 3 ) 
a v a i l a b l e e a r l y . 
A l s o i n the summer of 1926 the C h i e f s of S t a f f produced t h e i r f i r s t 
annual review of defence p o l i c y , an i n n o v a t i o n which they had proposed 
s i x months e a r l i e r . Among the papers prepared f o r t h e i r use was one 
63. C.I.D. Papers 264-C, 269-C, 270-C, CAB 5/6. 
64. C.I.D. Paper 640H3, CAB 4/13; C.I.D. 207th meeting, CAB 2/4. 
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by the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , which i s d i s c u s s e d i n the next chapter, and one 
by Hankey on the assumptions upon which defence p o l i c y was based, e x i s t i n g 
commitments, and the s t a t e of planning i n v a r i o u s f i e l d s . The assumptions 
were those a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d , namely t h a t war w i t h Japan w i t h i n the next 
t e n y e a r s was not s e r i o u s l y to be apprehended, and t h a t under p r e s e n t 
circumstances war w i t h France was i n c o n c e i v a b l e . The report of January 
1926 on a i r f o r c e expansion f o r home defence had s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was 
at p resent no reason to a n t i c i p a t e a war among the Great Powers of Europe. 
As regards the United S t a t e s i t had been t a c i t l y assumed t h a t war was so 
improbable t h a t no p r e p a r a t i o n s need be made. 
The C h i e f s of S t a f f began t h e i r survey by d i s c u s s i n g the problem of 
B r i t a i n ' s a b i l i t y to go to war. They pointed out t h a t none of the 
t r e a t i e s to which B r i t a i n was a party d e f i n e d her m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n s 
p r e c i s e l y . They d i d not c o n t e s t the view of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , t h a t 
the more the n a t i o n s of Europe became convinced of B r i t a i n ' s r e a d i n e s s 
to f u l f i l a guarantee the l e s s would be the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t she would be 
c a l l e d upon to do so. But t h e r e were l i m i t s to the a p p l i c a t i o n of such a 
p o l i c y . The s i z e of the f o r c e s maintained by Great B r i t a i n was governed 
by v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s p e c u l i a r to each S e r v i c e and was not a r r i v e d a t by 
any c a l c u l a t i o n of the requirements of f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; nor was i t p o s s i b l e 
t h a t i t ever should be so c a l c u l a t e d . Thus although the e x p e d i t i o n a r y 
f o r c e and a l i m i t e d number of R.A.F. squadrons c o n s t i t u t e d the only f o r c e 
a v a i l a b l e f o r immediate use i n Europe or o u t s i d e the Empire, they were so 
a v a i l a b l e only when the requirements of i m p e r i a l defence allowed. The 
S e r v i c e s could t h e r e f o r e only take note of European commitments: they 
could not make s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n to meet them a p a r t from adopting such 
measures of t r a i n i n g , o r g a n i s a t i o n and equipment as would enable them to 
65. C.I.D. Paper 700-B, CAB 4/14. 
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f i g h t on the co n t i n e n t i f r e q u i r e d , i t was most n e c e s s a r y to r e a l i s e 
t h a t the m i l i t a r y b a s i s on which f o r e i g n p o l i c y must u l t i m a t e l y r e l y f o r 
the f u l f i l m e n t of c o n t i n e n t a l commitments was the c a p a c i t y of Great 
B r i t a i n and e v e n t u a l l y ( i f they adhered to the Locarno t r e a t y ) of the 
natio n s of the Empire to m o b i l i s e a l l t h e i r r e s o u r c e s f o r war. The 
despatch of the s m a l l e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e could never be more than a 
pledge of B r i t a i n ' s r e a d i n e s s to f u l f i l her guarantees. The c a p a c i t y to 
f u l f i l them would depend on the completeness of the framework f o r m i l i t a r y 
expansion and the p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the i n d u s t r i a l m o b i l i s a t i o n needed to 
keep a n a t i o n a l army i n the f i e l d . 
The C h i e f s of S t a f f recommended, on nav a l p o l i c y , t h a t the one»power 
standards f o r c a p i t a l s h i p s and a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r tonnage l a i d down i n 
the Washington t r e a t y should be maintained, t h a t a l l o t h e r types of s h i p s 
should be maintained a t such s t r e n g t h as would ensure adequate s e c u r i t y 
f o r B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y and freedom and s e c u r i t y of see,passage to a l l p a r t s 
of the Empire; and t h a t Singapore should be p l a c e d a t the top of the l i s t 
of defence requirements. On m i l i t a r y p o l i c y , the C h i e f s of S t a f f pointed 
out t h a t the s i z e of the r e g u l a r army bore no r e l a t i o n to the s i z e of 
f o r e i g n armies but was con d i t i o n e d by the s i z e of the g a r r i s o n s maintained 
overs e a s , about h a l f the army being a t home and h a l f abroad, and the 
ex p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e being or g a n i s e d from the u n i t s a t home0 The problem 
of i m p e r i a l defence, they were happy to note, was immensely s i m p l i f i e d 
by the as s u r a n c e of a f r i e n d l y F r a n c e , T h i s made the Rhine i n f a c t Great 
B r i t a i n ' s s t r a t e g i c land f r o n t i e r : i t a l s o minimised the danger of a i r 
i n v a s i o n and secured the western Mediterranean, I t would t h e r e f o r e be 
p o s s i b l e to economise on home defence and con c e n t r a t e on the route to 
the e a s t . On a i r p o l i c y the C h i e f s of S t a f f recommended keeping up a 
programme not l e s s than the c u r r e n t one, but they thought t h a t p r o v i s i o n 
of anti=>aircraft defences could be postponed. 
I n order of urgency the C h i e f s of S t a f f recommended c o n c e n t r a t i n g 
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on Singapore f i r s t , then defence of the route to the e a s t and t h e t r a d e 
r o u t e s , defence of Hong Kong so f a r as was allowed by the Washington t r e a t y , 
and home defence. I n c o n c l u s i o n they drew "the e a r n e s t a t t e n t i o n of the 
Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n which has c o n s t a n t l y 
impressed i t s e l f on our minds i n the course of t h i s enquiry, namely, the 
s m a l l n e s s of our defence f o r c e s when compared w i t h the v a s t extent of our 
I m p e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and commitments,, We w i s h to p l a c e on r e c o r d 
our view t h a t the f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e f o r I m p e r i a l Defence a r e now reduced 
to a minimum and are b a r e l y capable of d e a l i n g w i t h the problems t h a t a r e 
l i a b l e to a r i s e e i t h e r s i n g l y or s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , " 
The Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence approved t h i s review subjec|*to a 
Cabinet d e c i s i o n on how f a r the country could a f f o r d to make p r o v i s i o n 
to meet i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , C h u r c h i l l was p a r t i c u l a r l y emphatic on 
t h i s point, s a y i n g t h a t although he had o r i g i n a l l y approved Singapore he 
had never meant i t to be a peg on which to hang f a r - r e a c h i n g schemes of 
a l a r m i s t p o l i c y , B a l f o u r s a i d t h a t he was c h i e f l y conscious of the problem 
whether to spend or husband the n a t i o n ' s r e s o u r c e s . Chamberlain s a i d t h a t 
from t h i s point of view he would put sea communication f i r s t , A week l a t e r 
the Cabinet approved the review as a g e n e r a l statement of defence p o l i c y , 
( 6 7 ) 
but without d i s c u s s i n g problems of c o s t . 
The I m p e r i a l Conference of 1926 l e f t defence matters much as before. 
D i s c u s s i o n s on o r g a n i s a t i o n and p r a c t i c a l co-operation took p l a c e i n the 
S e r v i c e Departments, At a meeting on 15 November the Dominion Prime 
M i n i s t e r s d e s c r i b e d t h e i r c o u n t r i e s ' present defence o r g a n i s a t i o n , Bruce 
of A u s t r a l i a s t r e s s e d the concern of a l l f o r i m p e r i a l defence, e s p e c i a l l y 
n a v a l defence s i n c e i t was doubtful whether any of the Dominions co u l d 
66, C,I„D, Paper 701-B, 22 Jun, 1926, CAB 4/15, 
67, CoIoD, 215th meeting, CAB 2/4; C, 4 9 ( 2 6 ) , 3 0 ^ u l , , CAB 23/53, 
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defend i t s e l f and t h e r e f o r e a l l had an i n t e r e s t i n s e e i n g t h a t the sea 
r o u t e s were kept open, B r i t a i n was p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s , but 
the Dominions should t r y to ensure t h a t the burden was shared a l i t t l e 
more e q u a l l y : e q u a l i t y of s t a t u s (as i t had j u s t been d e f i n e d i n 
B a l f o u r ' s famous formula) c a r r i e d w i t h i t , Bruce suggested, some respon-
s i b i l i t y f o r s h a r i n g the common burden. Both Bruce and Coates of New 
Zealand undertook to see what t h e i r c o u n t r i e s could c o n t r i b u t e to the 
( 6 8 ) 
c o s t of Singapore, The o t h e r Prime M i n i s t e r s made no o f f e r s . The 
conference r e a f f i r m e d the r e s o l u t i o n s on defence of 1923, expressed hopes 
f o r f u r t h e r measures f o r l i m i t a t i o n of armaments, and commended the 
progress made on c o - o p e r a t i o n , ^ 6 9 ^ Meagre though t h e s e r e s u l t s may seem, 
i t i s worth s t r e s s i n g t h a t a t the moment when the chimera of a common 
i m p e r i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y was a t l a s t being abandoned, c o - o r d i n a t i o n of 
defence was improving at the p r a c t i c a l l e v e l of t r a i n i n g and s t a f f i n t e r -
change, such as would make i t e a s i e r f o r the f o r c e s of the Commonwealth 
to f i g h t together should they ever again be c a l l e d upon to do so,^*"^ 
68, E. 9th, 9A, 9B, 9C, 12th meetings, CAB 32/46, Bruce quoted the 
f o l l o w i n g f i g u r e s of defence expenditure per c a p i t a to r e i n f o r c e 
h i s p o i n t ; Great B r i t a i n , 1924=5, ^ 8 s , 10d„; 1925=6, 51s, I d , 
Canada, 1924=5, 5s, 8d,; 1925=6, 5s, lOd, A u s t r a l i a , 1924-5, 
25s. 8d,; 1925=6, 27s, 2d. New Zealand, 1924-5, l i s . 5d„; 
1925=6, 12s, l i d . South A f r i c a , 1924-5, 2 s . 9d,; 1925-6, 2 s , 6d, 
The c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the c o s t of the Singapore base o r i g i n a l l y 
o f f e r e d by New Zealand and A u s t r a l i a had been d i v e r t e d to n a v a l 
v e s s e l s when the Labour Government announced t h e i r i n t e n t i o n of 
abandoning the base; New Zealand l a t e r c o n t r i b u t e d £1 m i l l i o n , 
69, Cmd 2768 of 1926, I m p e r i a l Conference, 1926, Summary of Proceedings, 
70, T h i s point i s made by D. C. Watt, " I m p e r i a l defence p o l i c y and 
i m p e r i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 1911=1939: a n e g l e c t e d paradox?" i n 
J o u r n a l of Commonwealth P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , I (1961=63), pp, 266-
81; r e p r i n t e d i n D, C, Watt, P e r s o n a l i t i e s and P o l i t i c s , London 
1965, pp. 139-58, 
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Chapter 8 
The Consequences of Locarno 
In a number of statements on B r i t i s h foreign policy made 
during 1926 Locarno was treated as, above a l l , a contribution 
to a new era i n Europe with the return of Germany to the 
comity of nations. Thus speaking to the Imperial Conference 
on 20 October 1926, j u s t over a year after the i n i t i a l l i n g 
of the t r e a t i e s , Chamberlain said; "The Locarno 
settlement i s at once the sign and the cause of a new 
s p i r i t i n Europe. We hope that i t marks the end, or the 
beginning of the end, of the fear and d i s t r u s t which found 
expression for so long i n a policy of threats and sanctions 
on one side and sullen resentment on the other." A 
supplementary memorandum circul a t e d to the Empire 
representatives stated that the p o l i c i e s of both France 
and Germany had taken a new directions no one i n either 
country believed i t possible to return to the old unhappy 
days, and few i n t h e i r hearts desired to do so. The 
effect of Locarno was spreading among the smaller powers 
of Europes a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s had become the fashion and 
i t was not f a n t a s t i c to hope that i n the next few years the 
present a l l i a n c e s might be replaced by mutual agreements 
for non-aggression uniting former enemies i n common pacts 
of guarantee. Locarno was i n large measure a B r i t i s h 
1. E. 118, CAB 32/47; E. 2nd and 3rd meetings, CAB 32/46; 
D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Appendix „ 
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achievement and was recognised as such by the other parties. 
As a r e s u l t B r i t i s h prestige and influence had been greatly 
enhanced: " B r i t i s h friendship i s captivated, B r i t i s h 
counsel asked, B r i t i s h aid sought, and as i n the days of 
Castlereagh, Great B r i t a i n stands forth again as the 
moderator and peacemaker of the new Europe created by the 
Great War." 
A rather different picture of the position of Great 
B r i t a i n was given i n a memorandum produced by the Foreign 
Office early i n A p r i l 1926 for the use of the Chiefs of 
Staff i n preparing t h e i r f i r s t annual review of defence 
policy. v 7 The differences of tone are attributable to 
the f a c t s , f i r s t that the paper was intended not for 
quasi-public-consumption but for~use i n "Whitehall, and second 
that i t was directed towards the question of B r i t i s h 
commitments. 
"Broadly speaking," the memorandum began, "the foreign 
policy of His Majesty's Government remains what i t has 
been for many years, i . e . , ( l ) to seek peace and ensue i t ; 
(2) to preserve the status quo and the balance of power; 
(3) to protect and develop B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n foreign 
countries." Unlike countries whose ultimate objective was 
to recover l o s t t e r r i t o r y or to expand, B r i t a i n had no 
2. E. 117, CAB 32/47. An e a r l i e r version, of which only 
the f i n a l paragraphs were substantially revised and 
brought up to date, i s printed i n D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, 
Vol. I , No. 1. 
3. See pp. sm-7. 
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t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions or des i r e f o r aggrandisement; 
"Our sole o b j e c t i s t o keep what we have and l i v e i n peace." 
The desire f o r peace was not p a r t i c u l a r l y a l t r u i s t i c : 
wars, qu a r r e l s and f r i c t i o n i n any p a r t of the world s p e l t 
l o s s t o B r i t i s h commercial and f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s - I n 
one sense disputes over the f r o n t i e r between Greece and 
Yugoslavia or over the ownership o f the Aland Islands 
concerned B r i t a i n no more than Spain or Argentina; but 
war i n the Balkans or the B a l t i c concerned B r i t a i n as much 
as Roumania or Norway. This was the reason why B r i t a i n 
intervened i n almost every d i s p u t e , and was one 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the maintenance of the armed f o r c e s which 
enabled her t o intervene w i t h a u t h o r i t y . Turning t o 
B r i t i s h commitments, the memorandum st a t e d the p r i n c i p l e s 
on which the Locarno settlement was based: (1) The 
arrangements were p u r e l y defensive and were supplementary 
t o the Covenant; (2) The arrangements were mutual i n 
character and d i d not c o n s t i t u t e an a l l i a n c e between some 
powers d i r e c t e d against others; (3) The B r i t i s h 
o b l i g a t i o n was l i m i t e d t o the maintenance of the e x i s t i n g 
t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements i n t h a t area w i t h which B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s were most c l o s e l y bound up, the f r o n t i e r between 
Germany and her western neighbours. No f r e s h o b l i g a t i o n s 
had been assumed elsewhere. I n conclusion of t h i s s e c t i o n 
Headlam-Morley's words o f Marsh 1923 were quoted? " I f 
any B r i t i s h Government, a f t e r f u l l and mature c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
f e e l themselves authorised t o become p a r t i e s t o a t r e a t y 
o f guarantee and t o make the maintenance of i t a permanent 
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p a r t of B r i t i s h p o l i c y ; i f t h i s i s p u b l i c l y proclaimed; 
i f i n presenting the estimates f o r naval and m i l i t a r y 
defence, the importance o f p r o v i d i n g f o r l i a b i l i t i e s under 
t h i s t r e a t y i s shown; then I b e l i e v e t h a t i n the long run 
the t r e a t y w i l l become e f f e c t i v e . " 
B r i t i s h commitments so f a r as Germany was concerned 
were determined by the Locarno t r e a t y and by the p r o v i s i o n s 
of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s regarding the occupation of 
the Rhineland. As regards the general p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , 
r e l a t i o n s a f t e r the war were governed by the f a c t of 
B r i t i s h membership of an a l l i a n c e , the r a i s o n d'etre of 
which had become the exaction from Germany of the execution 
of the peace t r e a t y . Up t o 1924 the p o s i t i o n as between 
the A l l i e s - and Germany, and as between the A l l i e s themselves 
was one of c o n t i n u a l s t r i f e . The p o l i c y of appeasement, 
begun i n 1924 w i t h the r e p a r a t i o n settlement, had 
culminated i n the Locarno conference. "Looked a t from one 
p o i n t of view, the Locarno t r e a t y may be regarded as the 
triumph of the B r i t i s h idea of compromise and c o n c i l i a t i o n 
over the c o n t i n e n t a l idea of compulsion. But i t was more 
than t h a t ; i t s g r e a t e s t s i g n i f i c a n c e was t h a t Germany 
was now brought i n t o the Concert of Europe as an equal 
w i t h the other Powers; the o l d war a l l i a n c e was broken, 
and the terms ' v i c t o r ' and 'vanquished' became t h i n g s of 
the past." 
4. See p. 3@a, See also p.SHS f o r the l i m i t a t i o n s on 
such a p o l i c y p o i n t e d out by the Chiefs of S t a f f . 
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The question f o r the f u t u r e was what use Germany 
would make of her new p o s i t i o n . The ephemeral questions 
of m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l , the Rhineland regime, e t c . , would 
c e r t a i n l y be solved w i t h no more than normal f r i c t i o n . 
Bigger questions were Danzig, Upper S i l e s i a , A u s t r i a , 
and general disarmament. On the f i r s t two, i t seemed 
c l e a r t h a t Germany would never r e s t u n t i l her grievances 
had been s a t i s f i e d . What would the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e be 
i f they arose i n an acute form? B r i t a i n was bound as a 
member of the League t o do her p a r t i n r e s i s t i n g any 
f o r c i b l e s o l u t i o n ; what she might do i n p r a c t i c e might 
w e l l be decided i n terms o f i n t e r e s t r a t h e r than of law. 
I t was h a r d l y p o s s i b l e t o f o r e c a s t now what l i n e would 
prove t o be i n B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t , but as a matter of 
h i s t o r y i t might be r e c a l l e d t h a t i n the past B r i t a i n had 
never taken up arms t o r e s i s t the dismemberment of Poland, 
even i n days when she was not c r i p p l e d by a c o l o s s a l war 
debt. 
The A u s t r i a n problem was a t present probably remote; 
but i f a c r i s i s arose over i t B r i t a i n would be a f f e c t e d 
as a si g n a t o r y o f the Treaty o f St-Germain and a member 
of the League. As f o r general disarmament, i t would 
c l e a r l y h o l d a foremost place i n the d i p l o m a t i c programme 
of any Germany Government. I f a d e f i n i t e attempt t o 
b r i n g about general disarmament f a i l e d , Germany might be 
tempted t o repudiate or evade her o b l i g a t i o n s under the 
Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . B r i t a i n would presumably regard as 
a t h r e a t any attempt t o rec r e a t e a Germany navy, and 
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could not acquiesce i n a v i o l e n t r e p u d i a t i o n of Germany's 
o b l i g a t i o n s on land armaments, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f the aim 
c l e a r l y were t o recover pre-war s t r e n g t h . The B r i t i s h 
a t t i t u d e t o a moderate or gradual increase i n the German 
army, on the other hand, would l a r g e l y depend on 
(*>) 
circumstances and e s p e c i a l l y on the a t t i t u d e of France. v ' 
I t i s not the i n t e n t i o n i n t h i s chapter t o t r a c e i n 
d e t a i l the n e g o t i a t i o n s of the year or eighteen months 
a f t e r Locarno on what the above memorandum described as 
the ephemeral questions regarding Germany's p o s i t i o n . 
Nor i s i t the i n t e n t i o n t o look f a r beyond 1926 and examine 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the longer term f o r the claims on the 
r e s u l t s of Locarno made by Chamberlain and the Foreign 
O f f i c e . The minor questions w i l l be considered as aspects 
of the immediate e f f e c t s of the Locarno settlement on the 
p o s i t i o n of Germany and her r e l a t i o n s w i t h the former 
A l l i e s . Germany's p o s i t i o n i n eastern Europe w i l l be 
discussed both i n t h i s connexion and as p a r t of the 
problem of the p o s i t i o n o f the Soviet Union. Further 
sections w i l l be devoted t o other aspects of the s e c u r i t y 
question, namely the p u r s u i t o f settlement i n other 
European t r o u b l e d areas and the general l i m i t a t i o n o f 
armaments. 
5. C.I.D. Paper 700-B, CAB 4/14; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, 
Vol. I , Appendix 0 
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Germany and the Western powers; disarmament and the 
Rhineland 
The Ambassadors' Conference note of 16 November 1925 
sta t e d t h a t agreement had been reached on the p o i n t s o f 
German disarmament s t i l l outstanding and t h a t the 
M i l i t a r y C o n trol Commission would be withdrawn as soon as 
i t had completed the tasks s t i l l remaining. The 
ac t u a l execution of the remaining p o i n t s was, however, 
delayed. I n the e a r l y months of 1926 the Germans were 
anxious t o see the Control Commission wound up, and they 
suggested a t the beginning of February t h a t i t should be 
withdrawn i n r e t u r n f o r the Reichstag's approval of the 
(7) 
a p p l i c a t i o n f o r membership of the League. w / This 
pressure, although not accompanied by the l e g i s l a t i o n 
necessary t o f u l f i l some of the remaining disarmament 
demands, was based on the assumption t h a t Germany would 
s h o r t l y be a member of the League Council and so would be 
i n a p o s i t i o n t o s t a t e her views about f u t u r e supervision. 
A f t e r some h e s i t a t i o n the German Government had addressed 
t o the Secretary-General on 12 January a l e t t e r saying 
t h a t they had c e r t a i n o b j e c t i o n s t o the scheme f o r League 
c o n t r o l approved by the Council i n 1924, t h a t they would 
wish t o discuss the matter, and t h a t they would make 
6. See pj?, 44<?ifii°S&&• 
7- D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 243, 250. The 
German p o s i t i o n i s described i n Salewski, 
Entwaffnung und M i l i t a r k o n t r o l l e , pp. 329-32. 
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proposals a t a l a t e r date. v ' The French Government 
were concerned l e s t t here might be a gap between the 
withdrawal of the Control Commission and the i n t r o d u c t i o n 
of the League scheme. "The Foreign O f f i c e were d o u b t f u l 
whether League i n v e s t i g a t i o n could ever be ap p l i e d 
e f f e c t i v e l y , but took the view t h a t t e c h n i c a l l y the 
e x i s t i n g scheme could be app l i e d so long as Germany had 
not entered the League and even t h e r e a f t e r so long as any 
mo d i f i c a t i o n s proposed by her had not been accepted. I n 
order t o meet the French an x i e t y about the d e m i l i t a r i s e d 
zone Chamberlain suggested t o Briand t h a t i n due course 
the Germans might be asked whether they would accept some 
permanent organ i n the Rhineland as p a r t of a l a r g e 
(9) 
agreement. K ' 
The p o s i t i o n about the Control Commission was changed 
by the f i a s c o i n March over Germany's en t r y i n t o the 
League. Now, although they could not say so, the Germans 
no longer desired the Commission's withdrawal before the 
autumn l e s t they be confronted w i t h the e x i s t i n g League 
scheme. There was i n f a c t l i t t l e prospect of e a r l y 
withdrawal since two questions i n p a r t i c u l a r , p o l i c e 
e f f e c t i v e s and the d e f i n i t i o n of war m a t e r i a l i n d r a f t 
l e g i s l a t i o n on import and export, were s t i l l not s e t t l e d 
8. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No.185; A.D.A.P., 
Vol. 1.1, Nos.13, 3^, 40. 
9. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos.174, 199, 201, n. 2, 
236, 24-7 o D'Abernon thought t h a t the Germans might 
accept i n r e t u r n f o r a r e d u c t i o n i n the p e r i o d of 
occupation. 
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i n the summer; and the p r e s e n t a t i o n t o the Reichstag 
of m i l i t a r y and naval estimates showing considerable 
increases i n expenditure d i d not help the atmosphere. 
However by the end o f J u l y a f r e s h e f f o r t t o speed up 
the remaining p o i n t s was being contemplated. On 17 August 
the Ambassadors' Conference sent Hoesch a note c a l l i n g 
f o r the e a r l y execution of the matters s t i l l delayed. 
The B r i t i s h refused t o agree t o the i n c l u s i o n i n the note 
o f a statement t h a t i f r e s u l t s were not obtained the 
Control Commission would remaini Lampson would have l i k e d 
t o i n f o r m the Ambassadors' Conference t h a t B r i t a i n was 
u n w i l l i n g t o continue c o n t r o l a f t e r September i n any 
case. W 
Once Germany entered the "League i n September and the 
Locarno t r e a t i e s came i n t o f o r c e , both the B r i t i s h and 
the Germans were anxious t o see the work of the Control 
Commission terminated by the end of the year. The 
remaining p o i n t s of d i f f i c u l t y were s t i l l the p o l i c e and 
the d e f i n i t i o n of war m a t e r i a l s , and also the c o n d i t i o n 
o f the German f o r t i f i c a t i o n s on the eastern f r o n t i e r and 
l e g i s l a t i o n f o r b i d d i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s by the 
n a t i o n a l i s t a ssociations. F i n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s began i n 
10. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos.322, 339, 365, 375, 
393, 395, 402, 419, 427, 440, 448; Vol. I I , N o s . l l , 
42, 76, 85; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1,1, Nos. 142, 170, 182, 
184, 192, 198. 
11. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.115, 120, 121, 124, 
127, 130, 139, 178; minute by Lampson, 5 Aug, 1926, 
C 8689/436/18, FO 371/11289. 
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Paris and B e r l i n on 20 November, but settlement had not 
been reached by the time t h a t Chamberlain, Briand, 
Vandarvelde, S c i a l o j a and Stresemann met at Geneva on 
6 Decembero A f t e r seeing Briand on h i s way through P a r i s , 
Chamberlain was hopeful of agreement; and from h i s f i r s t 
conversation w i t h Stresemann he concluded t h a t they would 
be "very clumsy" i f they could not arrange f o r the e a r l y 
withdrawal of c o n t r o l and the e n t r y i n t o f o r c e of the 
(1? ) 
League scheme of supervision as i t had been approved. ^ ' 
While the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Paris continued t o w r e s t l e 
w i t h the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and war m a t e r i a l , the M i n i s t e r s 
at Geneva discussed League c o n t r o l and supervision i n 
the d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone. C e r t a i n German doubts about the 
League scheme were discussed, but no one showed any wish 
t o examine i t de novos Stresemann now p r e f e r r e d t o avoid 
discussion, b e l i e v i n g t h a t time would work i n Germany's 
favour on i t . v ^ 1 
On supervision i n the Rhineland Briand admitted t h a t 
A r t i c l e 213 o f the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s d i d not provide 
•r 
f o r permanent or s p e c i a l organs,-but he suggested t h a t 
German agreement t o a sp e c i a l form o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n might 
f a c i l i t a t e the e a r l i e r end of the occupation. He stressed 
t h a t a l l t h a t he wanted was an unobtrusive o r g a n i s a t i o n 
which could observe any i n f r a c t i o n of the d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n 
12. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.318, 326; A.D.A.P., 
Vol. 1.2, Nos.235, 236. 
13. Op. c i t . , No.198. 
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and communicate the f a c t s q u i c k l y . But something of the 
k i n d was needed t o calm the a n x i e t i e s f e l t i n France about 
the Rhineland. Chamberlain suggested t h a t since, a f t e r 
Locarno, there were now o b l i g a t i o n s on both sides any 
organ set up should have the task of watching the French 
and the Belgians as w e l l . Stresemann d i d not commit hi m s e l f , 
and l e f t i t t o Schubert t o r a i s e o b j e c t i o n s i n conversation 
(14) 
w i t h Chamberlain. v ' A f t e r f u r t h e r d iscussion on the 
disarmament questions i t was agreed t h a t the Control 
Commission would be withdrawn on 31 January 1927, l e a v i n g 
experts i n B e r l i n t o see t o the execution o f c e r t a i n 
p o i n t s . The League scheme would then come i n t o f o r c e , and 
i f by t h a t date the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and war m a t e r i a l 
questions had not been s e t t l e d by n e g o t i a t i o n they would 
(15) 
be r e f e r r e d t o the Council o f the League. v ' 
Agreement on the d e f i n i t i o n of war m a t e r i a l was reached 
q u i t e q u i c k l y when n e g o t i a t i o n s s t a r t e d again i n January, 
but on the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s not u n t i l the l a s t minute. The 
f i n a l stages were not hel d up by the r e v e l a t i o n s about 
Soviet-German m i l i t a r y c o l l a b o r a t i o n , made i n the Manchester 
Guardian and taken up by the So c i a l Democratic press i n 
Germany. These r e v e l a t i o n s seem t o have caused no s t i r 
i n B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l quarters. A c e r t a i n amount had 
14. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No.333; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, 
Nos.233, 234, 237, 240, 242, 244. 
15- D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.352, 353, 354, 355; 
A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, Nos.251, 254, 257, 258, 260, 261; 
Salewski, Entwaffnung und M i l i t a r k o n t r o l l e , pp.358-65. 
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p r e v i o u s l y been known about the c o l l a b o r a t i o n ; i t appears 
to have been regarded as now a t h i n g of the past; and the 
c o n v i c t i o n p r e v a i l e d t h a t i n any case i t was not po s s i b l e 
t o keep Germany permanently subject t o c o n t r o l . The 
M i l i t a r y Control Commission was now withdrawn from B e r l i n , 
l e a v i n g behind a small number of experts. There seems t o 
have been no f u r t h e r d iscussion of a s p e c i a l organ of 
super v i s i o n i n the Rhineland u n t i l the autumn of 1928. 
Another aspect of German disarmament t h a t took some 
months of n e g o t i a t i o n t o wind up was the c o n t r o l of 
a v i a t i o n . The Aeronautical Control Commission had been 
withdrawn from Germany as e a r l y as May 1922 and replaced 
by a Committee of Guarantee and a set of r e g u l a t i o n s known 
as-the "nine r u l e s " . The- p l a n f o r the Committee of 
Guarantee provided t h a t i t should be reconsidered by the 
A l l i e d Governments when the Cologne zone was evacuated. 
At the end of November 1925 the German Government proposed 
t h a t the Committee and the nine r u l e s should be abolished, 
and t h a t i n s t e a d they should p r o h i b i t by l e g i s l a t i o n the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t and a l l form of l i a i s o n 
between c i v i l a v i a t i o n and the m i l i t a r y or naval 
(17) 
a u t h o r i t i e s . v ' Negotiations began i n Paris i n December. 
16. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.334, 415; Vol. I l l , 
Nos.20, 24; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, Nos.158, 270. The 
f i n a l stages are discussed i n d e t a i l by John P. Fox, 
" B r i t a i n and the I n t e r - A l l i e d M i l i t a r y Commission o f 
Con t r o l , 1925-26", i n Journal of Contemporary H i s t o r y , 
IV (1969), No.2, pp.143-64. 
17. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos.125, 126, 136, 140, 144, 
145, 149. 
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The A l l i e s agreed t o abandon a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on German 
c i v i l a v i a t i o n but i n s i s t e d on l e g i s l a t i o n t o prevent or 
l i m i t , as f a r as po s s i b l e , the development of high-powered 
a i r c r a f t u n s u i t a b l e f o r commerical purposes and f l y i n g 
t r a i n i n g f o r m i l i t a r y or naval personnel. 
The Reichswehr were extremely l o a t h t o accept any 
l i m i t a t i o n on personnel l e a r n i n g t o f l y , but e v e n t u a l l y 
gave way i n order t o secure the advantages f o r c i v i l 
a v i a t i o n . An agreement was f i n a l l y signed on 22 May 1926. 
Among other t h i n g s the German Government undertook t o 
p r o h i b i t the c o n s t r u c t i o n or import of m i l i t a r y - t y p e 
a i r c r a f t and g l i d e r s , and a l l m i l i t a r y f l y i n g i n s t r u c t i o n . 
The number of army and naval personnel allowed t o f l y 
( a p a r t from 36 who already h e l d l i c e n s e s ) would be allowed 
t o r i s e by stages t o 36 at the beginning of 1932. The 
r e q u i s i t e ordinances were issued i n J u l y and the Committee 
(18) 
of Guarantee was abolished on 1 September 1926. v ' The 
A i r M i n i s t r y were s a t i s f i e d t h a t under t h i s agreement 
Germany was not and could not become an a i r menace t o 
France and B r i t a i n : only, they s a i d , i f she were again 
allowed a m i l i t a r y a i r f o r c e would the p o s i t i o n be d i f f e r e n t . 
18. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos.152-500, passim; Vol. 
I I , Nos.2 9, 34, 65, 89, 152; CP. 269(26;, CAB 
24/180; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, Nos.25-220, passim. The 
agreement i s p r i n t e d i n League of Nations Treaty 
Series, Vol. L X V I I I , pp.332-74. 
19. Hoare t o C e c i l , 14 Dec. 1926; C e c i l t o Hoare, 17 Dec; 
Hoare t o C e c i l , 23 Dec, C e c i l Papers, BM Add. MS 
51083. 
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Although the p o s s i b i l i t y of shortening the p e r i o d of 
the occupation o f the Rhineland was mentioned from time 
t o time d u r i n g the nine months between the signature of 
the t r e a t i e s and Germany's e n t r y i n t o the League, the 
main problem about the occupation was a r e d u c t i o n i n the 
numbers of A l l i e d troops a f t e r the evacuation of the 
Cologne zone. The A l l i e s had undertaken a t Locarno and 
i n London t h a t the number i n the second and t h i r d zones 
would not be increased, and the note from the Ambassadors' 
Conference of 14 November had r e f e r r e d t o " c h i f f r e s normaux". 
The Germans pressed c o n t i n u a l l y f o r s u b s t a n t i a l r eductions 
and contended t h a t " c h i f f r e s normaux" meant the number of 
German troops garrisoned i n the same area before 1914. 
The -French-military a u t h o r i t i e s were re s i s t a n t ~ ~ t o change 
and Briand found i t very d i f f i c u l t t o overcome t h e i r 
o b j e c t i o n s . A f t e r the evacuation of the Cologne zone the 
B r i t i s h contingent was so small t h a t f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n 
would have made i t l i t t l e more than a token body. I n 
a d d i t i o n there were from time t o time d i f f i c u l t i e s between 
the occupation a u t h o r i t i e s and the Germans, mainly the 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
Part o f the t r o u b l e over the t r o o p reductions was of 
the German Government's own making, i n t h a t they had 
allowed and even encouraged exaggerated expectations as 
p a r t of the campaign f o r the acceptance of the Locarno 
t r e a t i e s ; and d u r i n g January 1926 they t r i e d t o make 
20. See gp. k^i. 
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reductions a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r applying t o j o i n the League. 
Representations were made i n Paris and London, and i t was 
said t h a t the Government might have t o r e s i g n i f they 
could not get a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n before the Reichstag 
Foreign A f f a i r s Committee voted on the a p p l i c a t i o n t o 
enter the League. Although there was some f e e l i n g i n the 
Foreign O f f i c e t h a t i f Stresemann were i n t r u t h so 
i s o l a t e d i n h i s support f o r Locarno i t would be b e t t e r 
not t o continue the pretence t h a t the t r e a t y would be 
c a r r i e d out i n the s p i r i t i n which i t was conceived, the 
German complaint was regarded as j u s t i f i e d since 
according t o the War O f f i c e the number of troops i n the 
second and t h i r d zones had a c t u a l l y increased. The French 
agreed t h a t Stresemann could s t a t e i n the Reichstag t h a t 
the occupying powers were examining the p o s i t i o n w i t h a 
view t o reducing the troops t o the lowest p o s s i b l e number 
(21) 
as soon as the Locarno t r e a t i e s came i n t o f o r c e . v ' 
On 3 February the Reichstag Foreign A f f a i r s Committee 
voted i n favour of Germany e n t e r i n g the League, and f o u r 
days l a t e r the d e c i s i o n was approved by re p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
of the Lander. Stresemann made onefurther e f f o r t t o get 
2 1 • D'B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos.183, 189, 191, 192, 196, 
202, 206, 207, 214, 216, 217, 223; memorandum by 
Lampson, 15 Jan. 1926. C 566/446/18, FO 371/11297; 
A.D.A.P., V o l . I . l , Nos.35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 43, 
46, 48, 59, nn. 1-2, 60, 61, 62; Stresemann, 
Vermgchtnis, Vol. I I , pp.432-4. 
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an undertaking t h a t the troops would be reduced t o a 
s p e c i f i e d number; he was perhaps prompted t o do so by-
complaints from Hindenburg t h a t the Government had not 
obtained more concessions. Briand, although f a r from 
pleased at t h i s new approach, repeated h i s assurance t h a t 
he would do h i s best; and on 8 February the German 
(22) 
a p p l i c a t i o n was duly despatched t o Geneva. v ' 
Meanwhile Chamberlain had enquired of D'Abernon what was 
meant by a passage i n Stresemann's speech of 28 January 
i n which he was reported (not q u i t e a c c u r a t e l y ) as having 
said t h a t Germany had not surrendered a f o o t of t e r r i t o r y 
a t Locarno. He also sent D'Abernon two long telegrams and 
a l e t t e r of complainlfabout the German a t t i t u d e . Without 
w a i t i n g , he said, f o r Germany t o complete the disarmament 
requirements the A l l i e s had evacuated the Cologne zone, 
had made f u r t h e r concessions on the d i f f i c u l t disarmament 
p o i n t s , had welcomed the German proposals on a i r c o n t r o l , 
and had fundamentally a l t e r e d the occupation regime. The 
German Government had made h a r d l y any attempt t o meet the 
Western powers' desires and showed no sig n of having t r i e d 
t o check the abuse w i t h which every endeavour t o act up t o 
the Locarno s p i r i t had been met. The weak p o s i t i o n of the 
German Government was appreciated, but i t was impossible 
t o avoid the conclusion t h a t the weakness was being 
d e l i b e r a t e l y used t o e x t o r t more concessions. B r i t i s h 
22. A.D.A,P», Vol. I l l , Nos.76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 
88; /'DTB.F.P. , Ser. IA, Vol. I , No.248. 
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p o l i c y was unchanged, but Briand's p o s i t i o n was weak and 
Locarno r e q u i r e d r e c i p r o c i t y ; the Germans must perform 
t h e i r share of the bargain and not leave Briand and 
Chamberlain hi m s e l f exposed t o the charge t h a t they were 
being duped i n t o making a l l the concessions piecemeal 
(23) 
w h i l e the German Government d i d nothing. v ' 
Chamberlain spoke t o Sthamer on the same l i n e s on 4 
February. To D'Abernon Schubert and Stresemann both 
r e j e c t e d Chamberlain's complaints and asked him t o r e p o r t 
t h a t the German Government were imbued w i t h the s p i r i t of 
Locarno, appreciated Briand's p o s i t i o n , and were doing 
(24) 
more than met the eye. v ' 
A f t e r the f a i l u r e over Germany's en t r y i n t o the League 
i n March D'Abernon recommended pushing on w i t h troop 
r e d u c t i o n s , as w e l l as the settlement of disarmament and 
the a i r n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n order t o strengthen the p o s i t i o n 
o f the German Government; and Chamberlain i n s t r u c t e d 
(25) 
Crewe t o take the matter up w i t h Briand. v ' At almost 
the same moment, the l a s t week of March, Stresemann 
consulted Hoesch about an approach t o Briand about a whole 
complex of questions. Hoesch regarded the moment as not un-
s u i t a b l e , since although Briand's Government were i n 
23° D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos.229, 231, 232, 236, 241. 
Kilmarnock suggested on 3 February t h a t i n f u t u r e i t 
might be necessary t o make concessions depend on the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of Western needs. 
2 Z f - OPo c i t . . Nos.242, 245, 248; A.D.A.P. , Vol. 1 . 1 , 
Nos. 73 , 74, 75 , 76, 82 , 97. 
25. D.B.F.P.. Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos.378, 386. 
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d i f f i c u l t i e s these had no t h i n g t o do w i t h f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; 
but he recommended l e a v i n g the question of the Control 
Commission alone f o r the time being, because disarmament 
was not concluded and i t was not d e s i r a b l e t h a t c o n t r o l 
should be withdrawn at once. ^ ' Briand assured both 
Crewe and Hoesch t h a t troop reductions were i n progress, 
and he impressed Hoesch w i t h h i s c o n v i c t i o n of the 
(27) 
necessity of Franco-German co-operation. v ' 
The news of the German-Sovietg t r e a t y , however, made 
f u r t h e r demarches inopportune f o r the time being, and on 
23 A p r i l Chamberlain i n s t r u c t e d D'Abernon t o speak 
s e r i o u s l y t o Stresemann about c o n d i t i o n s i n the occupied 
t e r r i t o r y , on which Kilmarnock re p o r t e d t h a t the a t t i t u d e 
of the German a u t h o r i t i e s had not changed i n any way since 
Locarno. I n a l e t t e r t o D'Abernon a t the same time 
Chamberlain wrote t h a t the German a u t h o r i t i e s seemed 
incapable o f r e a l i s i n g what was needed f o r the execution 
of Stresemann's great idea. "They have no c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
f o r the f e e l i n g of the other nations engaged, no regard 
f o r the p u b l i c o p i n i o n which other Governments have t o 
co n s u l t , and, apparently, no g r a t i t u d e or even a p p r e c i a t i o n 
of what fby great personal e f f o r t , has already been secured 
f o r them'J ^ 2 8^ 
26. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, Nos.182, 184. The French 
Government were i n d i f f i c u l t i e s over the f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n . 
27. Op.cit., No.188; D.JB.EVP. , Ser. IA, Vol. I , No.395-
2 8 - OP- c i t . , No.432, 455, 469; Chamberlain t o D'Abernon, 
23 Apr. 1926, C 4703/481/18, FO 371/11301. On 27 
A p r i l D'Abernon was i n s t r u c t e d t o make rep r e s e n t a t i o n s 
on another despatch from Kilmarnock. 
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Stresemann and the Re i c h Commissioner i n the 
Rhineland admitted t h a t the atmosphere i n the occupied 
t e r r i t o r y was bad, but contended t h a t i t was the f a u l t 
of the occupying powers f o r not c a r r y i n g out t h e i r 
promises. The problem, as before, seemed to be the French 
(29) 
m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s . v ' But Chamberlain made another 
attempt to p r e s s Briand and r a i s e d w ith Crewe the question 
of the f u t u r e of the occupation. The Labour M.P. Arthur 
Ponsonby had asked i n the House of Commons about the 
d e c l a r a t i o n by Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau of 16 
June 1919> t h a t i f before the end of the occupation p e r i o d 
Germany gave proofs of good w i l l and s a t i s f a c t o r y 
guarantees to assure the f u l f i l m e n t of her o b l i g a t i o n s the 
A l l i e s would be ready to agree among themselves f o r the 
e a r l i e r t e r m i n a t i o n of the occupation. (30) chamberlain 
wrote t h a t u n t i l Germany was i n the League and the Locarno 
t r e a t i e s came i n t o f o r c e there could be no question of 
hastening the end of the occupation. But when the t r e a t i e s 
were i n f o r c e the occupation would become an i n c r e a s i n g l y 
obvious anomaly, w i t h which great p l a y would probably be 
made i n B r i t a i n . He was anxious to take the i n i t i a t i v e 
2 9 - D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos.456, 484; A.D.A.P., 
Vol. 1.1, Nos.204, 206, 207. 
30. See H.C. Deb., 5th s e r . , Vol. 194, c o l s . 1186-8. The 
d e c l a r a t i o n was published i n Cmd 240 of 1919 > 
D e c l a r a t i o n by the Governments of the United S t a t e s , 
Great B r i t a i n and France i n regard to the occupation 
of the Rhine Provinces. 
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c a u t i o u s l y before t h i s happened, and to cause the d o c t r i n e 
to i n f i l t r a t e as o c c a s i o n o f f e r e d . Meanwhile the number 
of troops must be reduced, s i n c e a solemn undertaking had 
(31) 
been given. v ' 
Chamberlain thought t h a t Briand and B e r t h e l o t favoured 
shortening the occupation, and t h i s seems to have been the 
case provided t h a t the Germans made s u i t a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 
A f t e r the German attempt to r a i s e the matter a t the end 
of November 1925 had been r e p e l l e d , the e a r l i e s t mentions 
of i t came from the French s i d e , g e n e r a l l y connected w i t h 
the i d e a of m o b i l i s i n g p a r t of the German r e p a r a t i o n 
o b l i g a t i o n s . The l a t t e r i d e a seems to have o r i g i n a t e d 
w i t h D e l a c r o i x , the former B e l g i a n Prime M i n i s t e r who was 
now B e l g i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on the Reparation Commission 
and a t r u s t e e of the German r a i l w a y bonds. There was some 
d i s c u s s i o n of the matter about the t u r n of the year, but 
the f i n a n c i a l experts were g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t the time 
had not y e t come f o r t r y i n g to pay o f f any of the c a p i t a l 
(32) 
r e p a r a t i o n debt. w ' 
Crewe mentioned both the r e d u c t i o n of troops and the 
shortening of the occupation to Briand on 6 May, and 
r e c e i v e d the r e p l y t h a t once Germany was i n the League 
the matter of the occupation was bound to come up, but i t 
31. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 438, 468, 487. 
32. Op. c i t . , No.l88j L e i t h Ross ( T r e a s u r y ) to Lampson, 
7 Jan. 1926; Niemeyer ( T r e a s u r y ) to T y r e l l , 3 Feb., 
C 263, 1429/10/18, FO 371/11250; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, 
Nos.8, 11, 15, 16, 24, 33, 67, 110, 116. 
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could not be d e a l t w i t h u n t i l then. ^ J J i However a 
f o r t n i g h t l a t e r B e r t h e l o t , i n con v e r s a t i o n w i t h Hoesch, 
mentioned the occupation and the m o b i l i s a t i o n of 
r e p a r a t i o n o b l i g a t i o n s as t o p i c s f o r a con v e r s a t i o n w i t h 
Stresemann, which Briand had been hoping to arrange f o r 
Whitsun but which had to be postponed on account of the 
f 54) 
French p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . w ' A r e c e n t i n c i d e n t i n 
the Rhineland, which caused great offence to the French, 
appeared to show d e l i b e r a t e unhelpfulness on the p a r t of 
the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . D i s c u s s i n g i t wi t h Briand, Hoesch 
s a i d t h a t the best way of improving the s i t u a t i o n was f o r 
the A l l i e s to keep t h e i r promises of troop r e d u c t i o n s . 
Briand answered t h a t he was b a t t l i n g f o r i t , and he again 
assured Hoeseh t h a t he was convinced t h a t the h e a l t h of 
Europe depended on Franco-German understanding. 
On 26 June Stresemann s e t out to the Foreign A f f a i r s 
Committee of the Re i c h s t a g h i s i n t e n t i o n of invoking 
A r t i c l e 431 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s to r a i s e the 
question of ending the occupation once Germany was i n the 
League Counci l and the Control Commission had been 
withdrawn. He s a i d t h a t he d i d not intend to r a i s e the 
question of r e v i s i n g the Dawes Plan, but s t a t e d t h a t 
33. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No.505-
34. A.D.A.P., Vol. I . l , No.225. 
35o Op. c i t . , Nos.226, 228, 229; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, 
Vol. I I , Nos .3 , 13, 22, 26. 
570 
Germany would be w i l l i n g to a n t i c i p a t e d payments of the 
a n n u i t i e s i n order to achieve the end of the occupation. 
Stresemann s a i d t h a t when the Control Commission l e f t the 
question of disarmament would be wound up, and he was 
sure t h a t no one was going to r e v i v e the question of war 
c r i m i n a l s . Therefore the o b l i g a t i o n s r e f e r r e d to i n 
A r t i c l e 431 could i n p r a c t i c e only be r e p a r a t i o n s , and he 
contended t h a t the requirement was not t h a t Germany should 
have completed payment but only t h a t she should have 
ensured payment of the annuity f o r the c u r r e n t year. (36) 
The Foreign O f f i c e l e g a l a d v i e r s d i d not t h i n k t h a t 
t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A r t i c l e 431 was c o r r e c t . They 
h e l d t h a t the wording of A r t i c l e 429 ( " I f the c o n d i t i o n s 
of the present Treaty are f a i t h f u l l y c a r r i e d " out...") 
di d mean t h a t Germany need only be up to date w i t h her 
o b l i g a t i o n s f o r the f i r s t and second zones to be evacuated 
a t the end of f i v e and ten y e a r s r e s p e c t i v e l y , but t h a t 
by c o n t r a s t A r t i c l e 431 meant t h a t Germany must have 
completely f u l f i l l e d her o b l i g a t i o n s i f the occupation were 
to end before the e x p i r y of f i f t e e n y e a r s . Presumably 
the d r a f t e r s of the a r t i c l e had had i n mind the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t Germany might be able to pay o f f 
r e p a r a t i o n s i n a l a r g e lump sum as France had done w i t h 
36. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No.93- A r e p o r t of the 
speech reached the Foreign O f f i c e i n the middle of 
J u l y . A r t i c l e 431 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s read: 
" I f before the e x p i r a t i o n of f i f t e e n y e a r s Germany 
complies w i t h a l l the undertakings r e s u l t i n g from the 
present Treaty, the occupying f o r c e s w i l l be withdrawn 
immediately." 
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her indemnity a f t e r 1871 • Germany was not e n t i t l e d to 
r e l y on the d e c l a r a t i o n of 16 June 1919 - Stresemann 
indeed d i d not propose to do so - but i t was binding as 
between B r i t a i n and France. The question of p o l i c y was 
another matter. T h i s , according to Chamberlain, demanded 
t h a t "we should use every e f f o r t f i r s t to d i m i n i s h the 
number of troops, secondly to shorten the period of 
occupation. Once we have s e t to work on the p o l i c y of 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n embodied i n the twofold p r o v i s i o n s f o r a 
guarantee a g a i n s t aggression and of voluntary acceptance 
of e x i s t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s by j o i n i n g the League and s i g n i n g 
the Covenant, we ought not to need the occupation and i t s 
continuance by keeping up the o l d s t a t e of mind hi n d e r s 
i n s t e a d of h e l p i n g the new p o l i c y . But to get France to 
move w i l l be most d i f f i c u l t . . . . I t i s however to be 
hoped t h a t French statesmen w i l l see t h a t f o r success i n 
d e a l i n g w i t h the economic d i f f i c u l t i e s of France they 
r e q u i r e p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s which can only be produced by 
general appeasement and by a spreading c o n v i c t i o n i n 
Europe and elsewhere t h a t the danger of new q u a r r e l s i s 
f37) 
f i n a l l y averted f o r our time a t l e a s t . " w ' 
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were put to Crewe i n the middle 
of August, but he was not i n s t r u c t e d to take any a c t i o n 
w i t h the French Government. Before t h i s , on 28 J u l y , 
there had been another German approach about troop 
r e d u c t i o n s , o r i g i n a l l y intended f o r l a t e June but delayed 
37. Minutes on C 8060/778/18, FO 371/11308; D.B.F.P.. 
Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No.153. 
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by governmental c r i s e s i n France. w ' Chamberlain had 
already decided to approach the French on c e r t a i n problems 
which he fe a r e d might cause embarrassment a t Geneva i n 
September. He now sent Briand a pe r s o n a l l e t t e r and 
i n s t r u c t e d Crewe to impress i t on Briand t h a t troop 
reductions were a matter on which a promise had been given 
to the Germans and t h a t Parliamentary p r e s s u r e on him was 
(39) 
growing. Briand r e p l i e d t h a t he was no l e s s devoted 
than before to the p o l i c y of Locarno and a complete under-
standing w i t h B r i t a i n . The Germans had not done t h e i r p a r t 
s i n c e Locarno, and there were c e r t a i n grounds f o r anxiety 
which d i c t a t e d c a u t i o n about f u r t h e r concessions. But 
the French occupation f o r c e s had been reduced by 6,000 
men—since the previous November, and a f u r t h e r 6,000 would 
be withdrawn by the end of t h i s November. Briand and 
B e r t h e l o t a l s o spoke s e r i o u s l y to Hoesch about the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Franco-German r e l a t i o n s ; but Briand s a i d 
t h a t he had made i t a c o n d i t i o n of e n t e r i n g Poincare's 




D» B« F. P. , 
Vol. 1.1, Nos.252, 277, 280, 291, 294; 
Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No.107- Briand's m i n i s t r y 
r e s i g n e d on 17 J u l y . H e r r i o t was entrusted with 
o f f i c e but re s i g n e d a f t e r two days. On 23 J u l y 
Poincare formed a m i n i s t r y w i t h h i m s e l f as M i n i s t e r 
D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.112, 113; P e t r i e , 
L i f e and L e t t e r s , Vol. I I , pp.304-06. Grahame was 
a l s o i n s t r u c t e d to speak to Vandervelde. 
573 
continue. 
As the date f o r the League meeting i n September 
approached s i g n s of nervousness i n c r e a s e d . On 11 August 
Stresemann t o l d D'Abernon of a l e t t e r i n which Hindenburg 
had w r i t t e n t h a t he wanted the occupation f o r c e s reduced 
to the pre-war German g a r r i s o n f i g u r e , some promise on 
the end of the occupation, and the disarmament questions 
c l e a r e d up, before Germany j o i n e d the League. The 
German Government decided a g a i n s t making new co n d i t i o n s , 
but i n c r e a s e d the pressure about troop r e d u c t i o n s . 
Hoesch had thought of suggesting t h a t the B r i t i ^ and 
Belgg&n contingents might be f u r t h e r reduced, and h i n t s 
were dropped to D'Abernon and by Dufour. The Foreign 
O f f i c e had alre a d y been d i s c u s s i n g the i d e a w i t h the War 
O f f i c e , p o i n t i n g out t h a t the f o r c e was no longer 
r e q u i r e d f o r an a c t i v e m i l i t a r y r o l e ; but a l l t h a t was 
s a i d to Dufour was t h a t i t was d i f f i c u l t to see how 
B r i t a i n could withdraw her contingent a l t o g e t h e r without 
a l s o withdrawing from the Rhineland High Commission. 
T h i s , Chamberlain s a i d to Stresemann a t Geneva, he 
(42) 
supposed t h a t the Germans would not wish. v ' 
40. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.132, 135; A.D.A.P., 
Vol. 1.2, Nos.3, 4,7. 
41. Op. c i t . , Nos.22, 24, 37, 4 l , 58, 68; D.B.F.P., 
Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.140, 146, 151, 154, 184. 
42. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, Nos.26, 67, 83; D.B.F.P., 
Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.153, 177, 192, 204. 
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Germany's entry i n t o the League of Nations 
The f i n a l stages of the attempts to get Germany i n t o 
the League of Nations were extremely w e l l p u b l i c i s e d a t 
the time and have been e x h a u s t i v e l y d e s c r i b e d s i n c e . v ^' 
Much of the t r o u b l e t h a t brought about the f a i l u r e i n 
March 1926 was a League matter not s t r i c t l y r e l e v a n t to 
the s u b j e c t of t h i s study. The episode w i l l t h e r e f o r e 
only be d i s c u s s e d i n i t s bearing on r e l a t i o n s between 
Germany and the Western powers. 
A r t i c l e 4 of the Covenant provided t h a t the C o u n c i l of 
the League should be composed of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
United S t a t e s , the B r i t i s h Empire, France, I t a l y and 
Japan as permanent members, and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of four 
other s t a t e s on a non-permanent b a s i s . The C o u n c i l might 
name new permanent members w i t h the approval of the 
Assembly; the Assembly was to choose the non-permanent 
members; but nothing was s a i d i n the Covenant about how 
long the l a t t e r should r e t a i n t h e i r s e a t s . Although 
proposals were made i n 1921 and 1923 f o r the a d d i t i o n of 
new permanent members the number was not i n f a c t i n c r e a s e d 
most of the d i s c u s s i o n i n the e a r l y Assemblies about 
membership of the C o u n c i l was concerned w i t h s e c u r i n g a 
system of r o t a t i o n f o r the non-permanent s e a t s , the number 
43. Walters, H i s t o r y of the League of Nations, Vol. I , 
pp.316-27; Survey of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , JL926, 
pp. 1-78. Spenz, Die diplomatische Vorgeschichte~d.es 
B e i t r i t t s Deutschlands zum Vdlkerbund, i s a r e c e n t 
account from the German s i d e . D e t a i l s i n D.B.F.P., 
Ser. IA, Vols. I - I I and A.D.A.P., Vol. 1 . 1 - 1 .2 , 
passim. 
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of which was r a i s e d from four to s i x . I n the correspon-
dence w i t h the s t a t e s members of the Co u n c i l and wi t h 
the S e c r e t a r i a t between September 1924 and March 1925 
the German Government asked f o r and r e c e i v e d assurances 
t h a t Germany would be given a permanent C o u n c i l s e a t . I t 
i s probable t h a t the German Government and the 
Auswartiges Amt, which had known and cared l i t t l e about 
the d i s c u s s i o n s i n the Assemblies of 1921 and 1923, 
assumed u n t i l the tr o u b l e arose t h a t t h e i r country would 
j o i n the League and r e c e i v e a permanent C o u n c i l s e a t on 
i t s own. On the other hand they had never made t h i s a 
co n d i t i o n of entry, and i f they had i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t 
i t would have been r e j e c t e d . There was no d i s c u s s i o n of 
the procedure to be followed about German entry, e i t h e r 
a t Locarno or i n London a t the time of the sig n a t u r e of 
the t r e a t i e s . Chamberlain was i n f a c t made aware, on 
the morrow of the Locarno conference, t h a t the e a r l i e r 
Spanish ife&aim to a permanent se a t was l i k e l y to be renewed. 
The cla i m s of B r a z i l , Poland and China, none of them new, 
were p u b l i c l y staked i n February 1926 as soon as the 
German a p p l i c a t i o n was sent to Geneva. 
As noted above, the German Government decided to send 
t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n without making f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n s , but 
they agreed to withdraw i t i f the permanent C o u n c i l seat 
were not granted immediately. L e a g U e experts i n the 
44. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No.17. 
45. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, No.22. 
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Auswartiges Amt had suggested i n December t h a t the German 
del e g a t i o n should be c a r e f u l to check any tendency to 
t r e a t Germany l i k e the P r o d i g a l Son, and t h a t they should 
support the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y and the admission 
of the Soviet Union and Turkey and should s t r e s s the 
c o l l e c t i v i t y of the League. ^ e Germans were both 
very touchy about the s t a t u s of t h e i r country and were 
st r o n g l y opposed to Poland having a C o u n c i l s e a t of any 
kind a t any time, not only on grounds of p r e s t i g e but a l s o 
because they f e a r e d t h a t P o l i s h membership of the C o u n c i l 
would hinder f r o n t i e r r e v i s i o n , strengthen F r a n c o - P o l i s h 
t i e s loosened at Locarno, and t u r n B r i t a i n towards 
(47) 
Poland. v ' On the eve of the March meeting Dirksen 
suggested t h a t i f i t became necessary to promise to 
support Poland f o r a non-permanent se a t i n September, the 
d e l e g a t i o n should only agree i n r e t u r n f o r concessions 
from Poland on the p o s i t i o n of the German minority w i t h 
some kind of i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantee of t h e i r f u l f i l m e n t . 
O s t e n s i b l y , however (and r e a l l y i n some q u a r t e r s ) , the 
a g i t a t i o n during the month between the despatch of the 
German a p p l i c a t i o n and the s p e c i a l s e s s i o n of the Assembly 
f i x e d f o r 8 March to c o i n c i d e with the r e g u l a r C o u n c i l 
meeting, was about the question whether Germany should be 
46. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, No.87. 
47. Op. c i t . , No.90 and n.5. 
48. Op. cit.„ No.131. 
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admitted alone or whether the problem of the composition 
of the Counc i l should come up a t the same time. 
On the eve of the March meeting the p o s i t i o n of the 
p a r t i e s concerned was as f o l l o w s . The German Government 
were i n s i s t e n t upon e n t e r i n g alone and were opposed to 
making any promises f o r the f u t u r e . At one stage they 
threatened to r e c o n s i d e r or withdraw t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n i f 
France proceeded w i t h a proposal to give Poland a 
permanent seat, and B r i t a i n and France were accused of 
d i s l o y a l t y to Locarno. The French Government favoured 
g i v i n g permanent s e a t s to Poland and Spain. The I t a l i a n 
p o s i t i o n was non-commital. The Japanese were opposed to 
any i n c r e a s e i n the number of permanent s e a t s . The B r i t i s h 
Government f e l t themselves to be under some o b l i g a t i o n to 
support Spain f o r a permanent sea t , having e a r l i e r 
promised to do so i f any others were added, and favoured 
g i v i n g Poland a non-permanent seat as soon as p o s s i b l e ; 
but they were opposed to any change t h a t would have the 
e f f e c t of preventing or d e l a y i n g the admission of Germany. 
They were under g r e a t p r e s s u r e on t h i s p o i n t from League 
of Nations opinion a t home. (^O) ^ q e x j _ s - t i n g 
non-permanent members of the C o u n c i l , whose ass e n t to the 
admission of new members was necessary, the Swedish 
Government had d e c l a r e d t h e i r i n t e n t i o n of v o t i n g a g a i n s t 
49. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, Nos.103, 106, 109, 117; D.B.F.P., 
Ser. IA, Vol. 1, Nos.275, 279, 282, 283, 286. 
50. C. 9 ( 2 6 ) , CAB 23/52. 
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any i n c r e a s e i n the permanent membership apart from 
Germany; Belgium was a l s o opposed to the c r e a t i o n of 
more permanent s e a t s , a t l e a s t a t present; Czechoslovakia 
and Uruguay had not committed themselves. Spain and 
B r a z i l were themselves claiming permanent s e a t s ; Spain 
s a i d t h a t she would v o t e f o r Germany but would leave the 
League u n l e s s she were given a permanent s e a t too; there 
were h i n t s ( i n i t i a l l y denied but subsequently proved to be 
w e l l founded) t h a t B r a z i l might vote a g a i n s t Germany 
u n l e s s her c l a i m were admitted. 
The p o s s i b i l i t i e s of confusion and breakdown were 
t h e r e f o r e g r e a t . Negotiations a t Geneva, f i r s t between 
the Locarno powers and then w i t h other members of the 
Council and other i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s , were d i r e c t e d towards 
f i n d i n g a compromise t h a t would secure the admission of 
Germany. The German dele g a t i o n r e f u s e d a l l suggestions, 
such as t h a t they should not for m a l l y oppose the 
candidature of others, or t h a t an a d d i t i o n a l non-permanent 
s e a t should be c r e a t e d a t the same meeting, t h a t Sweden 
should r e s i g n her se a t i n favour of Poland, or even t h a t 
they should undertake to support Poland's candidature i n 
September, the whole question of the composition of the 
Council being considered by a commission meanwhile. 
F i n a l l y the Germans agreed to a proposal t h a t Sweden and 
Czechoslovakia should r e s i g n i n favour of the Netherlands 
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and Poland, K ' so t h a t the u l t i m a t e cause of the 
breakdown was the B r a z i l i a n delegate's i n s t r u c t i o n s to vote 
a g a i n s t Germany i f h i s country were not given a permanent 
s e a t at the same time. Germany's a p p l i c a t i o n to j o i n the 
League was n e i t h e r d i s c u s s e d nor withdrawn. On 18 March 
the Council adopted a r e s o l u t i o n appointing a committee 
( i n c l u d i n g a German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) to study the composition 
of the C o u n c i l and the number and method of e l e c t i o n of 
i t s members. 
Af t e r the March meeting the B r i t i s h Government took 
the view t h a t a new s i t u a t i o n had been cr e a t e d ; they were 
determined t h a t Germany should have a permanent seat but 
they regarded themselves as f r e e of commitments to any 
other country. For the work of the committee on the 
composition of the Council they agreed t h a t they d i d not 
favour adding any more permanent s e a t s other than t h a t f o r 
Germany, but t h a t the number of non-permanent s e a t s could 
be i n c r e a s e d to nine, of which some could be i n a new 
(52) 
category of r e - e l i g i b l e or semi-permanent s e a t s . v ' 
51. The French i n i t i a l l y supported a proposal t h a t Poland 
should take Sweden's p l a c e and another member of the 
L i t t l e Entente t h a t of Czechoslovakia; the Germans 
refused, i n s i s t i n g on there being one e x - n e u t r a l ; 
and Chamberlain feiad Briand warned t h a t i f the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s f a i l e d so t h a t Germany d i d not enter the 
League and Locarno f e l l through, France would not get 
another guarantee from B r i t a i n ; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, 
Vol. I , No.361. 
52. T h i s proposal was worked out by C e c i l , who was B r i t i s h 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on the committee; C. 18(26), CAB 
23/52; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No.399. 
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Since the German de l e g a t i o n had i n the end accepted 
a compromise a t Geneva the setback d i d not g r e a t l y a f f e c t 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Western powers. A r e p o r t to B e r l i n a t 
the end of the meeting observed t h a t i f Sweden had stuck 
to her guns the German v i c t o r y would have been complete, 
but i t would have been gained a t the c o s t of worsening 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Western powers and t h i s was u n d e s i r a b l e 
a t present when other important questions such as a v i a t i o n 
(53) 
and m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l awaited settlement. German 
missions abroad were i n s t r u c t e d t h a t the l i n e to take was 
t h a t the League had s u f f e r e d a setback and Germany had 
been done an i n j u s t i c e . She ought not to have been brought 
to Geneva before everything was f i x e d , and i t would be 
hard to go back u n l e s s the gener a l s i t u a t i o n were made 
more favourable f o r her. However the Locarno p o l i c y was 
being continued and the Western powers had undertaken to 
(54) 
proceed as though the t r e a t i e s had come i n t o f o r c e . K ' 
A f t e r some h e s i t a t i o n the Germans sent a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
to the committee on the composition of the Council, which 
produced i n May recommendations, on the l i n e s of the 
B r i t i s h proposal, f o r i n c r e a s i n g the number of non-permanent 
s e a t s from s i x to nine, with p r o v i s i o n f o r r o t a t i o n but 
with up to three members being able to be d e c l a r e d 
r e - e l i g i b l e . Nothing was s a i d f o r m a l l y about permanent 
s e a t s , but i t was evident from the d i s c u s s i o n t h a t only 
53. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, No.169. 
54. Op. c i t . , No.175. 
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Spain and B r a z i l r e a l l y favoured extending the number 
beyond the Great Powers; and a t the Counc i l meeting i n 
June the B r a z i l i a n delegate announced h i s Government's 
d e c i s i o n to withdraw from the League. 
The German Government were s a t i s f i e d w i t h the 
(55) 
recommendations of the committee; but once again 
as the date of the September meeting approached t h e r e were 
sig n s of f r a y e d nerves. Reports of Spanish and P o l i s h 
suggestions f o r amending the proposals i n such a way as 
to secure immediate r e - e l i g i b i l i t y e l i c i t e d German 
statements t h a t u n l e s s assurances were given t h a t the 
proposals would not be changed and nothing would be done 
to prevent Germany from e n t e r i n g the C o u n c i l alone, the 
d e l e g a t i o n would not go to Geneva. There was a l s o , as 
noted above, f r e s h i n s i s t e n c e on troop reductions, which 
a t one moment sounded l i k e a new c o n d i t i o n f o r e n t e r i n g 
the League. (56) However some amendments were made and 
agreed by the German Government. Poland was s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h a v i r t u a l l y c a s t - i r o n assurance t h a t she would at 
once be d e c l a r e d r e - e l i g i b l e and was almost c e r t a i n to be 
r e - e l e c t e d : Spain, however, r e f u s e d to be s a t i s f i e d and 
gave n o t i c e of withdrawal from the League. On 8 September 
the Assembly voted to admit Germany to the League, and 
then voted to a l l o c a t e her a permanent seat on the C o u n c i l 
55. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, No.228. 
56. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos.l40, 141, 145, 149, 
150, 154. 
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and to i n c r e a s e the number of non-permanent s e a t s . Two 
days l a t e r the German delegation, which t h i s time had 
been w a i t i n g i n B e r l i n u n t i l assured of success, took 
t h e i r p l a c e s i n the Assembly. The r u l e s f o r f i l l i n g the 
non-permanent Counci l s e a t s were adopted on 14 September; 
of the new members e l e c t e d only Poland was d e c l a r e d to be 
e l i g i b l e f o r r e - e l e c t i o n i n three y e a r s ' time. The 
exchange of r a t i f i c a t i o n s of the Locarno t r e a t i e s a l s o 
took p l a c e on 14 September and they thereupon came i n t o 
f o r c e . 
Thoiry 
The meeting between Briand and Stresemann a t Thoiry 
near Geneva on 17 September 1926 gave r i s e to expectations 
of a transformation i n Franco-German r e l a t i o n s , and when 
t h i s d i d not take p l a c e a shadow f e l l over the " s p i r i t of 
Locarno." I t i s even now o f t e n supposed t h a t the two 
M i n i s t e r s reached agreement i n p r i n c i p l e on a bargain by 
which the Rhineland would be evacuated i n r e t u r n f o r 
German f i n a n c i a l help to France, and t h a t Briand, who had 
got c a r r i e d away by h i s generous temper and ignorance of 
f i n a n c e , withdrew from the bargain under p r e s s u r e of 
n a t i o n a l i s t opinion i n France and as the f i n a n c i a l scheme 
proved i m p r a c t i c a b l e . French accounts of the Thoiry 
meeting have never supported t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; the 
newly opened French a r c h i v e s throw some f r e s h l i g h t on 
the s u b j e c t without, however, e n t i r e l y s o l v i n g the problem 
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subject without, however, e n t i r e l y solving the problem 
of how f a r the expectation of a bargain was based on a 
genuine misunderstanding. 
A meeting between the two Ministers had been suggested 
as early as the end of March 1926 and Briand had hoped f o r 
one at Whitsun. Early i n August he t o l d Hoesch that he 
would l i k e to t a l k w i t h Stresemann at the time of the 
League meeting i n September, and through the French Embassy 
i n B e r l i n he exchanged views with Stresemann on the 
(57) 
subjects f o r t h e i r conversation. K ' I t was understood 
that they would include f i n a n c i a l questions, the 
occupation, and possibly the Saar and Eupen.and Malmedy. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of placing on the market some of the 
German i n d u s t r i a l obligations which under the Dawes Plan" 
formed security f o r the reparation debt, and thereby 
giving France and the other creditors a substantial amount 
of cash, had been v e n t i l a t e d i n the press f o r several 
months. More recently the President of the Reichsbank, 
Schacht, had wi t h the approval of the German Government 
been discussing w i t h Belgian f i n a n c i a l c i r c l e s a proposal 
that i n return f o r anticipated annuities and a lump sum 
Eupen and Malmedy might be ceded back to Germany. The 
Belgian Government, which l i k e the French were i n 
monetary d i f f i c u l t i e s , were disposed to favour the idea; 
but the French were opposed to i t , p a r t l y on f i n a n c i a l 
57. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, No.225; Vol. 1.2, Nos.3, 11, 
55; Laboula^e to Briand, 2 Sept. 1926, A.A.E., 
Grande Bretagne, Vol. 89« 
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grounds and p a r t l y because i t could form a precedent 
f o r t r e a t y revision. The Foreign Office were also very 
doubtful. (58) Belgians dropped the negotiations 
i n August, a f t e r French objections; but they s t i l l 
wanted f i n a n c i a l help and Poincare took up the idea of 
marketing the German railway bonds i n order to raise 
money f o r Belgium as w e l l as f o r France. Poincare was 
confident that German consent to the transaction and 
waiving of transfer protection was unnecessary and that 
only the Committee of Guarantees mattered, and th a t 
since Belgium and I t a l y had r a t i f i e d t h e i r war debt 
settlements with the United States the f a c t that the 
French had not r a t i f i e d the settlement signed i n A p r i l 
1926 but not yet submitted to- the Chambers, would not"be 
an obstacle to placing the bonds on the American market. 
The Quai d'Orsay disagreed on both points, but at 
Poincare's request prepared to approach the United States 
Government together w i t h the Belgians and I t a l i a n s , and 
58. A.D.A.P. , Vol. 1.1, Nos. 14-301, passim; Vol. I.2,fcfe.*K6, 
D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No.188; Vol. I I , Nos. tmh; 
54, 142, 168, 195; desp. 2174 to Paris, 29 J u l . 
1926; minute by Gregory, 11 Aug.; desp. 2375 to 
Paris, 20 Aug., W 7023, 7624/5314/4, FO 371/11823; 
Grahame to Chamberlain, 3 Aug., Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 53/326. Schacht had been t a l k i n g about Eupen i n 
Brussels a year e a r l i e r : French nervousness about 
these conversations may help to explain t h e i r 
suspicions about the omission of a mention of the 
Belgian f r o n t i e r i n the German security memorandum 
of 9 February 1925: Herbette (Brussels) to Herriot, 
22, 23 and 24 Mar. 1925; de Margerie to Herriot, 26 
and 30 Mar.; de Margerie to Briand, 16 May, A.A.E., 
Grande Bretagne, Vols. 74, 75. 
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asked f o r B r i t i s h support. v 3 ' 
I t i s thus clear that i t was the French Ministry of 
Finance who were p a r t i c u l a r l y pressing the mobilisation 
of the railway bonds; but i t i s also evident that the 
Quai d'Orsay realised that German consent to waiving the 
transfer protection would be necessary, so that some 
of f e r would have to be made to Germany i n return. On 
the German side Stresemann, up to the time that he l e f t 
f o r Geneva, appeared to the French Embassy to expect 
only a general conversation w i t h Briand without making 
"imprudent" demands. He indicated to his Cabinet 
colleagues, however, tha t without making any promises he 
would explore the p o s s i b i l i t y of far-reaching negotiations. 
When Briand arrived at Geneva Hoesch understood from him 
that he wanted to discuss a programme f o r a general 
solution which could be put i n t o e f f e c t by stages; and 
Stresemann on his a r r i v a l gathered from Professor Hesnard 
(head of the press department of the French Embassy i n 
Ber l i n , who acted as a go-between) that Briand was 
prepared to t a l k about the Saar and the occupation and 
intended to ask what Germany could o f f e r i n return. 
On 11 September Stresemann t o l d Chamberlain that he hoped 
to come to some arrangement with Briand about the Saar, 
59° Correspondence, 19 Aug.-l Sep. 1926, A.A.E., 
Allemagne, Vol. 398; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No.228. 
60. Laboulaye to Briand, 2 Sep. 1926, A.A.E., Grande 
Bretagne, Vol. 89; A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, Nos.73, 82 and 
n.2. 
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the end of m i l i t a r y control, the future of the Dawes Plan, 
and the size of the armies of occupation. Chamberlain 
said that he wished the meeting success. He was sure 
that the B r i t i s h Government would give friendly-
consideration to any f i n a n c i a l proposals on which French 
and German negotiators agreed; but they would not 
consent to anything i n the nature of new p r i o r i t y f o r 
France or Belgium. On the morning of 17 September, 
according to a report given l a t e r to the German Cabinet, 
the German delegation at Geneva agreed that i f a general 
settlement seemed possible, repurchase of the Saar mines 
f o r 300 m i l l i o n gold marks could be offered and the 
immediate evacuation of the second and t h i r d zones asked -
Stresemann himself suggesting the end of September 1927 
as a terminal date. I f Briand asked f o r more, 
mobilisation of the railway bonds could be discussed and 
a maximum of 1-g- m i l l i a r d gold marks could be offered i n 
return f o r evacuation. Revision of the Dawes Plan should 
not be discussed nor eastern questions mentioned; but i t 
should be said that Germany expected a free hand i n the 
negotiations w i t h Belgium. I f i t appeared tha t a general 
solution was not possible, Stresemann would concentrate 
on improvements i n the Rhineland, troop reductions, and 
(62) 
the withdrawal of the Control Commission. ^ ' 
61. Op. c i t . , No.83; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No.204. 
62. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, No.95-
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Briand and Stresemann lunched and spent the afternoon 
together at Thoiry on 17 September. Stresemann was 
accompanied by a private secretary^, Briand by Hesnard. 
The main accounts of the conversation are by Stresemann 
and Hesnard, and they d i f f e r a good deal. 
According to Stresemann, Briand began the conversation 
by saying that he wished to discuss a general solution of 
a l l questions between France and Germany, and he asked 
whether Germany would be forthcoming i n the economic 
sphere. He was thinking of the return of the Saar 
t e r r i t o r y and the end of the occupation. Stresemann said 
that he had found great opposition i n Germany to a 
r e a l i s a t i o n of the railway bonds, because they would 
represent an important element i n any revis i o n of the 
Dawes Plan. He thought that the opposition could only be 
overcome i f the occupation were to be ended by the end of 
September 1927» Briand asked what Stresemann thought of 
the f i n a n c i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Stresemann re p l i e d that f o r 
the Saar mines agreement had been reached on a fi g u r e of 
some 300 m i l l i o n gold marks. He could not forecast how 
63. Stresemann dictated a short note on the conversation 
on 17 September and a longer account three days l a t e r . 
He also gave a verbal account to the Cabinet i n 
B e r l i n on 24 September (see below). On the French 
side Hesnard wrote two memoranda, which were used by 
Briand's biographer. One i s preserved i n the French 
archives; I have not found the second. A.D.A.P., 
Vol. 1.2, Nos.88, 94; Stresemann, Vermsfchtnis, Vol. 
I l l , pp.14-23; A.A.E., Allemagne, Vol. 398; Suarez, 
Briand, Vol. VI, pp.215-27-
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much i n the way of obligations the world market could 
take? he could not imagine that i t would be more than 
li m i l l i a r d , and he also thought t h i s the largest sum 
to which Germany could commit herself. France would 
get 52 per cent, so the whole transaction would produce 
f o r her a c a p i t a l sum of 750 m i l l i o n plus 300 m i l l i o n 
gold marks. 
Hesnard's account of t h i s part of the conversation 
states that Briand began by saying that a general solution 
to Franco-German r e l a t i o n s , w i t h i n the framework of the 
peace tr e a t y , was not conceivable before the security 
question was s e t t l e d , and i t was closely linked with the 
settlement of reparations. Stresemann r e p l i e d that he 
was ready to seek a general solution. He mentioned 
the mobilisation of the railway bonds and said that 
opposition i n Germany would lose importance when public 
opinion saw the p o s s i b i l i t y of a general solution; 
but i n p r a c t i c a l terms i t hardly seemed possible to raise 
more than 1-g- m i l l i a r d gold marks. Briand said that t h i s 
did not seem much, and Stresemann r e p l i e d that t h i s was 
only a p a r t i a l solution. A complete settlement would 
mean a f i n a l assessment of the German debt and i t s 
commercialisation by stages. The two Ministers agreed 
that the problem would have to be studied by experts, 
but Briand said that t a l k s could not begin u n t i l the 
question of security had been examined and s e t t l e d . 
According to Stresemann he then asked about the end 
of fllilitary c o ntrol. Briand r e p l i e d that Stresemann 
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should see that the outstanding questions were set t l e d . 
He defended French o f f i c i a l s against Stresemann's charge 
of quibbling over d e t a i l s , and said t h a t he had given 
instructions to concentrate on the main questions. 
The soldiers would obey i f they were given clear orders. 
I f small points remained the best thing was to s e t t l e 
them. Then, s t i l l according to Stresemann, Briand said 
that he was worried about the n a t i o n a l i s t associations i n 
Germany: i t was a scandal that the Stahlhelm should 
issue a m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g manual. The French m i l i t a r y 
a u t horities accused him of ignoring what was r e a l l y 
going on i n Germany: why did the Government not suppress 
such things? Stresemann explained that the Stahlhelm 
had no m i l i t a r y significance and was not supported by 
the Reichswehr, and defended the a t t i t u d e towards the 
associations of Gessler and Seeckt. But Hesnard noted 
that Stresemann c l e a r l y found t h e i r l o y a l t y less than 
complete. 
Next Stresemann, according to his account, said that 
i f they agreed about the occupation, the Saar, and the 
end of m i l i t a r y control, they must also understand one 
another about Eupen and Malmedy. Briand said that the 
Belgians had behaved f o o l i s h l y and the timing was a l l 
wrong. But when Stresemann asked whether France had 
objections of p r i n c i p l e , Briand r e p l i e d that i f the 
general problems were solved Eupen and Malmedy would be 
solved too. 
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F i n a l l y Briand said that there had been disagreements 
about the occupied t e r r i t o r y and he wanted to point out 
what had been done. Almost a l l of what the Germans 
had asked f o r at Locarno had been completed. The French 
had given up nearly a quarter of the houses requisitioned, 
and the number of troops had been s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced. 
Stresemann answered that he owed Briand thanks, but the 
l a t t e r himself had said to Hoesch that the 6,000 men 
now being withdrawn were not enough. However, he could 
r e f r a i n from t a l k i n g about reductions i f they now had 
the prospect of complete evacuation. He then asked f o r 
a f u r t h e r reduction i n the ordinances and enquired about 
supervision a f t e r the withdrawal of the Control Commission. 
Briand said that there- must be a f ormula to secure the 
League's r i g h t of investigation, but no-one was thinking 
of using i t against a member of the Council. But he 
earnestly begged Stresemann to pay a t t e n t i o n to the 
Reichswehr: he had the impression that they were doing 
things that Stresemann did not know about, and t h e i r 
p o l i c y must not be allowed to suffer. Stresemann r e p l i e d 
that he understood, but did not thi n k that the matters 
were serious. The l a s t part of the conversation was 
only b r i e f l y summarised by Hesnard. 
The short account of what Stresemann t o l d the German 
Cabinet on 24tfa September states t h a t Briand talked 
about a general settlement and asked whether Germany was 
w i l l i n g to help France f i n a n c i a l l y . He had put forward 
as the German desires; ( l ) r eturn of the Saar with 
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repurchase of the mines; (2) evacuation of the second 
and t h i r d zones; (3) removal of the control Commission; 
(4) r e t u r n of Eupen and Malmedy. He had explained the 
objections to the mobilisation of the railway bonds. 
He and Briand had agreed that t h e i r Governments were not 
committed by what they had said. Stresemann asked f o r 
general approval of what he had done and authority to 
continue the negotiations. (^4) 
Bearing i n mind that the meeting lasted f o r nearly 
f i v e hours, so that not even Stresemann's long account can 
be complete, many of the discrepancies between his version 
and Hesnard's can be explained on the assumption that 
each recorded i n greater d e t a i l the points on which 
his side had been most f i r m . I t i s perhaps not very 
material that Stresemann suggested that i t was Briand 
who f i r s t mentioned the Saar and evacuation, whereas 
Hesnard suggested that i t was Stresemann who f i r s t 
mentioned concrete matters. The main difference i n 
content i s that Hesnard mentioned neither the evacuation 
nor the Saar, the two matters of the greatest importance 
to Stresemann. There i s other evidence from the French 
side that they were discussed; (^ -*) - j ^ t i t i s 
64. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, No. 105. 
65. Suarez, Briand, Vol. VI, pp. 228-9; D.B.F.P., Ser. 
IA, Vol. I I , Nos. 234, 238. 
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regrettable that on these matters there seems to be no 
French version of the conversation to compare w i t h 
Stresemann's. 
Apart from t h i s , the greatest difference i s one of 
tone; but t h i s i s c r u c i a l to the question whether there 
was a misunderstanding. Hesnard's memoranda convey the 
impression of a general f r i e n d l y exploration of 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s , Stresemann's of something very l i k e the 
heads of an agreement. Briand's expansiveness i s reported 
i n much greater d e t a i l by Stresemann than by Hesnard. 
I t i s impossible to t e l l from the w r i t t e n record how 
fa r Stresemann took i t l i t e r a l l y . He may have taken 
gestures or words of comprehension as indications of 
agreement; but a careful reading even of Stresemann's 
record indicates that Briand made no specific promises. 
Examination of the f i n a n c i a l suggestions soon revealed 
that they were impracticable. The Treasury, although 
admitting that i n theory there was much to be said f o r 
converting the reparation debt i n t o a commercial one that 
would engage Germany's c r e d i t , nevertheless pointed out 
serious p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . I n the f i r s t place the 
reparation o b l i g a t i o n was too large to be commercialised 
without being w r i t t e n down much more d r a s t i c a l l y than 
anyone had contemplated so f a r . Secondly, the Dawes 
bonds were not suitable f o r marketing. Under the 
transfer arrangements servicing could be helA up at any 
time; u n t i l the annuities reached t h e i r maximum l e v e l 
i n 1928 i t would be impossible to say whether the safe-
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guards were s u f f i c i e n t and so the security good enough. 
Any issue now would, therefore, have to be at a 
substantial discount. Some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s might 
disappear i n time, but the f i n a l one, the d i f f i c u l t y of 
getting a s u f f i c i e n t l y large block of bonds absorbed 
without compromising a l l other receipts from Germany, 
appeared insurmountable. I t might seem invidious, the 
Treasury allowed, f o r B r i t a i n to oppose attempts by 
France to meet her f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , especially 
i f Germany, who had nothing to lose by giving away other 
people's money, encouraged the attempts. Nevertheless 
such a pol i c y ought to be discouraged. As f o r the re-
purchase of the Saar mines, there would be advantages 
for-both sides i f i t - t o o k place before 1935- Payment f o r 
Eupen and Malmedy would be less complicated since i t 
would f a l l outside the t r e a t y arrangements. Either 
t h i s or the Saar transaction might be financed, but the 
two together would involve a payment of £25 - 30 
m i l l i o n i n p r i o r i t y over reparations, and t h i s would be 
bound to impede the development of the Dawes Plan. (66) 
The Treasury wanted t h e i r objections conveyed to 
the French Government. Chamberlain, however, urged that 
c r i t i c i s m must also be constructive; "that we must not 
press our own interests too f a r ; that we must not have 
the appearance of destroying f o r s e l f i s h reasons so 
66. Treasury memorandum, 17 Sep. 1926, CP. 333(26), 
CAB 24/181; conclusion i n D^BJjVP., Ser. IA, 
Vol. I I , No. 237, n. 5. 
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promising a development i n Franco-German r e l a t i o n s ; and 
that we must show a desire to help and not hinder the 
rapprochement." (^7) 
But i n the event B r i t i s h c r i t i c i s m of the proposals 
was not a decisive hindrance. A committee set up by the 
Germany Government to examine the proposals found many 
objections. Anion the French side, as the need f o r 
immediate f i n a n c i a l support diminished with the success 
of Poincare's emergency measures, the r e a l i s a t i o n grew 
that the i n t e r e s t on the proceeds of s e l l i n g 1-jjr m i l l i a r d 
gold marks' worth of railway bonds to American 
investors was not much f o r Germany to pay f o r the 
evacuation of the Rhineland, even i f the United States 
Government did agree to the issue. i t i s ~ 
d i f f i c u l t to suppose that the Germans were not aware of 
t h i s ; but Stresemann, despite his cautious words to h i s -
colleagues, appears to have allowed not only the press 
but also o f f i c i a l s , including Schubert and the chief 
Germany reparation expert, to believe that a bargain had 
almost been struck with Briand. Hence Hoesch, on 
67. Minutes, 9 and 12 Oct. 1926, C 10779, 10930/10060/ 
18, F0 371/11331. 
68. A.D.A.P.t Vol. 1.2, Nos. 142, 153, 154, 160, 162, 163; correspondence, 1-15 Oct. 1926, A„A.Eo, 
Allemagne, Vol. 399; D.B.F.P.. Ser. IA, Vol. I I , 
Nos. 232, 252, 256. No approach was made to the 
United States Government, because the B r i t i s h 
Government refused support, the I t a l i a n Government 
would not j o i n i n , the Belgian Government obtained 
f i n a n c i a l help by other means, and the French Embassy 
i n Washington considered the chances of success 
slender unless the French debt settlement were 
r a t i f i e d . 
595 
returning to Paris from a v i s i t to B e r l i n , was 
distressed to f i n d from Seydoux, the Assistant P o l i t i c a l 
Director at the Quai d'Orsay, that the French viewed 
the Thoiry conversation i n a very d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , 
t h a t they were thinking not of the return of the Saar 
t e r r i t o r y but only of the repurchase of the mines, and 
that t h e i r idea of a general programme was simply to 
study a l l questions together i n a f r i e n d l y s p i r i t . 
From t h i s conversation Seydoux concluded that there had 
been a serious misunderstanding, probably a t t r i b u t a b l e 
to the d i f f e r e n t personalities of the two p r i n c i p a l s . 
He also suggested that the Germans now realised that 
France did not need t h e i r help f o r f i n a n c i a l recovery 
so that early evacuation of the Rhineland could only be 
purchased by p o l i t i c a l concessions. (^9) 
Such concessions, i t was now being suggested, might 
consist of a settlement i n the east since the 
occupation was a security f o r the observance of the 
Treaty of Versailles as a whole. On 2813a. October 
Hoesch had a long conversation w i t h Briand, who explained 
the f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s but said that German good 
w i l l over reparations would make possible the e a r l i e r 
evacuation envisaged i n the Treaty. At the end of the 
69. Memorandum by Seydoux, 1 Oct. 1926; Briand to 
Laboulaye, 9 Oct.; Laboulaye to Briand, 11 Oct.; 
memoranda by Seydoux, 23 Oct., A.A.E., Allemagne, 
Vol. 399; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No. 230. 
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conversation Hoesch mentioned the press suggestions 
that Germany should come to an agreement with Poland 
or give formal assurances about Austria; but Briand 
r e p l i e d that he saw no point i n r a i s i n g again questions 
already s e t t l e d by the peace t r e a t i e s and reinforced 
by the Locarno agreements. (^ O) Hoesch reported that 
despite Briand's honest endeavours i t was no good 
pretending that they were on a very sure course. He 
thought i t best to go on with the conversations, 
without commitments, u n t i l the December Council meeting. 
Stresemann, however, wanted some positi v e r e s u l t s . On 
the one hand he t r i e d to encourage the French to pursue 
a Saar settlement on i t s own; on the other he suggested 
that the French attempts to get the disarmament 
questions cleared up meant an abandonment of the Thoiry 
policy. When Hoesch saw Briand again on lOtS. November 
he learned without surprise that the l a t t e r was not 
yet i n a pos i t i o n to t a l k about the Saar. Although 
one French o f f i c i a l , at least, considered possible 
subjects f o r negotiation, a t t e n t i o n during the remaining 
weeks before the December meeting at Geneva was 
concentrated on disarmament and the withdrawal of the 
Control Commission; there were no fu r t h e r Franco-
(71) 
German ta l k s about a general solution. v ' 
70. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, Nos. 156, 157, 167, 173; resume 
of conversation, 28 Oct. 1926, AoA.Eo, Allemagne, 
Vol. 399. 
71. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.2, Nos. 174, 176, 177, 188; 
memorandum by Seydoux, 23 Nov. 1926, A.A .E. , Allemagne, 
Vol. 400. 
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The newly available French archives e n t i r e l y support 
the view that the Thoiry conversation was no more than 
a general f r i e n d l y exploration of desires and 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t i s s t i l l impossible t o be cer t a i n how 
and why the d i f f e r e n t conceptions of what happened 
arose. As Seydoux suggested, they may have been due to 
the d i f f e r e n t temperaments of Briand and Stresemann -
the former expansive, generous and imprecise i n 
expression, the l a t t e r at times allowing optimism to 
override h is realism and to rush ahead i n t r y i n g to 
exp l o i t favourable circumstances. Stresemann may have 
thought that the French monetary c r i s i s was a good 
opportunity to secure his great aim i n the west i n the 
same way as, as i s discussed i n the next section, he 
hoped to use Polish f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s to secure 
his great aim i n the east. At a l l events the prospects 
f o r a Franco-German bargain did not greatly improve. 
A week a f t e r the withdrawal of the Control Commission 
Crewe remarked that no plan f o r the early evacuation 
of the Rhineland seemed p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s from the 
French point of view. Great concessions on German 
disarmament had been made f o r p o l i t i c a l motives, and the 
withdrawal of the Control Commission amounted i n French 
eyes to the abandonment of a f i r s t l i n e of defence: 
i t would be extremely d i f f i c u l t to abandon the remaining 
concrete pledge of French security. Crewe considered 
that u n t i l the German Government gave unmistakable and 
r e i t e r a t e d proofs of p a c i f i c intentions and dispelled 
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the suspicion w i t h which many Frenchmen regarded Germany, 
or u n t i l some new compensation of value were found, 
France would not agree to the evacuation of the 
Rhineland. ^ 7 2^ 
The Polish and Russian factors 
Although a f t e r December 1924 there was no fur t h e r 
discussion of a German-Soviet alliance against Poland, 
German policy towards Poland was affected by re l a t i o n s 
w ith the Soviet Union and vice versa, while f o r the 
Soviet Union rel a t i o n s with Germany were affected by 
those with the Western powers. 
As-regards Poland, f a r from introdueing-an element 
of s t a b i l i t y and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n t o German-Polish 
relations as Chamberlain had hoped, Locarno at f i r s t 
stimulated German hopes of recovering l o s t t e r r i t o r y . 
The means of doing so appeared f o r a time to be offered 
by a serious f i n a n c i a l and economic c r i s i s i n Poland. 
As recorded i n Chapter 6, D'Abernon discussed German-
Polish re l a t i o n s with Schubert i n October and November 
1925 and believed that he had persuaded Schubert of the 
necessity of improving them. At the end of the year 
a b r i e f was prepared i n the Auswartiges Amt f o r a 
furt h e r discussion with D'Abernon, se t t i n g out the 
exist i n g p o s i t i o n and the German desires. Germany, 
72. DoB.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I l l , No. 7° 
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Dirksen wrote, would welcome an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p eration 
t o s o r t out Poland's finances but i t must be accompanied 
by a p o l i t i c a l settlement. The only p o s s i b l e permanent 
s o l u t i o n would be the r e t u r n of Danzig, the r e t u r n of 
the C o r r i d o r as f a r south as a l i n e from Schneidemuhl 
to Thorn, some smaller r e c t i f i c a t i o n s f a r t h e r south not 
i n c l u d i n g Posen, and Upper S i l e s i a and p a r t s of c e n t r a l 
S i l e s i a . ^ 7 3^ 
The conversation w i t h D'Abernon does not appear t o 
have taken place. Instead, German e f f o r t s i n the next 
few months were d i r e c t e d p r i n c i p a l l y a t B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l 
c i r c l e s . There had been a r e p o r t i n September t h a t the 
P o l i s h Government were going t o approach the Bank of 
England f o r help, and t h a t the Governor was l i k e l y t o 
encourage B r i t i s h banks t o increase the c a p i t a l of the 
Bank of Poland - an a c t i o n t h a t would give B r i t a i n 
(7k) 
i n f l u e n c e over the P o l i s h s t a t e . v ' I n the middle 
of November the P o l i s h Government d i d make a request 
f o r B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l advice and f o r help from the Bank 
of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
They received a non-committal r e p l y saying t h a t since 
an American economist, Professor Kemmerer, was on the 
p o i n t of v i s i t i n g Warsaw i t seemed premature t o send 
73- A.D.A.P., Vol. I I 1, No. 21. 
74. K160/K019795-97. 
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another adviser, and t h a t i t was undesirable t h a t any 
of the c a p i t a l of the Bank of Poland should be owned 
by f o r e i g n e r s . ^ ' The Poles then seem t o have dropped 
the idea of a B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l adviser and began t o 
t h i n k i n s t e a d of asking f o r a team of experts t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e the whole economy. Treasury o f f i c i a l s 
thought t h a t Poland might have t o approach the League of 
Nations f o r a f i n a n c i a l scheme s i m i l a r t o those which 
had been ap p l i e d t o A u s t r i a and Hungary, This would mean 
a degree of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l and perhaps also an 
economic understanding w i t h Germany, Whether of t h e i r 
own accord or not, the o f f i c i a l s also expressed doubts 
about the maintenance of Poland's t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y , 
The p r i n c i p a l t a r g e t f o r the German e f f o r t s was the 
Governor of the Bank of England. On 28tta February 
Dufour rep o r t e d him as saying t h a t the Poles were not 
yet ready f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l and were t r y i n g t o 
r a i s e c r e d i t s . Dufour asked whether i t would not be 
advisable t o make the grant of a l a r g e sum depend on 
a t e r r i t o r i a l settlement w i t h Germany. Norman r e p l i e d 
t h a t the banks would not wish t o get i n v o l v e d i n p o l i t i c a l 
75« Warsaw desp. 555, 11 Nov. 1925; Bank of England t o 
P o l i s h Legation i n London, N 6314, 7159/43/55, 
FO 371/10998. 
76, AoDoA.P., Vol. I I . 1 , No. 26; Niemeyer t o Lampson, 
10 Feb. 1926, N 639/41/55, FO 371/11760. The c u r r e n t 
s t a t e o f German-Polish trade r e l a t i o n s i s described 
by Riekhoff, German-Polish R e l a t i o n s , Ch. V I I . 
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questions, t o which Dufour r e j o i n e d t h a t such a 
settlement would be i n the i n t e r e s t of the c r e d i t o r s 
as i t would mean r e a l peace and s e c u r i t y i n eastern 
Europe. At the end o f March Sthamer repo r t e d t h a t 
Norman was s e r i o u s l y examining the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
connecting P o l i s h s t a b i l i s a t i o n w i t h a German-Polish 
(77) 
settlement. v 1 At the same time the Treasury were 
t e l l i n g the B r i t i s h Legation i n Warsaw t h a t the Poles 
would be advised t o apply t o the League - advice which 
the Legation d i d not expect Poland t o f o l l o w . 
I n f u r t h e r conversation w i t h Norman on 6t h A p r i l Dufour 
learned t h a t the Bank of England had been t r y i n g t o 
prevent the grant of piece-meal c r e d i t s t o Poland i n 
order t o b r i n g about-a proper f i n a n c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
This should p r e f e r a b l y be done by the League, which 
should be able t o make i t a c o n d i t i o n t h a t Poland should 
s e t t l e a l l economic and p o l i t i c a l problems w i t h her 
(79) 
neighbours. ' 
Schacht was expected t o v i s i t London i n A p r i l , and 
Norman hoped t o discuss Poland w i t h him. But the v i s i t 
77. A.D.A.P., Vol. I I . 1 , Nos.72, 97. 
78. Niemeyer t o Max Mu l l e r , 29 Mar. 1926; Max Muller 
t o Niemeyer, 7 Apr., N 1463, 1621/41/55, FO 371/ 
11761. 
79. A.D.A.P.,Vol. I I . 1 , No. 116. Early i n March D'Abernon, 
r e p o r t i n g on renewed German-Polish n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r 
a trade agreement, commented t h a t he saw l i t t l e hope 
of success w i t h o u t some p o l i t i c a l adjustment and 
pressure from outside. The Northern Department of 
the Foreign O f f i c e saw no prospect of B r i t i s h 
pressure; B e r l i n desp. 113, 3 Mar. 1926, N 1034/ 
228/55, FO 371/11768. 
602 
was postponed and i n s t r u c t i o n s on German p o l i c y were 
ins t e a d sent t o Sthamer who was, however, t o l d not t o 
discuss the matter h i m s e l f . The i n s t r u c t i o n s stressed 
the need f o r great c a u t i o n i n t a c k l i n g the P o l i s h 
question. At present Germany's p o s i t i o n was not strong 
enough t o enable her t o put forward her p o l i t i c a l demands 
w i t h any prospect of success. An attempt t o s e t t l e 
the f r o n t i e r question now i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n would, at best, 
produce p a r t i a l r e s u l t s , and these would p r e j u d i c e the 
chance of a f u l l s o l u t i o n l a t e r . The aim must, 
t h e r e f o r e , be t o postpone a d e f i n i t i v e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
of Poland. On the other hand i f a s t a r t were made 
Germany would have t o j o i n i n r a t h e r than be accused 
of sabotaging the attempt: the aim i n t h i s case must 
be t o see t h a t a c t i o n was l i m i t e d and t h a t no t e r r i t o r i a l 
compromise was reached t h a t d i d not secure f o r Germany 
Danzig, the Co r r i d o r , Upper S i l e s i a and p a r t s of c e n t r a l 
S i l e s i a . Reconstruction by the League was undesirable 
since i t would probably take too great a share i n the 
t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements. 
Schacht's v i s i t t o London took place a t the end of 
May. He had agreed beforehand w i t h Dirksen about the 
l i n e t o take on P o l i s h r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , but he found 
80. jLJ3.A.P., Vol. I I . 1 , No, 150. An a d d i t i o n a l German 
i^^TB^SsoTDwishing t o keep Poland o f f the League 
^ Council was t h a t as a member of i t Poland could 
h a r d l y be subjected t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l 
c o n t r o l . 
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Norman much le s s ready t o consider coupling i t w i t h a 
f r o n t i e r settlement. Both Norman and Niemeyer t r i e d t o 
persuade Schacht of the bad impression t h a t would be 
caused i f Germany refused t o take p a r t i n h e l p i n g 
Poland. ^ The German M i n i s t e r i n Warsaw, too, 
advised t h a t r e f u s a l t o p a r t i c i p a t e would not help Germany' 
cause; and he d i d not share Dirksen's hope t h a t B r i t a i n 
would put pressure on Poland t o come t o an agreement 
(82) 
w i t h Germany. v ' 
H i t h e r t o the Foreign O f f i c e had not been i n v o l v e d 
i n the approaches t o the Bank of England and the 
Treasury, and i t s records show very l i t t l e evidence of 
knowledge o f the matter. According t o the German 
archives the p o s s i b i l i t y - o f connecting P o l i s h f i n a n c i a l : ~ 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h f r o n t i e r r e v i s i o n was mentioned 
once or twi c e t o T y r e l l , and Lampson on 21ai May t o l d a 
German j o u r n a l i s t t h a t Germany ought t o pursue 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h Poland and not t o r a i s e p o l i t i c a l 
demands or t r y t o sabotage f i n a n c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
but no c o n f i r m a t i o n from the B r i t i s h side has been 
found. K -' On h£k June, however, a Baron de Ropp, 
81. A.D.A.P., Vol. I I . 1 . , «%sisgg^, Nos. 203, 213. 
82. A.D.A.P., -^mmgMk*™ Vol. I I . 2 , Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 
13, Rauscher c o n t i n u a l l y advised h i s Government 
t h a t there was no prospect of Poland surrendering 
t e r r i t o r y v o l u n t a r i l y . 
83- A.D.A.P.. ^ b f e ^ y s ^ Vol. 1.1, No. 173; Vol. I I . 1 , 
No. 208. 
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who was sometimes used by the German Government as an 
u n o f f i c i a l mouthpiece, t o l d a member of the Northern 
Department t h a t Germany expected t o have a voice i n 
any League of Nations scheme f o r f i n a n c i a l help t o 
Poland, but t h a t no German would l i f t a f i n g e r , t o 
help Poland unless t h e r e were a hope of f r o n t i e r r e v i s i o n . 
This was taken as a h i n t t h a t i f B r i t a i n wanted German 
co-operation i n the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Poland she would 
have t o put pressure on Poland t o agree t o f r o n t i e r 
r e v i s i o n . At l a s t on 12-fete August, and as i f i t were 
h i s own idea, Norman suggested t o Lampson t h a t the idea 
of Germany buying back Eupen and Malmedy might be applied 
t o the Corridor as w e l l . Lampson said t h a t he thought 
i t would be most-unwise t o s t a r t t a l k i n g about the 
Corridor. He d i d not take Norman1s. remarks s e r i o u s l y , 
but on Chamberlain's i n s t r u c t i o n s he repeated h i s 
advice t o the Governor on the f o l l o w i n g day. 
The P o l i s h p o s i t i o n improved i n the summer of 1926, 
l a r g e l y thanks t o increased coal exports as a r e s u l t of 
the prolonged miners' s t r i k e i n B r i t a i n . I n October 
the German Government decided t o resume the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
on a trade agreement and other matters. Rauscher 
84. Minute by C o l l i e r , 4 Jun. 1926, N 2591/41/55, 
FO 371/11763. 
85. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No. 143; minutes on 
C 9013/234/18, FO 371/11280. For the whole 
episode see Korbel, Poland between East and West, 
pp. 197-200, and Riekhoff, German-Polish 
Relations, pp. 256-63. S i r Henry Clay, Lord 
Norman, London 1957, pp. 258-60, gives a very 
b r i e f account of the P o l i s h problem which reveals 
nothing about Norman's involvement i n the 
p o l i t i c a l aspect. 
605 
advised t h a t even apart from these n e g o t i a t i o n s i t was 
des i r a b l e i n the i n t e r e s t of o v e r a l l p o l i c y t h a t the 
a t t e n t i o n of the world should not be c o n t i n u a l l y drawn 
back t o the German-Polish q u a r r e l by press campaigns. 
The only r e s u l t of assertions t h a t i t was i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 
was renewed pressure on Germany t o recognise the status 
quo i n some way. The discussions i n the French press 
since Thoiry, Rauscher suggested, showed how even a 
Franco-German understanding could f a i l over Poland. 
P i l s u d s k i ' s assumption of power i n Poland i n May, 
1926, gave r i s e t o rumours t h a t another coup against 
L i t h u a n i a was being planned. There was also renewed 
press discussion of the p o s s i b i l i t y of compensating 
Poland w i t h L i t h u a n i a n t e r r i t o r y f o r the r e t u r n of-
Danzig t o Germany. I n connexion w i t h these r e p o r t s and 
the French press discussion of an eastern settlement, 
and i n connexion w i t h a renewed L i t h u a n i a n suggestion of 
( 8 7 ) 
a t r e a t y w i t h Germany, v ' the head of the P o l i s h 
s e c t i o n of the Eastern Department of the Ausw'artiges 
Amt discussed once more, i n the middle of November, 
the prospects f o r Germany o b t a i n i n g a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
r e v i s i o n of the P o l i s h f r o n t i e r . Any s o l u t i o n t o t h i s 
c a r d i n a l problem of German f o r e i g n p o l i c y was, Z e c h l i n 
86. A.D.A.P., Vol. I I . 2 , No. 134. 
87. Talks about a t r e a t y had been going on d e s u l t o r i l y 
f o r over a year: 4569/E168393-97; Stresemann, 
Vermachtnis, Vol. I I , pp. 228-30; A.D.A.P., 
Vols. I I . 1 - I I . 2 , passim. 
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wrote, f a r d i s t a n t . There were only three p o s s i b l e 
sources of help f o r Germany - B r i t a i n and the United 
States, Russia, and France. B r i t a i n had long been 
regarded as the best hope because B r i t i s h o p i n i o n had 
been the f i r s t i n western Europe t o recognise the "impossible" 
nature of the Cor r i d o r . But the hope o f e n l i s t i n g B r i t i s h 
support f o r a combination of a f r o n t i e r r e v i s i o n w i t h 
f i n a n c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n had come t o nothing; and although 
B r i t a i n might welcome changes which d i d not upset the 
balance of power and d i d c o n t r i b u t e t o p a c i f i c a t i o n , 
she was u n l i k e l y t o take any i n i t i a t i v e . At present 
Germany could not undertake a f o r e i g n p o l i c y w i t h o u t or 
against B r i t a i n , but l i t t l e was t o be hoped f o r from her 
i n the P o l i s h question. 
The most popular of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a s o l u t i o n 
was German-Russian c o l l a b o r a t i o n . The two c o u n t r i e s had 
indeed a common i n t e r e s t i n a l t e r i n g the P o l i s h f r o n t i e r s ; 
but i n other respects (notably L i t h u a n i a ) t h e i r i n t e r e s t s 
were not the same and i n p r a c t i c e even a Russian m i l i t a r y 
v i c t o r y over Poland would not help German i n t e r e s t s so 
long as a German-French understanding had not been 
reached. France, i n f a c t , h e l d the key t o German aims 
i n the east, and a German-French understanding on a broad 
basis must lead t o an understanding about the east as 
w e l l . I t was a very l a r g e problem, but i f there were no 
f u r t h e r cause of d i r e c t dispute between the two c o u n t r i e s 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n between them might i n time enable German 
i n t e r e s t s t o be s e t t l e d anew. On immediate questions, 
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Z e c h l i n thought t h a t a P o l i s h - L i t h u a n i a n union would be 
( 8 8 ) 
very dangerous f o r Germany. v ' 
Zechlin's head of department, W a l l r o t h , agreed t h a t 
the most important p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r an eventual 
s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n was t h a t France should be encouraged 
t o d i s i n t e r e s t h e r s e l f i n eastern questions. He regarded 
any idea of Germany co-operating i n compensating Poland 
i n L i t h u a n i a as extremely p r e j u d i c i a l t o German i n t e r e s t s 
and t o German r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union and the 
B a l t i c s t a t e s ; but he was le s s alarmed by the prospect 
of a P o l i s h absorption of L i t h u a n i a since he thought 
t h a t i t would weaken r a t h e r than strengthen Poland and 
would worsen Polish-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . 
Assurances were given t o -the Soviet Government t h a t 
B r i t a i n had not approached Germany about compensation 
f o r Poland i n L i t h u a n i a ; and when Stresemann mentioned 
Chicherin's f e a r s a t Geneva, Chamberlain said t h a t there 
was no foundation f o r them. Also a t Geneva the P o l i s h 
M i n i s t e r f o r Foreign A f f a i r s assured Schubert t h a t the 
r e p o r t s of an impending a t t a c k on L i t h u a n i a were nonsense.(^O) 
I n f a c t , r e l a t i o n s between Poland and L i t h u a n i a d i d not 
reach c r i s i s p o i n t again u n t i l the end of 1927 . 
8 8 . A.D.A.P., Vol. I I . 2 , No. 140 . 
8 9 . A.D.A.P., Vol. I I . 2 , ^ ^ ^ ^ No. 145 . 
9 0 . A.D.A.P., Vol. I I . 2 . togEirib^ Nos. 137 , 148 , 
1 6 3 ; D.B.F.P., Ser. I A V V O I . I I , No. 323-
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The n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a p o l i t i c a l agreement between 
Germany and the Soviet Union were resumed a f t e r the 
(91) 
Locarno conference a t the Russian request. K ' 
Although the Germans maintained t h a t the l e t t e r from the 
western powers on A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant was e n t i r e l y 
s a t i s f a c t o r y i n safeguarding Germany's p o s i t i o n and ought 
t o remove the Soviet o b j e c t i o n s , the Russians professed 
themselves unconvinced. The n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , 
consisted i n the main of Soviet attempts t o induce Germany 
t o commit h e r s e l f t o n e u t r a l i t y i n case of war between 
the Soviet Union and other powers, even i f the Soviet 
Union were the aggressor, and German attempts f i r s t not 
t o have a t r e a t y a t a l l but only some k i n d of 
d e c l a r a t i o n not mentioning n e u t r a l i t y , and f i n a l l y t o 
confine a n e u t r a l i t y undertaking t o cases where the 
Soviet Union was the v i c t i m of unprovoked aggression 
coupled w i t h an undertaking not t o j o i n an economic 
boycott against her i n peacetime. The Germans were 
throughout prepared t o give assurances about A r t i c l e 16. 
They also spared no e f f o r t t o deter the Russians from 
s i g n i n g even an a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y w i t h Poland. 
The idea of g i v i n g assurances about A r t i c l e 16 w o r r i e d 
Hoesch, who regarded any k i n d of promise of n e u t r a l i t y 
as incompatible w i t h the League idea and as an u n j u s t i f i e d 
w e i g h t i n g of the balance of German p o l i c y . He was 
91. A f u l l account of the n e g o t i a t i o n s i s given i n Kurt 
Rosenbaum, Community of Fate. German-Soviet 
Diplomatic Relations 1922--1928, Syracuse, N.Y., 
1965, pp. 188-219. Documents p r i n t e d i n A.D.A.P., 
Vol. I I . 1 . 
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sure t h a t the Russian motive was a desire t o d i s r u p t 
Germany's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the western powers. Schubert, 
however, t o whom Hoesch expressed these doubts and who 
equally d i s t r u s t e d Chicherin's good f a i t h , nevertheless 
beli e v e d t h a t the Soviet f e a r s o f B r i t i s h p o l i c y were 
genuine and t h a t by e n t e r i n g the League Germany was g i v i n g 
the Russians a blow. He agreed w i t h Hoesch t h a t the 
German s e c u r i t y o f f e r had not been meant as an o p t i o n 
f o r the west, but he argued t h a t Locarno had i n p r a c t i c e 
t i p p e d the balance t o the west so t h a t i t was necessary 
(qp) 
t o make an eastward c o n t r i b u t i o n t o redress i t again. K ' 
I n the l a s t week of February the German Government 
approved d r a f t s of a short t r e a t y and a p r o t o c o l which 
corresponded f a i r l y c l o s e l y t o the t e x t s e v e n t u a l l y signed. 
Stresemann was not prepared t o sign them u n t i l Germany was 
s a f e l y i n the League; but on l a * March an agreement 
was concluded f o r a c r e d i t t o the Soviet Union o f 300 
m i l l i o n marks, more than h a l f of which was guaranteed 
by the Reich and Land Governments. The setback a t 
Geneva, and the almost simultaneous P o l i s h r e f u s a l o f 
a non-aggression pact w i t h the Soviet Union unless the 
B a l t i c States were included, a l t e r e d the s i t u a t i o n . By 
the end of March the Germans had made up t h e i r minds 
t h a t the t r e a t y must be signed. But the f i n a l stage o f 
the n e g o t i a t i o n s was complicated. By t e l l i n g the 
Western powers t h a t a t r e a t y was i n prospect the Germans 
92. #pg^m« A.D.A.P. .Vol. I I . 1 , Nos. 25, 41. 
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e f f e c t i v e l y committed themselves t o si g n i n g something; 
but a t the same time they secured themselves against 
the charge of repeating the s u r p r i s e o f Rapallo, and also 
t o some extent against having t o accept f a r - r e a c h i n g 
Soviet amendments. The Russians b a t t l e d t o the l a s t t o 
secure a German undertaking o f n e u t r a l i t y i n a war 
provoked by the Soviet Union and one t h a t Germany would 
not j o i n i n economic a c t i o n against the Soviet Union 
a t any time. They also put forward proposals f o r new 
m i l i t a r y c o l l a b o r a t i o n . At the l a s t minute they accepted 
compromise proposals which, the Germans b e l i e v e d , 
secured the p r i n c i p l e of t h e i r d r a f t w h i l e removing words 
t o which the Russians objected. 
The B r i t i s h and French Governments were informed of 
the prospect of the t r e a t y on 31s«5 March. Both 
expressed anxiety about the c o m p a t i b i l i t y of a promise 
of n e u t r a l i t y w i t h the o b l i g a t i o n s o f the Covenant. (93) 
Chamberlain and Briand agreed t h a t i t was impossible t o 
prevent the conclusion of the t r e a t y ; but Chamberlain 
asked t h a t the Germans should take steps t o reassure the 
Poles, and Briand expressed a hope t h a t the signature 
might be delayed u n t i l a f t e r the French Senate had 
approved the Locarno t r e a t i e s . (94) However, on 
93. D.BoF.P. Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 384, 391, 392, 397, 
398, 400, 409, 410; A.D.A.P., Vol. I I . 1 , Nos. 99, 
100, 104, 108, 109, 110, 113. 
94. D.B.F.P. Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 412, 414, 415, 418, 
420, 421, 423; A.D.A.P., Vol. I I . 1 , Nos.119, 121, 124. 
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14G A p r i l The Times repo r t e d t h a t what was described as 
a new Reinsurance Treaty was i n prospect, so t h a t 
signature could not be postponed. The German Government 
complained about the leak, but i t was not a l t o g e t h e r t o 
t h e i r disadvantage. Less than ever could they a f f o r d t o 
l e t the n e g o t i a t i o n s f a i l , but t h e i r chance o f r e s i s t i n g 
excessive Soviet demands was strengthened. Sthamer 
now repeated t o Chamberlain assurances t h a t t h e r e was 
no change i n German p o l i c y and t h a t n othing i n the 
proposed arrangements was incompatible e i t h e r w i t h 
the Locarno undertakings or w i t h the o b l i g a t i o n s of 
the Covenant. (95) 
Eastern European c o u n t r i e s were a good deal alarmed 
by the news o f the t r e a t y . Benes suggested t h a t the 
German Government should be asked o f f i c i a l l y how i t s 
p r o v i s i o n s were t o be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h the procedures o f 
the League; but Chamberlain thought i t b e t t e r t o assume 
German good f a i t h and unwise t o enter i n t o f u r t h e r 
d i s c u s s i o n of A r t i c l e 16. (96) ^ Q Poles were not 
e a s i l y encouraged and Schubert d i d not improve matters 
by accusing them o f i n t r i g u e against Germany. (97) 
95. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 434; A.D.A.P., Vol. 
I I . 1 , Nos. 135, 144, n. 8. 
96. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 429, 435, 437, 441, 
443, 447, 449; Prague desp. 139, 17 Apr. 1926, 
N 1726/718/38, FO 371/11791; A.D.A.P.. Vol. I I . 1 , 
Nos. 155, 167, n. 3; Vol. I l l ; No. 120. 
97. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 450, 459; A.D.A.P., 
Vol. I I . 1 , No. 157. 
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This " i n t r i g u e " consisted mainly o f having discussed 
a non-aggression pact w i t h the Soviet Union, the prospect 
of which had s e r i o u s l y w o r r i e d the German Government; 
but i t was, i n f a c t , the Poles who had turned down the 
pact unless the B a l t i c States were included. I n suggesting 
t o the western governments t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
Polish-Soviet agreement and the a c t u a l signature of a new 
Polish-Roumanian t r e a t y had been the motives f o r 
deciding on the German-Soviet t r e a t y , the Germans professed 
f e a r o f P o l i s h r a t h e r than of Soviet p o l i c y . They 
also professed - and indeed f e l t - some f e a r of a Franco-
Soviet rapprochement r e s u l t i n g from the debt n e g o t i a t i o n s 
r e c e n t l y s t a r t e d i n Paris. (98) 
The German-Soviet t r e a t y and an exchange of notes 
were signed i n B e r l i n on 241S& A p r i l and published two 
days l a t e r . I n the t r e a t y the two co u n t r i e s undertook 
(1) t h a t they would remain i n f r i e n d l y contact t o 
promote an understanding on a l l p o l i t i c a l and economic 
questions a f f e c t i n g the two countries;m^(3) t h a t i f on 
the occasion of such a c o n f l i c t , or when n e i t h e r p a r t y 
^was_engage,d_ i n j w a r l i k e operations, a c o a l i t i o n were formed 
98. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 392, 401, 407, 
409, 415, 435, 445, 454, 464,. D'Abernon a t t r i b u t e d 
the i n f o r m a t i o n given t o himjja l e a d i n g German 
a u t h o r i t y . " I have not been able t o f i n d i n the 
German Foreign M i n i s t r y archives a p a r a l l e l memorandum 
t h a t would confirm whether or not t h i s was a disguise 
f o r Schubert, as f r e q u e n t l y was the case. The 
renewed Polish-Roumanian defensive a l l i a n c e , signed 
on 26*te March was not, as the o r i g i n a l one of 1921 
had been, concerned s o l e l y w i t h aggression on the 
two c o u n t r i e s ' eastern f r o n t i e r s : B.F.S.P., Vol. 
CXIV, pp. 916-17; Vol. CXXV, pp. 981-3. 
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against e i t h e r w i t h a view t o an economic boycott, the 
other would not j o i n . I n t h e i r note the German Government 
st a t e d t h a t Germany's en t r y i n t o the League could not 
be an obstacle t o f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet 
Union. The League was designed f o r the peaceful 
settlement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes and the German 
Government were determined t o co-operate i n the 
r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h i s idea. I f , however, any e f f o r t s 
d i r e c t e d against the Soviet Union should take shape w i t h i n 
the League, Germany would combat them. Nor could l o y a l 
observance of o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g out of A r t i c l e s 16 and 
17 adversely i n f l u e n c e Germany's a t t i t u d e t o the Soviet 
Union, against whom sanctions could only be considered 
i f she -entered on a war o f aggression against another 
s t a t e . The question whether the Soviet Union were the 
aggressor could only be determined w i t h b i n d i n g f o r c e 
f o r Germany w i t h her own consent. As t o whether Germany 
could take p a r t i n any a p p l i c a t i o n of sanctions, the 
German Government r e f e r r e d t o the note on A r t i c l e 16 
addressed t o them on the signature of the Locarno 
t r e a t i e s . I n r e p l y the Soviet Government took note of 
(99) 
these explanations. v ' 
Knowledge o f the exact terms of the t r e a t y and notes 
d i d not a l l a y anxiety abroad. Chamberlain was s t i l l 
r e l u c t a n t t o say so t o other Governments, but he had the 
Germans informed t h a t the t e x t s were obscure and a very 
99. German t e x t s i n A.D.A.P.„ Vol. I I . 1 , No. 168; 
t r a n s l a t i o n i n BoF.S.Po 9 Vol. CXXV, pp. 738-41. 
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inadequate f u l f i l m e n t of the advance assurances. I t 
was again decided not t o ask f o r formal explanations 
of the German a t t i t u d e t o the a p p l i c a t i o n o f A r t i c l e s 
16 and 17, hut i t was arranged t h a t Gaus should give 
explanations t o Fromageot and Murat. 
Gaus gave these explanations on 1 2 t i i May a t Geneva. 
He repeated the assurance t h a t the t r e a t y could not 
override the Locarno engagements or the o b l i g a t i o n s of 
the Covenant, and then explained the a r t i c l e s . The 
n e u t r a l i t y s t i p u l a t i o n was expressly c o n d i t i o n a l on the 
Soviet Union being the v i c t i m of unprovoked a t t a c k . 
The Russians, he sa i d , had objected t o the term 
"unprovoked aggression" on the ground t h a t i t suggested 
t h a t - t h e i r - country might be g u i l t y of provocation; 
but the words "despite i t s peaceful a t t i t u d e " covered 
the same p o i n t . The p r o v i s i o n of A r t i c l e 3, also, 
was only a p p l i c a b l e when the Soviet Union was the 
v i c t i m of unprovoked aggression or when there was no 
armed c o n f l i c t ; i n such cases A r t i c l e s 16 and 15(7) 
of the Covenant d i d not a r i s e . The German note 
c o n s t i t u t e d r e p l i e s t o questions put by the Soviet 
Government about the e f f e c t of Germany's e n t r y i n t o the 
League. The statement t h a t A r t i c l e 16 d i d not o b l i g e 
Germany t o take any a c t i o n w i t h o u t her own consent 
100. D.B.F.Po, Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 470, 475, 476, 
477, 478, 479, 482, 486, 489, 490, 492, 494, 497, 
501, 502, 507, 509, 510, 512, 513, 514, 516, 519, 
522; A.DcAoP., Vol. I I . 1 , Nos. 174, 178, 184, 
185; Vol. 1.1, Nos. 213, 215. 
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accorded with the Assembly resolution of 1921; Germany-
had not undertaken not to agree to a vote that the 
Soviet Union was an aggressor. The reference to the 
(101) 
Locarno l e t t e r said no more than the l e t t e r i t s e l f . v ' 
Gaus's explanations were given and accepted verbally 
but were not f o r publication. After f u r t h e r discussion 
Stresemann agreed that Briand might state i n the Senate 
that Gaus had explained the German Government's view, 
so that there could be no doubt on the question whether 
the German-Soviet t r e a t y was i n harmony with the 
(102) 
Covenant and the Locarno tre a t y . v ' 
On the e f f e c t of the Treaty of B e r l i n one of the best-
informed German experts on the Soviet Union, Schlesinger, 
wrote early i n July that Soviet policy- would invariably 
a f f e c t Germany's po s i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . 
I n her own i n t e r e s t Germany must t r y to prevent the Soviet 
Union taking steps that would endanger her existence. 
On the other hand Schlesinger thought that the Russian 
fears of B r i t a i n were j u s t i f i e d , and argued that even 
i f B r i t a i n , f o r i n t e r n a l reasons, could not conduct an 
active anti-Soviet p o l i c y herself she had the means to 
cause other states to conduct i t f o r her. I t was also 
important f o r Germany to prevent the threat to Soviet 
survival from becoming acute at a time when Soviet 
101. A.D.A.P.. Vol. 1.1, No. 227, annex 2. 
102. D.B.FoP., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 523; Vol. I I , 
Nos. 9, 10, 12; A.D.A.P.. Vol. 1.1, Nos. 227, 
232, 234, 235. 
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r e l a t i o n s w i th Europe v i r t u a l l y rested on Germany 
alone. <1°3> 
I n f a c t , Chamberlain's policy of correct indifference 
towards the Soviet Union was maintained throughout 1926. 
As f o r working through other countries, the Foreign 
Office had very l i t t l e to do with r e l a t i o n s between the 
Soviet Union and her neighbours. Before Chicherin 
v i s i t e d Paris i n November 1925 the French were t o l d that 
Chamberlain would be prepared to consider a suggestion 
f 104) 
of a meeting. v ' But Chicherin did not ask f o r an 
i n v i t a t i o n and although Soviet representatives continued 
to say that a settlement with B r i t a i n was desired there 
was no sign of readiness to f u l f i l the condition of a 
changed a t t i t u d e on debts and claims and an end to a n t i -
B r i t i s h a c t i v i t i e s . At the beginning of November there 
was some discussion i n the Foreign Office about a change 
of p olicy, since other European countries were t r y i n g to 
improve t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i th the Soviet Union and moves 
might be expected to include her i n the p a c i f i c a t i o n of 
Europe and perhaps to admit her to the League. The 
conclusion at t h i s stage was that there should be no 
change; so that when the Soviet Charge d 1 A f f a i r e s made 
enquiries about t a l k s f o r a settlement he was given the 
same answer as before. (^ ®^ ) 
103. A.D.A.P., BmmsFtt:., Vol. I I . 2 , No. 32. 
104. Minute by Lampson, 29 Oct. 1925, N 6054/102/38, 
FO 371/11016; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 
46, n. 4. 
105. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , ee^^bfe^, Nos. 46, 
65, 142, 150, 181. 
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During the winter, however, signs of a domestic 
campaign about Anglo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s increased, and 
Chamberlain f e l t obliged to take some steps to f o r e s t a l l 
i t . He again recommended his Cabinet colleagues not to 
make attacks on the Soviet Union which would confirm 
Chicherin's suspicions of B r i t i s h policy; and a f t e r a 
deputation from the London Chamber of Commerce, who were 
worried about the working of the trade agreement, had 
been received at the Foreign Office Chamberlain wrote i n 
a l e t t e r f o r publication that the Government were prepared 
to consider any Soviet proposals f o r a settlement i n good 
f a i t h and di d not think that abrogation of the trade 
agreement would serve B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . (^6) 
In reporting-the German-Soviet t r e a t y to the Central 
Executive Committee Litvinov said that i t was Soviet 
policy to conclude t r e a t i e s w ith other states i n order 
to lessen the danger of blocs being formed against her. 
I f the object of Locarno were to bring peace among nations 
i t s authors ought to welcome the German-Soviet tre a t y ; but 
i f the r e a l object were to i s o l a t e the Soviet Union then 
the t r e a t y with Germany had removed some of the sting. 
Litvinov r e i t e r a t e d a desire f o r an understanding w i t h 
B r i t a i n and professed to see some signs of a changing 
a t t i t u d e there. ^ 1 ° 7 ^ 
106. fm^ssgc* D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 278, 
416, enclosure. 
107. Degree, Soviet Document on Foreign Policy, Vol. 
I , pp. 104-17; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 
463, 465. = " ' 
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By about t h i s time, indeed, the d e s i r a b i l i t y of some 
settlement was being considered i n the Foreign Office, 
but the transfer of Soviet funds to support the General 
Strike put an end to any prospect of a favourable decision 
(1OR 
and increased Conservative Party pressure f o r a breach. ^ 
For the time being the demand was resisted. Chamberlain 
stated i n the House of Commons on 25tH June that the Govern-
ment did not intend to break o f f r e l a t i o n s , and he t o l d 
the Soviet Charge d ? A f f a i r e s that he desired to avoid 
a rupture. ( 1 0 9 ) No important element i n the s i t u a t i o n 
changed thereafter, except th a t the pressure from the 
Conservative Party and some of his colleagues f i n a l l y 
i n May, 1927, overcame the opposition of Chamberlain and 
(110) 
his advisers to a breach with the-Soviet Union. v • ' 
The pursuit of settlements i n other troubled areas 
The prospects f o r Locarno-type agreements i n other 
parts of Europe did not improve during 1926, the optimism 
of the Foreign Office at the time of the Imperial 
Conference notwithstanding. The fundamental reason was 
1 0 8 - D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I . % §Erv-e^t,., NOB. 504; 
Vol. I I , Nos. 31, 52, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 71, 80. 
1°9- H.C. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 197, cols. 769-77; 
D.B.F.Po, Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No. 90; also Nos. 103, 
176. 
110. Cf. Stambrook, i n Int e r n a t i o n a l Review of History 
and P o l i t i c a l Science, VI (1969J. 
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the lack of s u f f i c i e n t incentives. I n the B a l t i c area 
negotiations f o r non-aggression t r e a t i e s , guarantee 
pacts and the l i k e were repeatedly hampered by the 
c o n f l i c t i n g interests of almost a l l the countries 
concerned; and were especially complicated by the positions 
of Poland and Lithuania and the German and Soviet 
(111) 
atti t u d e s thereto. v ' The B r i t i s h Government played 
no part, despite the Russian conviction that the B a l t i c 
States were pawns i n B r i t a i n ' s anti-Soviet policy (a 
conviction that was one of the motives f o r t r y i n g to 
conclude non-aggression pacts with them) and that under 
Pilsudski Poland was f a l l i n g under B r i t i s h influence. 
I n November, 1925, Chamberlain commended to the 
Lithuanian Minister i n London the p r i n c i p l e of Locarno, 
namely a f r e e l y chosen contribution to peace; but i n 
recording the conversation he wrote that i t was not 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y to impose such a policy on other countries.^ 
On 22£^ J January a member of the Latvian Legation asked 
the Northern Department what B r i t a i n would think of a 
pact between the B a l t i c States and the Soviet Union. 
He was t o l d that Chamberlain favoured any arrangement 
anywhere that would tend to promote peace and a f e e l i n g 
of security. (^3) 
111. See Korbel, Poland between East and West, pp. 189-
208; X. J. taudin and H. H. Fisher, Soviet Russia 
and the West, 1920-1927, Stanford 1957, PP- 280-2. 
112. D.BoF.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 83. 
113- Desp.29 to Riga, 29 Jan. 1926, N 300/124/59, 
FO 371/11723. 
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The Soviet proposals of the spring of 1926 f o r a 
pact with the B a l t i c States were said to include a provision 
that they would not j o i n i n any h o s t i l e alliance directed 
against the Soviet Union, a provision which might have 
con f l i c t e d with the obligations of the Covenant. I n 
consequence the B r i t i s h representatives i n the area 
were instructed that although the Government desired to 
see peaceful r e l a t i o n s established everywhere i n Europe, 
and would view without jealousy negotiations f o r improved 
rela t i o n s between the Soviet Union and any of her 
neighbours, t h i s a t t i t u d e was based on the assumption 
that any agreements were purely defensive and did not 
i n any way derogate from the duties of members of the 
League. v ' The terms of the German-Soviet tr e a t y 
seemed to underline the need f o r care. At the beginning 
of May the Lithuanian Government asked whether i t would 
be regarded as a suitable model f o r the Soviet-
Lithuanian t r e a t y now under discussion. The reply 
suggested was tha t i t would be essential to make sure that 
the language of the t r e a t y conformed s t r i c t l y to the 
/ J\ Si C \ 
terms and obligations of the Covenant. ^ D } 
Recommendations such as t h i s would not weaken the 
Soviet d i s t r u s t of B r i t i s h policy i n the B a l t i c States. 
114. Riga desp. 89^ 13 Mar. 1926; Moscow desp. 227, 
19 Mar., N 1309, 1531/124/59, FO 371/11723; 
D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I , No. 417. 
115. Riga desp. 156, 7 May 1926; desp. 180 to Riga, 
1 Jun., N 2222/124/59, FO 371/11724. 
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By the end of the summer, however, some Soviet o f f i c i a l s 
were prepared to concede that the behaviour of the 
Foreign Office and B r i t i s h diplomatic representatives 
was correct, although they s t i l l harboured the darkest 
suspicions of other B r i t i s h agencies. ^ ; The terms 
of the Soviet-Lithuanian t r e a t y signed on 28^. September 
i n f a c t corresponded closely to those of the Treaty of 
Berl i n ; but one of the reasons f o r the f a i l u r e of the 
Soviet negotiations with the other B a l t i c States was 
(117) 
t h e i r insistence on f i d e l i t y to the Covenant. v ' 
Far from the prospects of settlements i n central 
and south-east Europe improving i n 1926, the s i t u a t i o n 
was further disturbed by the development of Mussolini's 
aim of s u b s t i t u t i n g I t a l i a n f o r French influence i n the 
region and his decision to establish a v i r t u a l 
protectorate over Albania. ( H 8 ) As f a r as rel a t i o n s 
between Hungary and her neighbours were concerned, the 
scandal over the discovery of a conspiracy i n Hungary 
to counterfeit French banknotes to be used f o r p o l i t i c a l 
ends i n central Europe was a serious setback a f t e r the 
116. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , No. 180; Riga desp. 
322, 3 Sep'.JfeN 4251/387/38, F0 371/11787. 
117. Soviet-Lithuanian t r e a t y , B.F.S.P., Vol. CXXV, 
pp. 890-3; Riga desp. 263, 20 Jul.,, 1926, N 3466/ 
124/59, FO 371/11724; Helsingfors desp. 180, 25 
Nov. 1926, N 5431/124/59, FO 371/11726. 
118. I t a l i a n p o l i c y i n the Balkans and the Danubian 
area at t h i s time i s discussed i n Cassels, 
Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, pp. 315-47. 
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t e n t a t i v e feelers of the winter of 1925. Austria, 
however, concluded an a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y w i t h 
Czechoslovakia i n March. 
Early i n 1926, as a r e s u l t p a r t l y of long-standing 
discussion of a Franco-Yugoslav t r e a t y and p a r t l y of the 
more recent t a l k of a Balkan Locarno, the French proposed 
a t r i p a r t i t e agreement with I t a l y and Yugoslavia to 
guarantee the t e r r i t o r i a l settlement. This suggestion 
savoured too much of an alliance of the v i c t o r s to meet 
with B r i t i s h approval. Chamberlain was anxious to see 
an improvement i n Franco-Italian r e l a t i o n s ; but instead 
of welcoming a proposal that might have contributed to 
t h i s end he echoed Mussolini's objection that i t was 
contrary to the Locarno s p i r i t . Mussolini's refusal to 
contemplate French p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n any combination i n 
the A d r i a t i c region was founded on I t a l i a n ambitions, 
not on devotion to the s p i r i t of Locarno; but i t was 
s u f f i c i e n t not only to k i l l a t r i p a r t i t e pact but to 
(119) 
delay conclusion of a Franco-Yugoslav t r e a t y . v ' 
Briand's deference to Mussolini's wishes on t h i s occasion 
did not help to improve re l a t i o n s w i t h I t a l y , which on 
the contrary deteriorated. Much as Chamberlain regretted 
t h i s f a c t , he continued to favour the expansion of I t a l i a n 
influence across the Ad r i a t i c ; and the Foreign Office 
1.19. D.B.F.P,, Ser. IA, Vol. I , Nos. 263, 291, 300, 
329; Kennard to Howard Smith, 23 Feb. 1926; 
Howard Smith to Kennard, 1 Mar., C 2673/1618/62, F0 
371/11242; D.D.I., Vol. IV, Nos. 237, 240, 249, 
250, 262, 263, 266, 269, 271, 273, 278, 283. 
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viewed with equanimity the French misgivings about the 
(120) 
decline of t h e i r influence i n central Europe. ' 
The Preparatory Commission f o r the Disarmament Conference 
The Preparatory Commission f o r the Disarmament 
Conference began i t s f i r s t session on 18tk May, 1926. 
Eleven months l a t e r i t adopted a report s e t t i n g out a 
d r a f t convention without figures and with a number of 
alter n a t i v e proposals. The only parts of t h i s f i r s t 
year's e f f o r t that are relevant to the subject of t h i s 
study are the attempt that was made to devise provisions 
on security, and the conclusions that might be drawn about 
the future. 
I n the inst r u c t i o n s given to Cecil i t was stated, with 
regard to security and assistance to an attacked state, 
that the B r i t i s h Government were w i l l i n g to j o i n i n 
considering whether A r t i c l e 16 could be regarded as 
ef f e c t i v e , but that they f e l t strongly that reduction 
and l i m i t a t i o n of armaments would so greatly increase 
security as to make t h i s point less important. Any 
fu r t h e r examination of A r t i c l e 16 should be directed 
towards ensuring that the obligations were such as could 
and would be carried out. The r e a l menace to security, 
i n many cases, was competition between neighbouring states 
i n maintaining excessive armaments. The measures 
120. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos. 74, 88, 126. 
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contemplated i n A r t i c l e 16 f o r dealing w i t h aggression 
did l i t t l e to remove t h i s menace: the only thing that 
could do so was e f f e c t i v e agreement on the reduction and 
l i m i t a t i o n of armaments. The B r i t i s h Government could 
only contemplate contributing to f u r t h e r guarantees of 
security i n exchange f o r a guarantee that a genuine 
(121) 
scheme of disarmament would be enforced. v ' 
At an early meeting of the d r a f t i n g committee the 
French delegation proposed that a sub-commission should 
study procedures f o r assistance under A r t i c l e 16 and that 
the Council should study procedures f o r c a l l i n g rapid 
meetings i n case of war or threat of war. Cecil was 
able to get t h i s proposal withdrawn and instead a 
resolution adopted, addressed to the Council, suggesting 
that i n order to enable a state to calculate the extent 
of disarmament to which i t could agree i t was necessary 
to determine the procedures fbru.giving help to a v i c t i m 
of attack, and asking that such procedures should be 
(122) 
studied. v ' However, the Foreign Office were so much 
disturbed by t h i s apparent attempt to go back to the 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance that the French Ambassador 
was asked f o r an explanation. Briand r e p l i e d that there 
was no question of reopening the Treaty or the Geneva 
121. League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory 
Commission f o r the Disarmament Conference, Series 
I I , Geneva 1926, pp. 13-25,' D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, 
Vol. I I , No. 2. 
122. Documents of the Preparatory Commission, Series 
I I , pp. 89-101; 110-11; D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. 
I I , Nos. 14, 16, 19. 
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Protocol, but the majority of the Commission accepted the 
connexion between security and disarmament. The problem 
was to determine the amount of disarmament made possible 
by guarantees of security. (^3) Remitting the question 
to the Council solved one d i f f i c u l t y i n t h a t the United 
States would have had great d i f f i c u l t y i n discussing i t 
i n the Preparatory Commission; but i t created another i n 
that Germany was not yet on the Council and objected 
strongly to A r t i c l e 16 being discussed without her. The 
dilemma was overcome by postponing discussion of the 
(124) 
resolution. v ' I n September the proposal was referred 
to a committee of the Council, where the Belgian 
representative suggested that what r e a l l y mattered was 
to -improve Council procedures when any danger of war 
existed. Recommendations to t h i s e f f e c t were approved 
by the Council and the Assembly i n 1927. No more was 
heard of A r t i c l e 16 f o r the time being. 
The Preparatory Commission had by no means completed 
i t s work by the time of the Assembly meeting i n September 
1926, but i t was then instructed to hasten so that i f 
possible the Disarmament Conference could be called 
123. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I . , ^ g a d ^ Nos. 20, 21, 
28, 357 47. 
124. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I . . •Qsggrsafc—. Nos. 44, 53; 
A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, Nos. 236, 239, 242. 
125. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I I , Nos. 83, 187, 196, 
320; Vol. I l l , Nos. 15, 47. 
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before, the next Assembly. .With a good many doubts on 
the part of t h e i r advisers, the B r i t i s h Government 
decided to put forward a d r a f t convention f o r the next 
meeting, of the Commission. v ' The French delegation 
.also put. forward a d r a f t ; intensive discussion brought 
agreement on some points but l e f t others unreconciled. 
One d i f f i c u l t y was over-naval l i m i t a t i o n , and the 
problem was made worse by- the meeting and the f a i l u r e 
of the separate naval conference i n the summer of 
1927V which revealed a fundamental Anglo-American 
difference over, cruisers. re . 
Surveying the scene a f t e r the adjourment of the 
Preparatory* Commission..in A p r i l , 1927, Cadogan, one of 
the_F_oreign_Office__officials permanently attached to 
the B r i t i s h delegation to. the League of Nations, was 
inclined;to think that the whole attempt not only 
had achieved very l i t t l e but had been misguided. The 
League,-he wrote, had discovered between 1920 and 
1922J that general reduction o f * l i m i t a t i o n of armaments 
'was impossible i n the absence of security. I t had then 
pursued general security and had found i t impossible,. 
Locarno had been a " b r i l l i a n t s t a r t " .on the a l t e r n a t i v e 
road towards security by means of regional agreements; 
but i t had had no sequel and there seemed to be no 
126. D.BoFoP,, Ser. IA, 0g>v <^ **-> Vol. I l l , Nos. 10, 
,• 37C". .15/27, CAB 23/54. •: Texts of the d r a f t 
conventions i n Cmd 2888 of 1927, League'of Nations. 
Preparatory Committee f o r the Disarmament Conference 
Report of the B r i t i s h Representative to the 
Secretary of'State f o r Foreign Affairs,.Arifeces 
I and I I . 
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prospect of a series of r e g i o n a l arrangements adding 
up t o the c r e a t i o n of a general sense of s e c u r i t y s u f f i c i e n t 
t o produce a general r e d u c t i o n of armaments. But since 
1925 the f e e l i n g t h a t something must be done about 
disarmament had grown i n t o an obsession: the wheel 
had come f u l l c i r c l e and s e c u r i t y had dropped i n t o the 
background. Cadogan thought t h a t the d i f f i c u l t i e s and 
dangers would be only beginning when the Disarmament 
Conference met, f o r i t was then t h a t f i g u r e s would have 
to be f i l l e d i n . Even supposing t h a t agrement were 
reached on the basis of what each country regarded as 
the minimum e f f e c t i v e s necessary f o r i t s s a f e t y , t h a t 
would not c o n s t i t u t e r e d u c t i o n of a k i n d t o s a t i s f y 
Germany. Cadogan had no proposal on how the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
should be continued, other than delay. He would have 
p r e f e r r e d t o t r y f o r r e g i o n a l disarmament i n areas 
(-197) 
where r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y had been achieved. v ' 
C e c i l , n a t u r a l l y , d i d not con|de# t h a t l i t t l e had 
been achieved, and he argued t h a t even i f the disarmament 
conference produced only a very modest r e d u c t i o n i t 
would mark a step forward by s e t t i n g up a d e f i n i t e 
machinery. He maintained also t h a t f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s 
could not be postponed, p r e c i s e l y because of the German 
d i f f i c u l t y since the A l l i e s were o b l i g e d t o promote 
(128) 
a scheme of general disarmament. v ' 
127. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I l l , Nos. 200, 300. 
128. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I l l , §B ' ; ! 9 N 9 
628 
--: The question whether the German obli g a t i o n to remain. 
disarmed depended l e g a l l y on the Allies-' o b l i g a t i d n 
to formulate and carry out a scheme of. general disarmament 
(-129) 
was not as simple as Cecil thought. I t was, 
however, undeniably true that the German d i f f i c u l t y 
had already arisen and that the B r i t i s h Government, 
thanks to League of Nations opinion and not least 
to Cecil, had already committed themselves to the 
general reduction of armaments. Their feet were v 
set on the treacherous road from which, as the next 
six years were i:o show, , there could be no turning 
.off whatever happened i n Europe. Cadogan's idea that 
•the Locarno powers might be able to agree on 
l i m i t a t i o n of-armaments as between-themselves-was— 
possibly the- least practicable a l t e r n a t i v e . I t was 
presumably based on an assumption not only that 
Locarno had solved the problem of ^western European-
security but also - contrary to the evidence of the 
Preparatory Commission and of French m i l i t a r y w r i t i n g 
i n 1926 - 27 - that^France no longer feared Germany. 
In f a c t , at th i s time, as l a t e r , any l i m i t a t i o n of 
armaments- to which France would agree would not meet the 
German case, which was concerned not with world 
disarmament but with a substantial reduction i n the 
129. g D.B.F.P., Ser. IA. See ; Q ^ ^ * K » Vol. I , Nos. 
4=132b, 508. 1 




At almost the'same time as Cadogan and Cecil were 
discussing the lessons of the f i r s t year of the Preparatory 
Commission f o r the Disarmament Conference, reports from 
Paris and Coblenz suggested to the Foreign Office that 
the a t t i t u d e of France and Belgium was "informed less:, 
completely than formerly by the Locarno s p i r i t . " v J ' 
In reply to an enquiry whether t h i s was so, Crewe 
pointed out on 8"Q Ju l y ^ 1927^ that the' Locarno, t r e a t i e s 
had never been regarded i n France as a complete' solution 
to the problem of•French security: even Briand had 
described, them i n the Senate as "un bien r e l a t i f . " 
:Crewe had suggested some months e a r l i e r that the f a c t 
'that the Locarno guarantees, although not regarded as 
s u f f i c i e n t , were as much as any B r i t i s h Government were 
l i k e l y to give, would impel France to do what she could , 
130. Cf. A.D.A.P., Vol. 1.1, No. 144, a Reichswehr 
memorandum of 6 March 1926 which pointed out that 
a l l the aims of German poli c y meant controversy 
w i t h Germany's neighbours and I t a l y . The f i r s t 
aim of her disarmament policy must therefore be to 
s t r i p France of'her dominating m i l i t a r y power; 
secondly Polish armaments must be reduced; t h i r d l y 
those of Belgium and Czechoslovakia: and behind 
them I t a l y . World disarmament was * of no great 
interest. to Germany.' .For French m i l i t a r y 
reorganisation and thinking i n 1926-27 see Jon 
Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy. Germany and the West 
1925-1929, Princeton 1972, pp. 105-13. — — 
131. D.B.F.P.9, Ser. IA, Vol. I l l , Nos. 249, 250, 256. 
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to e f f e c t a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with. Germany. He thought 
that: t h i s was s t i l l the case, but that the mass of 
moderate French opinion was in c l i n e d to ask whether • 
German policy was not fundamentally h o s t i l e to France and 
B r i t a i n . This, i f true, need not mean that Germany 
contemplated a breach of the Locarno t r e a t i e s ; - there 
were plenty of other directions i n which she could act. 
against her l a t e enemies. It•might, however, mean that 
immediate concession to Germany i n a l l matters would not 
a l t e r German policy. "France accepts Locarno,"- Crewe 
\concluded, "and continues to act i n i t s s p i r i t . • I t 
does not follow t h a t she believes that the Locarno policy 
i s immediately-capable of a wider development. She 
.might be ready. for_ such & development were Germany able 
to convince her that she too was guided by i t s s p i r i t 
and not only by i t s l e t t e r . " , ^ 
An answer to the question of who gained most from 
Locarno involves not only a balancing of immediate and 
long-term gains but also the weighing of imponderables 
and answers to fu r t h e r hypothetical questions. When 
part of Stresemann's l e t t e r to the Crown Prince, with 
i t s reference to a t a c t i c of "finassieren," was published 
i n the Vermachtnis i n 1932 there"was an outcry that 
the western powers had been duped. Briand 1s biographer 
l a t e r asserted that since the t e r r i t o r i a l provisions , 
132. D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, Vol. I l l , ;Qp^i^fe> No. 263; 
Vol. I I , No. 36. 
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of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s were s t i l l i n t a c t at the 
time of Stresemann's death i t was rather he who f a i l e d , 
and that Briand was always aware that the s p i r i t of 
Locarno needed additional doses of appeasement to keep 
i t a l i v e . ^ 1 3 3 ^ 
Without pursuing Suarez's argument into the 1930 8s 
one might say that i n so fa r as Locarno led neither 
to the complete Franco-German r e c o n c i l i a t i o n for which 
Briand hoped and worked, nor to, the t e r r i t o r i a l r e v i s i o n 
'•".--..v '5'.-'., ' f '" ' VyC-.v.'+ ,v,' .*'•.-•; '. • j<, A*""',-,-
. " • -.• . = -. : « •. • .' . 
for which Stresemann hoped and worked, both ultimately 
f a i l e d . But i n so f a r as a l l the main parties to the 
t r e a t i e s gained something, i t was a genuinely 
.-,/.. :r;i.. •;' . • j . . ' v .'.J.-j ir t j ' f a v "•. " -V 
successful settlement. The gains actually achieved by 
-Germany? were considerable. - Already—by_the - date—when— 
the t r e a t i e s were signed the immediate objects for 
which Stresemann made the security offer i n January 
1925 had been secured; -an Anglo-French a l l i a n c e had 
been frustrated and the evacuation of the f i r s t zone of 
the occupied t e r r i t o r y had been assured. Within the . 
next-eighteen, months the Control-Commission had been , 
withdrawn without securing the complete fulfilment of 
the m i l i t a r y clauses of the Treaty? of V e r s a i l l e s , 
and the idea of- a permanent organ i n the demilitarised 
zone.had been abandonedv< I t was- increasingly doubtful 
whether the scheme of League investigation of German 
disarmament would ever be applied. The hopes for an 
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early complete evacuation of the Rhineland i n return 
for a f i n a n c i a l contribution proved, vainr but before' he 
died Stresemann secured a promise of accelerated 
evacuation and an improved reparation settlement. • , 
The gain for France was some release from fear.for 
the security of her eastern f r o n t i e r and a formal 
assurance of B r i t i s h support i n case of need: a 
secondary gain was a measure of r e l i e f from the danger 
that her strength would be over-taxed as'a r e s u l t of 
a German-Polish quarrel. But these gains were not 
s u f f i c i e n t to reconcile French opinion to German demands 
for the reduction of European armaments, and i t i s 
beyond the scope of t h i s study to speculate on•the 
circumstances i n which a Franco-German r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
might have taken place.. The gain -for B r i t a i n was release 
from f r i c t i o n with.both Germany and France over the peace 
settlement, and from; the necessity for constant a c t i v i t y 
in:western European a f f a i r s . 
For:Germany 1s eastern and south-eastern neighbours, 
especia l l y Poland, the measure of any gain from the 
Locarno settlement depended almost e n t i r e l y on future 
developments. Relations between Germany and 
Czechoslovakia continued on the previous passable 
bas i s : "fehose between Germany, and Poland underwent a 
s l i g h t improvement, but no genuinely favourable 
development was possible i n view of the absolute German 
re j e c t i o n of the t e r r i t o r i a l settlement i n the east. 
The r e v i s i o n i s t claims against Poland not merely were 
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a matter of policy but had the character of a national 
.mystique which',could only be modified by a dictator. 
The: sole gain was that from 1925 German Governments, 
having•evaluated Germany's m i l i t a r y capacity, pursued 
the aim of r e v i s i o n by propaganda/ economic and 
diplomatic means alone=and.directed the emphasis at the 
western governments rather than hoping for a m i l i t a r y 
solution i n conjunction with the Soviet Union. The 
hope that the western powers would secure, the German 
aim was, however, i l l u s o r y . A good deal of sympathy 
for i t was aroused, but when the western governments 
had to choose between a c t i v e l y supporting change and 
maintaining the status quo,the; l a t t e r always: seemed 
the better way to preserve peace. Whether any .favourable.! 
offer could have induced Poland to part with.territory 
must be open to grave-doubt; propaganda and economic 
pressure could not possibly do so. Stresemann pursued 
re v i s i o n with persistence u n t i l h i s death. Whether 
he would have continued to'believe t h a t - i t could be 
achieved by these means, and whether he would have 
continued to use these means alone, .once .Germany's, m i l i t a r y 
position had improved, are. questions for speculation. 
While i t ' i s impossible to be sure, many sober 
authorities are inclinedoto give him the benefit of 
(134) 
the doubt. v • In the mean time the-expansion of 
134. : The l a t e s t and most thorough discussion of the Polish problem i s by Riekhoff, German-Polish 
.Relations, Chs. IX and X I I , e s p e c i a l l y pp.263-71. 
economic re l a t i o n s between Germany and France did not 
take place, whereas for a l l the defects of the German-
Soviet relationship the economic-a#*©#mftits signed 
for p o l i t i c a l reasons with the Treaty of B e r l i n 
contributed to the improvement of Germany's position. 
"L 1 e s p r i t de Locarno est compose de plusieurs 
e s p r i t s f o r t d i f f e r e n t s , " wrote Henri de Jouvenel i n 
1932. ^35) rpj^ g atmosphere of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and hope 
that made up so large a part of the s p i r i t of Locarno. 
-TOp from the s t a r t more prjsvmlenii i n B r i t a i n than , 
elsewhere. I t i s perhaps too easy with hindsight to 
dismiss i t as an i l l u s i o n ; but even,without going into 
the question of popular optisism and the differences 
between generous public statements and private mis-
givings , i t does seem that there was always a basis of 
wishful thinking and a f a l s e estimate of Germany's 
motives for entering on the security pact. Had the 
objectives of Stresemann's policy been better * 
understood, i t i s possible that the r e j o i c i n g might 
have been more tempered and the expectations more 
r e a l i s t i c . No doubt those who did express misgivings 
i n private hoped that by the time that Germany had 
recovered her strength she would be so tied* to the west 
by i n t e r e s t and membership qf the League that she would 
have learned to play a constructive part i n European 
society; but the alternative was not f t i l l ^ faced. 
135. Henri de Jouvenel, La Paix francaise, Paris 1932, p. 181. ; _ " * * 
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The step taken at Locarno 'by B r i t a i n was a limited one, 
a l b e i t the largest that was possible at the. time. Since 
B r i t a i n would make no,.more- far-reaching contribution 
.the-influence that she could exercise thereafter was 
necessarily also limited. Locarno was a p a r t i a l 
settlements unless i t s . p r i n c i p l e were applied i n other 
'"" •-• v .-"•**>•.•'. ,\A. "? ^ v ^ T ' '<•'.- Sy:-^' '. . -. ;/- •'' '. ,•' .' ' ' ; - . 
areas i t could not carry the weight that was loaded on 
to i t . However differen t were the circumstances of the 
eventual breakdown, some of the causes were present from 
the s t a r t of the negotiations: 'the ambiguities of the 
relationships between the three major parties,, and 
between them and the p a r t i e s i n the east, were re f l e c t e d 
i n the ambiguities of the t r e a t i e s . Annelise Thimme, 
_ i n her short.study_ of Stresemann, has written that 
whereas i n the negotiations for the security treaty 
each power had something to contribute, thereafter 
Germany had no more to, give and could only demand. (^6) 
One can accept t h i s as a ^statement of what was actually 
^ possible while being able to see the contributions that 
were s t i l l needed, from Germany, i n the west as well as 
i n the east, i f the pact were r e a l l y to succeed. The 
judgment indeed-demonstrates how-limited was the effect 
of Locarno upon the security of even western Europe. 
General security'might be unattainable,' but i n due 
course European security was proved to be i n d i v i s i b l e . :•" 
136. Annelise Thimme, Gustav Stresemann, Hanover- and 
Frankfurt 1957, p. 111. 
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Appendix 
S u c c e s s i v e t e x t s of the western s e c u r i t y t r e a t y 
( i ) 
B r i t i s h d r a f t , 3 J u l y 1 9 2 5 ^ ^ 
1. The high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s s e v e r a l l y and 
c o l l e c t i v e l y guarantee i n the manner provided i n the 
f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e s the maintenance and i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the 
f r o n t i e r s between France and Belgium on the one hand and 
Germany on the other hand, as f i x e d by or i n pursuance of the 
T r e a t y of Peace signed at V e r s a i l l e s on the 28th June 1919. 
2. France and Belgium of the one p a r t and Germany of the 
other p a r t s e v e r a l l y undertake t h a t they w i l l i n no case 
r e s o r t to war a g a i n s t the other except i n r e s i s t a n c e to 
i n v a s i o n or a t t a c k by the other or when a c t i n g w i t h the 
a u t h o r i s a t i o n of the C o u n c i l or the Assembly of the League 
of Nations. 
3. I f any p a r t y to the p resent t r e a t y a l l e g e s t h a t a 
v i o l a t i o n of a r t i c l e 2 of t h i s t r e a t y or of a r t i c l e s 42, kj 
or 180 of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s has been, or i s being, 
committed, the q u e s t i o n s h a l l be brought before the C o u n c i l 
of the League f o r t h w i t h . 
4. As soon as any v i o l a t i o n of a r t i c l e 2 of t h i s 
t r e a t y or of a r t i c l e s 42, 43 or 180 of the T r e a t y of 
V e r s a i l l e s s h a l l have been e s t a b l i s h e d to the s a t i s f a c t i o n 
of the C o u n c i l of the League, the C o u n c i l s h a l l f o r t h w i t h 
n o t i f y such v i o l a t i o n to each of the p a r t i e s to t h i s t r e a t y . 
5. The p a r t i e s to t h i s t r e a t y s e v e r a l l y agree that i n 
the event of any n o t i f i c a t i o n being made to them as provided 
i n a r t i c l e 4, they w i l l each of them come immediately to the 
a s s i s t a n c e of the Power a g a i n s t which the a c t complained of 
i s d i r e c t e d . 
6. T r e a t i e s s h a l l be concluded between France and 
Germany and between Belgium and Germany r e s p e c t i v e l y 
p r o v i d i n g f o r the p e a c e f u l settlement of a l l d i s p u t e s , 
whether j u r i d i c a l or p o l i t i c a l , which may a r i s e between them 0 
1. C 8861/459/18, F0 371/10735. 
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7. ( l ) The t r e a t i e s r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 6 s h a l l be 
placed under the guarantee of the p a r t i e s to the present 
t r e a t y . 
(2) I f i t i s a l l e g e d by a p a r t y to one of the s a i d 
t r e a t i e s t h a t the other p a r t y has f a i l e d to comply w i t h i t s 
p r o v i s i o n s , e i t h e r by r e f u s i n g to submit a d i s p u t e to the 
machinery t h e r m provided f o r the settlement of d i s p u t e s , or 
tfc=> 
by f a i l i n g to comply w i t h an award, recommendation or r e p o r t 
r e s u l t i n g therefrom, the q u e s t i o n s h a l l be r e f e r r e d to the 
C o u n c i l of the League. 
(3) I f the C o u n c i l of the League i s s a t i s f i e d that 
a p a r t y to one of the s a i d t r e a t i e s has f a i l e d to comply w i t h 
i t s p r o v i s i o n s as a l l e g e d , the C o u n c i l s h a l l propose what step 
s h a l l be taken to secure compliance w i t h the t r e a t y . 
( 4 ) I f the p a r t y which has f a i l e d to comply w i t h the 
p r o v i s i o n s of one of the s a i d a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s i s found 
by the C o u n c i l of the League to have r e s o r t e d to war a g a i n s t 
the other p a r t y to that t r e a t y , the p a r t i e s to the present 
t r e a t y s e v e r a l l y agree t h a t they w i l l each of them come 
Immediately to the a s s i s t a n c e of the Power a t t a c k e d . 
8. The p r o v i s i o n s of the p r e s e n t t r e a t y s h a l l not be 
deemed to prevent a c t i o n , provided that such a c t i o n i s not 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Covenant, i n f u l f i l m e n t of a guarantee 
given by one of the p a r t i e s to the p r e s e n t t r e a t y f o r the 
execution of an a r b i t r a t i o n ^ o f the same purport as those 
r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 6, concluded by another p a r t y to the 
present t r e a t y w i t h a t h i r d S t a t e , where the p a r t y f a i l i n g to 
comply w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the s a i d a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y 
r e s o r t s to war a g a i n s t the other p a r t y to that t r e a t y . Nor 
s h a l l they be deemed to a f f e c t the r i g h t s enjoyed by any of 
the p a r t i e s to the present t r e a t y under the T r e a t y of 
V e r s a i l l e s or under the subsequent agreements t h e r i n provided 
f o r , i n c l u d i n g the agreements signed i n London on the 30th 
August 192k. 
9. Nothing i n t h i s t r e a t y s h a l l a f f e c t the r i g h t s and 
o b l i g a t i o n s of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s as Members of the 
League of Nations, nor s h a l l i t p r e j u d i c e the power and duty 
of the League to take, i n accordance w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of 
the Covenant, any a c t i o n t h a t may be deemed wise and 
638 
e f f e c t u a l to safeguard the peace of the world, 
10. The present t r e a t y must be submitted to the C o u n c i l 
of the League of Nations and must be r e c o g n i s e d by the C o u n c i l , 
a c t i n g i f need be by a m a j o r i t y , as an engagement which i s 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Covenant of the League; i t w i l l continue 
i n f o r c e u n t i l , on the a p p l i c a t i o n of one of the p a r t i e s to 
i t , the C o u n c i l , a c t i n g i f need be by a m a j o r i t y , agrees t h a t 
the League i t s e l f a f f o r d s s u f f i c i e n t p r o t e c t i o n . 
11. Copies of the t r e a t i e s r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 6 
s h a l l be communicated to each of the p a r t i e s to t h i s t r e a t y 
before i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
12. T h i s t r e a t y s h a l l impose no o b l i g a t i o n upon any of 
the B r i t i s h Dominions, or upon I n d i a , u n l e s s the Government 
of any such Dominion, or of I n d i a , s i g n i f i e s i t s acceptance 
thereof» 
The present t r e a t y s h a l l be r a t i f i e d , but s h a l l not come 
i n t o f o r c e u n l e s s and u n t i l Germany has become a member of 
the League of Nations. 
1. The high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s s e v e r a l l y and 
c o l l e c t i v e l y guarantee i n the manner provided f o r i n the 
f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e s the maintenance and i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the 
f r o n t i e r s between France and Belgium on the one hand and 
Germany on the other hand, as f i x e d by or i n pursuance of the 
T r e a t y of Peace signed a t V e r s a i l l e s on the 28th June 1919» 
and the i n t e g r i t y of the neighbouring t e r r i t o r i e s , together 
w i t h the t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo of the Rhineland r e s u l t i n g 
from the s a i d t r e a t y and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , from a r t i c l e s 42, 43 
and 180. 
2. France and Belgium of the one p a r t and Germany of 
the other p a r t s e v e r a l l y undertake t h a t they w i l l i n no case 
r e s o r t to war a g a i n s t the other. 
T h i s s t i p u l a t i o n s h a l l not, however apply i n the case of 
r e s i s t a n c e to i n v a s i o n , a t t a c k , or h o s t i l e a c t s , or i n the 
case of a c t i o n undertaken w i t h the a u t h o r i s a t i o n of the 
C o u n c i l or the Assembly of the League of Nations. 
i i 
F r ench r e d r a f t , 31 J u l y 1925 ( t r a n s l a t i o n ) 
2. C 10146/459/18, FO 371/10737. 
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3o Except i n the c a s e s contemplated i n paragraph 2 of 
a r t i c l e 2, any d i s p u t e s which may a r i s e between Germany and 
Belgium or between Germany and France, and which cannot be 
s e t t l e d by n e g o t i a t i o n , s h a l l be s e t t l e d by means of 
a r b i t r a t i o n , and the s a i d Powers hereby agree t h a t they w i l l 
comply w i t h the settlement so a r r i v e d a t . The methods of 
a r r i v i n g a t such a settlement are the s u b j e c t of s p e c i a l 
arrangements. 
k. Subject to the p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 6 below, i f one 
of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s a l l e g e s t h a t a v i o l a t i o n of 
a r t i c l e 2 of the p r e s e n t t r e a t y or of a r t i c l e s 42, or 180 
of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s has been or i s being committed, 
i t w i l l be f o r that p a r t y to b r i n g the q u e s t i o n at once before 
the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations. 
5. As soon as the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations i s 
s a t i s f i e d that such a v i o l a t i o n has been committed, i t w i l l 
n o t i f y i t s f i n d i n g without delay to the Powers s i g n a t o r y of 
the present t r e a t y , who s e v e r a l l y agree t h a t i n such case they 
w i l l each of them come immediately to the a s s i s t a n c e of the 
Power a g a i n s t which the a c t complained of i s d i r e c t e d . 
6. I n case of a manifest v i o l a t i o n by one of the high 
c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s of a r t i c l e 2 of the p r e s e n t t r e a t y or of 
a r t i c l e s 42, k3 or 180 of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s , i f the 
other c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s are agreed t h a t such v i o l a t i o n 
c o n s t i t u t e s an unprovoked a c t of aggression, and that by 
reason of the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s or of the assembly of 
armed f o r c e s i n the d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone immediate a c t i o n i s 
n e c e s s a r y , the s a i d p a r t i e s s e v e r a l l y agree t h a t they w i l l 
each of them come immediately to the a s s i s t a n c e of the Power 
a g a i n s t which the a c t complained of i s d i r e c t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s 
the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations, which i s to be s e i z e d 
of the q u e s t i o n i n accordance w i t h a r t i c l e k, w i l l i s s u e i t s 
f i n d i n g s and the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s w i l l a c t i n 
accordance t h e r e w i t h . 
7« The p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 3 above are p l a c e d under 
the guarantee of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s as provided 
by the f o l l o w i n g s t i p u l a t i o n s 8 
( l ) Where one of the p a r t i e s r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 2, 
without r e s o r t i n g to h o s t i l e measures, has r e f u s e d to submit 
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a dispute to a r b i t r a t i o n or to comply w i t h an a r b i t r a l 
d e c i s i o n , the other p a r t y s h a l l be a t l i b e r t y to b r i n g the 
matter before the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations, which 
s h a l l propose what steps s h a l l be taken to secure compliance 
w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 3. 
(2) I f one of the Powers r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 2 r e f u s e s 
to submit a d i s p u t e to a r b i t r a t i o n or to comply w i t h an 
a r b i t r a l d e c i s i o n , and r e s o r t s to h o s t i l e measures, the 
p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 6 s h a l l apply. 
8. The p r o v i s i o n s of the present t r e a t y do not a f f e c t 
the r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s 
under the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s or under subsequent arrangement 
i n c l u d i n g the agreements signed i n London on the 30th August 
1924, nor y e t the r i g h t s of any one of the high c o n t r a c t i n g 
p a r t i e s to take a c t i o n , i n so f a r as such a c t i o n igjt not 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Covenant, i n f u l f i l m e n t of a guarantee 
given by i t to the observance of the a r b i t r a t i o n conventions 
concluded t h i s day between Germany and Poland and between 
Germany and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , i f the p a r t y which v i o l a t e s such_ 
a convention r e s o r t s to h o s t i l e measures. 
9. Nothing i n the present t r e a t y s h a l l a f f e c t the r i g h t s 
and o b l i g a t i o n s of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s as members of 
the League of Nations, or s h a l l be i n t e r p r e t e d as r e s t r i c t i n g 
the r o l e of the League <2f f o r the purpose of m a i n t a i n i n g the 
peace of the world. 
10. The p r e s e n t t r e a t y must be submitted to the C o u n c i l 
of the League of Nations and must be r e c o g n i s e d by the C o u n c i l 
as an engagement which i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Covenant of the 
League. 
11. The s p e c i a l conventions on the procedure f o r 
a r b i t r a t i o n , r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3 and signed t h i s day, 
and the a r b i t r a t i o n conventions r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 8 
above between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovak! 
s h a l l , before the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the p r e s e n t t r e a t y , be 
communicated to each of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s who are 
not p a r t i e s to the s a i d conventions. 
12. The present t r e a t y s h a l l impose no o b l i g a t i o n upon 
any of the B r i t i s h Dominions, or upon I n d i a , u n l e s s the 
Government of any such Dominion, or of I n d i a , s i g n i f i e s i t s 
6 4 l 
acceptance t h e r e o f . 
13. The present t r e a t y s h a l l be r a t i f i e d , but s h a l l not 
come i n t o f o r c e u n t i l Germany has become a member of the 
League of Nations. 
( i i i ) 
Anglo-French d r a f t , 12 August 1 9 2 5 ^ ) 
1. The High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s s e v e r a l l y and 
c o l l e c t i v e l y guarantee i n the manner provided i n the 
f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e s the maintenance and i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the 
f r o n t i e r s between Prance and Belgium on the one hand and 
Germany on the other hand, as f i x e d by or i n pursuance of 
the T r e a t y of Peace signed a t V e r s a i l l e s on the 28th June, 
1919« and a l s o the s t a t u s of the Hhineland as l a i d down i n 
a r t i c l e s 42, 43 and 180 of the s a i d t r e a t y . 
2. France and Belgium of the one p a r t and Germany of 
the other p a r t s e v e r a l l y undertake that they w i l l i n no case 
r e s o r t to war a g a i n s t the other. 
T h i s s t i p u l a t i o n s h a l l not, hox^ever, apply i n the case 
of r e s i s t a n c e to i n v a s i o n or a t t a c k or i n the case of a c t i o n 
undertaken i n agreement w i t h the Co u n c i l or the Assembly of 
the League of Nations, or i n case of a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of 
a r t i c l e s 42, 43 or 180 of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s , i f such 
v i o l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s an unprovoked a c t of a g g r e s s i o n and by 
reas o n of the assembly of armed f o r c e s i n the d e m i l i t a r i s e d 
zone, immediate a c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y . 
3. Any di s p u t e which may a r i s e between Germany and 
Belgium or between Germany and France and which cannot be 
s e t t l e d by n e g o t i a t i o n s h a l l be s e t t l e d by means of 
a r b i t r a t i o n , and the s a i d Powers hereby agree that they w i l l 
comply w i t h the settlement so a r r i v e d a t . 
The d e t a i l e d arrangements f o r e f f e c t i n g such s e t t l e m e n t 
s h a l l be the s u b j e c t of s p e c i a l agreements. 
4. ( l ) I f one of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s a l l e g e s 
t h a t a v i o l a t i o n of a r t i c l e 2 of the present t r e a t y or of 
a r t i c l e s 42, 43 or 180 of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s has been 
or i s being committed, i t s h a l l b r i n g the q u e s t i o n a t once 
3. C 10611/459/18, F0 371/10738. 
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before the Cou n c i l of the League of Nations. 
(2) As soon as the Council of the League of Nations i s 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t such a v i o l a t i o n has been committed, i t w i l l 
n o t i f y i t s f i n d i n g without delay to the Powers s i g n a t o r y of 
the present t r e a t y , who s e v e r a l l y agree t h a t i n such case they 
w i l l each of them come immediately to the a s s i s t a n c e of the 
Power a g a i n s t whom the a c t complained of i s d i r e c t e d . 
(3) I n case of a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n by one of the High 
C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s of a r t i c l e 2 of the present t r e a t y or of 
a r t i c l e s 42, 43 or 180 of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s , i f the 
other C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s are agreed that such v i o l a t i o n 
c o n s t i t u t e s an unprovoked a c t of aggress i o n , and that by 
reason of the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s or of the assembly of 
armed f o r c e s i n the d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone immediate a c t i o n i s 
nec e s s a r y , the s a i d p a r t i e s s e v e r a l l y agree that they w i l l 
each of them come immediately to the a s s i s t a n c e of the Power 
a g a i n s t whom the a c t complained of i s d i r e c t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s 
the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations, which i s to be s e i z e d 
of the ques t i o n i n accordance with the f i r s t paragraph of 
t h i s a r t i c l e , w i l l i s s u e i t s f i n d i n g s , and the High 
C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s w i l l a c t i n accordance t h e r e w i t h . 
5« The p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 3 above are p l a c e d under 
the guarantee of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s as provided by 
the f o l l o w i n g s t i p u l a t i o n s ! 
(1) Where one of the Powers r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3» 
without r e s o r t i n g to f o r c e , r e f u s e s to submit a dispute to 
a r b i t r a t i o n or to comply w i t h an a r b i t r a l d e c i s i o n , the other 
p a r t y s h a l l b r i n g the matter before the C o u n c i l of the League 
of Nations, and the C o u n c i l s h a l l propose what steps s h a l l be 
taken to secure compliance w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 3» 
(2) I f one of the Powers r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3 
r e f u s e s to submit a dis p u t e to a r b i t r a t i o n or to comply w i t h 
an a r b i t r a l d e c i s i o n , and r e s o t t s to f o r c e , the p r o v i s i o n s of 
a r t i c l e 4 s h a l l apply. 
6. The p r o v i s i o n s of the pre s e n t t r e a t y do not a f f e c t 
the r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s 
under the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s or under arrangements 
supplementary t h e r e t o , i n c l u d i n g the agreements signed i n 
London on the 30th August, 1924, nor yet the r i g h t s of any one 
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of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s to take a c t i o n , i n so f a r as 
such a c t i o n i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Covenant, i n 
f u l f i l m e n t of a guarantee given by i t to the observance of 
the a r b i t r a t i o n conventions concluded t h i s day between Germany 
and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia, i f the p a r t y which 
v i o l a t e s such a convention r e s o r t s to f o r c e . 
7. Nothing i n the present t r e a t y s h a l l a f f e c t the r i g h t s 
and o b l i g a t i o n s of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s as Members 
of the League of Nations, or s h a l l be i n t e r p r e t e d as 
r e s t r i c t i n g the duty of the League of Nations to take whatever 
a c t i o n may be deemed wise and e f f e c t u a l to safeguard the peace 
of the world. 
8. The present t r e a t y s h a l l be d e p o s i t e d w i t h the 
League of Nations i n accordance w i t h the Covenant. I t s h a l l 
remain i n f o r c e u n t i l the C o u n c i l , a c t i n g a t the request of 
at l e a s t two of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s , and v o t i n g i f 
need be by a m a j o r i t y , decides that the League of Nations 
ensures s u f f i c i e n t p r o t e c t i o n to the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s . 
9. The s p e c i a l agreements embodying the d e t a i l e d 
a^pjangements f o r e f f e c t i n g a settlement by a r b i t r a t i o n , 
r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3 and signed t h i s day, and the 
a r b i t r a t i o n conventions r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 6 between 
Germany and Poland and Germany and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , s h a l l , 
before the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the present t r e a t y , be communicated 
to each of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s who are not p a r t i e s 
to the s a i d conventions. 
10. The p r e s e n t t r e a t y s h a l l impose no o b l i g a t i o n upon 
any of the B r i t i s h Dominions, or upon I n d i a , u n l e s s the 
Government of such Dominion, or of I n d i a , s i g n i f i e s i t s 
acceptance t h e r e o f . 
11. The p r e s e n t t r e a t y s h a l l be r a t i f i e d , but s h a l l not 
come i n t o f o r c e u n t i l Germany has become a Member of the 
League of Nations. 
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( i v ) 
(k) 
Text drawn up at the j u r i s t s ' meeting, 4 September 1925 
The P r e s i d e n t of the German Re p u b l i c ! H i s Majesty the 
King of the B e l g i a n s ? the P r e s i d e n t of the French R e p u b l i c ; <o 
and H i s Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d and of the B r i t i s h dominions beyond the 
Seas, Emperor of I n d i a ; 
Anxious to s a t i s f y the d e s i r e f o r s e c u r i t y and 
p r o t e c t i o n which animates the peoples upon whom f e l l the 
brunt of the war of 1914-18; 
Taking note of the abrogation of the t r e a t i e s f o r the 
n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Belgium, and conscious of the n e c e s s i t y of 
s t a b i l i s i n g the t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo i n the a r e a which has 
so f r e q u e n t l y been the scene of European c o n f l i c t s ; 
Animated a l s o w i t h the s i n c e r e d e s i r e of g i v i n g to a l l 
the s i g n a t o r y Powers concerned supplementary guarantees 
w i t h i n the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and the t r e a t i e s i n f o r c e between them; 
Have determined to conclude a t r e a t y w i t h these o b j e c t s , 
and have appointed as t h e i r p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s : 
Who, having communicated t h e i r f u l l powers, found i n 
good and due form, have agreed as f o l l o w s s -
1. The High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s s e v e r a l l y and 
c o l l e c t i v e l y guarantee i n the manner provided i n the 
f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e s the maintenance and i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the 
f r o n t i e r s between France and Belgium on the one hand and 
Germany on the other hand, as f i x e d by or i n pursuance of the 
T r e a t y of Peace signed at V e r s a i l l e s on the 28th June, 1919, 
and a l s o the s t a t u s of the Rhineland as l a i d down i n a r t i c l e s 
42, 43 and 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the s a i d t r e a t y . 
2. France and Belgium of the one p a r t and Germany of the 
other p a r t s e v e r a l l y undertake that they w i l l i n no case 
a t t a c k or invade the other or r e s o r t to war a g a i n s t the other. 
T h i s s t i p u l a t i o n s h a l l not, however, apply i n the case 
of r e s i s t a n c e to a c t i o n i n v i o l a t i o n of the above undertaking 
or i n the case of a c t i o n undertaken i n agreement w i t h the 
4. C 12792/459/18, FO 371/10742. Words u n d e r l i n e d i n 
a r t i c l e 6 not agreed. 
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C o u n c i l or the Assembly of the League of Nations, or i n case 
of f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of a r t i c l e s 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 
1 and 3, of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s , i f such v i o l a t i o n 
c o n s t i t u t e s an unprovoked a c t of a g g r e s s i o n and by reason of 
the assembly of armed f o r c e s i n the d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone, 
immediate a c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y . 
3° I n vie** of the undertakings entered i n t o i n a r t i c l e 
2, Germany and France and Germany and Belgium undertake to 
s e t t l e by p e a c e f u l means and i n the manner l a i d down h e r e i n , 
a l l q u e stions of every k i n d which may a r i s e between them and 
which i t may not be p o s s i b l e to s e t t l e by the normal methods 
of diplomacy. 
Questions w i t h regard to which the p a r t i e s are i n c o n f l i c t 
as to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s s h a l l be submitted to j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n , and the p a r t i e s undertake to comply w i t h such 
d e c i s i o n . 
A l l other q u e s t i o n s s h a l l be submitted to a c o n c i l i a t i o n 
commission. I f the proposals of t h i s commission are not 
accepted by the two p a r t i e s , the q u e s t i o n s h a l l be brought 
before the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations, which w i l l d e a l 
w i t h i t i n accordance w i t h the Covenant. 
The d e t a i l e d arrangements f o r e f f e c t i n g such p e a c e f u l 
settlement s h a l l be the s u b j e c t of s p e c i a l agreements. 
4. ( l ) I f one of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s a l l e g e s 
t h a t a v i o l a t i o n of a r t i c l e 2 of the pre s e n t t r e a t y or of 
a r t i c l e s 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3» of the T r e a t y of 
V e r s a i l l e s has been or i s being committed, i t s h a l l b r i n g the 
qu e s t i o n a t once before the Co u n c i l of the League of Nations. 
(2) As soon as the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations i s 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t such a v i o l a t i o n has been committed, i t w i l l 
n o t i f y i t s f i n d i n g s without delay to the Powers s i g n a t o r y of 
the p r e s e n t t r e a t y , who s e v e r a l l y agree t h a t i n such case they 
w i l l each of them come immediately to the a s s i s t a n c e of the 
Power a g a i n s t whom the a c t complained of i s d i r e c t e d . 
(3) I n case of a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n by one of the High 
C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s of a r t i c l e 2 of the present t r e a t y or of 
a r t i c l e s 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the T r e a t y of 
V e r s a i l l e s , each of the other C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s , which 
agrees that such v i o l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s an unprovoked a c t of 
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aggression, and that by reason of the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s 
or of the assembly of armed f o r c e s i n the d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone 
immediate a c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y , w i l l come at once to the 
a s s i s t a n c e of the Power a g a i n s t whom the a c t complained of i s 
d i r e c t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations, 
which w i l l be s e i z e d of the q u e s t i o n i n accordance w i t h the 
f i r s t paragraph of t h i s a r t i c l e , w i l l i s s u e i t s f i n d i n g s , and 
the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s undertake to a c t i n accordance 
w i t h the recommendations of the C o u n c i l provided that they are 
concurred i n by a l l the members other than the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
of the P a r t i e s which have engaged i n h o s t i l i t i e s . 
5. The p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 3 above are p l a c e d under 
the guarantee of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s as provided by 
the f o l l o w i n g s t i p u l a t i o n s s -
(1) Where one of the Powers r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3, 
without committing a breach of a r t i c l e 4, paragraph 1, r e f u s e s 
to submit a d i s p u t e to p e a c e f u l settlement or to comply w i t h 
an a r b i t r a l d e c i s i o n , the other p a r t y s h a l l b r i n g the matter 
before the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations, and the C o u n c i l 
s h a l l propose what steps s h a l l be taken. 
(2) I f one of the Powers r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3 
r e f u s e s to submit a d i s p u t e to p e a c e f u l settlement or to 
comply w i t h an a r b i t r a l d e c i s i o n , and commits a breach of 
a r t i c l e 4, paragraph 1, the p r o v i s i o n s of the s a i d a r t i c l e 4 
s h a l l apply. 
6. The p r o v i s i o n s of the present t r e a t y do not a f f e c t 
the r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s 
under the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s or under arrangements supplem-
entary t h e r e t o , i n c l u d i n g the agreements signed i n London on 
the 30th August, 1924, nor y e t the r i g h t s of any one of the 
High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s to take a c t i o n , i n so f a r as such 
a c t i o n i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Covenant, i n f u l f i l m e n t 
of a guarantee given by i t to the observance of the 
a r b i t r a t i o n conventions concluded t h i s day between Germany 
and Poland and between Germany and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , i f the 
p a r t y which v i o l a t e s such a convention r e s o r t s to f o r c e . 
7. Nothing i n the present t r e a t y s h a l l a f f e c t the 
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s as 
Members of the League of Nations, or s h a l l be i n t e r p r e t e d as 
647 
r e s t r i c t i n g the duty of the League to take whatever a c t i o n 
©say be deemed wise and e f f e c t u a l to safeguard the peace of 
the world. 
8. The present t r e a t y s h a l l be deposited with the 
League of Nations i n accordance w i t h the Covenant. I t s h a l l 
remain i n f o r c e u n t i l the C o u n c i l , a c t i n g on the request of 
at l e a s t two of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s , and v o t i n g i f 
need be by a m a j o r i t y , decides t h a t the League of Nations 
ensures s u f f i c i e n t p r o t e c t i o n to the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s . 
9 . The s p e c i a l agreements embodying the d e t a i l e d 
arrangements f o r e f f e c t i n g a settlement by a r b i t r a t i o n , 
r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3 and signed t h i s day, and the a r b i t r a -
t i o n conventions r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 6 between Germany and 
Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia, s h a l l , before the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of the present t r e a t y , be communicated to each 
of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s who are not p a r t i e s to the 
s a i d conventions. 
1 0 . The pre s e n t t r e a t y s h a l l impose no o b l i g a t i o n upon 
any of the B r i t i s h Dominions, or upon I n d i a , u n l e s s the 
Governmant of such Dominion, or of I n d i a , s i g n i f i e s i t s 
acceptance t h e r e o f . 
1 1 . The present t r e a t y s h a l l be r a t i f i e d , but s h a l l not 
come i n t o f o r c e u n t i l Germany has become a Member of the 
League of Nations, 
T r e a t y of Mutual Guarantee, 1 6 October 1 9 2 5 ( t r a n s l a t i o n ) ^ 3 ' 
The P r e s i d e n t of the German Reich, H i s Majesty the King 
of the B e l g i a n s , the P r e s i d e n t of the French Republic, and 
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great B r i t a i n 
and I r e l a n d and of the B r i t i s h Dominions beyond the Seas, 
Emperor of I n d i a , H i s Majesty the King of I t a l y s 
Anxious to s a t i s f y the d e s i r e f o r s e c u r i t y and p r o t e c t i o n 
which animates the peoples upon whom f e l l the scourge of the 
war of 1 9 1 4 - 1 8 ; 
Taking note of the ab&ogation of the t r e a t i e s f o r the 
5 . Cmd 2 5 2 5 of 1 9 2 5 . 
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n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Belgium, and conscious of the n e c e s s i t y of 
ensuring peace i n the a r e a which has so f r e q u e n t l y been the 
scene of European c o n f l i c t s ; 
Animated a l s o w i t h the s i n c e r e d e s i r e of g i v i n g to a l l 
the s i g n a t o r y Powers concerned supplementary guarantees w i t h i n 
the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
the t r e a t i e s i n f o r c e between them; 
Have determined to conclude a t r e a t y w i t h these o b j e c t s , 
and have appointed as t h e i r p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s : [names omitted] 
Who, having communicated t h e i r f u l l powers, found i n good 
and due form, have agreed as f o l l o w s s -
1 . The high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s c o l l e c t i v e l y and 
s e v e r a l l y guarantee, i n the manner provided i n the f o l l o w i n g 
a r t i c l e s , the maintenance of the t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo 
r e s u l t i n g from the f r o n t i e r s between Germany and Belgium and 
between Germany and France and the i n v l o l a b i l t y of the s a i d 
f r o n t i e r s as f i x e d by or i n pursuance of the T r e a t y of Peace 
signed a t V e r s a i l l e s on the 28th June, 1 9 1 9 > and a l s o the 
observance of the s t i p u l a t i o n s of a r t i c l e s 42 and 43 of the 
s a i d t r e a t y concerning the d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone. 
2. Germany and Belgium, and a l s o Germany and France, 
mutually undertake t h a t they w i l l i n no case a t t a c k or invade 
each other or r e s o r t to war a g a i n s t each other. 
T h i s s t i p u l a t i o n s h a l l not, however, apply i n the case 
of -
1 . The e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t of l e g i t i m a t e defence, 
t h a t i s to say, r e s i s t a n c e to a v i o l a t i o n of the 
undertaking contained i n the previous paragraph or to a 
f l a g r a n t breach of a r t i c l e s 42 or 43 of the s a i d T r e a t y 
of V e r s a i l l e s , i f such breach c o n s t i t u t e s an unprovoked 
a c t of a g g r e s s i o n and by reason of the assembly of armed 
f o r c e s i n the d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone immediate a c t i o n i s 
n e c e s s a r y . 
2. A c t i o n i n pursuance of a r t i c l e 1 6 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. 
3 ° A c t i o n as the r e s u l t of a d e c i s i o n taken by the 
Assembly or by the C o u n c i l of the League of Nations or 
i n pursuance of a r t i c l e 1 5« paragraph 7 s of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, provided that i n t h i s l a s t 
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event the a c t i o n i s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a S t a t e which was 
the f i r s t to a t t a c k . 
3 . I n view of the undertakings entered i n t o i n a r t i c l e 
2 of the present t r e a t y , Germany and Belgium and Germany and 
France undertake to s e t t l e by p e a c e f u l means and i n the manner 
l a i d down h e r e i n a l l q u e s t i o n s of every kind which may a r i s e 
between them and which i t may not be p o s s i b l e to s e t t l e by 
the normal methods of diplomacy; 
Any q u e s t i o n w i t h regard to which the p a r t i e s are i n 
c o n f l i c t as to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s s h a l l be submitted to 
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n , and the p a r t i e s undertake to comply w i t h 
such d e c i s i o n . 
A l l other q u e s t i o n s s h a l l be submitted to a c o n c i l i a t i o n 
commission. I f the proposals of t h i s commission are not 
accepted by the two p a r t i e s , the qu e s t i o n s h a l l be brought 
before the Cou n c i l of the League of Nations, which w i l l d e a l 
w i t h i t i n accordance with a r t i c l e 1 5 of the Covenant of the 
League. 
The d e t a i l e d arrangements f o r e f f e c t i n g such p e a c e f u l 
settlement are the s u b j e c t of s p e c i a l arrangements signed 
t h i s day. 
4. ( l ) I f one of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s a l l e g e s 
t hat a v i o l a t i o n of a r t i c l e 2 of the present t r e a t y or a 
breach of a r t i c l e s 42 or 43 of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s has 
been or i s being committed, i t s h a l l b r i n g the qu e s t i o n at 
once before the Co u n c i l of the League of Nations. 
(2) As soon as the Cou n c i l of the League of Nations i s 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t such v i o l a t i o n or breach has been committed, 
i t w i l l n o t i f y i t s f i n d i n g s without delay to the Powers 
s i g n a t o r y of the present t r e a t y , who s e v e r a l l y agree t h a t i n 
such case they w i l l each of them come immediately to the 
a s s i s t a n c e of the Power a g a i n s t whom the a c t complained of i s 
d i r e c t e d . 
( 3 ) I n case of a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of a r t i c l e 2 of the 
present t r e a t y or of a f l a g r a n t breach of a r t i c l e s 42 or 43 
of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s by one of the high c o n t r a c t i n g 
p a r t i e s , each of the other c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s hereby 
undertakes immediately to come to the help of the p a r t y 
a g a i n s t whom such a v i o l a t i o n or breach has been d i r e c t e d as 
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soon as the s a i d Power has been able to s a t i s f y i t s e l f t h a t 
t h i s v i o l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s an unprovoked a c t of a g g r e s s i o n 
and t h a t by reason e i t h e r of the c r o s s i n g of the f r o n t i e r or 
of the assembly of armed f o r c e s i n the d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone 
immediate a c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the C o u n c i l of 
the League of Nations, which w i l l be s e i z e d of the q u e s t i o n 
i n accordance with the f i r s t paragraph of t h i s a r t i c l e , w i l l 
i s s u e i t s f i n d i n g s , and the h i g h c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s undertake 
to a c t i n accordance w i t h the recommendations of the C o u n c i l 
provided that they are concurred i n by a l l the members other 
than the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the p a r t i e s which have engaged i n 
h o s t i l i t i e s . 
5 . The p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 3 of the p r e s e n t t r e a t y 
are p l a c e d under the guarantee of the high c o n t r a c t i n g 
p a r t i e s as provided by the f o l l o w i n g s t i p u l a t i o n s s = 
I f one of the Powers r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3 r e f u s e s to 
submit a d i s p u t e to p e a c e f u l settlement or to comply w i t h an 
a r b i t r a l or j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n and commits a v i o l a t i o n of 
a r t i c l e 2 of the present t r e a t y or a breach of a r t i c l e s 42 or 
4 3 of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s , the p r o v i s i o n s of a r t i c l e 4 
s h a l l apply. 
Where one of the Powers r e f e r r e d to i n a r t i c l e 3 without 
committing a v i o l a t i o n of a r t i c l e 2 of the present t r e a t y or 
a breach of a r t i c l e s 42 or 4 3 of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s , 
r e f u s e s to submit a d i s p u t e to p e a c e f u l settlement or to 
comply w i t h an a r b i t r a l or j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n , the other p a r t y 
s h a l l b r i n g the matter before the C o u n c i l of the League of 
Nations, and the C o u n c i l s h a l l propose what steps s h a l l be 
taken: the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s s h a l l comply w i t h these 
p r o p o s a l s . 
6 . The p r o v i s i o n s of the present t r e a t y do not a f f e c t 
the r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s 
under the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s or under arrangements 
supplementary t h e r e t o , i n c l u d i n g the agreements signed i n 
London on the 3 0 t h August, 1 9 2 4 . 
7. The present t r e a t y , which i s designed to secure the 
maintenance of peace, and i s i n conformity with the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, s h a l l not be i n t e r p r e t e d as 
r e s t r i c t i n g the duty of the League to take whatever a c t i o n may 
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be deemed wise and e f f e c t u a l to safeguard the peace of the 
world. 
8. The present t r e a t y s h a l l be r e g i s t e r e d at the League 
of Nations i n accordance with the Covenant of the League. I t 
s h a l l remain i n f o r c e u n t i l the C o u n c i l , a c t i n g on a r e q u e s t 
of one or other of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s n o t i f i e d to 
the other s i g n a t o r i e s Powers three months i n advance, and v o t i n g 
a t l e a s t by a tw o - t h i r d s ' m a j o r i t y , decides that the League of 
Nations ensures s u f f i c i e n t p r o t e c t i o n to the high c o n t r a c t i n g 
p a r t i e s ; the t r e a t y s h a l l cease to have e f f e c t on the 
e x p i r a t i o n of a p e r i o d of one year from such d e c i s i o n . 
9 . The pr e s e n t t r e a t y s h a l l impose no o b l i g a t i o n upon 
any of the B r i t i s h Dominions, or upon I n d i a , u n l e s s the 
Government of such Dominion, or of I n d i a , s i g n i f i e s i t s 
acceptance t h e r e o f . 
1 0 . The pr e s e n t t r e a t y s h a l l be r a t i f i e d and the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n s s h a l l be deposited a t Geneva i n the a r c h i v e s of 
the League of Nations as soon as p o s s i b l e . 
I t s h a l l e n ter i n t o f o r c e as soon as a l l the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n s have been deposited and Germany has become a 
member of the League of Nations. 
The present t r e a t y , done i n a s i n g l e copy, w i l l be 
deposited i n the a r c h i v e s of the League of Nations, and the 
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l w i l l be requested to t r a n s m i t c e r t i f i e d 
copies to each of the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s . 
I n f a i t h whereof the above-mentioned p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s 
have signed the present t r e a t y . 
Done at Locarno, the l 6 t h October, 1 9 2 5 . 
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